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Abstract 
 
A major and unresolved challenge facing South Africa’s post-apartheid government, is 
how best to overcome the historical injustices of land dispossession and the resultant 
poverty now found in the communal areas of the former 'homelands'. In line with the 
South African government’s hybrid of neo-liberal and social welfare approaches to 
development, one important strategy for addressing these challenges has so far been the 
promotion of inclusive business models such as joint ventures (JVs), especially in the 
context of land restitution claims, but also in communal areas. This study explores the 
impacts of the JV model on livelihoods and land rights and use, and engages with key 
debates regarding the dynamics of class formation in the former 'homelands' of South 
Africa.  
 
The study undertakes a comparative analysis of two Joint Venture (JV) dairy farms, 
involving the same agribusiness partner, Amadlelo Agri. The farms are located on 
irrigation schemes in the former Ciskei of South Africa’s Eastern Cape Province. The JVs 
involve residents from the rural settlements of Keiskammahoek and Shiloh, as both 
landowners and workers. The comparative case study presented here illustrates quite 
divergent outcomes when the same JV model is implemented in different rural 
settlements, most powerfully because of differences in the class structure of each 
settlement.  
 
Class analysis helps to explain the more intense intragroup conflicts that have emerged 
around the JV in Shiloh. Intragroup dynamics and conflicts, which have historical roots 
extending beyond the implementation of the JV intervention, are also critical to 
understanding divergent outcomes. A class-analytic approach assists in understanding the 
tensions that the JV model of capitalist farming generates in relation to household 
reproduction, in a class-differentiated manner. 
 
The sole focus in much of the literature on agricultural investments has been on 
relationships between agribusiness, and what are too often portrayed as homogenous 
'communities’. However, this thesis illustrates that this approach is misleading when 
applied to analysis of the real politics on the ground.  Struggles over jobs, dividends and 
land take place within highly differentiated communities. Investigating the inter- and 
intra-household distribution of JV benefits and risks is central to understanding the 
impacts of the JV on livelihoods and incomes, and also the emerging contentions and 
conflicts. To this end, I explore how class interacts with other aspects of social 
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difference, particularly gender, kinship, ethnicity, race, generation and religious 
affiliation. 
 
A class-analytic approach is significant because it illuminates the emerging agrarian class 
structure that a JV-type intervention both reflects and in turn conditions, in dialectical 
fashion. It thus allows exploration of the implications of the JV model for wider 
processes of agrarian change in South Africa. Although there is evidence of livelihood 
benefits being derived by some households, as well as limited opportunities for 
accumulation, the JV model does not appear to stimulate the emergence of a class of 
productive black farmers. Significantly, the study could not identify any households as 
'middle farmers', reliant on 'accumulation from below', which many authors consider to 
be a more progressive, dynamic and desirable pathway of agrarian reform. The JV model 
is at risk of equating ‘black emerging farmers’ with a group of customary landowners, 
who are in reality workers and 'passive recipients' of JV dividends and land rents. 
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Chapter 1. Agricultural ‘Joint Ventures’ in the Communal Areas of the 
Former Homelands 
1.1 Introduction 
 
A major and unresolved challenge facing South Africa’s post-Apartheid Government is how 
best to overcome the historical injustices of land dispossession and the resultant poverty now 
found in the communal areas of the former 'homelands', where most victims of forced removals 
were relocated. The former 'homeland's or Bantustans1 are a key legacy of the 1913 and 1936 
land acts, which reserved only 13 % of the land area of the country for ownership by black 
South Africans. These regions continue to suffer from a legacy of poverty and 
underdevelopment that has sharpened in recent years, due to the failure of post-apartheid land 
and agrarian reform to address land hunger, tenure insecurity and impoverished livelihoods 
(Cousins and Walker 2015; Claassens 2015).  
 
Many rural households maintain the strong linkages to urban areas that were forged under 
apartheid, and often 'rural settlements' are, in reality, homes for displaced urban workers. 
Classical notions of 'the countryside' filled with 'rural people' are often inappropriate for 
describing rural South Africa (Murray 1995). Wage labour and remittances have long been the 
dominant income sources for rural households. However, a growing crisis of unemployment in 
recent years has meant that the livelihood contributions of formal employment are declining, 
and social grants have become increasingly central to meeting household reproduction needs. 
Along with increased dependence on off-farm income and state grants, as well as population 
increase, the ability of rural households to engage in farming has been compromised (Cousins 
2013; Neves and du Toit 2013; Hebinck and van Averbeke 2013). Yet post-apartheid 
government policy continues to focus on the revival of agriculture as key to poverty reduction 
(DRDLR 2011; National Planning Commission 2013). 
 
In line with the South African Government’s hybrid of neo-liberal and social welfare 
approaches to development, one important strategy for addressing the challenges facing 
smallholder farmers and land reform beneficiaries has so far been the promotion of inclusive 
business models2 such as joint ventures (JVs) (Tapela 2005; Lahiff et al. 2012). JVs typically 
involve collaboration between 'agribusiness' investors and 'small farmers' (Cotula et al. 2009; 
IFAD 2012) or local people with existing land rights (Mayson 2003). IFAD (2012:9) defines 
JV arrangements as follows:  
 
“Joint ventures entail co-ownership of a business venture by two independent market 
actors, such as an agribusiness and a farmers’ organization. A joint venture involves 
sharing of financial risks and benefits, and in most, but not all cases, shared decision-
making authority in proportion to the equity share”.  
                                                 
1 There were 10 'homelands' designated for different South African 'tribes' (Claassens 2015). The Ciskei, which is the focus of this study, was 
one of four homelands that became 'nominally independent states' and was designated for the Rharhabe Xhosa (Switzer 1993). 
2 The term 'inclusive business model' is used to refer to a host of arrangements that aim to involve poor people in agricultural value chains as 
owners, producers or employees, including joint ventures, contract farming, lease contracts, farm worker share-equity schemes and 
management contracts (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010; Cotula 2013; IFAD 2012). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 2 
 
Since around 2005, JVs have been promoted as one key model in land and agrarian reform in 
South Africa (Pieterse et al. 2017; Lahiff et al. 2012). The JV model’s success to date, 
however, is questionable. Research in South Africa has illustrated that many JVs have 
struggled to take off, and have collapsed after major losses for both investors and communities 
(van Koppen et al. 2018; Cousins and Gumede 2017; Bitzer and Bijman 2014; Davis 2014; 
Lahiff et al. 2012; Aliber and Maluleke 2010; Pellizzoli 2009; Tapela 2005). Despite mounting 
evidence of unfavourable outcomes, these models continue to be posited as potential 'win-wins' 
for both small farmers and agribusiness, if they are structured in appropriate ways, in both the 
South African and the international literature (Pieterse et al. 2017; Vermeulen and Cotula 
2010; Liversage 2010; IFAD 2012).  
 
Critics of ‘inclusive business models’ have cautioned that the model may be a new way for 
agribusiness to exploit black farmers and landowners, while retaining their dominance of the 
market and benefiting from improved political credibility (Tapela, 2005; Lahiff et al., 2012). 
They highlight how these models tend to promote large-scale commercial farming as the only 
viable option within land and agrarian reform.  This has been exacerbated by the unwillingness 
of government to sub-divide land for smallholder production, as a possible alternative model 
(Cousins, 2011/5; Aliber and Hall, 2012). Many authors highlight the negative consequences of 
these approaches for social reproduction, given that they attempt to integrate small farmers and 
the rural poor into circuits of capitalist relations (Murray Li, 2011; Manenzhe, 2015).  
 
A strong focus on JVs in the South African context has thus tended to exclude other ways of 
promoting improved agricultural production in both communal areas and in land reform 
contexts, for example, through subsistence production or promotion of a differentiated 
smallholder sector targeting both formal and informal markets (Lahiff et al., 2012; Pellizzoli, 
2009; Tapela, 2005; Mayson, 2003). Alternatively, other authors like Manenzhe (2018) suggest 
that we should be considering farming systems, which can bring together the complementarity 
of large-scale and household production. However, the specific nature of the agricultural 
commodity being produced (e.g. livestock, dryland crops or irrigated fruit and vegetables) must 
also be considered when promoting new avenues for black emerging farmers to enter the 
agricultural sector, and when envisioning alternatives to JVs.   
 
When we situate the JV model of agricultural development within a political economy analysis 
of relations of land, labour and capital in South Africa, it becomes clear why a model in which 
private sector actors lead development has become so dominant. Since Africans have been 
historically marginalised in the agriculture sector, concerns have abounded regarding the 
'viability' of supporting a differentiated small to medium-scale sector of black farmers. This has 
led to the belief that promoting equity ownership of existing farms and other agricultural 
enterprises, alongside secure employment, is a more pragmatic solution (Cousins and Scoones 
2010; Davis 2014).  
 
The prevalence of a 'one-size-fits-all' JV model can also be explained by a tendency among 
both policy makers and researchers to assume that the destructive effects of the colonial and 
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apartheid eras resulted in a 'linear process of proletarianisation' among former homeland 
residents (Levin and Neocosmos 1989). The state’s increasingly discriminatory policies are 
believed to have eroded opportunities for accumulation among the African peasantry, 
uniformly transforming it into a proletariat. This process is seen as a crucial mechanism 
through which white agrarian capital emerged in South Africa (Morris 1976; Wolpe 1972). 
Empirical evidence presented in this thesis, however, points to the reality that rural 
communities in contemporary South Africa are in fact highly differentiated. This is evident in 
the diverse socially reproductive strategies pursued by households and quite distinct responses 
to the same JV business model, both between and within different settlements in the former 
Ciskei homeland. This thesis challenges dominant assumptions of homogeneity, exploring the 
underlying class dynamics that help explain these differences. Dynamics of social 
differentiation were found to be a key explanation for divergent outcomes at different JV farms 
and are thus a strong focus of this thesis. 
 
In this thesis, I propose an approach for exploring the class dynamics of rural social change. 
The approach is based on application of the methodology that Patnaik (1987) developed for 
investigating class relations in rural India, using a 'labour exploitation criterion', together with 
relevant adjustments that take into account the character of class relations in South Africa’s 
communal areas. I draw on class typologies developed by Cousins (2010) and Levin et al. 
(1997) for South Africa, but I also draw on those proposed by Neocosmos (1987) for 
Swaziland and by Scoones et al. (2012) and Cousins et al. (1992) for Zimbabwe. These authors 
have all considered, to differing degrees, the complex interrelations between class differences 
in agriculture and social reproduction strategies located largely, or entirely, off-farm.  
 
Patnaik’s (1987) conceptual framework distinguishes between rural classes on the basis of a 
key variable - the degree to which one employs others, works for others or works for oneself. 
In this study I combine this principal indicator of 'labour exploitation' with a range of other 
variables, such as the income contributions of social grants, levels of ownership of farming 
assets and livestock, and the contribution of agricultural production, to simple or expanded 
reproduction (Cousins 2010) to issues of class analysis. I argue that making use of this 
approach is illuminating of key processes and political dynamics in my case study sites. 
Employing a class-analytic illustrates how the JV model of capitalist farming generates a range 
of tensions and contradictions within processes of social reproduction engaged in by diverse 
households (Murray Li, 2011/14; Manenzhe, 2018; Mackintosh, 1989; Pellizzoli, 2009; Davis, 
2014). These tensions in turn engender complex intragroup conflicts, which are framed by 
narratives of belonging and identity politics. The implications of this type of analysis is that 
'changing the terms' of JV contracts and improving their 'governance', the focus of much of the 
literature on JVs to date, will not fundamentally reverse the types of negative impacts 
documented by research. These contradictions, it will be argued, emerge from within the logic 
of the model itself. 
 
However, I caution, as do many other authors, that class dynamics are not the only ones at 
work in contexts such as these, since they are intermeshed with many other 'determinations', 
and are thus complex, contingent and subject to processes of constant change. Employing a 
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typology based on only some key variables always involves a degree of reductionism, and on 
its own explains only some aspects of social reality (Scoones et al. 2012; Cousins 2010; 
Bernstein 2010). This thesis thus explores how class intersects with gender, ethnic, religious, 
racial and other lines of social difference, and how these identities shape the distribution of 
benefits and risks associated with the JVs (and vice versa). I also investigate the relations 
between these socially differentiated communities and both agribusiness firms and the state. I 
look at how the social relations of production that the JV model entails can be theorized and 
the character of its governance and financial relations. How benefits and risks are distributed 
between these actors has important implications for the relative livelihood outcomes of 
customary landowners and labour. These various levels of analysis aim to build a richer picture 
of the significance of these JV investments for agrarian change in South Africa.  
1.2 Rationale for the study of Joint Ventures and of Amadlelo Agri’s Sharemilking 
projects in Keiskammahoek and Shiloh 
 
In this thesis, I explore the potential impacts of JVs through a concrete comparative case study 
of two JV dairy farms involving the same agribusiness partner, Amadlelo Agri. Amadlelo 
Agri 3  is an agribusiness firm whose stated mission is 'to contribute to transformation by 
creating profitable, sustainable, black empowered Agri Business’. They have established seven 
dairy JV farms in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. This thesis involves a 
comparative case study of two of these farms which are both located in the former homeland of 
the Ciskei in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. Keiskammahoek 'Seven Stars Trust' 
was established in 2010 and the 'Shiloh Dairies Trust' were established in 2011.  
The rationale for focusing on JVs in this study derives from the model’s prominence in 
government’s rural development strategies. It is therefore critical that we subject the model to a 
thorough evaluation, to understand its impacts on livelihoods and land rights and to clarify 
under which contexts it may or may not be an appropriate way of organising agricultural 
production. While much research has already documented experiences with JVs in relation to 
South Africa’s land restitution programme, comparatively less research has focused on the 
communal areas of the former homelands. Overall, however, since JVs are a relatively new 
inclusive business model, evidence of its impacts on livelihoods and land rights remain patchy. 
Recently there has been a proliferation of JV models in the communal areas. The drivers of this 
model and its potential impacts on livelihoods, land rights and agrarian change deserve further 
attention and it is hoped this PhD can contribute to this.  
A review of the literature has revealed that contrasting conceptual schools of thought maintain 
very diverse and often opposing discourses on inclusive business models. The conceptual basis 
of these models emerged from mainstream economics approaches and the international 
development and livelihoods approach. However, there are relatively few analyses, especially 
of JVs, from within a Marxist political economy approach (see Manenzhe, 2015; Davies, 2014; 
Aliber and Maluleke, 2010; Pellizzoli, 2009). This stands in contrast, for example to contract 
farming, which has a much longer history of implementation and a much more prolific 
                                                 
3 Amadlelo Agri’s shareholders include: Vuwa Investments (a black empowerment company) which has a 35.1 % share, Amadlelo Milk 
Producers Investment Company (owned by 50 white commercial dairy farmers) which has a 49.9 % share and the Amadlelo Empowerment 
Trust (500 workers from 50 commercial farms) who own a 15 % share.  
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literature. Much of the existing literature on JVs thus provides only a partial picture of the full 
significance of these investments for the questions of interest to Marxist political economy. 
The rationale behind interrogating JVs from within a political economy lens is that this 
framework illuminates class dynamics and the tensions between capitalist accumulation and 
social reproduction, which are all central to understanding the potential impacts of JVs on 
agrarian change in South Africa.  
 
Both the Shiloh and the Keiskammahoek farms are located on the site of homeland-era 
irrigation schemes, originally established in 1976 at Keiskammahoek and in the mid 1960s at 
Shiloh (and subsequently revitalised in 1979). At Keiskammahoek commercial dairy 
production was the focus and was undertaken by households, alongside some marginal crop 
production. While at Shiloh only a few households (15-17) were engaged in commercial dairy 
production, while the majority of households had food plots primarily for household 
subsistence and some commercial vegetable production was undertaken by a group farm. After 
the Ciskei Agricultural Corporation (Ulimocor) was liquidated in 1997 (van Averbeke 1998; 
Holbrook 1996), both schemes fell out of full commercial production, although some marginal 
production continued at Keiskammahoek. Both irrigation schemes were later resuscitated 
through the Recapitalisation and Development Programme (ReCap)4, when Amadlelo Agri 
was identified as the strategic partner.  
 
The similar contexts and time frames allow for some common features in these schemes that 
facilitate comparison, however they also differ in fundamental ways. For example, the much 
larger group of 395 customary landowning households at Shiloh, with rights to relatively small 
irrigation plots (+- 1 hectare), is sharply contrasted to the historical context at Keiskammahoek, 
where land consolidation (12-20 hectares) benefited only 35 households. Most of the 35 
households at Keiskammahoek have private title to their land (or are in the process of finalising 
their titles), unlike Shiloh, where irrigation plots are held under a form of communal tenure 
(van Averbeke et al.  1998).  
 
The Amadlelo Agri JV model is based on a '50/50 sharemilking' agreement, a model which 
they have adapted from that developed first in New Zealand (see Blunden et al. 1997; Pepper 
2013; Gardner 2011; NZDairy, 2016). In Amadlelo’s version of sharemilking, the community, 
through government investment, brings the fixed assets to the business including the land, 
irrigation and the milking parlour.  These assets are owned by different community 
cooperatives, in this study the Mayime Cooperative at Shiloh and the Seven Stars Cooperative 
at Keiskammahoek. Amadlelo Agri brings the cows and other movable assets. Each JV 
sharemilking farm has an operating company in the form of a Trust (Keiskammahoek Seven 
Stars Trust and Shiloh Dairies Trust). The Trusts are governed by representatives from both 
Amadlelo Agri and the community cooperatives.  
 
Amadlelo Agri is responsible for the day-to-day running of the farms. After a 10 % 
management fee has been deducted, profits from milk sales are split on a 50/50 basis between 
                                                 
4 Government has made access to ReCap funding conditional upon beneficiaries entering into an arrangement with a 'strategic partner' 
(DRDLR 2013). There is thus pressure placed on both communities and agribusiness to enter into JVs if they want to access scarce 
government funding (Lahiff et al. 2012). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 6 
Amadlelo Agri and households affiliated to the farming cooperatives. This thesis analyses the 
changes Amadlelo Agri has made to New Zealand’s sharemilking model and its implications 
for the share of benefits and risks between the two parties. I also provide a framework for 
theorising ‘sharemilking’ JVs by drawing on existing theories (Blunden et al. 1997; Kerr and 
Layton, 1983; Cheung, 1969; Gardner, 2011), my own empirical research, and the key 
concepts of Marxist political economy, particularly Patnaik’s (1983) application of theories of 
capitalist rent to sharecropping.  
 
The comparative case study illustrates how implementation of the same business model has 
produced quite divergent outcomes. At Keiskammahoek, the fewer households benefiting and 
the larger scale of production, means the dividend for irrigation plot holders is substantially 
larger than at Shiloh. However, besides this more obvious explanation, divergent outcomes are 
also the result of different historical and contemporary processes of class formation, and how 
these intersect with land ownership and the wider crisis of unemployment in each rural locality. 
An investigation of the character of decision-making and politics within community 
cooperatives provides yet a further lens that together explains divergent outcomes. 
 
There are a number of motivations that led me to selecting Amadlelo Agri’s JV farms as the 
specific case studies in this PhD. After investigating a number of JVs during the preliminary 
stages of fieldwork Amadlelo Agri appeared to offer both the most interesting and important 
case. The scale of the investment is one important factor. The agribusiness firm has established 
seven dairy JV farms, and in addition has investments in piggery and macadamia JVs. These 
dairy schemes involve the use of valuable irrigation resources in communal areas and sizeable 
government funding has been invested. Amadlelo Agri reports that government investment in 
fixed assets across all of their projects to date has amounted to R197 million, while they have 
invested R 92 million in dairy animals and movable equipment. The scale of the investment 
along with the ‘political popularity’ of the model, which appears set to be replicated across 
other communal areas and land reform projects, motivated the choice of Amadlelo Agri as a 
case study of the JV model5. 
1.3 Research Questions and Design 
 
This thesis makes use of a case study approach. Case studies involve investigating one or a 
number of situations or social entities. Case studies are useful in identifying the various aspects 
of a phenomenon, which is to be studied. They reveal the ways these aspects relate to one 
another within a complex whole (Baxter and Jack, 2008). A case study approach is useful when 
research aims to answer why and how questions. Case studies also assist where contextual 
conditions are either pertinent to explaining certain phenomenon or where the distinction 
between the context and the phenomenon is not clear (Yin, 2003 in Hornby, 2014). A case 
study approach was chosen for this PhD to illuminate the different ways in which JVs impact 
land rights and livelihoods where different sets of variables are present. The logic behind 
                                                 
5 See Chapter 4 for more detail on why and how I selected Amadlelo’s JV farms, along with information on other JVs that were researched 
during preliminary fieldwork. 
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focusing on a comparative case study is to identify contingent causal relations that may assist 
in explaining different outcomes in particular contexts.  
The research design for this PhD thesis is discussed in full in Chapter 4. It involved an open 
and iterative process, whereby the research design and questions were reflexively revised and 
data collection, analysis and writing did not follow a linear process (Terre Blanche and 
Durrheim, 2002). I did not commence the research with a specific hypothesis, because that 
kind of approach to research is not in line with the ‘critical realist’ approach that I have 
adopted. Sayer (1992: 244), for example, notes that: 
 
“Instead of specifying the entire research design and who and what we are going to 
study in advance we can, to a certain extent, establish this as we go along, as learning 
about one object or from one contact leads to others with whom they are linked, so that 
we build up a picture of the structures and causal groups of which they are a part”.  
 
I can, however, identify broad phases within the research process as a whole. I began the PhD 
in March 2015 and commenced with an intensive yearlong reading programme on agrarian 
studies with my NRF reading group. This allowed me to think broadly about how abstract 
theory related to my research study and prepared me to ask the ‘right’ questions in the field. 
Instead of having a set period of ‘block fieldwork’ to collect data, I instead stretched the 
fieldwork over 15 months, between September 2015 and December 2016. I would go into the 
field for a period of time and then I would return, analyse the field data, write up my findings 
and make decisions about how the research design or questions needed to be adjusted in light 
of what I had learnt. After I had ‘finished the fieldwork’ I dedicated myself to analysing the 
data, reading widely and writing up the thesis.  
 
This thesis attempts to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. How are agricultural investments structured as joint ventures, in relation to financial 
arrangements, property rights, production systems, capital-labour relations and governance 
arrangements and what are the effects of the differences among case studies?  
 
2. How have local residents, both prior and since the implementation of the joint venture, 
pursued their livelihoods and what is the class and gendered character of local livelihood 
systems?  
 
3. What is the nature of residents’ land rights both prior and since the implementation of the 
joint venture and how is common property governed, including the role of traditional 
authorities?  
 
4. What is the current performance of joint ventures in agricultural production and what are 
their prospects for success- in relation to both capital’s interests and the impacts on local 
residents, in terms of the distribution of costs and benefits and shaping of class and gender 
relations?  
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5. How can the impacts of JVs on the livelihoods and land rights of local residents be 
explained, with particular emphasis on the social relations of production, the structure of 
property rights, discourses of ‘custom’ and the character of decision-making and power?  
 
6. What are the wider political and policy lessons that can be drawn from these cases of large-
scale agricultural investments in communal areas? And how can the study contribute to 
understanding processes of agrarian change in contemporary South Africa, in particular, the 
changing role and significance of communal areas and former reserves in the wider 
political economy of South Africa? 
 
To answer these questions, I made use of both intensive and extensive methods. The former 
identifies significant relations of connection and explores causal processes. The latter identifies 
common patterns and characteristics of a population and produces statistical categories or 
taxonomic groups (Sayer, 1992). My research questions entailed a longitudinal analysis of 
livelihoods, land rights and land use. The current status of these aspects was revealed through a 
household livelihood survey, together with intensive enquiry. To understand the livelihoods of 
people prior to the intervention, I drew on existing research findings, my own life-history 
interviews, and what historical records I could obtain. At the Amadlelo Agri JV farms the 
fieldwork included a household survey of 121 households, 122 unstructured and semi-
structured interviews, 29 life histories and 2 focus groups.  
 
Critical realism asserts that it is not possible to perceive reality solely through empirical 
observation, all observation is theory laden. In other words, we require theory to bring together 
‘appearances’ and ‘reality’ (Sayer, 1992). Throughout the research process I thus subjected my 
empirical data to a critical process of analysis, making use of relevant theory, drawn mostly 
from the key concepts of political economy. This also means that the research questions and 
the focus of analysis have been reflexively revised throughout the research process.  
1.4 Background and Context: Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa  
 
In 1994 the agrarian landscape inherited by the democratic government was characterised by 
extreme inequality, an outcome of centuries of the violent dispossession that colonialism had 
wrought on indigenous populations. As a result, the ‘land question’ in South Africa carries 
‘tremendous symbolic and moral force’ (Hart, 2002:11) and generates tremendous ‘political 
heat’ (Walker and Cousins, 2015: 1). The democratic government faced the unenviable task of 
undoing a process that had relegated the majority population of black South Africans to 13 % 
of the land, in overcrowded reserves or Bantustans. This legacy has meant that the majority 
population were (and largely continue to be) excluded from enjoying the benefits of the 
country’s most productive agricultural land and from historical processes of accumulation that 
were the exclusive reserve of white farmers (Walker and Cousins, 2015).  
 
Today, the inequalities of land ownership between white and black remain glaring. However 
the exact extent of this inequality is unclear because statistics on land ownership in South 
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Africa are notoriously poorly kept. The state land audit6 claims that 79% of land in South 
Africa is privately owned, 14% is state land (including communal areas of the former 
homelands), and the status of the remaining 7% of the land is unclear (DRDLR, 2017; Merten, 
2017). However, the accuracy and usefulness of the land audit has been questioned. Cousins 
(2018) notes that “it can’t identify the racial, gender and national identity of the 320 000 
companies, trust and community based organisations that own 61% of all privately owned 
land”. Furthermore it does not enable government to “identify zones of need and opportunity 
for land reform” (Cousins, 2018), which would be critical to inform a more effective land and 
agrarian reform policy.  Furthermore, StatsSA does not distinguish farms by either their value 
of output or size, and official data on smallholder farming is anything but comprehensive 
(Cousins, 2018). 
 
Noting these shortcomings in official data sets, we can nevertheless note some key changes to 
South Africa’s agrarian structure since 1994. The outcomes of land and agrarian policy are 
noted to be seriously at odds with the direction previously envisaged by policy-makers 
(Cousins, 2015). There is a growing trend of concentration of agricultural production under a 
few highly productive white capitalist farmers. In 1994 there were around 60, 000 white farms, 
which by the 2002 Census of Commercial Agriculture amounted to only 45, 000 (in Bernstein, 
2015). The 2012 Quarterly Labour Force Survey reported that only 34 905 remain (in 
Liebenberg and Kirsten, 2013). Concentration of production is evidenced in how 80 % of total 
agricultural turnover is produced by the top 20 % of farmers - around 7000 white farm owners 
(Cousins, 2015). The dairy sector in South Africa represents an extreme version of the 
concentration trend: in 1994 there were around 9000 dairy farmers but only 1683 remain as of 
2016 (LACTO Data, 2016).  
 
Concentration has proceeded in the context of a number of processes including: integration of 
the agricultural sector into global markets, decreased protection, growing competition, the 
growth of prosperous enterprises achieving economies of scale and scope, and the success of 
some enterprises supplying lucrative niche markets (Cousins, 2015). Those farming enterprises 
that manage to survive and prosper, in spite of severe competitive pressures, do so through the 
increasing management of farms as businesses, mechanisation, technological innovation, 
adoption of farming techniques that are less labour-intensive, and a focus on understanding 
markets (Genis, 2012). Cousins (2015) estimates that around 10, 000 black farmers have 
entered the commercial farming sector, and between 100, 000 and 250, 000 rural households 
have benefited from land transfers7. Genis (2012), however, warns that the new realities of the 
commercial farming sector pose daunting challenges for these new entrants. Declining profit 
margins, concentration and extreme competition, allow only the most competitive farming 
enterprises to survive.  
 
                                                 
6 The first of which surveyed state land and the second privately owned land, published in November 2017.  
See: http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/publications/land-audit-report/file/6126 and  
http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Cadastral-Survey-management/Booklet/land%20audit%20booklet.pdf 
7 Although existing data sources don’t distinguish clearly between those who nominally received land and those actually residing on land and 
using it.  
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These changes to the agrarian structure have had notable impacts on farm labour. Wages for 
farmworkers have increased, due in no short measure to struggles on the part of labour itself. 
However, unexpected results of legislation enacted to protect the tenure rights of farmworkers, 
has also resulted in evictions and an increased incidence of casual and seasonal work (Hall et 
al., 2013; Aliber and Simbi, 2000). This however depends on the nature of the agricultural 
commodity. In the dairy sector, the incidence of permanent wage labour, as compared to causal 
or seasonal, is higher due to the production requirements. On the other hand however, intense 
competition in the dairy sector has led to widespread mechanisation, which allows for milking 
very large herds with very few labourers (Midgley, 2016; MPO, 2015). Overall, the 
agricultural sector is becoming increasingly less labour-intensive. In 2007 430, 000 labourers 
were recorded in permanent employment and 365, 000 in casual and seasonal employment 
(StatsSA, 2007; Cousins, 2015) compared to 1.2 million permanent and casual jobs recorded in 
1990. Although official data on farm employment is unreliable, it is estimated that between 
1993 and 2006, around 40% of farmworkers lost their jobs (Bernstein, 2015).  
 
How important are land and agrarian reform for addressing South Africa’s development 
challenges?  
 
Many authors question the role that land and agrarian reform can realistically play in 
addressing the crisis of social reproduction which classes of labour face in South Africa 
(Bernstein, 2013; Cousins, 2015). Bernstein asserts that what is needed to improve the 
wellbeing of South Africa’s rural and urban classes of labour is a much broader and “radical 
political and macroeconomic project centred on public investment and redistribution”. Since 
the end of Apartheid urbanisation has rapidly increased. This begs the question of the relative 
importance of rural land and agrarian livelihoods to meeting the country’s development 
challenges. In 1980, 57% of the population were classified rural. However, by 2001 this 
trajectory had inverted with 57% classified urban, and by 2014 this had increased further to 
63% (Walker and Cousins, 2015). The urban population is expected to grow to 80% by 2050. 
Moreover, only 4.6% of people derive employment from agriculture (ILO, 2014). Currently the 
rural population comprises around 20 million people, of which 16 -17 million continue to live 
in the former Bantustans (Walker and Cousins, 2015).  
 
In rural areas, it is only among a tiny minority that agriculture comprises a main livelihood 
source. The vast majority of people rely on wages, remittances and social grants (Neves and du 
Toit, 2013; Walker and Cousins, 2015). The service sector has become increasingly dominant 
as the main source of capital accumulation, accounting for 60% of GDP (StatsSA, 2014). This 
does not, however, mean that agriculture is an insignificant component of the economy. 
Although South Africa is not a predominantly agrarian society, like its neighbours elsewhere 
on the continent, ensuring a supply of cheap food to the population remains important to the 
concerns of capital and the state. Agriculture also continues to make a sizable (although 
reduced) contribution to employment in rural areas. Moreover, for households in the former 
Bantustans, small-scale farming remains crucial as a food security strategy. Agrarian 
livelihoods are thus critical in securing the reproduction of some of the poorest classes of 
labour living in the former homelands and the ‘white’ countryside (Walker and Cousins, 2015).  
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There is however widespread agreement that post-apartheid rural development and land reform 
policies have made a minimal impact on addressing systemic poverty (Cousins, 2015). 
Empirical evidence indicates that around half of rural land reform projects have improved the 
livelihoods of beneficiaries; although impacts are often marginal and very few cases involve 
successful production by the new enterprises (Hebinck and Cousins, 2013; Cousins and Dubb, 
2013). The few success stories (Hornby, 2012) usually involve significant capital investment 
by government, but are sadly the exception and have thus done little to alter the agrarian 
structure. Cousins (2015: 255) concludes that “overall, the major beneficiaries of processes of 
agrarian change have been the owners of large-scale commercial farming and agribusiness 
enterprises”. 
What shape should land and agrarian reform take? 
 
Despite disappointing outcomes to date, land reform involving the establishing of ‘productive’ 
agriculture on redistributed land and in communal areas, continues to be a focus of efforts to 
create jobs and improve rural livelihoods, as is emphasised in the National Development Plan 
of 2011 (Cousins, 2015). The NDP asserts that in the agriculture, agro-processing and related 
sectors government should aim to create an additional 643 000 direct jobs and 326 500 indirect 
jobs by 2030. Among the strategies for achieving this is extending the current 1.5 million 
hectares under irrigation by an additional 500, 000. The NDP claims that this can be achieved 
through more efficient use of existing water resources, along with establishing new irrigation 
schemes8 (National Planning Commission, 2012).  
 
Cousins (2015) has argued that the key focus of agrarian reform in South Africa, should be a 
programme that focuses on large-scale redistribution of water and land rights to a ‘nascent 
class of small- to medium-scale market-oriented farmers’. He envisions this precipitating a 
process of ‘agricultural accumulation from below’. The beneficiaries of this redistribution 
programme would be those households already engaging in agriculture who are ‘market-
oriented’. They comprise an estimated 200, 000 households, who with their dependants amount 
to about a million people. Controversially, yet arguably a pragmatic caveat is Cousins’ (2015) 
argument that the top 20 % of large-scale commercial agriculture operations should be 
excluded from land redistribution in the short to medium term. This he argues would safeguard 
agricultural production and food security for around two decades, and allow agrarian reform to 
proceed around the productive core of agricultural operations. 
 
The literature raises some concerns regarding supporting a small to medium-scale sector of 
farmers. One such doubt is that because historically agrarian capital was concentrated in white 
capitalist farmers and agribusiness, and Africans were marginalized, the viability of a 
programme of agrarian reform aimed at previously disadvantaged groups remains at question 
(Davis, 2014). Research and policy is thus often concerned with whether there is an adequate 
level of interest in farming and agricultural skill amongst former Bantustan residents to justify 
targeting them for land and agrarian reform, or whether people themselves prefers secure 
                                                 
8 The proliferation of the Amadlelo Agri model of dairy farming onto a number of irrigation schemes must be contextualised within this policy 
context. 
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employment (Levin and Weiner, 1997). However, more recent research emphasizes that skilled 
and productive black smallholder farming does exist. However, the extent of this capacity and 
the viability of supporting a smallholder sector in South Africa’s highly concentrated agrarian 
landscape remains a subject of contestation (see Cousins, 2011/5; Aliber and Hall, 2012; Davis, 
2014; Sender and Johnston, 2004; Levin and Weiner, 1997). Cousin’s (2015) suggestion would 
seem to address this concern because it targets those smallholders already engaged in 
production. 
 
The New Growth Path envisions expanding the smallholder sector from 200,000 to 500,000 by 
2020 (EDD, 2010). However, the South African government’s policy towards smallholders has 
been marred by confusion, and tends to pay lip service to the idea of supporting a smallholder 
sector. In reality, interventions are favoured which focus on de-racialising existing agrarian 
capital through strategic partnerships, usually entailing the promotion of large-scale capitalist 
farming enterprises. This perhaps has its roots in misperceptions regarding what constitutes a 
‘smallholder’, as well as an unclear vision for developing the smallholder sector. Aliber and 
Hall (2012) for example note that government policy has been characterised by a bias towards 
policies that seek to transform ‘small-scale farmers’ into large-scale commercial farmers. 
 
The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, has however since 2010/11 begun 
differentiating the sector into ‘subsistence’, ‘smallholder’ and ‘commercial’ farmers, to bring 
some clarity to their strategies (DAFF, 2010:2). Cousins (2013) provides a different and useful 
typology to differentiate smallholders that also considers the types of value-chains producers 
target. This includes subsistence-oriented smallholders, market-oriented smallholders in loose 
value chains, market-oriented smallholders in tight value chains, and small-scale black 
capitalist farmers.  
 
Questions remain as to what policies are viable, given limited resources and capacity of 
government, to support the very different needs of these diverse smallholders and what form 
agrarian reform of the smallholder sector should take. Aliber and Hall (2012) identify three 
viable strategies. Firstly, focusing on promoting food security for a large number of poor 
households. Secondly, providing opportunities for a select few better-off farmers to graduate to 
commercial farmers, which they refer to as ‘accumulation for the few’. Finally, a much more 
radical programme of ‘accumulation from below’, whereby a large number of the existing 
population of subsistence and smallholders are supported to maximise and diversify their 
production to develop into ‘sustainable commercial smallholders’. It is the latter proposal, 
which they promote.  
 
Apart from an initial period of policy support for smallholders, in the first years of the land 
reform programme, the South African government in practice continues to define viability in 
terms of the large-scale commercial farming model (Aliber and Cousins, 2013; Cousins and 
Scoones, 2010).  Since 2004 the appetite in South African land and agrarian reform has clearly 
leant towards the dominant market-based development paradigm. This sees private sector 
involvement and market-oriented strategies as the primary means for achieving social justice, 
while avoiding negative outcomes for productivity and profit levels that might result if land 
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were subdivided. The Joint Venture model has thus been adamantly promoted as a means to 
ensure the continuity of pre-existing models of large-scale commercial production on land 
being transferred to restitution claimants (Davis, 2014; Lahiff et al., 2012; Spierenburg et al., 
2012; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Aliber et al., 2008; Hellum and Derman, 2008; Derman et al., 2006).  
I will now discuss South Africa’s land reform programme since 1994, to situate the elements of 
agrarian change discussed above into the broader policy context. 
 South Africa’s Land Reform Programme 
 
The underlying tenets of the land reform programme were the outcomes of the ‘negotiated 
settlement’, preceding the first democratic election in 1994. The African National Congress 
(ANC) surprisingly entered these pivotal negotiations with no decisive analysis of the agrarian 
question or a clear vision for land reform- a reflection of the urban bias of the organisation 
itself (Bernstein, 1997; de Villiers, 2003). On the other hand white agrarian capital in South 
Africa had strategically positioned itself for the transition (Bernstein, 1997) and had 
pragmatically aligned itself with the interests of global capital inherent in the policy proposals 
of the World Bank (Steyn & Bosch, 1994). The World Bank’s proposal for a market-based 
land reform was accepted by the ‘Government of National Unity’. Some commentators have 
concluded that these historic compromises made during the transition period have limited the 
transformative potential of land reform and is in part to blame for the slow pace of land reform 
to date (du Toit et al., 2011; DRDLR, 2011). 
 
The legal basis for South Africa’s land reform programme was first laid out in Chapter Two of 
the ‘South African Constitution, 1996’, in Section 25 of the Bill of Rights (RSA, 1996). This 
outlined the notorious ‘property clause9’ (Aliber, 2015). The Land Reform Programme was 
later formalised in detail in the 1997 ‘White Paper on South African Land Policy’. It stipulated 
a three-pronged strategy to achieve equitable redress of land rights based on land restitution, 
redistribution and tenure reform10 (DLA, 1997; Lahiff et al., 2012; Bunce, 2013). Each aspect 
of the programme can be explained as follows: 
 
“…A land redistribution programme, aimed at broadening access to land among the 
country’s black majority; a land restitution programme to restore land or provide 
alternative compensation to those dispossessed as a result of racially discriminatory 
laws and practices since 1913; and a tenure reform programme to secure the rights of 
people living under insecure arrangements on land owned by others, including the state 
(in communal areas and the former ‘Coloured’ rural reserves) and private landowners 
(farmworkers, farm dwellers and labour tenants). A less high profile programme to 
improve systems of land administration was also proposed.“ (PLAAS, 2016). 
 
Government’s initial target for redistribution of agricultural land to black South Africans was 
30% or 86 million hectares by 1999. DPME’s (2017) mid-term view report indicated that as of 
                                                 
9  See the Bill of Rights for the full section. “ (2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application— (a) for a public 
purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have 
either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.” 
10 The tenure reform programme is of most significance to this research since this PhD looks at agricultural investments based in the former 
homelands. 
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31 March 2017, 8.7 million hectares, or 10.6% of all privately owned farmland, rather than the 
targeted 30%, had been transferred to black South Africans. This has cost government R62 
billion, all-inclusive.  In line with the National Development Plan, government now hopes to 
reach the original target of 30% by 2030. However, it has been estimated that the state would 
need to settle claims and redistribute land five times as fast as it has to date (Manenzhe 2018; 
Selebalo, 2018). 
 
 Land Restitution claims have suffered from backlogs. The original claims period closed on 
December 31 1998 with 79, 696 claims lodged. Despite the fact that some of the original 
claims lodged before 1998 have yet to be finalised, the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment 
Act (2014) beckoned the reopening of restitution claims. Parliament's High Level Panel report, 
published in November 2017, highlights some key concerns regarding the current trajectory of 
land restitution:  
 
"There are still more than 7 000 unsettled, and more than 19 000 unfinalised, ‘old order’ claims 
(claims lodged before the initial cut-off date of 1998). At the present rate of finalising 560 claims a 
year, it will take at least 35 years to finalise all old order claims; new order claims (lodged in terms 
of the now repealed Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act of 2014) that have already been 
lodged will take 143 years to settle; and if land claims are reopened and the expected 397 000 
claims are lodged, it will take 709 years to complete Land Restitution" (HLP, 2017: 238).  
 
The reopening of claims has been criticised by civil society organisations, academics and land 
activists for putting thousands of existing claims, yet to be settled or implemented, in jeopardy. 
However, for now the claims will allegedly be “kept in abeyance pending finalisation of all pre 
1998 land claims or introduction of a new legislation” (Manenzhe, 2018: 14).  
 
The reopening of restitution claims has been judged by some commentators as an attempt by 
the ANC government to garner electoral support. The new claims process also opens the doors 
for claims by traditional leaders. This process, alongside the unclear policy position on 
communal land, puts the land rights of millions of South Africans living in the former 
homelands in the balance (Claassens, 2015; Walker, 2015). However there seems to be a 
chasm between government rhetoric on fast-pacing land reform and actual implementation. 
Hall’s (2018) analysis of the government’s budget for land reform and restitution, for example, 
demonstrates how the budget for settling restitution claims has in fact declined over the last 
four years. 
 
The only foreseeable way in which a more ‘cost-effective’ approach could be adopted is if the 
government is successful in advancing expropriation with below-market compensation, or 
without compensation (Hall, 2018). In the former case, this could be done by making full use 
of the ‘just and equitable compensation11’ clause in section 25(3) of the constitution (Aliber, 
2015). In the latter case, there has been on-going debate about possibly amending the 
constitution. Following Cyril Ramaphosa’s appointment as President of South Africa in 
                                                 
11  This clause in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that, “the amount of the compensation and the time and manner of 
payment (for an expropriated property) must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests 
of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances” (Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
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February 2018 and his expressed commitment to implement expropriation, there has been a 
flurry of debate around the land question. On 27th February 2018, parliament overwhelmingly 
passed a motion to explore whether or not there is a need to amend the Constitution and the 
property clause, to allow for expropriation of land without compensation. This marks a break in 
previous rhetoric of the ANC-led government to pursue the ‘just and equitable’ principle. It 
looks likely that we will see a more radical land reform programme emerge in the years to 
come, but this remains to be seen (Claassens, 2018; Hall, 2018; Gerber, 201812).  
 
Up until now, however, no drastic break in land reform policy has been implemented. The 
formulation of certain bills may however allow the government to take tangible action in the 
future. The promulgation of the Property Valuation Bill of 2013 provides for an office of a 
Valuer-General to hasten land reform, through valuation of property aimed at driving down 
prices (Aliber, 2015). The Expropriation Bill of 2016 furthermore sets the stage for alternative 
means of expropriation, beyond the market-based approach followed to date. Hall (2018) notes 
that the most promising sign of a more radical land reform programme emerging is the increase 
in funding designated to the Office of the Valuer General in the 2018 budget. 
 
However, not everyone agrees that it is necessary or wise to amend the constitution. Many 
suggest that it would be prudent to instead increase the budget for land reform and make full 
use of the ‘just and equitable principle’. This would allow the state to pay compensation below 
market rates and in certain cases, where deemed ‘just’, to not pay anything at all (Hall, 2018; 
Cousins, 201813; Claassens, 201814; Selebalo, 201815). Moreover Claassens (2018) warns that 
expropriation together with the Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill pose dangers often 
ignored in the mainstream debate: “It is not white title deeds that are in jeopardy in South 
Africa. It is the property rights of those who bore the brunt of forced removals and Bantustan 
rule”. The insecure land rights of people living for example in informal settlements, on farms, 
or in the communal areas (the latter whose rights remain vested in the state) could be 
jeopardised by expropriation (Claassens, 2018; Hall, 2018). 
The failures of tenure reform: The shaky ground on which Joint Ventures are built in the 
former homelands  
 
Tenure reform has been the most unsuccessful of the three-pronged land reform programme. 
Prior to 1994 the rights to occupy and use land in the rural areas of the former homelands were 
not recognised sufficiently in law. Many people only had conditional permits in the form of 
‘Permission to Occupy’ (PTO) certificates. These were however usually granted to men, 
leaving widows and divorcees vulnerable to eviction. Since 1994, tenure insecurity has 
escalated because pre-existing systems of land administration have virtually collapsed. In the 
absence of clear directives, land administration procedures have become ad hoc and unclear. 
Confusion also reigns, as to the relative responsibility of traditional authorities vis-à-vis local 
                                                 
12 See: https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-national-assembly-adopts-motion-on-land-expropriation-without-compensation-
20180227 
13 See: https://theconversation.com/land-debate-in-south-africa-is-clouded-by-misrepresentation-and-lack-of-data-93078 
14 See: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-03-04-op-ed-ramaphosas-speech-to-the-house-of-traditional-leaders-betrays-sonas-
promises-on-mining/#.WqFcVJPwa1s 
15 see:  https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-02-20-this-is-what-the-budget-would-look-like-if-it-took-people-
seriously/?utm_content=bufferbe6e9&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer 
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government, in allocating land for residence and development. This is creating tensions 
between the two, in which local people often pay the price (PLAAS, 2016; Cousins, 2012). The 
Bill of Rights, (1996), section 25, subsection 6 and 9, explicitly outlines the government’s legal 
obligation to providing secure tenure: 
 
“(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress… 
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6)” 
 
More recently the National Development Plan also includes targets concerning tenure reform 
such as creating “tenure security for communal farmers, especially women”. However, in 
reality there is yet to be any effective legislation that secures the land rights of people living in 
communal areas of the former homelands. 60% of the population have informal rights that are 
neither recorded nor secure (Hornby et al., 2017). Parliament’s High Level Panel (2016) 
emphasised the imperative for effective policy to urgently secure their tenure rights (Hall, 
2018).  
 
The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) was passed in 1996 as an 
interim measure however, in the absence of any law, it has been renewed annually. IPILRA is, 
however, limited to ensuring that informal rights holders be consulted before any agreements to 
dispose of land are made (PLAAS, 2016). The White Paper of 1997 (see DLA, 1997: 57–8) set 
out some underlying principles that could in fact guide a national programme of tenure reform 
in line with the constitution. Furthermore, in 1998/9 a draft Land Rights Bill provided a 
promising and comprehensive approach to securing communal land rights. Unfortunately, it 
was rejected by the new Minister Thoko Didiza, who came to the conclusion that it was too 
complex and would require too much state support to implement (PLAAS, 2016).  The Land 
Rights Bill embraced the complexity of socially embedded land rights, which are characteristic 
of the communal areas: 
 
“Protected rights would vest in the individuals who use, occupy or have access to land, 
but would be relative to those shared with other members, as defined in agreed ‘group 
rules’… Procedures were set out for people to choose which local institution would 
manage and administer land rights on their behalf.” (PLAAS, 2016: 46). 
 
The Minister instead started anew on a policy that resulted in the Communal Land Rights Act of 
2004 (CLRA). Since then, there has been a package of new policies and acts introduced 
including the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2004), The Traditional 
Courts Bill (2008), Communal Land Tenure Policy (2013), The Traditional and Khoisan 
Leadership Bill (2015) and The Communal Land Tenure Bill (2017) However, not all of them 
have been adopted as some have failed to pass constitutional muster. Some authors have 
argued that what all the policies and acts have had in common is the vesting of authoritarian 
powers in traditional leaders (Claassens, 2013/15/18; Cousins, 2013b). Part of the problem 
with the failure to produce effective laws is that in the post-Apartheid era, we are seeing a 
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perpetuation of colonial ‘rule-bound’ stereotypes of customary law (Claassens, 2013; Cousins, 
2013b).  Claassens (2013) argues that policy and law to support the land rights of people in 
communal areas (particularly women), should be rooted in recognition of custom as “the 
changing practices and values of ordinary people”, which is consistent with the idea of ‘living 
customary law’. However, in practice the content of this ‘living law’ is difficult to prove. It is 
thus common to see lawyers and the state resorting to the ‘official customary law’, embodied in 
the rigid codified old texts of the colonial era (Claassens, 2013).  
 
Claassens (2013) describes how the roles and powers of traditional leaders in post-Apartheid 
South Africa are playing out as contestations over the content and status of customary law, and 
who gets to define it. These contestations are taking place in two distinct spaces- Parliament 
and the Constitutional Court. They each propose radically disparate ideas of customary law and 
tenure, and the role of traditional leaders. The Constitutional Court affirms the jurisprudence of 
living customary law. This involves democratising the customary space to ensure the 
participation of ordinary people in developing and defining custom relevant to their changing 
needs (Claassens, 2013).  
 
In sharp contrast, Parliament has taken steps to centralise power over customary land and 
people in the former homelands, under the exclusive jurisdiction of traditional leaders through 
the package of new policies and acts. In this regard, the many reports of state-supported 
corruption involving traditional leaders, especially on land with rich mineral endowments are 
especially concerning (Claassens and Matlala, 2014; Capps and Mnwana, 2015). Less well 
documented are the threats posed by intensification of agricultural investments in the 
communal areas. This PhD, however, will demonstrate that the focus needs to extend beyond 
traditional leaders, to elite capture in general, which also reflects processes of social 
differentiation inherent to different contexts.  
 
I will now very briefly review the content and implications of the host of laws relevant to the 
communal areas of the former homelands. The Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act (2004), allowed for the establishment of Traditional Councils, which are 
supposedly ‘transformed’ versions of the Apartheid Tribal Authorities created under the Bantu 
Authorities Act 68 of 1951 (Cousins, 2013b). These Traditional Councils entrenched the 
controversial boundaries of chiefdoms established during Apartheid. The Act does not provide 
roles and powers for traditional leaders as such, but rather stipulates that provinces need to 
enact their own laws within the provided framework (Claassens, 2013). The Act stipulates that 
40% of its members must be elected, however, traditional leaders may appoint the remaining 
60%. These are commonly family members, giving traditional leaders exceptional sway (Jara, 
2011). The Act stated that 30% of the members must be women, however, in objection to this 
provision traditional leaders won a waiver that the quota can be reduced where ‘insufficient 
women are available’. Claassens (2013: 75) points out the insidious nature of this given “the 
fact that 59 % of the population in the former homelands is female.”  
 
The Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) (2004) was struck down by the constitutional court in 
2010 on procedural grounds.  Its approach to tenure reform involved transferring ownership of 
land in the former homelands from the state to communities (represented by traditional 
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councils). The CLRA would have transferred ownership of land within apartheid-era 
boundaries to chiefs and traditional councils, who were then charged with registering 
individual rights within a community land register and administering ‘community rules’ 
(Cousins, 2013b; Ntsebeza, 2004; Claassens, 2005; Lund, 2012).  Claassens (2015, 2013) 
particularly emphasises the negative consequences this act would have had for historically 
independent groups (with title deeds held by a communal property association or trust), who 
would be subsumed within tribal boundaries.  
 
The Communal Land Tenure Policy (CLTP) of 2013 sought to replace CLRA, however, it 
shared many similarities with the rejected act. The CLTP proposed allocating freehold title 
deeds to traditional councils. This would have effectively downgraded people’s current 
customary land rights into a weaker form of ‘institutionalised use rights’ (Bunce and Ngubane, 
2015). Relevant to JVs, it gave traditional councils responsibility for investment, development 
and natural resource management, including for agriculture and forestry investments (Lund, 
2013; Shabane, 2013). A deep concern was that this policy might lead to land and resource 
grabbing through the state, to the benefit of traditional leaders (Loate, 2014). Communities 
would, however, be able to choose a governance structure (CPA, Traditional Council or Trust). 
This constituted a shift in government thinking. It might have reflected nervousness about the 
constitutionality of the CLTP, bearing in mind that CLRA was struck down by the 
Constitutional Court in 2010 (Bunce and Ngubane, 2015).  
 
The Communal Land Tenure Bill replaced the policy in 2017 and is supposedly informed by 
public engagements and submissions. It proposes the transfer of state owned communal land to 
‘communities and members of communities’. In the new formulation, it is either a Traditional 
Council or CPA that becomes the title-holder. The bill requires that ‘community rules’ be 
adopted with a 60% quorum among households. The chosen governance entity will allegedly 
only hold “communally owned portions of land… reserved for collective and individual 
enterprise and industrial sector activities, including, but not limited to grazing, cropping, 
forestry, mining, tourism, infrastructure and manufacturing”. However, the High Level Panel’s 
Diagnostic Report on Land Reform notes that in reality it would become the title-holder for the 
‘entire cadastral unit’. The authors note some additional concerns relevant to JVs:  
 
“These owners will be empowered to enter into business arrangements with external 
investors through ‘investment and development entities’ and joint ventures. Critics have 
argued that this approach to communal tenure reform runs the risk of encouraging 
unaccountable traditional leaders and councils to agree to business deals that privilege 
local and external elites and provide few benefits to ordinary community members, as is 
often the case at present in relation to mining” (PLAAS, 2016:14). 
 
The Traditional Courts Bill was originally introduced in 2008, but faced opposition from civil 
society and Parliament and was referred to the National Council of Provinces. Four provinces 
rejected it, and another four provinces proposed contradictory amendments (Claassens, 2013). 
It was reintroduced in 2011, and subsequently discussed at a number of provincial public 
hearings in 2012. However, it was subsequently withdrawn before the 2014 elections (PLAAS, 
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2016). The bill violated the principle of ‘separation of powers’, by making the traditional court 
at once the lawmaker, judge and prosecutor (Jara, 2011).  
 
The Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill of 2015 was introduced to replace the Framework 
Act.  This allows for Khoi-San claimants to be included as traditional leaders, and become 
government paid Khoi-San councils. This bill once again re-entrenches Apartheid era 
boundaries, which remain deeply contested and obviously problematic (PLAAS, 2016; Clark 
and Luwaya, 2017). Clark and Luwaya (2017) 16 highlight the problem with how the TKLB 
draws a distinction between the authority of a traditional council in the former homelands vis-
à-vis Khoi-San councils. In the case of the former, their authority is derived through the 
jurisdiction of a piece of land (according to apartheid boundaries). In contrast, Khoi-San 
councils derive their legitimacy through voluntarily affiliation. Clark and Luwaya (2017: 15) 
also draw attention to the dangers this policy poses in terms of mining and other investments, 
because traditional councils are not required to consult community members before entering 
into agreements. 
 
In relation to communal land, the National Development Plan aims to “convert some under-
used land in communal areas and land reform projects into commercial production” (National 
Planning Commission, 2012: 197). Just exactly what is understood as ‘under-used’, however, 
remains unclear. It raises red flags regarding protecting the land rights of households and 
communities, to which land may make significant contributions to social reproduction but not 
necessarily meet the ‘commercial production’ criteria. The discourse of ‘under-used’ land is 
common in relation to JVs.  
 
In conclusion, tenure reform so far has failed to confirm people's communal rights as fully-
fledged property rights. The host of laws and policies reviewed here have instead had the effect 
of reinforcing the undemocratic institution of traditional leadership on people in the communal 
areas and conferring private ownership on legal entities such as a CPA or a Traditional 
Council, which effectively downgrades people's current rights. Cousins (2017) has instead 
argued that we should look towards vesting shared rights in members of communities, rather 
than in institutions which government is ill-equipped to oversee. The critical issue then is not 
choice of a land-owning institution, but rather how to protect and affirm jointly held rights 
(Bunce and Ngubane, 2015).  
 
The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, of 1996 (IPILRA), could provide a solid 
basis for building a new law on communal land. IPILRA recognizes informal rights, giving 
them the status of formal rights, and vests them in both the individual and the collective. A 
choice over institutions to administer land rights may arise from this fundamental premise. 
However, it will only be meaningful if communities have a choice regarding the boundaries of 
their common land, and appropriate forms of development on it. A revised communal tenure 
policy would ideally provide for clear and explicit constitutional protection of rights, which 
could be expressed in a dynamic and living form of customary law. This should also include 
                                                 
16 In their commissioned report for Parliament’s High Level Panel: “Assessment of Key Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental 
Change” 
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strong mechanisms for protecting individual rights within this wider framework (Bunce and 
Ngubane, 2015; Cousins, 2017; Claassens, 2015).    
1.5 Structure of the PhD Thesis 
 
The structuring of this PhD thesis was influenced by a critical realist method of inquiry. In 
order to understand complex reality, it is necessary to make some abstractions. This entails 
dealing with discrete parts before being able to make sense of all the causal mechanisms as part 
of a concrete whole (Sayer, 2010). Some Chapter are thus necessarily more descriptive, while 
the last chapters attempt to integrate abstract theory and concepts with the empirical research, 
to bring together form and content (Harvey, 2010). It is hoped that the final concluding chapter 
succeeds in retracing this journey, as Marx (1973: 100) notes, “not as the chaotic conception of 
a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations”. 
 
The first two Chapters of this thesis entail a review of the literature that deals with the theory 
and empirical evidence that is of relevance to the PhD topic. They set the stage by clarifying 
what is already known about the topic across various schools of thought. It is from this review, 
that I clarify my overall conceptual framework for the study, although I reserve a full treatment 
of my class analytics approach for Chapter 12. In Chapter 2 I review some of the seminal 
works on the classical agrarian question, with the intension of drawing out key concepts. 
Having already outlined the key contemporary concerns of land and agrarian reform in Chapter 
1, here I discuss the historical roots of South Africa’s agrarian question and some key debates 
about class formation in the former homelands of South Africa. Chapter 3 explores the existing 
evidence on inclusive business models, including JVs. I explore the drivers of these 
investments and offer some possible explanations for the dominance of the model. I situate 
them within a context of agrarian change and how global capitalism is reshaping capital - 
labour relations. I conclude by clarifying my position among the various schools of thought 
and summarise a range of analytical concepts that will be used to analyse my case studies. 
 
In Chapter 4 I explain in detail my research design and methodology and reflect on the possible 
limitations of the study. I discuss the conceptual underpinnings of the critical realist approach 
and some reflections of Marx’s methodology that guided the research design. I outline the 
methods that were used to gather data in the field for my comparative case study and explain 
the process of data analysis. Chapter 5 aims to describe in detail the contexts of the two rural 
settlements of Keiskammahoek and Shiloh. From a Marxist political economy approach, 
context is imperative to understanding causal mechanisms and relations. I discuss the historical 
context of the Ciskei and the development of the Bantustan era irrigation schemes. I then look 
at the contemporary context and how these rural settlements are constituted in terms of 
relations of land, labour and capital.  
 
Chapter 6, 7 and 8 are integrally linked and together attempt to explain the political economy 
of Amadlelo Agri’s sharemilking joint ventures. I begin Chapter 6 with an in depth look at the 
historical and contemporary dynamics of the dairy industry in South Africa. This enables JVs 
to be understood in the context of the specific opportunities and challenges of the dairy sector. 
The contemporary context, dominated by a few highly efficient large capitalist dairy farmers 
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and large processors, is explained through the lens of the agrarian question(s). I briefly 
consider the prospects of alternative models and attempt to explain why JVs have become the 
government’s preferred mechanism for organising milk production in the context of land and 
agrarian reform.  
 
Chapter 7 is focused on describing how Amadlelo Agri’s sharemilking model is structured as a 
joint venture, in relation to financial arrangements, property rights, production systems, capital-
labour relations and governance arrangements.  I briefly document and analyse some of the 
governance challenges and how these might impact the outcomes at each farm. In Chapter 8 I 
bring all of these insights together. I provide a framework for theorizing the social relations of 
production in sharemilking JVs that takes account of the opportunities and limitations of our 
dairy market and the incentives that attract agribusiness to sharemilking arrangements in the 
South African context. Among other authors, I draw on Patnaik’s (1983) application of Marxist 
theory of rent to sharecropping for the framework. I also look at the implications of the 
adjustments Amadlelo Agri has made to the original New Zealand 50/50 sharemilking model 
and how this affects how we evaluate it, in terms of the relative benefits accruing to customary 
landowners.  
 
Chapter 9, 10, 11 and 12 move the focus away from investigating the JV as a model, and 
instead zoom in on its effects on the livelihoods, land rights and dynamics of class formation 
within the rural settlements of Shiloh and Keiskammahoek. Of course the structuring of the JV 
model is integral to explaining these impacts as well, however, a synthesis of these arguments 
is reserved for the final chapters. Chapter 9 describes in more detail the nature of land rights 
and use, and how these have been impacted by the JV. I also detail some emerging conflicts 
and contestations over land, which have arisen in the face of the JVs. Chapter 10 and 11, 
explore the current status of local livelihood systems and household composition in 
Keiskammahoek and Shiloh respectively. The objective is to understand how households meet 
their social reproduction. I capture a full picture of household incomes and assets, and explore 
how the character of household composition affects social reproduction (e.g. dynamics of 
generation and gender). This allows me to create a fuller picture of how the benefits derived 
from the JV in the form of jobs, dividends and land rents, fit into the wider reproductive 
strategies of households.  
 
Chapter 12 proposes a context-specific class typology for exploring the dynamics of social 
differentiation. The typology is based on application of Patnaik’s (1987) 'labour exploitation 
criterion', together with relevant adjustments that take into account the character of class 
relations in South Africa’s communal areas, drawing on the class typologies developed by 
Cousins (2010) and Levin et al. (1997). The class-based typology assists in understanding the 
tensions that the JV model of capitalist farming generates in relation to household 
reproduction, in a class-differentiated manner. It also illuminates the emerging agrarian class 
structure that a JV intervention conditions, and thus explores the implications of the model for 
agrarian change in South Africa.  
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In the final Chapter 13, I attempt to synthesise the key arguments made in the thesis that 
provide an explanation for the diverse impacts of the JVs on the livelihoods and land rights of 
local residents. The emphasis is on dynamics of social differentiation, the social relations of 
production, the structure of property rights, discourses of ‘custom’ and the character of 
decision-making and power. In doing so, I try to reveal “a rich totality of many determinations 
and relations” (Marx, 1974:100). I also clarify the key lessons of the research for policy and 
for understanding dynamics of agrarian change in South Africa.   
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Chapter 2. The Agrarian Question 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I discuss some of the key conceptual theories and debates within the agrarian 
political economy tradition, which inform my analysis of the impacts of joint ventures (JVs) on 
livelihoods, land rights and social differentiation. It aims to clarify and make explicit the 
conceptual framework that I employ in this thesis. The key areas of enquiry in agrarian 
political economy are concerned with the social relations of production17 and reproduction18. 
Bernstein (2010: 22) has usefully summed this up by into four succinct areas of enquiry, which 
I paraphrase below:   
 
• Who owns what?  
This question investigates the social relations inherent to various property regimes (e.g. 
private and communal). Private property and the conversion of land into a commodity 
is an invention of capitalism and have particular relevance for social relations in 
farming. This question is also concerned with the ownership and distribution of the 
‘means of production’ and reproduction.  
 
• Who does what?  
This question looks at the social divisions of labour. It investigates how social relations 
between different classes, genders and different types of producers, for example, define 
who performs what activities. 
 
• Who gets what?  
This question is concerned with how the ‘fruits of labour’ are divided in society and 
among social groups. It is not only the distribution of income that is of interest but also 
non-monetary contributions and the less tangible benefits derived from domestic and 
other forms of unpaid labour. 
 
• What do they do with it? 
This question is about social relations of reproduction, consumption and accumulation. 
A unique feature of capitalism is how capital appropriates the surplus labour of workers 
for productive accumulation.  The question seeks to understand how various social 
relations of production and reproduction shape the distribution of the social product. 
 
Scoones (2016: 82/3) has recommended two useful additions, which are concerned with the 
social and ecological challenges that contemporary society faces:  
 
                                                 
17 Marx and Engels (1956: 408) describes social relations of production as “The social relations within which [humans] produce, the social 
relations of production ... in their totality form what are called social relations, society, and specifically a society at a determinate historical 
stage of development, a society with a peculiar, distinctive character. Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois society are such totalities of 
relations of production”. 
18 Reproduction is the process of “securing the conditions of life and of future production from what is produced or earned now” (Bernstein, 
2010: 128).  
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• How do social classes and groups in society and within the state interact with each 
other?  
This question investigates how particular institutions, social relations and forms of 
domination that prevail in different societies, and between the state and its citizens 
affect livelihoods. 
 
• How do changes in politics get shaped by dynamic ecologies and vice versa? 
This final question looks at how environmental dynamics and political ecology 
influences livelihoods. It is also concerned with how livelihood strategies and the 
distribution of resource entitlements affect the environment. 
 
These six questions are useful in that they have a universal character and can be applied in 
diverse contexts. They form the underlying basis of interrogation in dealing with empirical 
material, and provide direction as to what dynamics are considered core to a political economy 
approach. Evaluating the significance of JV arrangements for agrarian change also entails an 
engagement with the character and historical development of the capitalist economy of South 
Africa. More precisely, understanding how the agrarian economy fits into and impacts upon the 
key dynamics of the capitalist economy as a whole. In this chapter, I thus first begin by 
reviewing some of the seminal works on the classical agrarian question, and the key concepts 
underpinning it. I will then present some concrete examples of pathways of historical agrarian 
transitions, along with a discussion of more contemporary concerns. These various areas of 
questioning will provide a solid basis for discussing South Africa’s agrarian question; 
including both its historical roots, as well as a look at some of the key contemporary concerns 
of land and agrarian reform. 
 
Since this PhD makes use of a class-analytic approach, this chapter will also review how 
Marxist political economists understand and have investigated class dynamics. Marxist 
approaches emphasise that class identity is based on the social relations of production, and thus 
a class must be defined in terms of its relations with other classes (Bernstein, 2010). Struggles 
‘over class’ however, often precede struggles ‘between classes’ (Harris-White and Gooptu, 
2000). Along with class, other social differences also intersect, combine, and co-produce each 
other, such as gender, race, generation, ethnicity, lineage and religion, to name a few (Perez 
Nino, 2016; Peters, 2004). These relational differences are also seized upon by capital in the 
ways it recruits, organises, and subdues labour in various contexts (Bernstein, 2010).  
 
Unpacking underlying class dynamics is not simple and straightforward, because capital-labour 
relations are often not clear and explicit in the varied ways in which people meet their 
livelihoods under the uncertainties and pressures of the modern capitalist system. Class 
relations that are disguised by surface appearances need to be revealed through careful 
analysis. This is certainly true in the case of a joint venture, where agribusiness is being 
brought in as a ‘partner’ to ‘communities’ or ‘small farmers’; social categories whose class 
character is anything but clear. In the South African context, debates about class in the former 
homelands also have their specific peculiarities. For example, a pervasive ‘linear 
proletarianisation thesis’ has tended to underestimate incipient class formation in the 
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countryside (Levin and Neocosmos, 1989). This chapter reviews these debates on class in an 
attempt to draw out key concepts that can assist in making sense of complex and subtle class 
dynamics within agricultural joint ventures in contemporary South Africa.  
 
2.2 The Agrarian Question(s) and Agrarian Transitions  
 
“Political economy investigates agrarian change through processes of class struggle and 
class formation” (Bernstein, 2015: 455)  
 
The ‘agrarian question’ has been unpacked in terms of a number of different (classic) 
problematics (Cousins, 2013). These are outlined below into four main questions or 
problematics. The ‘classical agrarian question’ is contained in the interrelated questions (one, 
two and three) below. These problematics have been skilfully outlined by Byres (1991, 1996) 
and Bernstein (1996, 2009), based on the extensive scholarship and seminal works of a number 
of classical agrarian political economists (see for example Marx, 1867; Engels, 1950; 
Preobrazhensky, 1926; Lenin, 1967; Kautsky, 1899). Bernstein (2011: 450) refers to the first 
three questions as comprising an ‘agrarian question of capital’ which centres on:  “The 
transition to capitalism in which two definitive (“stylized”) classes of pre-capitalist agrarian 
social formations ("feudalism") - namely predatory landed property and the peasantry - are 
transformed (displaced, eliminated), by the emergence of capitalist social relations of 
production, in turn the basis of an unprecedented development of the productive forces in 
farming”. The fourth question constitutes an ‘agrarian question of labour’, as proposed by 
Bernstein (2009), and is an addition to the ‘classical agrarian questions’. Although the subject 
of intense contention and debate, the agrarian question of labour is considered by many 
Marxists to be ‘the new’ agrarian question. This is because classical questions are considered 
to have been largely resolved on a global scale by the pervasive nature and reach of global 
capitalism.  
 
1) A problematic of accumulation: is concerned with the question of what contribution 
agriculture and the transfer of agricultural surpluses can make to industrialisation, 
accumulation and the emergence of capital (Marx, 1867; Preobrazhensky, 1926; Akram-
Lodhi & Kay, 2009; Byres, 1991; Lenin, 1967). 
 
2) A problematic of production: investigates the extent to which capitalism has penetrated 
the countryside and agriculture, and whether a transformation from pre-capitalist to 
capitalist agriculture has occurred. This tends to transpire through the development of the 
productive forces in farming. Capitalist relations of production come to dominate in the 
countryside through processes of rural class differentiation. The absence of such dynamics 
in class relations may pose an obstacle to the unleashing of productivity in agriculture 
(Marx, 1867; Kautsky, 1899; Lenin, 1899; Byres, 1991/6; Bernstein, 1996, 2009, 2010; 
Lerche et al., 2013; Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2009; Cousins, 2013). 
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3) A problematic of politics and class struggle: is a political question of the nature of class 
struggle and emerging alliances between classes both in and outside the countryside. Which 
class interests the state supports is also an area of concern. This literature focuses on the 
role of peasants, smallholders and farm workers in struggles for equality, socialism and 
democracy (Engels, 1950; Cousins, 2013). 
 
4) A problematic of the social reproduction of classes of labour: is concerned with the 
reproductive demands of ‘fragmented classes of labour’, who pursue their reproduction 
through complex combinations of self and wage-employment (Bernstein, 2010).   
 
A key focus in the treatment of the classical agrarian question has been the examination of the 
persistence of the peasantry, and whether or not its persistence signifies an incomplete 
transition to a capitalist mode of production from feudalism. Many Marxists expected 
capitalism to inevitably dissolve the peasantry, as society became dominated by the 
antagonistic classes of capital and labour (as famously described by Marx, 1867). The 
elimination of the peasantry, however painful, is thus even considered a good thing by those 
who adhere to the ideas of ‘necessary progress’ wrought by capitalist and socialist 
modernization (Bernstein, 2010).  
 
Engels (1950), however, noted that it was only in two regions in Europe (Britain and Prussia) 
where capitalism managed to entirely eliminate the peasantry as a significant economic and 
political force. There are ongoing debates among agrarian political economists about the nature 
of the peasantry and whether it has disappeared in ongoing and accelerating processes of 
deagrarianisation (Bryceson et al, 2000; Hobsbawm, 1994) and is merely a historical category 
(Bernstein, 2010), is currently being ‘eliminated’ (Kitching, 2001), or continues to exist and is 
posed as a major social force in the countryside, underpinning contemporary agrarian political 
movements (McMichael, 2006; Douwe van der Ploeg, 2008), (in Hornby 2014).  
 
Weis (2007) cautions against Hobsbawm’s (1994) and other’s claims about “the death of the 
peasantry” (p.289) as a result of ‘agricultural revolution’. Rather, Weis (2007) contends that 
small-farm households still account for nearly two-fifths of the world population, and that their 
redundancy should not be considered an inevitable outcome of capitalist expansion. Authors 
like McMichael (2006), van der Ploeg (2008/ 16) and Schneider (2016), however, argue that 
so-called ‘peasants’ or ‘family farmers’ constitute a single exploited class, around which social 
movements can organise.  
 
These claims are fervently opposed by Bernstein (2010) and other agrarian political 
economists. Bernstein (2010) argues that since there is such diversity in the South and 
elsewhere, one cannot speak simply of a single class of “family farmers”. He illustrates the 
variety that exists within this group, in terms of their varying social relation with capital. 
Bernstein (2010) states, “there is no single ‘class’ of ‘peasants’ or ‘family farmers’ but rather 
differentiated classes of small-scale capitalist farmers, relatively successful petty commodity 
producers and wage labour” (p.4). Using the same logic, one cannot speak of a single class of 
Capital. Capital can be distinguished by, different activities and sectors (agricultural, financial, 
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commercial etc.), scales (from households, to petty commodity producers to global 
corporations etc.), and classes of capital (distinguished by the interests of capital within 
different activities). 
 
Brenner’s (2001) concept (drawing on Marx) of the commodification of subsistence also 
provides credence to arguments that ‘family farmers’ do not constitute a single class. The 
concept captures the reality of how peasants can no longer reproduce themselves (or subsist) 
outside of commodity relations, as capitalist relations come to dominate. There are a plethora 
of diverse historical ‘paths’ through which this process has taken place in different contexts, 
which will be discussed later below. Class differentiation among family farmers occurs as a 
result of them being ‘locked into’ commodity production for their subsistence. They become, 
what can best be described as petty commodity producers (PCPs) involved in small-scale 
commodity production utilising mostly household labour. Because they occupy the 
contradictory class position of both capital and labour, PCPs are a particularly unstable form, 
which is susceptible to processes of class differentiation. Differentiated classes therefore 
emerge from PCPs over time, including ‘small-scale capitalist farmers’, ‘middle farmers’, 
‘poor farmers’ and ‘wage labour’ (Bernstein, 2010). PCPs have however also been 
conceptualized as a form of ‘small capital’. Their position as a smaller capital compels them to 
substitute their capital with recourse to their labour-power (Wilson, 1986; Perez Nino, 2016). 
 
Lenin (1967 [1899]) explored the tendencies and dynamics of class differentiation among the 
peasantry in the context of the Russian countryside and identified poor, middle and rich 
peasants. Poor peasants struggle simply to reproduce themselves, without squeezing their own 
labour power or their capital or likely both.  Many may lose hold of their capital, and come to 
rely exclusively on the sale of their labour power. If this happens, they may transform into 
proletarians or semi-proletarians (if they maintain some foothold in agricultural production). 
Middle peasants can engage in simple reproduction and meet the pressures it demands through 
their own efforts. Rich peasants are those able to engage in expanded reproduction, 
accumulating capital and perhaps producing on an increasingly larger scale of production and 
some may overtime become capitalist farmers. 
 
What is often referred to as an “unresolved agrarian question” refers mostly to the context of 
poor countries, in which the persistence of differentiated peasantries in the countryside presents 
an obstacle to capitalist development (Hornby, 2014). Three broad explanations have been 
formulated which attempt to explain why the development of capitalist farming has been so 
uneven, and why peasants or family farmers persist in many parts of the world. The first is that 
there are specificities inherent to agriculture that prevents capital from directly investing in 
farming, as easily as it does in other sectors. Particularly relevant, is the unpredictability of 
natural conditions and ecological processes, which cannot be as easily manipulated as factors 
of production compared to other industrial sectors. Because farming is confined by the natural 
growth time of animals and plants and the unpredictability of their environment, labour time is 
often exceeded by production time. Capital is unable to realize its profits during this extended 
production time. Capitalist farming thus tries to speed up this natural production time through 
technological innovations, such as those described in the quote below (Bernstein, 2010).  
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“Poultry production is perhaps the most striking example of industrialised agriculture, 
because a standardized chicken “factory”, with its enclosed and controlled environment, 
is completely mobile. It can be established anywhere that is profitable, thus “liberating” 
capital from land and locale specific constraints, which characterized the whole history 
of farming until now” (Bernstein, 2010: 91).  
 
However some agricultural commodities are more susceptible to capital penetration than 
others, as Mann and Dickinson (1978) have outlined. The persistence of smallholders, 
producing certain agricultural commodities, has thus often been explained by the inherent 
qualities that make these products more resistant to capitalist penetration. It is for this reason 
that Cousins (2015) has proposed certain horticulture crops for smallholder production. These 
can’t easily be mechanized because they are inherently labour-intensive. Milk as a commodity, 
on the other hand, is extremely susceptible to technological innovation and capital-intensive 
farming methods. Mechanization of the farming process has proceeded rapidly with the 
introduction of rotary milking parlours, for example that can milk 80 cows at a time requiring 
little labour. This PhD thus raises questions around the suitability of milk for agricultural 
development projects in the communal areas, where creating jobs is a high priority.  
 
A second explanation for the persistence of the peasantry is that capital stands to benefit from 
the reproduction of family farmers. This explanation hinges, firstly, on the idea that the ‘burden 
of ground rent’ on profits, along with delayed production times, incentivises capital to allow 
family farmers to carry the costs (Djurfeldt, 1981). In addition to the issue of rents, it is also 
more complex and costly to supervise labour in a field as compared to a factory. Family 
farmers are believed to have an advantage in controlling (household) labour. For some, this 
character of family farming has been interpreted as demonstrating their superior efficiency in 
relation to capitalist farmers. Chayanov (1966), writing in the context of Russia in the 1920’s, 
developed the concept of “self-exploitation” to explain this dynamic. He suggested that the 
household excludes its own labour costs as a factor of production, and thus can out-compete 
capitalists who have to take account of wage costs. Peasants are also willing to sell their 
products at lower prices. These characteristics of family farmers were also used by Kautsky 
(1988), to explain the persistence of the peasantry against the onslaught of capitalist 
development at the end of the nineteenth century.  
 
“The argument is that this staying power or “persistence” is tolerated, and even 
encouraged, by capital as long as peasant or family farming can continue to produce 
“cheap” food commodities that lower the costs of labour power (wages) to capitalist, 
and indeed itself produces “cheap” labour power. That is, peasants and small farmers 
who also sell their labour power can be paid less because their wage does not have to 
cover the full costs of household reproduction, which are partly met through its 
farming- sometimes seen as a “subsidy” to the capitals that employ rural labour 
migrants” (Bernstein, 2010: 94-5).  
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The final argument is that the persistence of the peasantry can be explained by ‘resistance’ 
among small-scale farmers to processes of proletarianisation and dispossession (Bernstein, 
2010). Araghi (2009), for example asserts that, “global peasantization is not a completed or 
self-completing process leading to the death of the peasantry. Social classes do not simply end 
and die; they live and are transformed by social struggles” (p.138). Wolf (1969) has captured 
these types of peasant struggles in his seminal work, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century.  
Scott (1985) refers to the strategies peasants have used to resist exploitation and expropriation 
through “everyday forms of peasant resistance”. The more contemporary discourse, which is 
gaining much attention amongst certain scholars, is the assertion that there is a counter-
movement of global peasant resistance, personified in movements like La Via Campesina, 
seeking to preserve “the peasant way” against the onslaught of corporate agribusiness and 
neoliberalism (McMichael, 2006; Van der Ploeg, 2008).  
 
According to Cousins (2013), “the agrarian question is resolved when agriculture is fully 
capitalist, or when capitalist industrialization has occurred (whether or not agriculture has 
undergone a capitalist transition)” (p. 118). Bernstein (2011) notes that the most “virtuous” 
outcome of resolving the classical agrarian question, would be if rapid growth in the 
productivity of agriculture is able to create a surplus fund that can be invested in 
industrialisation, without undermining the accumulation fund for farming or severely 
squeezing classes of labour. Bernstein (2011) however notes that,  
 
“... Such virtue is historically rare by contrast with far more vicious ways of trying to 
affect agriculture's contribution to industrialization. This typically proceeds through one 
form or another of taxing agriculture, regardless of its levels of productivity and 
investment, and the conditions of labour in the countryside, and/or otherwise 
intensifying state control over peasant production, and/or promoting intensifying 
production and accumulation by agrarian capital (including "progressive:' i.e., richer, 
strata of the peasantry)”. 
 
An investigation of the historically specific processes through which capitalism emerged, 
allows us to characterise both the general nature of the global capitalist economy and the 
specificities of capitalism in the South African context. It is to this end that I now turn in brief 
to summarising the origins of these debates in the studies of classical transitions in the English, 
Prussian, French and American pathways. Rather than describing these transitions in their full 
complexity (for which there is not sufficient space), I will instead attempt to merely highlight 
their key drivers, tendencies and characteristics. This will lay the groundwork for discussing 
the nature of agrarian transition and modern capitalism in the South African context, and its 
significance for the reproduction of fragmented classes of labour today.  
 
Agrarian transitions 
 
The classical agrarian question involves an exploration of the ‘world historical’ process of 
transitions from feudalism (or other pre-capitalist modes of production), to a capitalist mode of 
production, and the varied implications these transformations have had for agrarian formations. 
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Capitalist transitions have taken diverse forms across different contexts, which have been 
explored in depth by numerous authors (Marx, 1867; Byres, 1991, 1996; Lenin (1967 [1899]). 
Transitions to capitalism have often (but not always) involved an equally diverse variety of 
forms of ‘agrarian transition’, which refers to: 
  
“Those changes in the countryside necessary to the overall development of capitalism 
and to the ultimate dominance of that mode of production in a particular national and 
social formation… one notes the important possibility that the agrarian question in this 
broad sense may be partly, and even fully, resolved without the dominance of capitalist 
relations of production in the countryside”. (Byres, 1996: 27).  
 
Transitions to capitalism have, however, in some contexts also involved the successful 
transformation of pre-capitalist agrarian formations (dominated by the peasantry and predatory 
landed property) into capitalist landed property, agrarian capital and labour. This creates the 
basis for capitalist social relations of production, and in farming, an immense advancement of 
the productive forces. In order for capitalist relations of production to dominate in agriculture, 
it is necessary that a process of accumulation of capital be taking place. In the literature, a 
distinction is made between ‘accumulation from above’ and ‘accumulation from below’.  
These distinctions clarify how agricultural growth proceeds within capitalist economies, and 
who benefits from it (Cousins, 2013), and are characterised in the different paths below. The 
first beginnings of capitalist production were in the 14th and 15th centuries in Mediterranean 
towns,19 but the capitalist era really begins in the 16th century (Marx, 1867). I will now very 
briefly sum up various transitions to capitalism that have been studied in the agrarian political 
economy tradition.   
 
The English Path: Marx (1867) investigated the first historic case of agrarian capitalism in 
England, and the class basis of capitalist farming in this context. Byres (2009) characterises the 
English path, as “landlord-mediated capitalism from below” (p.57). In England, the former 
feudal landlord class was transformed into a capitalist landlord class. The feudal lords usurped 
the commons and drove the peasants from their land. This process transformed the peasantry 
into proletarians, divorced from their means of subsistence and thus forced to meet their 
reproduction through the labour market. This created the necessary conditions for a capitalist 
society (Marx, 1867). This transformed capitalist landlord class rented land to capitalist tenant 
farmers, who were given fixed-term leases with competitive rents.  These rents were 
increasingly drawn from the profits of the capitalist tenants (Wood, 2009). This ‘revolution’ 
had brought into being a new class of landlords and capitalist appropriators of surplus value, 
alongside a massive class of proletarians. The meeting of these three classes created the social 
relations of production, which underpinned the new capitalist order (Marx, 1867).  
The immense productivity of this form of capitalist agriculture allowed for transfers of surplus 
from agriculture to support industrialization (Byres, 2009). Proletarianization also enabled the 
                                                 
19 Marx (1867) describes how capitalistic production developed first in Italy where serfdom disappeared earliest.  At first those emancipated 
from serfdom found themselves to be proletarians with ‘new masters’ in the towns. However a reverse process was initiated towards the end of 
the 15th Century where the revolution of the capitalist world-market annihilated the dominance of Northern Italy’s commercial trade. These 
proletarians were driven in masses into the countryside, which initiated the beginnings of ‘petite culture’ in the form of gardening.  
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creation of a home market, since the poor and landless had to go to market for all their 
subsistence needs and people were driven to towns or to large farms for wage employment. 
Separating peasants from the means of production resulted in the destruction of rural domestic 
industry and the separation of manufacture from agriculture. “Only the destruction of rural 
domestic industry can give the internal market of a country that extension and consistence 
which the capitalist mode of production requires” (Marx, 1867). 
In Capital, Volume I, Marx (1867) famously explores the process of primitive accumulation, 
which created the conditions for this transformation, beginning in the last part of the 15th 
Century in the English countryside20. According to Marx (1867: 713), a primitive accumulation 
preceded capitalist accumulation in England, and was “an accumulation not the result of the 
capitalist mode of production, but its starting point”. Marx likened primitive accumulation to a 
type of theological ‘original sin’, which is necessary to create the social relations and property 
regimes that underpin the capitalist mode of production. The notion is central because it marks 
a departure from what Marx considered an evasion from the historical facts in previous 
accounts of the development of capitalism. For Marx the origins of Capitalism do not lie 
merely in the accumulation of wealth for reinvestment, but rather in a revolution of social 
property relations (Wood, 2009).   
 
“The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical 
process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, 
because it forms the pre-historic stage of capital and of the mode of production 
corresponding with it” (Marx, [1867] 2011:786).   
 
Marx’s account of capitalist development is revolutionary, because it moves beyond defining 
capitalism as merely ‘a better and more organised form of trade’ or ‘commercial society’. In 
Marx’s conception, capitalism is a distinctive and new mode of production, with very specific 
social property relations and ‘laws of motion’. These arise from specific historical conditions, 
rather than assumed universal laws of markets (Wood, 2009). However, since his account, 
Marxists continue to debate the exact forces or ‘prime movers’ that catalysed transitions from 
Feudalism to Capitalism.  
 
The ‘Dobb-Sweezy debate’ is one such example. British Marxist historian Dobb (1976) argues 
that the prime force responsible for dissolving feudalism was a transformation in social 
relations between the feudal classes (feudal lords and peasants). He suggests that the petty 
mode of production was a catalyst for class struggle between these classes. On the other hand, 
American Marxist economist Sweezy (1976) suggests that the prime mover must have been 
from outside feudalism itself, because he claims it was a mode of production particularly 
resistant to change. He emphasises the expansion of markets and the growth of commodity 
production as the prime movers. These debates give rise to questions of whether transitions to 
capitalism have their roots within the relations of feudalism itself (as Dobb suggests) or from 
impulses outside of it (as Sweezy suggests).  
 
                                                 
20 See Capital, Volume 1 in his chapter on ‘The So-called Primitive Accumulation’ p. 788-848. 
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Brenner (1976) also provides a convincing argument. In his view, there is no ‘embryonic 
capitalism’ hidden in feudal relations and a transition from a ‘backward’ mode of production to 
a more productive one is not inevitable. He argues that the specificities of the English Path are 
the unintended consequence of landlords and tenants, who were trying to reproduce themselves 
as they were, rather than actively trying to transform social property relations in a specifically 
capitalist direction. Unintentionally both, however, came to increasingly rely on improving 
productivity and success in the market so that tenants could hold on to and extend their land, 
and so landlords could increase their rents. These tendencies led to the distinctive social 
formation of English agrarian capitalism- capitalist tenant, landlord and wage labourer (Wood, 
2009).  
 
The Prussian Path: The Prussian path to capitalism was negotiated in Eastern Europe by the 
late 19th century. It took a markedly different form from the English path. It is considered the 
classic example of ‘accumulation from above’ (Lenin, 1964). The impetus for the transition 
originated exclusively within the landlord class, and was followed by the destruction of the 
peasantry. In Prussia “pre-capitalist landlords [Junkers], slowly transformed themselves into 
Agrarian capitalists” (Cousins, 2013: 119). The transformation was slow and characterised by 
the retention of some feudal features. Unlike the English landlord class, the Junkers became 
capitalist farmers and ceased to be landlords (Byres, 2009/1996). Byres (2009) notes that this 
specific form of transition was possible because this feudal landlord class had been involved in 
production prior to the capitalist transition. Under Feudalism, as takers of labour rent they were 
never divorced from the production and labour process, like the English landlord class was 
(Byres, 2009). Prussia’s transition has been influential in developing countries wishing to 
follow a similar trajectory of development through land and agrarian reforms (Byres, 1996). It 
is also particularly relevant to the South African context, since capitalist transition in South 
Africa is said to have taken a Prussian style path (Morris, 1976). 
 
Up until the 16th century, the peasantry in Prussia ‘east of the Elbe’ was described as a 
contender for the title of Europe’s ‘freest peasantry’ (Brenner, 1976; Byres, 1996/2009; Engels, 
1950). The key factor that led to a reverse of the autonomous status of the peasantry was the 
labour shortages that the Junkers faced, following the Black Death in the 14th century and 
subsequent disasters in the 15th century. The Junkers took over much of the deserted land, 
previously farmed by the peasants. With the help of the state, the Junkers overcame labour 
shortages by curtailing the peasantry’s movement, setting a maximum wage, extending 
mandatory labour services, and securing the state’s support in suppressing peasant resistance to 
these reforms (Byres, 1996/2009).  
 
By the end of the 18th century, however, there was a clear class struggle emerging among the 
peasantry for the abolition of feudal labour services and dues. The Prussian state realising the 
threats of peasant resistance, moved to invoke reforms on the royal demesnes in 1799. In the 
wake of Napoleon’s attack in 1806, Feudalism was eventually abolished in 1807 and the 
Prussian serfs freed. The 19th century marked a slow transition to capitalist agriculture in 
Prussia. The process was controlled by a class of large feudal landlords (Junkers), who slowly 
stifled and ultimately destroyed the peasant economy. A few rich peasants managed to 
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transform themselves into capitalist farmers, in alliance with the Junkers, but they comprised a 
small minority (Byres, 2009).  
 
The mass of the peasantry were expropriated from the land and subjected to a pauper standard 
of living, in relations of bondage to the Junkers (Byres, 1996).  The new distinctive form of 
agrarian capitalism that emerged involved the Junkers (as a new class of capitalist farmers) 
exploiting the labour of these previous serfs, who came to form a new class of particularly 
oppressed wage labourers. By 1871 the Junkers had become in every sense capitalist and the 
transition was complete (Byres, 2009).  
 
The immediate result of these new social relations of production was a constricted home 
market, due to the impoverishment of the rural masses. At first this had negative implications 
for the manufacturing industry and meant that productive forces developed slowly. This is 
contrasted, for example, with the American path, which experienced a tremendous growth of 
the home market and development of scientific technique. The semi-feudal features of Prussian 
agriculture, on the other hand, acted as a powerful brake on the development of the productive 
forces (Byres, 1996).  
 
The American Path: Lenin (1964) identified the Prussian and the American paths, as two 
diverse pathways to capitalist transition. What is distinctive about the American Path is that 
agrarian capitalism did not involve a transition from Feudalism in the western and northern 
parts of America (Bernstein, 2010). It is rather characterised by the absence of a feudal 
landlord class driving the transformation. The American path has come to represent 
‘accumulation from below’, as opposed to ‘accumulation from above’ exemplified in the 
Prussian path. In the American path, capitalism emerges from within the peasantry, rather than 
a pre-existing landlord class. It involved widespread transformation of peasants into capitalist 
farmers, driven by a process of social differentiation and ‘class-for-itself action’, pursued by 
rich peasants (Byres, 1996).  
 
This process began from within the ranks of independent small farmers in the Northeast21, in a 
process that accelerated in the 19th century (Bernstein, 2010). Byres (1996) notes two phases in 
the transformation of smallholder peasants into capitalist farmers. Firstly, small farmers, who 
were at first more or less independent of commodity relations and able to subsist wholly or 
partially from the land, became drawn into commodity production and thus transformed into 
‘petty commodity producers’. The next stage of transition is from ‘petty commodity producer’ 
to capitalist farmer. According to Lenin (1964), this was an incomplete but progressively 
expanding process of transformation. It was marked foremost by the exploitation of labour in 
the production process. Lenin (1964) argued that the use of hired labour was unmistakable in 
diverse forms of farming22: 
 
“Under capitalism, the small farmer- whether he wants to or not, whether he is aware of it 
or not- becomes a commodity producer. And it is this change that is fundamental, for it 
                                                 
21 The transformation is delayed in the South by the persistence of slave plantations from the 17th Century into the 19th century. The 
establishment of large-scale capitalist farming only really occurs after 1945 across the South of the country (Bernstein, 2010). 
22 Other authors such as Himmer contended that the majority of farms employed only family labour (Byres, 1996). 
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alone, even when he does not yet exploit hired labour, makes him a petty bourgeois and 
converts him into an antagonist of the proletariat.  He sells his product while the proletarian 
sells his labour-power. The small farmers, as a class, cannot but seek a rise in the prices of 
agricultural products, and this is tantamount to them joining the big landowners in sharing 
the ground rent, and siding with the landowners against the rest of society. (Lenin, 1964: 
95-6).  
 
Lenin perceived the American Path to be a more progressive pathway to capitalism than the 
Prussian pathway, as it involved the “free economy of the free farmer working on free land” 
(Lenin, 1964: 140).23 Lenin (1962) contended that the American Path was socially progressive, 
in that it involved “a rise in the standard of living, the energy, initiative and culture of the entire 
population” (p. 423). It was also economically progressive, since it involved the most 
impressive and rapid development of the productive forces (mechanisation and the 
development of an immensely productive agriculture), with implications for a markedly large 
portion of the population. It also involved “a tremendous growth of the home market” (Lenin, 
1962: 423), for both Department I industries (the market for capital goods and the means of 
production, including agricultural machinery and inputs) and Department II industries (the 
market for consumer goods) (in Byres, 1996). It is this ‘progressive’ nature, which makes this 
path of agrarian transition through ‘accumulation from below’ particularly attractive to 
developing countries (Cousins, 2013).  
 
The French Path: Byres (2009) asserts that the French path was characterised by ‘capitalism 
delayed’. The impulse for capitalist transition was stifled in the countryside by an enduring 
peasantry (Byres, 2009; Wood, 2009).  Engels (1950) characterised France at the end of the 
19th century, as “the classical land of small peasant economy” (p.460). The French landlord 
class did not show any signs of transforming itself into capitalist farmers, as in the Prussian 
case through ‘accumulation from above’. Nor was there an impetus towards transforming into 
capitalist landlords, as in the English case. There were also no signs of any emerging processes 
of “accumulation from below”, from within the ranks of a differentiating peasantry, as in the 
American case. Although the peasantry was differentiated, the differences between the landed 
aristocracy and the peasantry remained more notable and antagonistic, than those between the 
different social strata of the peasantry. This stifled the class conflict necessary to disrupt the 
feudal social order (Soboul, 1956; Byres, 2009).   
 
Serfdom had collapsed in France by the end of the 15th century, but this did not provide the 
impetus towards agrarian capitalism. A differentiated peasantry merely continued to reproduce 
itself as before (Byres, 2009). The peasantry was comprised of a very large base of poor 
peasants, and a minority of rich peasants24 (Goubert, 1956). By the 18th century many of the 
poor and some middle peasants (manouvriers) had lost their land through indebtedness to 
richer peasants, and were thus rendered wage-labourers (Soboul, 1956). Soboul (1956) assigns 
                                                 
23 However, Lenin’s (1964) assertion that the peculiarity of the American situation was “the availability of unoccupied free land” (p.88) is of 
course the subject of contention. This land was only ‘unoccupied’ and ‘free’ after native Indians had been dispossessed of their land (Byres, 
1996). 
24 At the peak of the social pyramid were the laboureurs-fermiers (the large tenants farmers) and the receveurs de seigneurie (‘the receivers for 
the lords of the manors’), a small group of very rich peasants, however not commonly found across France. They, however, are not assigned 
the same revolutionary role in the transition as the laboureurs class of the rich peasantry (Soboul, 1956). 
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the revolutionary role to a group of rich peasants (laboureurs25), who first began to destroy the 
system of feudal production.  It was through their capacity to accumulate, that a market for 
labour and commodities was created and that the rural community first began to disintegrate, 
confronted by the beginnings of capitalist production. These rich peasants resented the feudal 
system that siphoned off of their surpluses (Goubert, 1956 in Byres, 2009). 
 
However, it was the French Revolution in 1789 that really “cleared the ground for a possible 
unleashing of capitalism” (Byres, 2009: 71). Critically, it abolished feudal rights and its 
inherent social relationships, and established the right to private property which catalysed the 
enclosures and restricted communal rights. The key beneficiaries of this were the rich 
peasantry or laboureurs (who finally established themselves as a class), along with the urban 
middle class. The transition to capitalist agriculture, however, proceeded slowly and unevenly 
throughout France. It was hampered by resistance from within the ranks of the mass of poor 
and middle peasants, who opposed attempts to enclose land. It was not until the end of the 19th 
century, that capitalism was truly unleashed across the French countryside (Soboul, 1956; 
Byres, 2009).  
 
Contemporary implications of the classical agrarian question 
 
In the developing country context, where social and economic development remains a 
challenge, and where transitions to capitalist agriculture remain patchy or incomplete- what is 
the significance of studies of the various pathways of agrarian transition? Given the ecological 
and social contradictions of modern capitalism, and as Moore (2010) has highlighted, the 
ecological limitations of capitalist accumulation, this would also have obvious implications for 
viable pathways in developing countries. Byres’ (1996) comparative study of different paths 
leading to industrial capitalism as a mode of production, illustrates an incredible diversity of 
paths. The Japanese and South Korean paths, for example, illustrate that a transition to 
capitalist agriculture (as in England, Prussia, France and America), is not necessarily a 
prerequisite. In the East Asian case, highly productive peasant farmers were heavily taxed by 
the state, in order to contribute towards an accumulation fund for industrialization (Bernstein, 
2010; Byres, 1991).   
 
Marx himself emphasised the need for historically concrete investigations, and the possibility 
of multiple determinations and forms of capitalist transition. If we judge the forms of capital-
labour relations present in a given country in the Global South according to these classical 
transitions, we may come to inaccurate conclusions as to the dominance of capitalist relations 
in a given social formation. This has led authors to inaccurately refer to ‘semi-feudal’ or ‘pre-
capitalist’ relations.26 However, the scope of global Capitalism as a mode of production clearly 
has a ‘world historical’ character (Bernstein, 2010). In the South African context, in the 1970s 
                                                 
25 They typically were not engaged in sharecropping but rather owned their own plots and some also leased additional land. Many owned no 
more than 40 acres but the larger ones farmed up to 100 acres. They provided credit to the poorer peasants and also hired them to work on their 
land (Goubert, 1956). 
26 This has been particularly common in literature on agrarian change in the Indian context, where as part of ‘the modes of production debate’ 
authors like Bhaduri (1973) have claimed that relations of production in agriculture “have more in common with classical feudalism of the 
master-serf type than with industrial capitalism” (p.120). This is disputed by other authors who claim this characterization misrepresents the 
specificities of capitalist relations in the Indian context (see Lerche et al., 2014 and Harriss 2012).  
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some Marxist scholars, most notably Wolpe (1972), asserted the idea that pre-capitalist forms 
can ‘articulate’ with or exist alongside the dominant capitalist form. This notion has however 
been discredited by several authors (see for example Levin and Neocosmos, 1987; Mafeje, 
1981; Bernstein, 2003) and will be discussed in more detail below in the section on South 
Africa’s agrarian question.  
 
Banaji (1997) has demonstrated how capital can take many diverse forms, and exploits labour 
in an equally diverse number of ways across different social arrangements and historical 
formations. Therefore if we do not find a pure form of “landless labour” or clear processes of 
proletarianisation in the countryside this does not mean that capitalist relations are not 
dominant (Bernstein, 2010). This point is clearly relevant to South Africa and elsewhere on the 
continent where although many people retain access to land (in a plethora of arrangements) 
they have come to increasingly rely on selling their labour-power and are irrefutably subject to 
commodity relations.  Categories such as ‘tenant farmer’, ‘small peasants’ and ‘wage-
labourers’ are in reality incredibly fluid and often very ambiguous. People may occupy several 
of these social places or may move between them at different points of time. Drawing on 
Banaji (1997), Bernstein’s notes the ambiguities of identifying ‘free’ and ‘unfree’ labour under 
capitalism: 
 
“Even if “free” proletarian wage labour remains the most “advanced” form of labour in 
capitalism, and grows in relative weight as capitalism develops, it is not the only type 
of labour exploited by capital; nor, then, can it be uniquely definitive of the origins and 
development of capitalism” (Bernstein, 2010: 34).  
 
Therefore it may not be the existence of the ‘free’ wage labourer, diametrically opposed to the 
capitalist, (who equally takes many forms), that indicates the predominance of capitalist 
relations of production. Brenner’s (2001) idea of the commodification of subsistence might be a 
more useful way to think of how capitalist relations transform social formations, and the ways 
in which diverse classes of labour have to reproduce themselves. The commodification of 
subsistence refers to how people (including small farmers) are unable to reproduce themselves 
outside the bounds of commodity relations, and must meet their livelihoods in part through 
markets. This is the case even when they have access to land and/or other means of production.  
 
Bernstein (1996, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009) has questioned whether under the conditions of 
global capitalism, agriculture is still able to impact on capitalist transformation in developing 
countries, or facilitate (or constrain) the emergence of capital. He contends that there are other 
forms of accumulation, which have become more critical to these dynamics, such as 
manufacturing and services (particularly financial). He thus questions the continued relevance 
of an Agrarian Question of Capital, which has been resolved in his view. This is so, even in the 
context of countries of the global south where economic development remains a nagging 
concern and a seemingly unfinished national project:  
 
“An effect of the profound changes since the 1970s that we term "globalization" is that 
there is no longer an agrarian question of capital on a world scale, nor a "peasant 
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question" in any helpful sense, even though the agrarian question has not been resolved 
in much of the "South" “ (Bernstein, 2011a). 
 
Bernstein (2011a) further argues that by the end of the 1970s predatory landed property (of 
pre-capitalist origins) had mostly disappeared across much of the world, as a force of any 
significance. This was in part a result of the many land reforms, along with other dynamics of 
capitalist accumulation and restructuring that marked the post war period. Another key sign of 
the end of the agrarian question of capital has been the immense growth of global agribusiness. 
Along with this, is the parallel growth in the productivity and extent of capitalist agriculture, 
often driven by state-led development projects. The very nature of agrarian capital or what we 
understand as ‘agriculture’ has therefore undergone immense transformation. When compared 
to the classical paths, contemporary agrarian capital and agriculture are unrecognisable. 
Bernstein (2011a) describes these processes below: 
 
“Agriculture in capitalism today is not synonymous with, nor reducible to, farming, nor 
is it constituted simply as a set of relations between agrarian classes (landed property, 
agrarian capital, labour), as in the "classic" agrarian question. Rather, agriculture is 
increasingly, if unevenly, integrated, organized, and regulated by the relations between 
agrarian classes and types of farms, on one hand, and (often highly concentrated) 
capital upstream and downstream of farming, on the other hand. Moreover, such 
integration and regulation operates through global as well as national (and more local) 
social divisions of labour, circuits of capital, commodity chains, sources and types of 
technical change (including in transport and industrial processing as well as farming), 
and markets”. 
 
Bernstein’s claim that the agrarian question of capital is no longer relevant is however subject 
to intense debate among political economists. Byres (2003), for example, contends that the 
agrarian question of capital is still relevant and that Bernstein’s claim runs the risk of ‘world 
system determinism’, and ignores the importance of ‘national capitals’. O' Laughlin (2016) 
appraises Bernstein’s new rendering of a question of labour in the context of Africa. She notes 
that his framework provides a useful conceptual lens but it should be considered as ‘open’ and 
‘evolving’ and subject to historical specificities: 
 
“The question is not whether the ‘classic’ agrarian question fits contemporary Africa 
but whether the Marxist analytical framework underlying Bernstein’s work on the 
agrarian question still provides us with conceptual handles with which to understand the 
class dynamics of agrarian change in Africa today. I think it does, but it must be taken 
as an open, evolving and debatable framework that retains Marx’s focus on the politics 
of changing the world not through moral appeals to justice but by collectively 
confronting the historically grounded class contradictions of capitalism.”  
 
A final important point that Bernstein makes is that the ‘transnational’ nature of capital has 
effectively ‘decoupled’ it from national labour regimes, which have become increasingly 
fragmented and unable to secure their livelihoods as a result. Capital is now able to by-pass 
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labour regimes, which it perceives as standing in the way of or limiting surplus value 
appropriation in the productive process. This has precipitated a crisis of reproduction among 
fragmented classes of labour, and condemned an every enlarging number to the ‘global reserve 
army of labour’, who are made redundant to the needs of capital. It is here that I now turn to 
the contemporary implication of the Agrarian Question of Labour. 
 
The agrarian question of labour  
 
Bernstein, (2007) acknowledges the contradictions and unevenness of capitalism’s extension 
and the plight of labour, especially in the Global South, and thus contends that there remains an 
agrarian question of labour: 
 
 “The growing global masses of labour pursue their reproduction in conditions of 
increasingly scarce, insecure ‘informal sector’ (‘survival’) activity subject to forces of 
differentiation and oppression along intersecting lines of class, gender, generation, caste 
and ethnicity…It is thus the crisis of labour as a crisis of reproduction… that compels 
attention” (p. 45). 
 
The agrarian question of labour speaks to a crisis of social reproduction, which is rooted in a 
scarcity of employment under modern capitalism. In order to meet simple reproduction, classes 
of labour are compelled to diversify the forms of labour, types of employment and self-
employment, across both urban and rural spaces under increasing exploitation and precarity 
(Bernstein, 2011a). Livelihoods are thus pursued across multiple sites and the various fluid 
identities and social locations of classes of labour, defy fixed notions of ‘urban’/ ‘rural’, ‘petty 
trader’/ ‘farm worker’, ‘employed’ or ‘self-employed’ (Panitch and Leys, 2001).  
 
Many people are also compelled to (re)turn to the land to meet part of their reproductive needs, 
heightening struggles over land. This compels a focus on how the broader crisis of employment 
scarcity under modern capitalism is at the core of struggles over land, its use and its meaning 
(Arrighi and Moore, 2001).  We must also remember, as Bernstein (2011a) aptly warns, that 
these struggles, due to the ways in which labour is fragmented, typically are part of broader 
social and political struggles involving classes of labour outside the countryside. Therefore 
they are not wholly focused on agrarian questions per say. Given the fragmentation of labour, 
class relations and alliances are likely to be ambiguous as Bernstein (2011a: 457-8) 
emphasizes,  
 
“Popular struggles over land are more likely to embody uneasy and erratic, 
contradictory and shifting, alliances of different class elements and tendencies than to 
express the interests of some (notionally) unambiguous and unitary class subject, be it 
proletarian or ‘peasant,’ semi-proletarian, or ‘worker-peasant’  “. 
 
The fragmentation of labour in the former Bantustan’s is even more extreme given the 
particular history of forced removals involved in their formation. Households maintain strong 
linkages to urban areas, making many of these ‘rural areas’ in reality homes for displaced 
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urban workers. This obscures classic notions of ‘the countryside’ or people who live in the 
former homeland’s as ‘rural’ (Bernstein, 1998; Murray, 1987). Both ‘hoe and wage’ have been 
central to the history of the establishment of capitalism across sub-Saharan Africa (Cordell et 
al., 1996).  
 
Livelihoods in the Bantustans in so-called ‘rural areas’ rely far less on farming to meet social 
reproduction, than in other rural areas in the Global South might. Wages, remittances, pensions 
and social grants are the mainstay of livelihoods for most (Bernstein, 1998; Hebinck and van 
Averbeke, 2013).  The agrarian question of labour thus compels a focus on the ways in which 
classes of labour are ‘fragmented’ under global capitalism. This is particularly the case in the 
global south where they must pursue their social reproduction with recourse to increasingly 
scarce, oppressive and insecure wage employment, which is combined in complex 
combinations with equally insecure own-account farming and informal petty trade (Bernstein, 
2011a).  
 
The ‘fragmentation of classes of labour’ poses particular challenges to class analysis. Class 
identities are anything but clear under modern capitalism. The clear divisions between capital, 
labour and landed property, that characterize the classic texts of agrarian political economy are 
no longer clearly distinguishable in contemporary contexts. The various spaces that people 
inhabit may be subject to complex and even conflicting forms of differentiation along lines of 
gender, class, generation and ethnicity (Bernstein, 2011a) This ‘messiness’ of class place also 
speaks to the broader crisis in global capitalism and struggles to reproduce labour as a class or 
capital as capital. In essence it speaks to “the underlying contradiction of a world capitalist 
system that promotes the formation of a world proletariat but cannot accommodate a 
generalized living wage (that is, the most basic of reproduction costs)”(Arrighi and Moore 
2001, 75). 
 
The ‘opaqueness’ of class also serves the interests of capital, (often aligned to the state) in its 
ability to continue to exploit labour in the production process. The rise of social or worker 
ownership across all industries, but also in farming, in arrangements such as joint ventures and 
farmworker equity schemes are good examples of this type of strategy (Minn, 1996). Along 
with class, other social differences also intersect, combine and co-produce each other, such as 
gender, race, generation, ethnicity, lineage and religion, to name a few (Perez Nino, 2016). 
Relational differences are also seized upon by capital in the ways in which they recruit, 
organise and subdue labour in various contexts (Bernstein, 2010). Class dynamics are thus not 
the only ones at work, since they are intermeshed with many other 'determinations', and are 
thus complex, contingent and subject to processes of constant change. Employing a ‘class 
typology’ based on only some key variables always involves a degree of reductionism, and on 
its own explains only some aspects of social reality (Scoones et al. 2012; Cousins 2010; 
Bernstein 2010).   
 
Social reproduction 
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Since the agrarian question of labour requires a focus on the social reproduction of classes of 
labour, it is fitting that we turn to how ‘social reproduction’ has been investigated by political 
economists. Social reproduction is understood as the “creation and recreation of people as 
cultural and social, as well as physical, beings” (Vogel, 2000). As such it goes beyond the 
unpaid ‘care-work’ which Marxist-feminists have highlighted, to include the maintenance of 
human beings in their full set of social relations as members of communities, in networks of 
kinship, marriage, gendered relations and other religious and cultural associations (Cousins et 
al., forthcoming). Social reproduction takes place in various different spaces, from the 
household level, to the market, and also with assistance from the state. Meeting social 
reproduction involves various labour processes, which could be unpaid or paid, communal or 
individual, material or symbolic, and involves mental, emotional and manual labour (Chung, 
2017; Vogel, 2000).  
 
Social reproduction should not be seen as something relegated to the private sphere or reduced 
to the ‘unpaid care economy’, and as such something separate from the ‘commodity economy’ 
(Chung, 2017). The political-economic aspects of social reproduction also involve the 
reproduction of certain labour related skills and social and cultural behaviours and practices. 
These ultimately reinforce class and other types of social difference, essentially reproducing 
labour-power and class society (Katz, 2001; Vogel, 2000; Farris, 2015). Social reproduction is 
also, however, a site of contestation and struggle with uncertain outcomes. 
 
Capitalism as a mode of production internalizes a ‘crisis tendency’ of social reproduction. On 
the one hand, sustained capital accumulation relies on the social reproduction of labour-power. 
However, the constant striving for sustained accumulation uproots the very process of social 
reproduction that it is conditional upon (Fraser, 2016). The point is that this tendency is not 
only a threat to the social reproduction of classes of labour, but also to the continued 
reproduction of the capitalist mode of production itself. This crisis tendency may be witnessed 
at a broader scale in society but its tendencies may also manifest in cases like joint ventures 
that introduce new social relations of production. A JV may displace the labour regimes of 
previous petty commodity producing households with a single capitalist farming entity. Seen 
from this perspective, this not only changes their control over the means of production but may 
also have the effect of uprooting people from the means by which they maintain their social, 
economic and cultural practices, networks, knowledge and memories, which are intimately 
connected to accessing land. This process transforms livelihoods, seen in their fullest totality, 
in ways which lead to the renegotiation of inter and intra-household relations, particularly of 
gender, class and generation (Chung, 2017). 
 
In her study of the Besters Land Reform Project in South Africa, Hornby (2015) found a 
fundamental contradiction between capital accumulation and social reproduction that 
underpinned many conflicts over livelihoods and social organisation. Sarah Berry (1989) has 
also demonstrated the centrality of investments in social networks to meeting social 
reproduction in African agrarian formations. Berry (1989) reveals how even in times of crisis 
or scarcity, individuals and households will continue to invest in various social networks as a 
means to secure future claims to land, labour and other resources. Some researchers have 
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regarded these strategies as ‘unproductive’ use of labour, land or other resources. However this 
ignores the ways in which access to the means of reproducing human life are negotiated in 
many agrarian social formations. The idea of social reproduction allows us to take account of 
the multiple values and uses of land and labour in maintaining life in its fullest economic, 
social and cultural forms. It also allows for gender relations to be placed centrally in defining 
people’s relationship to land and as a key signifier of power, where much of the literature on 
agricultural investments has been ‘gender blind’ (Chung, 2017).  
 
The ecological contradictions of capitalist agriculture 
  
In spite of the immense productivity of capitalist agriculture on a world-scale, it has not 
managed to eliminate hunger and poverty. The signs of capitalist agriculture’s ecological 
contradictions are glaring (Weis, 2010). Scholars such as Moore (2010) and Weis (2007) have 
drawn our attention to the ‘ecological limits’ that restrict the potential of capitalist 
accumulation. Weis (2007) assesses the ‘ecological footprint’ of contemporary industrial 
agriculture, which he links to how our food system is dominated by the ‘grain-livestock 
complex’ 27 . He draws our attention to the contradictions and crises that this system of 
industrial agriculture has induced.  
 
On the one hand, Weis (2007) recognises that the food system is immensely productive and is 
producing more cheap food than ever before, with obvious benefits for the poor. However, on 
the other hand, industrial agriculture has immensely ‘unstable environmental foundations’ and 
has contributed to climate change and loss of biodiversity. There are also several negative 
social impacts such as: the marginalisation of small-farm livelihoods, labour insecurity (people 
are being replaced by technology), farmers are becoming trapped in a “cost-falling price 
squeeze”, unhealthy and toxic food is being produced, and the industrial food system is 
generally “divorcing food from time, space and culture” (Weis, 2007: 45). Araghi (2000: 155) 
also highlights the social contradictions of our so-called ‘productive’ food system, whereby 
“hunger amidst scarcity” has now been replaced by “hunger amidst abundance”. 
 
Moore (2010) views capitalism from within a conception of ‘world-ecology’: “joining together 
the accumulation of capital and the production of nature in dialectical unity” (p.389). He 
interrogates whether concerns over the end of cheap oil and food, that characterize the current 
phase of global capitalism, represents a ‘socio-ecological impasse’ for our global food system. 
He questions whether this is merely the latest crisis among a number of others in the history of 
capitalism. If this is the case, new rounds of accumulation may surely transcend the crisis? Or 
alternatively, are we witnessing an “epochal turning point in the relation of capital, capitalism 
and agricultural revolution?” (p.389) Moore (2010) concludes that there is indeed a 
contradiction between the ecological limitations of nature and capitalist accumulation:  
 
“This is the inner contradiction of the specifically capitalist ecological regime – the 
capitalization of world nature tends to rise faster than the opportunities for 
                                                 
27 See also Dubb (2018) forthcoming PhD thesis 
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appropriation, reducing the ecological surplus. This manifests in rising costs of 
production in agriculture, energy production and other primary sectors. And this can 
only be counteracted by liberating new reservoirs of socialized natures – rivers, natural 
gas fields, peasant societies – for the accumulation process… Today, there surely 
remain ecological spaces relatively untouched by the violence of the commodity form. 
But their relative weight in the world-system is incomparably lower today than it was” 
(p.408-9) 
 
2.3 The Agrarian Question in South Africa: Historical Roots and Dynamics of Class 
Formation in the Former ‘Homelands’ 
 
Morris (1976) likened the process of capitalist transformation that unfolded in South Africa to 
a Prussian Path of agrarian transition. The early development of white agrarian capital was 
characterised by ‘accumulation from above’ (Lenin, 1982) whereby the state made use of its 
power and resources to build the agrarian capital of a small rural elite.  Morris (1976) 
emphasizes the central role of mining in the 19th century in transforming the social relations of 
production in the countryside. Rather than a productive agriculture providing a surplus to 
industry, in South Africa it was the other way around.  
 
Accumulation occurred in the mining sector, which gave a boost to agriculture through an 
increased demand for agricultural commodities from a growing home market. This in turn 
precipitated a change in the social relations of production, because it became more profitable 
for landowners to sell farm produce directly, rather than renting their land to the African 
peasantry. The slow and uneven process, through which the African peasantry was transformed 
into wageworkers, is seen as a crucial mechanism through which agrarian capital emerged in 
South Africa (Morris, 1976).  
 
The formation of South Africa’s Bantustans is also considered to have played a central role in 
the overall development of the capitalist economy. In the radical political economy tradition, 
forged through the pioneering work of authors such as Legassick and Wolpe (1976), the 
Bantustans were understood as constituting ‘pre-capitalist modes of production’, which 
articulated with the dominant capitalist mode of production. In this view, the Bantustans played 
an important role in the development of capitalism because they provided the basis for ‘cheap’ 
migrant labour by essentially subsidising low wages. This was possible because migrants 
reproduced themselves in part through their rural households and own-account agricultural 
production (Wolpe, 1972). Agricultural production was, however, constrained in the 
homelands by this exploitative system and slowly household livelihoods became less reliant on 
farming, as reproduction needs were met primarily through wage labour and migrant 
remittances (Cousins, 2010; Murray, 1995).  
 
Bundy (1979) demonstrated how in the early period of industrialization, conditions for 
accumulation existed and successful African petty commodity producers emerged. However, 
the state’s increasingly discriminatory policies eroded these opportunities, thus marginalising 
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the African peasantry. Radical political economists emphasise how this slow and uneven 
process eventually transformed the peasantry into a proletariat (Levin and Neocosmos, 1989). 
However, this assumption of ‘linear proletarianisation’ is hotly debated in the literature. 
Beinart et al., (1986), for example, emphasize the rich diversity of regional experiences and the 
uncertain outcomes of capitalist development. Switzer (1993: 5) describes the results of the 
extension of capitalist relations in the Ciskei, which  
 
“…gradually undermined and destroyed the reproductive capacity of African household 
production […] A growing portion of the African population- landless peasants, 
agricultural workers, urbanites who did not participate formally in the capitalist sector 
and were not employed by government, and women in a variety of occupations- 
operated on the fringes of the wage-labour economy and collectively composed the 
most disorganized and repressed social category. The vast majority of blacks would 
eventually be reduced to these super-exploited ‘excluded classes’ ”.  
 
It is true that the oppressive character of the labour regime constrained rural class formation in 
the homelands to some extent (Cousins, 2010). However, there has been an unfortunate 
tendency to overstate this homogeneity. Neocosmos and Levin (1989: 238) highlight the lapse 
in reasoning that underlies this view: “the assumption of linear proletarianisation underlying 
Wolpe's thesis obscures the fact that wage remittances may be necessary to subsidise 
agricultural petty commodity production rather than the reverse”. Several authors emphasize 
that in the apartheid period wages and remittances were central to sustaining agricultural 
production (Murray, 1981; Spiegel, 1986; James, 1985; Beinart, 1982). This issue was 
explored in the Ciskei by authors such as de Wet (1985: 90), who asserted that it is “a family's 
participation in the migratory wage labour economy that provides it with the money necessary 
to cultivate”.  
 
In more recent studies, Hebinck and van Averbeke (2013) emphasises that agrarian activities 
continue to contribute significantly to household reproduction in spite of their contribution to 
monetary income being relatively low. Chapter 10 of this thesis will engage further with 
debates around the extent of ‘proletarianisation’ in the former ‘Bantustans’, and provide 
evidence that illustrates that households within these settlements are highly differentiated. 
 
South Africa’s agrarian question is noted to be “extreme and exceptional” (Bernstein, 1996). 
Its trajectory differs both to the forms which emerged in the context of Europe and to those 
which materialised across the African continent. This is notably to do with the character of 
settler colonialism, which was probably more extensive, systematic and arguably more violent 
than elsewhere on the continent. Thus the resulting development of capitalism in South Africa 
was peculiar and complex.  
 
Cousins (2011) argues, for example, that Lenin’s widely applied typology of class 
differentiation cannot be applied to the South African context. This is because of the 
emergence of an African peasantry that was deliberately constrained by the creation of the 
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homelands as labour reserves, and by the appropriation of large farms for the engineering of a 
‘white capitalist farming class’.   
 
Oya (2007) also notes that South Africa stands out as an exception on the African continent. 
Unlike other African contexts, the focal of studies is on the growth of agrarian capitalism and 
the role of ‘rural (agrarian) capitalists’. However, he points out that this ‘impression’ that South 
Africa is a peculiar case also has to do with disagreements and divisions among agrarian 
political economists on the Left, as to the character of capitalist development in Africa. Oya’s 
(2007) research illustrates that in Senegal, for example, one also finds ‘agrarian capitalists’. 
The sparse mention of agrarian capitalism elsewhere on the continent is embedded in the 
impression “that the system has integrated ‘small-scale farmers’ (petty commodity producers) 
rather than ‘agrarian capitalists’ ” (p.455) into the global economy. However, South Africa is 
still peculiar in that it “is associated with settler capitalism and not so much with indigenous 
agrarian capitalists” (Oya, 2007: 455).  
 
Although the roots of agrarian capitalism in South Africa may be ‘peculiar’, this trajectory is 
now transforming somewhat.  This is illustrated by more recent studies, which provide 
evidence of examples of ‘accumulation from below’ among ‘indigenous agrarian capitalists’. 
However, accumulation strategies have remained somewhat constrained by a number of factors 
(see Cousins, 2013; Hornby, 2015).  Overall however, the agrarian economy has remained 
largely untransformed with white agrarian capital remaining indisputably dominant and 
maintaining a monopoly over resources and power (Genis, 2012; Cousins and Walker, 2015).  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The investigation of South Africa’s agrarian question in this chapter has provided a fuller 
understanding of the context in which JVs are taking place. This enables an evaluation of how 
they might fit within (and impact on) processes of agrarian change in South Africa. This will 
be explored in the final chapter of this thesis, after the impact of JVs on livelihoods, land rights 
and social differentiation has been fully explored in the context of the concrete case studies. 
There are a number of key ‘framing debates’ and specific ‘concepts’ that have been reviewed 
in this chapter, which will be useful in analysing empirical data.  
 
Firstly, as a broad ‘framing debate’, Bernstein’s (2011a) rendering of the agrarian question of 
labour has compelled our attention towards the wider crisis of employment under modern 
capitalism, and how classes of labour battle to meet their simple reproduction needs. It is this 
tension which is often at the core of struggles over land, its use and its meaning (Arrighi and 
Moore, 2001).  
 
Struggles emerging in the countryside are implicitly, therefore, also part of broader social and 
political struggles. Conflicts and contestations, which appear to be between specific actors 
located in a rural locality, might actually involve actors outside the countryside and be (at least 
symbolically) part of larger struggles e.g. against the state and systemic and historical class 
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oppression. Conflicts emerging in the context of JVs need to be embedded within this wider 
crisis of reproduction. This thesis therefore also investigates the wider pressures placed on 
household reproduction, and how they interweave in complex ways with the JV intervention to 
produce particular outcomes. 
 
The review also highlights the difficulty in understanding class, because of the myriad ways in 
which class place is fragmented. Bernstein, (2010/1) argues that in most rural areas of the 
Global South, households would be best characterised as ‘fragmented classes of labour’. In 
studies of classical agrarian transition, what at least appeared to be somewhat more ‘pure’ 
forms of landed property, agrarian capital and agrarian labour, fit awkwardly with the messy 
contemporary social realities, and overlapping spaces people locate themselves in to pull 
together their livelihoods.  
 
Lenin’s (1967) framework of poor, middle and rich peasants, has been widely utilised to 
describe general tendencies towards class differentiation in a plethora of different contexts. As 
discussed above, however, Cousins (2010), has argued that it cannot be applied to the South 
African context, because the emergence of a differentiated African peasantry was deliberately 
constrained by the creation of the ‘homelands’. The complexities and specificities of the South 
African context, thus pose a challenge to research employing a class lens.  
 
The approach in this PhD thesis is to avoid reproducing existing class typologies, which fail to 
represent the complexities of class in the South African context. Instead, I use the concept of 
‘general tendencies’ towards class formation, to get to grips with the specificities of local 
realities. The framework for my approach is based in part on Patnaik’s (1987) Labour 
Exploitation Criterion, which is embedded firmly in the Marxist tradition. Patnaik’s empirical 
index, distinguishes peasant classes based on “the degree and type of labour exploitation 
relative to self-employment, as the single most important indicator of class status” (ibid.: 51). 
In Chapter 12, I will discuss Patnaik’s (1987) Labour Exploitation Criterion and elaborate 
more fully on how it has influenced my approach to understanding class dynamics. 
 
Class dynamics are, however, not the only ones at work, and are intermeshed with many other 
‘determinations’. Class place is thus complex, contingent and subject to processes of constant 
change (Scoones et al., 2012; Cousins, 2010; Bernstein, 2010). The challenge is in theorizing 
the ways in which class difference relates to other aspects of social difference. Marxist 
feminists, for example, have typically struggled to explain the way in which these multiple 
oppressions and privileges are experienced, sometimes as distinct relations and at other times 
as a part of a social totality in different spaces in society and in the home. ‘Intersectionality 
feminism’ provides a useful way of understanding social differentiation. It emphasizes how 
different aspects of social difference are produced and continually reproduced in a dynamic 
relationship with each other (Ferguson, 2016).  
 
Peters (2004) also notes that “differentiation takes many forms- including youth against elders, 
men against women, ethnic and religious confrontations- these also reveal new social divisions 
that, in sum, can be seen as class formation” (p.291). This PhD will make use of this nuanced 
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and fluid understanding of class formation and social differentiation, as a way to try and 
grapple with the complex intragroup struggles emerging in the wake of these JV interventions. 
The focus of my research is on understanding how class interacts with other aspects of social 
difference such as gender, kinship, ethnicity and generation (Bernstein, 2011a).  
 
The concept of social reproduction is another central concept I will make use of in this PhD. 
Hornby (2014) and Manenzhe (2016) have highlighted the tensions which capitalist farming 
introduces in arrangements such as JVs and commercial farming undertaken by CPAs. 
Difficult choices must be made between capital accumulation and furthering the aims of the 
farming enterprise, or paying out profits in the form of dividends to meet the urgent demands 
of social reproduction experienced by poorer households. The idea of social reproduction also 
allows us to take account of the multiple values and uses of land and labour in maintaining life 
in its fullest economic, social and cultural forms. It also allows for relationships of gender, kin 
and generation, for example, to be placed centrally in defining people’s relationship to land and 
as a key signifier of power (Chung, 2017).  
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Chapter 3. The Political Economy of Inclusive Business Models and 
Agricultural Investments  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
JVs are one of many ‘inclusive business models’ that aim to involve poor people in agricultural 
value chains as owners, producers and/or employees (Cotula & Leonard, 2010).  
 
 “Inclusive business models in the agricultural sector are widely seen as a means of 
providing access to capital, information and markets for smallholders and communities 
who may otherwise be marginalised from the economic mainstream and are therefore 
seen by many as an effective means of rural development” (Lahiff et al., 2012: 3) 
 
This chapter reviews the existing literature on inclusive business models (like Joint Ventures) 
and other agricultural investments, and the role they have played to date in rural development 
and agrarian reform. I begin by first defining relevant terminology and looking at how JVs and 
similar agricultural investment models are constituted. I then explore the drivers of these 
investments in terms of both the South African and the global development paradigm. Based 
on the existing literature, I offer some possible explanations for the dominance of such models. 
The review looks at how they can be explained within the context of agrarian change, and how 
global capitalism is reshaping capital-labour relations. I will use some of the key concepts 
already discussed in Chapter 2 to help elucidate the emerging issues in this Chapter.  
 
In this Chapter I also look at the different, and often contrasting ways in which the 
phenomenon of ‘inclusive business models’ has been understood and evaluated across 
theoretical paradigms. These various frameworks tend to pose very different types of questions 
and have diverse conceptual tools at their disposal to make sense of empirical data. This 
chapter begins to analyse the implications of adopting a Marxist conceptual framework for the 
research approach 28 . I clarify my position among these various schools of thought and 
summarise a range of analytical concepts that will be used to analyse my case studies. Having 
acknowledged how the focus of research and its results are shaped by different paradigms, I 
explore some of the evidence on the outcomes and impacts of JVs in different contexts.  
 
Since JVs are a relatively new model, evidence of its impacts on livelihoods and land rights are 
patchy. Conceptual frameworks to analyse these impacts and the models broader significance 
are also not robust as of yet. This literature review therefore draws on evidence from other 
‘inclusive business models’, particularly contract farming, which has the most prolific 
contributions from Marxist political economists, as well as worker share equity schemes, which 
have been implemented for far longer in South Africa than JVs have 29. I also draw on the vast 
literature on ‘land grabs’, which have involved a range of models for organising production.  
                                                 
28 Methodology will be discussed in more detailed in Chapter 4. 
29 Sharecropping will also be discussed in Chapter 6 since it is relevant to the social relations of production involved in the ‘sharemilking’ 
model.  
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3.2 ‘Inclusive Business Models’ in South Africa 
 
“Inclusive business is simply a way of achieving typical business objectives, such as 
profitability, supply security and market share. But also, yes, it is different from most 
businesses. Inclusive business models are often highly creative solutions that buy from, 
or sell to, substantial numbers of people with low income. Innovation is often achieved 
through engagement with non-traditional business partners such as producer 
associations or non- profit organizations, enabling companies and other stakeholders to 
pool financial investment, skills, contacts and other resources” (IFAD, 2012: 7). 
 
‘Inclusive business models’ in agriculture have also been referred to as ‘agricultural 
investments’, ‘collaborative business models’ (Cotula & Leonard, 2010), ‘mutually beneficial 
partnerships’ (FAO, 2002), ‘ways to do business with the poor’ (BIF, 2011; Wach, 2012), and 
in the South African context as ‘strategic partnerships’ (Bitzer and Bijman, 2014; Aliber and 
Maluleke, 2010). Inclusive business models include a range of different models including: 
Joint Ventures, contract farming30, sharecropping, tenant farming, lease contracts, farm worker 
share-equity schemes, management contracts other upstream and downstream business links 
(Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010; Cotula and Buxton, 2010; IFAD, 2012). These various models 
aren’t neatly separated, as it is common for models to overlap and be combined into hybrid 
forms (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010).  
 
Literature highlights that in order for a business model to be considered ‘inclusive’ or 
‘collaborative’, it should have a specific concern for fair, equitable and sustainable terms of 
agreement, and should “genuinely share value between the parties” (Cotula and Buxton, 2010: 
6). Doubts however persist regarding the extent of ‘inclusiveness’ and whether in practice these 
models result in the same asymmetries of power and benefits as outright land acquisitions (Hall 
et al., 2015; Borras and Franco, 2012; Lahiff et al., 2012; Murray Li, 2011; Vorley, et al., 2009; 
Hart, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2002). Research typically highlights how by their very nature, they 
connect two sets of players- ‘smallholders’ and agribusiness-who meet at the table with 
radically different negotiating power (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010). However, the evaluation 
of such models differs depending on the school of economic thought, which is discussed 
further below.  
 
In the South African context, inclusive business models are often referred to as ‘strategic 
partnerships’ (Bitzer and Bijman, 2014; Aliber and Maluleke, 2010). The term is most often 
used to refer to JVs, management contracts and lease agreements, which are usually 
‘government-facilitated arrangements’ (Bitzer and Bijman, 2014). Lahiff et al (2012: 7) 
describe the specificities of these arrangements to the South African context: 
 
                                                 
30 Contract farming and outgrower schemes involve arrangements which link smallholders to an agro-processor (Aliber and Maluleke, 2010). 
They differ to JVs in that production is carried out by smallholders. Whereas in a JV, it is possible that landowners do not control the 
production process but instead are recipients of dividends and land use fees, or are involved as wage labourers. In the context of land reform in 
South Africa, contract farming is not as common, although it is often mentioned as a possible way of improving the land reform programme 
(Aliber and Maluleke, 2010). 
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“In distinction to the way in which the term is used in the international business 
literature, the term ‘strategic partnership’ is used here (and widely in South Africa) to 
signify a joint venture or other form of collaboration between an established 
commercial firm and a new (or ‘emerging’) group of workers, shareholders, small 
farmers, entrepreneurs or community members with limited commercial experience and 
little or no access to finance or leading-edge markets. Such collaborations typically 
have social as well as economic objectives, including empowerment of workers, 
women or other previously disadvantaged groups, skills transfer, accelerated career 
paths and creation of trading opportunities for small and micro enterprises.”  
 
Joint Ventures can take diverse forms. Governance and financial arrangements, equity 
ownership of farm operating companies and farm assets, and lease agreements tend to vary 
widely. However, all of these arrangements entail some form of partnership between 
agribusiness and ‘communities’ with access to land (Aliber et al. 2008). In the South African 
case it is necessary to redefine some of the terminology when talking about JVs, to more 
accurately reflect the specificities of the context. Most JVs are implemented in the context of 
the restitution programme31 or in the former homelands. In both contexts ‘community partners’ 
may have long been estranged from agrarian based livelihoods. Given this, the widely used 
terms of ‘farmer’ or ‘smallholder’, to describe the communities who partner with agribusiness, 
sits uncomfortably with local realities. Hence Mayson (2003:1) refers to arrangements 
involving black people with existing or recently restored land rights:  
 
“They [JVs] involve black people who currently have land rights or who are land 
reform beneficiaries and will be receiving a government subsidy on the one hand, and 
white commercial farmers, corporate entities or sectors of government on the other, 
engaging in joint agricultural or other land-related production”. 
  
A JV arrangement typically entails the establishment of a jointly owned operating company. 
The claimant community in the case of restitution, or the communal landowners in the case of 
the former homelands own at least half the shares 32  and the strategic partner owns the 
remainder. ‘Community actors’ are typically represented by a trust, cooperative or CPA. In 
these arrangements it is common for the strategic partner to provide working capital, while the 
government funds investment in fixed assets. The operating company sometimes pays land use 
fees to the organisation (trust, cooperative or CPA) that represents the community, while a 
management fee is paid to the strategic partner. There may also be specific agreements over the 
course of the contract (typically 10-15 years), in which the partner promises to transfer skills 
and provide training to landowners. Preferential access to jobs is also usually provided to the 
local community or landowning households, as well as other contracting opportunities e.g. 
fencing (Aliber and Maluleke, 2010; Lahiff et al., 2012; Cousins and Gumede, 2017).  
 
                                                 
31 They have also been implemented in the redistribution programme to a lesser degree (Lahiff et al., 2012). 
32  In some cases where substantial upfront capital is required which is taken as a loan from a financial institution like the Industrial 
Development Corporation rather than a government grant, equity ownership may differ. In these cases often the financial institution owns a 
portion of the operating company, which is only handed over to the community upon payment of their loan. This was the case in one of 
Amadlelo’s JV farms in Middledrift, for example. 
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When we situate the JV model of agricultural development within an analysis of relations of 
land, labour and capital in South Africa33, it becomes clear why a model in which private 
sector actors are supposed to lead development has become so dominant. Since Africans have 
been historically marginalized in the agriculture sector, concerns have abounded regarding the 
‘viability’ of supporting a differentiated small to medium-scale sector of black farmers. This 
has led to the belief that promoting equity ownership of existing farms and other agricultural 
enterprises, alongside secure employment is more pragmatic (Cousins and Scoones 2010; 
Davis, 2014).  
 
In another sense, the overwhelming emphasis on JVs as the only pathway into the commercial 
agriculture sector for so-called ‘emerging farmers’, is also indicative of a specific vision of 
‘transformation’ which has been limited by government’s historical ‘social compact’ with 
agribusiness. This has structured the direction of land and agrarian reform since the democratic 
transition in 1994 (Bernstein, 1996/8). This also explains Cousins' (2015) contention that the 
key beneficiaries of land and agrarian reform have been agribusiness enterprises and large-
scale commercial farmers; some of whom are benefiting tremendously from JVs and other 
strategic partnership models. 
 
It is difficult to report unequivocally on the extent of the JV model and other strategic 
partnerships in South Africa’s overall land and agrarian reform programme, because it is not 
reliably reported on. However, in 2012 the Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform stated in its mid-term review that 264 strategic partners and 117 mentors had been 
appointed (DRDLR 2013: xx). In a report to parliament in 2015 the portfolio committee on 
rural development and land reform claimed that 1351 projects had been established with 437 
strategic partners (PMG, 2015: 2). 
 
Cousins and Gumede’s (2017) national scan of agricultural investments in communal areas 
found 20 JV schemes, which were operational at the time of their research. During my own 
preliminary fieldwork in 2015 in the former Ciskei in South Africa’s Eastern Cape Province, I 
came across nine JV schemes (involving the establishment of 16 farms because some 
agribusiness partners had entered into multiple arrangements). These JV farms were producing 
a variety of commodities including milk, macadamias, pomegranates, citrus, pineapples, 
berries, wool, and ostrich meat. However, five of the nine JV schemes had been established, 
only to soon after fall into disrepair.   
 
My own research experience is thus commensurate with that of other authors, who have 
suggested that many JVs in South Africa have struggled to take-off and end up collapsing after 
major losses for both strategic partners and communities (Lahiff et al, 2012; Vermeulen and 
Cotula, 2010; Tapela, 2005; Aliber and Maluleke, 2010; Pellizzoli, 2009; Davis, 2014; Cousins 
and Gumede, 2017). In the cases I researched, collapse was usually a result of a host of reasons 
including: lack of funding and support from government and strategic partners, conflicts 
between target communities and strategic partners, intragroup conflicts within beneficiary 
groups, and particularly conflicts between communities and traditional leaders. In several of 
                                                 
33 This was discussed above in detail in the previous chapter 
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these cases, frustrations among the wider community led to the JV farms being vandalised (or 
to threats of vandalism) by the intended beneficiaries. This PhD will look at how this can be 
explained and what contradictions inherent to the model might be responsible for these types of 
outcomes. I interrogate what appears to be a contradiction in some cases, between the 
dynamics of capitalist farming and the demands of social reproduction experienced by socially 
differentiated communities. Some of these tensions and dynamics have already been discussed 
in Chapter two above.  
3.3. Drivers of Inclusive Business Models  
 
The trend in South African land and agrarian reform to overly rely on JVs reflects global 
trends. Many governments and international organisations strongly promote inclusive business 
models. The question is, what are the key drivers behind what appears to be a global 
phenomenon? (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010; IFAD, 2012; Haralambous et al., 2009). Current 
debates regarding appropriate models for agricultural development, come at a time when there 
has been growing criticism of ‘global land grabs’, as a result of the intense acceleration of 
land-based investments since 2007. This is a “phenomenon unmatched since colonial times” 
(Hall et al., 2015: 1). Africa finds itself at the centre of this land rush, accounting for 70% of 
total investments, according to some estimates. These investments have been driven, in part, by 
the perception of Africa as the last reserve of unused or under-utilised farmland (Deininger et 
al., 2011; World Bank, 2009).  
 
Accounts of the causes and drivers of the land rush have often entailed the promotion of single-
driver explanations such as ‘the global food crisis’ in a context of a growing demographic, or 
the new opportunities for capital accumulation presented by ‘biofuels’. Some studies have 
however endeavoured to provide more complex multi-casual explanations (Oya, 2013a). This 
often involves a combination of the tendency towards financialisation of capital under global 
capitalism, which has driven speculative acquisitions (Fairbairn et al., 2014), along with the 
global financial crisis of 2007/8, and the related food and energy crises  (Hall et al., 2015; 
Cotula et al., 2013/4; IFAD, 2012; Cooke et al., 2011; Borras et al., 2011; Haralambous et al., 
2009; White et al., 2012; Anseeuw et al., 2013)  
 
International organisations such as the FAO have responded to fears of ‘land grabs’ by 
developing multilateral agreements and tools, in collaboration with states and civil society to 
regulate these investments e.g. the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests. Some civil society actors see this as progress towards protecting rights 
of local communities (Seufert, 2013; Mckeon, 2013; Hall et al., 2015). Others worry that it 
misses the fundamental point of the problematic direction of agrarian change that models of 
agricultural investments promote. De Schutter (2010), particularly worries that such policy 
approaches may promote ‘responsible’ ways of dispossessing the peasantry, and that the 
investment model of large-scale capitalist farming fails to remedy the challenges faced by rural 
communities (de Schutter, 2010/1).   
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“Accelerating the shift towards large-scale, highly mechanized forms of agriculture will 
not solve the problem. Indeed, it will make it worse. The largest and best-equipped 
farms are highly competitive, in the sense that they can produce for markets at a lower 
cost. But they also create a number of social costs that are not accounted for in the 
market price of their output” (de Schutter, 2010) 
 
Many of these large-scale land investments have resulted in plantation models involving large-
scale acquisitions or long-term leases of land by agribusiness, whereby the farming operation 
and related value-chains are exclusively owned by the corporate (Cooke et al., 2011; 
Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010; Cotula et al., 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; World 
Bank, 2008). Governments and international organisations have thus posed ‘inclusive business 
models’ as ‘alternatives’ to the plantation and outright acquisition model, which involve little 
or no role or benefits for local communities. However, Cotula and Buxton (2010) contend that 
these models might not be preferable in all contexts to a plantation model. In some cases, 
smallholder farming might also be more appropriate.  
 
There is widespread agreement among international organisations including the FAO, IFAD 
and World Bank, that supporting smallholder farming is key to reducing rural poverty and 
improving agricultural productivity. It is clear that the strength of the ‘smallholder efficiency’ 
thesis has also influenced the growth of ‘inclusive business models’ and its adoption by 
governments and international agencies.  This is embedded in research that has sought to prove 
that small farms are more efficient than large-scale producers and that there is an ‘inverse 
relationship’ between the size of a farm and productivity. Much of this research has been 
driven the mainstream economic tradition (Lipton, 1977/1996, Binswanger & Deininger, 
1996).  
 
Marxist agrarian economists however criticise the logic of this ‘inverse relationship’ and 
particularly the absence of a class based analysis of ‘smallholders’ (Bernstein, 2010; Byres, 
2006; Cousins, 2010). Marxist theory also acknowledges that under certain conditions large-
scale farming can indeed be more productive. Some theorists go so far as to suggest that the 
large-scale farming can in fact produce more benefits for the poorest classes of the rural poor 
(Sender and Johnson, 2004).  
 
The form that investments take, particularly JVs, however, are often in reality modelled on the 
logic of large-scale farming, imposing models of capital-intensive farming on smallholders. 
Pellizzoli (2009), for example, found that in the context of agricultural investments on 
irrigation schemes in both South Africa and Mozambique, the types of production systems 
adopted are strongly influenced by an “efficiency” discourse. It opposes the use of irrigated 
land for subsistence agriculture, even though it is a major livelihood strategy in both areas. The 
emphasis on strategic partnerships in South Africa is a product of the state’s overarching 
neoliberal politics, which have affected the political economy of agriculture as well (Bitzer and 
Bijman, 2014; Fraser, 2007). It is also a response to the reality of the agrarian landscape, which 
as discussed above in Chapter 2, is characterized by concentration of both land and capital 
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(Cousins, 2015; Bernstein, 1996/8). JVs thus fit neatly into the government’s concerns for 
‘technological dynamism and international competitiveness’ (Bitzer and Bijman, 2014).  
 
Since JVs are a relatively newer inclusive business model, it is worth reviewing some of the 
literature that has provided explanations for the growth of other arrangements. Little and Watts 
(1994) and Oya (2012) argued that the proliferation of contract farming in Sub-Saharan Africa 
was driven by reforms introduced under structural adjustment and liberalization in a neoliberal 
context. Perez-Nino (2014) however argues that the immense variety of experiences and 
contexts mean that it is not possible to formulate an all-encompassing theory of contract 
farming.  
 
There are, however, certain historical tendencies and continuities that can be explained. Gibbon 
and Ponte (2005) explain the phenomenon of contract farming as a means for agrarian capital 
to incorporate land and labour into the productive process at lower costs (accessing cheap 
smallholder and often household labour) and also avoiding risks associated with employing 
people directly and investing capital into fixed assets. Wilson (1986) had observed that contract 
farming arrangements were typical among ‘undercapitalised peasantries’ where access to 
labour is abundant. Perez-Nino (2014) also emphases the dynamics of labour availability and 
mobilisation within and outside of households as a central dynamic of contract farming and one 
often ignored in accounts, including Little and Watts (1994), which exclusively focus on the 
relation between buyers and farmers.  
 
Political economy literature has also highlighted the political motives behind states supporting 
contract farming schemes. It avoids the tendency that local producers are dispossessed or 
squeezed out as capitalist relations of production and competition become dominant. The 
model can also be harnessed to garner political support for the state if promotion of contract 
farming schemes is seen as a form of political patronage (Ochieng 2010; Oya 2012). 
Mackintosh (1989) puts forward an interesting and compelling explanation for the promotion 
of contract farming schemes in Senegal. She conceptualises them as a mechanism by which the 
government dealt with the concerning socioeconomic implications of hastening rural 
proletarianisation. In this view they are seen as a mechanism “to tie people to the land, 
transform the social organisation of small-scale farming, reduce labour solidarity, and 
incidentally increase the share of risk borne by local producers” (XV). 
 
Wallerstein and Hopkins (1994) provide a persuasive explanation for the organisation of 
commodity chains in terms of the cyclical shifts of the capitalist world economy in periods of 
economic contraction and expansion, which could assist in understanding why we are seeing a 
proliferation of agricultural investments in recent years. They emphasise that two of the central 
concerns of capital are firstly, the reduction of transaction costs and secondly, the reduction of 
labour costs. However, meeting these concerns commonly requires quite opposite changes in 
social organization and geographical location. Their in-depth historical analysis has illustrated 
how during periods of expansion, reduction of transaction costs take priority over reduction of 
labour costs. Transaction costs can be reduced through vertical integration and geographical 
convergence of the boxes (separate production processes) making up a commodity chain. In 
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periods of contraction however, reducing labour costs becomes the priority, which is achieved 
through subcontracting (i.e. adding boxes) and through geographical dispersion of boxes 
(Wallerstein and Hopkins, 1994). Given that global capitalism is currently in a period of 
economic contraction, the interest of agribusiness in agricultural investments like JVs and 
contract farming could be partly explained by the need to reduce labour costs. This may 
involve contextual determinants in specific countries where capital is confronted with specific 
social and political pressures, leading it to (re)organise in particular ways.  
 
From a political economy perspective, the extent to which inclusive business models have 
entailed varying degrees of vertical integration or dispersion overtime must also be explained 
in terms of politics. The political environment may at times make corporate control over land 
and domination over the full agricultural value chain politically untenable e.g. in light of policy 
support for smallholders, ensuing land reform initiatives and increasing labour organisation 
(Oya, 2012). Domestic governments have also added to the momentum of investments in 
agriculture by providing incentives and identifying ‘idle land’, which can be allocated to 
agribusiness in JV arrangements (Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010). The globalising tendency of 
agribusiness also explains the rise of these arrangements. Agribusiness is always seeking new 
opportunities for accumulation and this often requires changing the patterns of labour 
exploitation (Oya, 2012).   
 
Alden-Wily (2012) suggests that the current land rush needs to be viewed within a longer, 
historical lens and that it is part of a longer drive towards enclosure and dispossession linked to 
land and agricultural commercialisation, which is a general characteristic of global capitalism. 
Hall et al., (2015) similarly remark that despite the contextual differences in their various case 
studies the implications of processes of ‘agricultural commercialisation’ for the character of 
agrarian change showed remarkable similarities in its tendencies: 
 
“In all our case studies, even where the land acquired is not community land or held 
under customary tenure, the process is towards privatisation of land rights, 
commodification of land and natural resources and towards social differentiation” (Hall 
et al., 2015: 8).  
3.4 Opposing Discourses: Views on Inclusive Business Models Across Theoretical 
Paradigms  
 
A comprehensive literature review reveals that ‘inclusive business models’ have been theorised 
in diverse ways by contrasting conceptual schools of thought. However, even within these 
dominant conceptual schools, approaches and views on understanding inclusive business 
models can vary widely. There also tends to be some conceptual overlaps between these 
paradigms, and thus they can’t always be neatly separated.  
 
The conceptual basis of these models emerged from mainstream economics approaches and the 
international development and livelihoods approach. Researchers at the International Institute 
for Environment and Development (IIED), for example, have written prolifically on this topic 
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and can be located, more or less, in the latter school of thought. They tend to be concerned with 
analysing relationships between private sector actors and small farmers and evaluating 
livelihood outcomes of these models. Impacts and outcomes are particularly analysed through 
the dominant “Ownership, Voice, Risk and Reward” framework (see for example Vermeulen 
and Cotula, 2010; Cooke et al., 2011; Cotula et al., 2009; IFAD, 2012; Cotula & Leonard, 
2010; Liversage, 2010). Cotula and Vermeulen’s (2010) framework, is probably the most 
dominant and widely used to analyse agricultural investments. However, it is clearly limited to 
a certain set of concerns.  
 
Mainstream economics, particularly those from the New Institutional Economics (NIE) variant, 
have tended to create representations of inclusive business models as ‘win-wins’ if strong and 
equitable contracts can be put in place (see Deininger & Byerlee, 2012; Karaan, 2003; Kirsten 
& Satorius, 2002; Sesil et al., 2001). This type of literature is often aligned with the good 
governance approach of the neoliberal agenda (Murray Li, 2007). The aim is not to question 
the fundamental basis of inclusive business models, as the internal logic is regarded as given. 
The point of departure is rather to identify the conditions under which such arrangements can 
become economically viable (Smalley, 2013). Mainstream accounts often frame these 
investment models, as ‘innovations’ that overcome what is understood fundamentally as a 
problem of ‘unequal market access’ (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012; Karaan, 2003). Many of these 
studies are merely concerned with issues of efficiency and tend to relegate unfavourable 
outcomes to problems of scarcity and inappropriate application of land, labour and capital 
(Smalley, 2013; Davies, 2014).  
 
In mainstream economics accounts, inclusive business models are said to be designed in ways 
that “do not leave behind small-scale farmers” (Vorley et al., 2009:187). They are thus 
believed to involve a pushback against a tendency of replacing smallholders with large-scale 
capitalist farms. They have been likened to an attempt to create “inclusive capitalism”, where 
previously excluded interests particularly of the poor are incorporated into capitalist-driven 
imperatives (Hart, 2007 in Davis, 2014). The focus on driving rural development through a 
deliberate attempt to link smallholders to formal markets is seen as constituting a “paradigm 
shift in the political economy of international development since the late 1990s” (Bitzer and 
Bijman, 2014: 168). Under this paradigm ‘the problem’ is conceptualised as market failure, 
requiring multi-actor collaboration and a specific role of business in processes of social and 
economic development. The increasing concentration, competition and stringent standards of 
global agricultural value chains have made it difficult for smallholders to access them. 
Inclusive business models are seen as a mechanism “to unlock the potential of global markets 
for growth and poverty reduction” (Bitzer and Bijman, 2014: 168).  
 
A criticism of some of the mainstream economics literature is that it has tended to be overly 
descriptive and has had a misplaced emphasis on processes around establishing contracts and 
on governance challenges (Oya, 2013b). Murray Li, (2007) has argued that focusing 
exclusively on governance, contractual issues and questions of efficiency, renders ‘technical’ 
investments in land and puts a veil over the politics of land deals, which are laden with unequal 
power relations. The political nature of the alliances drawn between capital and the state to 
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target and enclose the land of rural people are overlooked by this approach (Murray Li, 
2011/4). The assertion that the socio-economic issues facing rural communities can be 
explained by the absence of technical measures, ignores the fact that decent livelihoods for 
classes of labour have historically been hard won through struggles waged on the political 
front, between different social classes (Borras and Franco, 2012). Issues pertaining to equity 
and unequal power relations are, however, considered by some authors of the mainstream 
economics paradigm (Simmons, 2002, Deininger et al, 2011; Bitzer and Bijman (2014). Bitzer 
and Bijman (2014: 183), for example, assert that:  
 
“Considering the context of South Africa, strategic partnerships should be judged not 
merely on their performance as instruments for market access for emerging farmers, but 
must also answer the question of how far they contribute to addressing the country’s 
unequal agrarian structures. Partnerships have turned into a political project and are 
widely debated owing to their close ties to broader transformations. “ 
 
Radical political economy approaches are generally concerned with issues such as the 
character of agrofood systems, food security, unequal power relations, the investment scale of 
farming, and dynamics of social differentiation (see Davies, 2014; Pellizzoli, 2009; Hall et al., 
2015; Murray Li, 2007/11/14; Aliber and Maluleke, 2010; Lahiff et al., 2012; Smalley, 2013; 
Lahiff, 2008; Borras and Franco, 2012; Tapela, 2005). Unequal power relations and their 
structural dynamics are a dominant concern in many studies within the agrarian political 
economy approach. Scholars highlight the limited decision-making power, and the political and 
economic leverage available to community partners, as compared to the characteristic 
dominance of the agribusiness partner (Hall et al., 2015; Derman, et al. 2006, Bolwig et al. 
2010, Spierenburg et al. 2012).  
 
Understanding how this power relates to control over different parts of the value chain, and 
influence among different actors and governance institutions is strongly emphasized by many 
authors across paradigms (Davies, 2013; Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010; Cotula et al., 2010; 
Cooke et al., 2011; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000, 2004; Gereffi, et al. 2005; Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005). Whereas mainstream economists see the integration of smallholders into markets as the 
remedy to overcome poverty and inequality, agrarian political economists generally caution 
that linking farmers to markets through partnerships isn’t a panacea: 
 
“How the market develops is as important as whether it develops: if it undermines non-
monetary economic solidarity without raising productivity, then it may make farmers’ 
situation markedly worse” (Mackintosh, 1989: XVI).  
 
Although many authors do explore dynamics of social differentiation, some of the literature 
documenting agricultural investments tends to be blind to dynamics of social differentiation. In 
some accounts “family farmers” or “smallholders” constitute a class (McMichael, 2006; van 
der Ploeg, 2008). This has been seen by critics as an attempt to create the façade of a united 
front among the peasantry (Bernstein, 2010). Populist representations of agricultural 
investments framed predominantly as ‘land grabs’, tend to oppose capitalist development 
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regardless of the outcomes for local people (see McMicheal, 2012; Pearce, 2012; La Via 
Campesina, 2012; Oxfam, 2011; Grain, 2008). The resulting literature tends to create crude 
caricatures of capitalism and reproduces unhelpful binaries such as a predatory capital (the 
baddies) versus homogenous peasants (the goodies). This has the unfortunate effect of 
obscuring the messier reality of local politics on the ground (Oya, 2013b).  
 
Lastly, Marxist political economists are concerned with issues such as: capital/ labour relations, 
accumulation dynamics, class formation and social differentiation, and the logic of value (see 
for example Manenzhe, 2016; Perez-Nino, 2016; Dubb, 2016/8; Glover and Kusterer, 2016; 
Oya, 2013; Mackintosh, 1989). These studies would also be concerned with similar issues 
discussed above by other paradigms: Who owns what? Who gets what? (e.g. ownership, 
benefits and risks). However, they would go further to analyse the distribution of property 
rights, benefits and risks at inter and intra household (or group) levels. Therefore important 
relationships and dynamics of power are not relegated to those between ‘communities’ and 
‘agribusiness’.  
 
Marxist accounts would also be concerned with the social relations of production (who does 
what?) and accumulation dynamics (what do they do with it?) The last two concerns are not 
always explicitly present across the other paradigms, or at least, they are not given the same 
significance e.g. analysing the implications for wider capitalist development, agrarian change 
and class dynamics. There are however, some definite conceptual overlaps between the 
concerns of Marxists and radical political economy and it is not always easy to locate authors 
definitively.   
 
Under the general framework of the agrarian question of labour (Bernstein, 2009), Marxist 
accounts focus on the implications of inclusive business models for meeting the social 
reproduction of classes of labour. Authors like Oya (2013b) and Murray Li (2011), for 
example, suggest that the outcomes of land deals for labour should be our central concern. 
Access to land is thus important, only in so far as it forms a crucial source for livelihoods.  
 
Murray Li (2011) also emphasizes the need to look both at the impact on people who are 
displaced by land deals, as well as those not displaced but whose livelihoods may be 
transformed by a changing agrarian context. This means understanding the nature of the 
agrarian capital that is forming in the wake of land investments and whether it is providing 
more and better employment opportunities for the rural poor. This approach is quite contrary to 
the rights-based discourse on access to land, which commonly overlooks whether it supports 
labour or not, as it is more concerned with the inherent value of the land rights themselves 
(Oya, 2013b).  
 
In the South African context, there are not many studies that have taken an explicit Marxist 
analysis of JVs. However, some studies have employed a class lens, and have explored how 
benefits and risks are mediated by different aspects of social difference and intragroup 
conflicts, based on dynamics of gender, ethnicity and generation (Manenzhe, 2016; Davies, 
2014; Aliber and Maluleke, 2010; Pellizzoli, 2009). These kinds of studies are an exception to 
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the broader literature, which has been mostly descriptive or based within mainstream 
economics. Much of the existing literature on Joint Ventures provides only a partial picture of 
the full significance of these interventions in terms of the questions of interest to the Marxist 
agrarian political economy tradition. The Marxist literature is much more prolific on contract 
farming. The arguments employed are thus somewhat more developed, given the longer history 
of these arrangements (see Perez-Nino, 2016; Dubb, 2016; Glover and Kusterer, 2016; Glover, 
1984; Little and Watts, 1994).  
 
Modern capitalism and worker equity or ‘social ownership’  
 
“The complicated arrangements whereby community members are landowners through 
the Trust, indirectly own the community businesses through the Trust but are also 
employees of the business has presented challenges” (Cotula and Buxton, 2010: 30).  
 
The above statement speaks to a deeper logic of the JV model under the workings of global 
capitalism, which above all has a tendency to fragment class place. ‘Community owners’ find 
themselves in the confounding and antagonistic class places of labour, capital and landed 
property. Questions of interest to political economy include: why is capital organising in this 
way? What are the likely consequences for agrarian change and the broader development of the 
economy? What are the implications of this model for class relations?  
 
Under modern capitalism providing employees with equity ownership in a firm has become a 
global trend across sectors. Social or worker ownership is a way to deal with the inability of 
firms to raise wages in a context of economic stagnation and declining profits. It’s thus a 
mechanism to avoid labour unrest that might arise from falling living standards in a context 
where workers are being squeezed by stagnant or decreasing wages or entirely squeezed out by 
rising unemployment (Minns, 1996; Sesil et al., 2001).  
 
This form of ‘social ownership’ is regarded differently across theoretical paradigms. Some 
Marxist political economists see it, as a mechanism for the neoliberal state in a post-Keynesian 
world “to reconcile the competing claims of capital and labour” (Minns, 1996: 42). Within the 
bounds of the state’s compromised capacity to provide social security these new financial 
forms are seen as contributions to social welfare. Giving workers equity in a company is a 
means for dealing with social conflict between capital and labour and making it appear that 
workers are now also capitalists. However, the consequences of this restructuring have not 
resulted in a genuine shift in power towards workers (Minns, 1996).  
 
Although clearly worker equity shares in corporate businesses differ to the types of equity 
share schemes analysed in the land sector, I think it is still useful to contextualise inclusive 
business models in agriculture within these general tendencies of how capital is reorganising 
on a global scale. Furthermore these schemes need to be seen within the broader context of the 
general ‘tendency of the rate of profit to fall’ under capitalism. The ‘law’ posits that because 
technical progress under capitalism tends to involve labour-saving technologies, this induces 
the rate of profit to fall. The effect is based on the principle that lowering the cost of 
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production, through technical innovations, means the price of products tends not to rise. 
Company profits are thus unable to rise as rapidly as the capital investments that are required to 
invest in new technological innovations (Marx, 198134). This is a passionately debated concept 
among Marxists with very diverse views on the applicability of Marx’s idea of ‘the tendency’ 
or ‘the law’ to explaining capitalist crisis today (see Harvey, 2008/2015; Mandel, 1975; Meek, 
1967; Sweezy, 1962; Grossman, 1992; Brenner, 2006; Fine, 2012; Mohun, 2012).  
 
Despite its controversies this ‘tendency’ within capitalism can help to contextualise the move 
within rural development strategies towards promoting ‘inclusive business models’, which 
either involve giving workers equity in a business (as in worker share-equity schemes), or more 
recently giving those with access to land, equity shares in operating companies and access to 
existing ‘capital’ through JVs. This allows us to explain their significance within the failures of 
global capitalism to create either adequate remunerative jobs or new opportunities to extend 
capitalist accumulation for new entrants. In this context, sharing the equity of ‘existing 
capitals’ is a more viable strategy. In the case of South Africa the strategic partners tend to be 
‘white capital’ that has benefited from processes of accumulation when the agrarian question of 
capital was historically settled.  
 
From a NIE perspective employee ownership is linked to: the rise of equity markets as a means 
of raising funds, the growth of world capital markets, and the extension of financial markets 
through the dispersion of information technology. From a NIE perspective these models are 
motivated by attempts to improve efficiency, economic outcomes and particularly relationships 
between workers (labour) and owners (capital). By providing workers with equity shares 
companies may be able to offer lower salaries, control demands for raising salaries, discourage 
unionization and also avert hostile takeovers. Moreover if compensation is tied to a company’s 
stock price, workers would theoretically be more invested in company performance and 
perhaps willing to withhold current claims in favour of future benefits. Thus this logic is 
embedded within ‘principal-agent theory’, which assumes that worker and owner interests can 
be aligned by giving workers a stake in outcomes, and closely tying compensation to their 
performance (Sesil et al, 2001; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995; Kruse, 
1996).  
 
This is obviously at odds with a Marxist view, which sees the class positions of capital and 
labour as inherently and irreconcilably antagonistic. In any case, studies such as Sesil et al’s 
(2001: 2), which reviewed 50 large-sample empirical studies on employee ownership, were 
inconclusive about the effects of such arrangements: 
 
“These studies indicate employee ownership is linked to better outcomes on average but 
employee ownership clearly does not automatically improve worker and firm outcomes 
given that there are both positive and neutral findings. Additional research is needed to 
determine the conditions under which employee ownership improves economic 
outcomes, to examine worker and employer concerns and the trade-offs they are willing 
to make”.  
                                                 
34 See Marx, Chapter 13, Capital Volume III. 
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According to NIE theory, failure to improve productivity through group-based incentive 
schemes are conceptualised as the result of  ‘the free rider problem’ or an attitude of ‘risk-
adverseness’ among employees. Antidotes to the ‘free rider problem’ are often taken from 
arguments that underpin ‘game theory’ (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990).  
 
“The argument [from game theory] states that there is a co-operative and non-co-
operative solution associated with group interactions. As people engage in a repeated 
game they have a choice to free ride on the efforts of others or to work together” (Sesil 
et al., 2001: 5).  
 
Farm worker equity-share schemes in South Africa 
 
It is worthwhile considering for a moment South Africa’s experience with farm worker equity-
share schemes (also known as share equity schemes) since these have a longer history in the 
context of the democratic government’s land reform programme.  
 
“Share equity schemes are the type of joint venture around which government has 
developed most policy and to which land reform subsidies have been most often 
applied. These are arrangements where farm workers, small-scale farmers or other 
disadvantaged people buy shares in an agricultural enterprise ” (Hall et al., 2003: 19).  
 
Aliber and Maluleke (2010) comment that JVs resemble farm worker share equity schemes in 
some of their governance arrangements and logic. The major difference between the JV model 
and farm worker share equity schemes, is that with the latter, participation is conditional on 
employment and beneficiaries are therefore often the farm workers. In the context of JVs the 
beneficiaries may own the land outright, as restitution beneficiaries, or be customary land 
rights holders in the former homelands. In this case, beneficiaries are often provided with 
preferential employment at the farms but their participation is not conditional on employment 
and they may also be merely passive recipients of dividends. It is possible to find ‘hybrid’ type 
schemes such as the Grasslands JV sharemilking scheme. This scheme is structured as a JV, 
however, the beneficiaries are labourers on other commercial farms owned by South Africa’s 
largest dairy farmer Trevor Elliot.  
 
Farm worker equity-share schemes were first initiated in the early 1990’s by the private sector 
and facilitated by government. They have been seen as a mechanism to implement agrarian 
reform and black economic empowerment in both the agricultural and eco-tourism sectors 
(Knight et al, 2003). They are also seen as a means of poverty alleviation “transferring income, 
in the form of wages and dividends, and wealth through ownership of marketable shares to 
previously disadvantaged people” (Gray et al., 2005: 474). Critics of these schemes however 
highlight how they fail to create tenure security for beneficiaries. As Hall et al (2003: 19) 
emphasise, “In theory the focus is on securing the tenure of farm workers, but in practice 
participation in the scheme is often more directly tied to employment”. Several studies have 
also blamed poor results on assertions that it is predominantly failing firms, which enter into 
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equity share schemes and many white farmers only initiated the arrangement because their 
farms were in crisis and it was a means to recapitalise (Surplus People Project, 1998; Hall et 
al., 2003; Aliber and Maluleke, 2010; Hall 2015).  
 
These concerns lead the new Minister of Rural Development and Land reform in April 2009 to 
place a ‘verbal moratorium’ on equity share schemes, until concerns could be addressed 
(Aliber and Maluleke, 2010). The moratorium was only lifted in 2011 and a repackaged policy 
in the form of the 50/50 policy “Strengthening the Relative Rights of People Working the 
Land” was introduced in 2015. Indeed similar criticisms have been levelled against the 
government’s 50/50 scheme and the 50 farms included as their pilot projects. Ruth Hall (2015) 
claimed that the policy could inadvertently hasten farm evictions among workers nearing 10 
years of employment, who become eligible for equity stakes (in Donnelly, 2015). 
 
3.5 Impacts on Livelihood and Land Rights: Common Themes in the Literature 
 
Much of the literature to date has focused on the tension between, on the one hand the possible 
livelihood opportunities being generated by land investments, and on the other hand the threats 
to existing livelihoods (Oya, 2013a). An important point requiring emphasis is that these 
investments articulate in complex ways with pre-existing livelihood systems, social relations 
and processes of rural differentiation. Given how complex and fungible livelihood sources are, 
it’s not always easy to discern the impacts of the agricultural investment from longer 
trajectories of social and economic change or other interventions (Hall et al., 2015; Cotula, 
2013). The important question of whether investments are leading to any sustainable 
improvement to livelihoods is thus considerably more complex to answer than one initially 
might imagine. Despite this complexity and the methodological limitations of much of the 
literature, we may nonetheless identify a number of common themes reporting negative and 
positive impacts and the factors attributed to them. 
 
IFAD (2012) has documented some positive impacts from JVs they have funded. One such 
model is a combination of a JV and contract-farming model in Mali between smallholders and 
an agribusiness firm, Mali Biocarburant SA. The JV promotes a bio-fuel intercropping model 
where jatropha is produced either on unproductive land or intercropped with food crops. IFAD 
(2012) claim that this avoids drastic changes in land use that may compromise food security 
and other land based livelihoods while diversifying livelihoods and increasing incomes. This 
model is quite different to the JVs implemented in South Africa, all of which have involved 
implementation of a singular model of large-scale capitalist farming, most often of a single 
commercial crop e.g. pineapples, macadamia, milk, citrus, pomegranates, berries, ostrich, 
maize. Perhaps such a model deserves further investigation in the South African context to 
support more diverse livelihoods and land use for social reproduction beyond strict commercial 
use. 
 
Many of the positive impacts documented in relation to JVs in the South African context are 
based on the assumption that land was unused or underutilised prior to the intervention. This is 
particularly the case in relation to documented impacts in communal areas (Pieterse et al., 
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2017; Amadlelo, 2018). Hence these studies refer to the improved productivity of the land, the 
development of commercial farming enterprises, securing access to markets, additional benefits 
through activities up and downstream of the value chain, achieving economies of scale, 
addressing food security, and improved incomes through jobs and dividends (Pieterse et al., 
2017).   
 
One needs to be cautious about the positive impacts claimed in some studies. Pieterse et al., 
(2017) for example, conducted a study of seventeen JVs across the country and 
overwhelmingly reported on the positive impacts. They pose JVs as ‘innovative’ solutions to 
the constraints faced in the agricultural sector. However, these authors are affiliated to the 
Treasury and the study unfortunately does not meet rigorous standards of empirical research. 
The authors have clearly not problematized the role of traditional leadership in these JVs, for 
example. Pieterse et al., (2017: 18) come to the conclusion that JVs illustrate “how traditional 
leadership, government and the private sector can work together with a community and 
produce positive outcomes”.   
 
Other research has documented very different outcomes in relation to the role of traditional 
leaders in JVs. For example, Cousins and Gumede, (2017: 12) reported in one case that 
“dissatisfaction over the distribution of benefits is being expressed in terms of opposition to 
traditional leadership”.  It is perhaps in the mining sector that the problematic and contested 
role of traditional leaders has been most thoroughly documented, and challenges pertaining to 
gross corruption and elite capture of benefits most clearly displayed (Claassens, 2015; 
Claassens and Matlala, 2014; Capps and Mnwana, 2015; Hay, 2018; Custom Contested, 2018). 
Other authors emphasise more mixed results. Bitzer and Bijman (2014: 182), for example, 
conclude that their case studies of citrus JVs have been successful in increasing access for 
emerging farmers to export markets. However, JVs have been “less successful in fulfilling 
expectations of farmer empowerment. Seen from this perspective, government resources are 
supporting a type of institutional arrangement that has modest transformational effects”.  
 
The most obviously negative impacts to local livelihoods that have been reported are in the 
context of failed land deals (Cotula, 2013). In South Africa, on restitution farms with high-
value fruit orchards, where joint ventures have been established between claimant communities 
and private sector strategic partners, there have been several cases of documented failures. In 
some instances government funds were not fully released and as a result strategic partners 
withdrew when the farms became unprofitable (Lahiff et al., 2012).  
 
The most convincing arguments explaining the negative implications of JVs and other 
investment models, emphasise the structural tensions introduced by capitalist agriculture, and 
the resulting pressures placed on social reproduction. Manenzhe (2018: 15) notably attributes 
the negative impacts of JV schemes in Levubu in Limpopo province between restitution 
beneficiaries and agribusiness to the inherent tensions of the JV model embedded in capitalist 
farming: 
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 “Tensions in community-owned large-scale farming enterprises are explained by the 
contradictory unity of capital and labour within community-owned enterprises, with 
difficult choices to be made between enhancing social reproduction or ensuring 
accumulation and profitability. These combine with complex and cross-cutting 
processes of identification in socio-political struggles around access to, and control of 
key resources”. 
 
Murray Li (2014) provides a compelling explanation in her account of an agrarian transition in 
a remote ‘frontier’ region of Indonesia. Her account illustrates how commodification of 
subsistence takes root through a simple and seemingly innocent act of planting (permanent) 
commercial trees. Murray Li (2014) argues that the transition narrative, which holds that 
capitalist transition in farming is a natural and necessary evolution towards efficiency that frees 
labour for industry, has stunted political debate. Instead she warns that many people, who are 
squeezed-out of farming, will neither play a part in production based on profit, nor join the 
proletarian future. She criticises policies that promote the extension of capitalist relations in 
order to reduce ‘residual’ poverty. She also scrutinises the alternative narrative offered by 
social movements. Murray Li (2014) warns that it’s not viable for people to return to an 
idolised past condition, and once capitalist relations are formed they can’t be de-selected and 
retreat is not an option.  
 
Mackintosh (1989), researched large-scale agricultural investments in Senegal. She evaluates 
the impacts of the introduction of capitalist agriculture on local farming systems, labour 
organisation and social relations. Her conclusions regarding the pivotal impacts are 
illuminating:  
 
“Long-run changes induced in the social and economic organisation of rural life and 
work are the most important effect of such projects, outweighing the immediate 
competition for land and labour with local farming, on which most studies have 
focused” (xiii).  
 
Many of these ventures, particularly those involving the cultivation of export crops, are 
inherently ‘high-risk’ because of the high quality standards imposed. In many cases this risk is 
borne disproportionately by community landowners and workers. This is especially true where 
precarious and seasonal jobs are created. The failure of a venture may also result in decreased 
productivity of the land.  This may pose grave risks to the future implementation of alternative 
farming system or other strategies for land based livelihoods (Mackintosh, 1989). 
 
Hall and Kepe (2017) raise concerns of strategic partners who have clearly captured land 
reform projects for their own benefit at the expense of beneficiaries. Research documented on 
the mining sector illustrates how when it is left up to companies to represent community 
interests, challenges can arise, since power is often concentrated in the hands of a few directors 
who are not made adequately accountable to shareholders (Capps, 2010; Claassens and 
Matlala; 2014).  
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An evaluation of the Recap programme, which provides grants to beneficiaries who have 
entered into strategic partnerships, identified several challenges. Problematic relationships 
between beneficiaries and partners and unequal power relations were particularly emphasised. 
There has been insufficient focus on training and skills transfer to beneficiary communities, 
resulting in a feeling that original expectations had failed to materialise. Raising expectations 
unrealistically high about what benefits these projects can deliver has created much distrust 
among communities (Cotula and Buxton, 2010).  
 
In their national scan of joint ventures in communal areas, Cousins and Gumede, (2017) 
emphasised that arrangements were characterised by “tensions and conflicts”. These tensions 
arose from issues regarding accountability, decision-making and the fair, equal and transparent 
distribution of benefits. These tensions played out both as ‘intragroup conflicts’ and as 
conflicts between strategic partners and ‘communities’. In some cases dissatisfaction led to 
overt conflicts and commonly to disputes over the authority of those in leadership positions. 
Cousins and Gumede (2017) noted that in some of the case studies they evaluated, there were 
clearly negative impacts to both livelihoods and land rights and land use.  
 
Many studies associate negative outcomes with poor and undemocratic governance of 
community structures, particularly among large groups of beneficiaries. These structures are 
thus unfit to distribute benefits within the community, and the challenge is compounded when 
it is in the form of a monetary dividend (Makhathini, 2010; Cotula and Buxton, 2010). The 
governance and accountability challenges which plague cooperatives, trusts, traditional 
councils and communal property associations have been widely documented in the literature. 
Among the numerous contributing reasons for poor governance are the insufficient 
mechanisms to ensure downward accountability (Cousins and Gumede, 2017). Manenzhe 
(2018: 15) noted similar challenges in Levubu JV schemes in Limpopo Province within 
communal property associations: “Severe tensions and conflicts have arisen within CPAs, 
manifested in different forms of identity politics and competing ‘modes of belonging’. 
 
Joint Ventures typically involve very complicated governance and financial arrangements, 
which is noted in much of the literature documenting case studies as an inherent challenge. 
Community beneficiaries are often unable to understand these complex and often perplexing 
arrangements. Hence, it is common that they express difficulty in navigating governance 
structures to allow for their full participation and to monitor accountability (Davies, 2015; 
Lahiff et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2015; Makhathini, 2010; Sulle, 2010: Pellizzoli, 2009).  Many 
studies highlight discrepancies in the negotiating power between the local communities and 
agribusiness firms, in favour of the latter, who are often not genuinely interested in an equal 
partnership (Makhathini, 2010; Cotula and Buxton, 2010).  
 
A key issue highlighted in the context of JVs, and other models like farm worker equity-share 
schemes, is that the government is failing to play its crucial role in monitoring and evaluating 
these schemes and ensuring strategic partners are accountable to communities (Hall et al., 
2003; Bitzer and Bijman, 2014; Makhathini, 2010; Lahiff et al., 2012; Davies, 2014; Aliber 
and Maluleke, 2010).  
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“DLA [now DRDLR] as the principal department dealing with land reform, appears to 
have no mechanism in place to monitor the joint ventures it funds, whether in terms of 
their progress, whether policy requirements have been adhered to, whether business 
plans are implemented, and what impact they have on the livelihoods of grant 
beneficiaries.” (Hall et al., 2003: 20).  
 
Models which require community beneficiaries to raise money through loans to buy shares in 
operating companies (often using their land rights as collateral), has led to high levels of 
indebtedness in many cases. As a result, dividends are often delayed for several years, or never 
materialise. Among poorer communities, without diversified livelihoods to draw on, if the 
venture entailed giving over the land in its entirety, this means the community is unable to 
meet basic reproduction through marginal farming (de Koning and de Steenhuijsen Piters, 
2009; Jadhav, 2010; Cotula and Buxton, 2010). 
 
One of the key expected benefits derived from JVs is employment for local people and 
customary landowners. It is however common for jobs to be mainly low-paid, unskilled and 
seasonal or short-term, without the added benefits of social security (Vermeulen & Cotula, 
2010; Lahiff et al., 2012; Oya, 2012). For example, in JV schemes in Levubu, Manenzhe 
(2018) notes that in the absence of dividends (which have been reinvested in the farming 
entities), the only benefits have been ‘preferential employment’ for the claimant community. 
However, the farms have not managed to maintain these jobs and crucially, the increased 
labour costs associated with meeting high demands for jobs haven’t been countered by 
increases in productivity. Moreover, the monopsonistic control exerted over the labour of 
landowners, in arrangements like JVs and contract farming, can have the effect of transforming 
landowners into mere labourers on their own land (Watts, 1994). 
 
An important point to be made is that the type of agricultural commodity that is being produced 
has important implications for both land rights and labour. Where cash crops have been 
prioritized and production of local food has been limited, JVs have tended to reinforce the 
dominant mode of production of large-scale commercial farming (Lahiff et al, 2012; Jacobs, 
2001; Tapela, 2005). The production of various high-value tree crops, like cacao, oil palm and 
various nuts, has significantly affected land use patterns because the crops become a permanent 
feature on the land (Murray Li, 2014; Cooke et al., 2011; Cotula et al., 2009; McCarthy, 2010; 
Mackintosh, 1989).  
 
The production of types of crops that require long periods before harvest generally necessitates 
long-term leases to secure investor capital. Long-term leases of this scale may prevent local 
people from accessing land for several generations and spell the end of multipurpose land-
based livelihoods, such as cultivation of food, livestock rearing and gathering of essential 
ecosystem services. This may result in less livelihood resilience and a weakened capacity to 
ensure food security. Agricultural investments that entail the production of export crops and 
agro-fuels can compete with production of local food and thus induce a food crisis 
(Mackintosh, 1989; Shackleton et al., 2001; Haralambous et al., 2009).  
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Cooke et al. (2011: 64) explore the effects of various models of JVs in the oil palm sector in 
Malaysia, which have been established between customary landowners on the one hand, and 
government agencies and/or private companies on the other. They conclude that, “there is 
compelling evidence that the quality of social and financial benefits of participation in the oil 
palm sector is closely correlated to the way in which native communities are incorporated into 
the programme… unfortunately, the terms of some of the joint venture schemes reviewed here 
could also be described as ‘unfavourable’ to local native landowners”  
 
Cooke et al., (2011) do, however, note that some alternative models such as the ‘Keresa 
Smallholder Group Scheme’ have evidence of better livelihood outcomes. In this case, 
customary landowners retain control of their land, and the programme focuses on transferring 
knowledge to ultimately allow them to manage their own oil palm smallholdings. A challenge 
in extending this model is that there are few oil palm mills that can process palm from a 
number of dispersed smallholders (Cooke et al., 2011). In the developing country context, 
where capitalist industrialisation and transitions to capitalist farming are yet to be firmly 
rooted, JVs appear to be an attractive way for states to bypass the capital investment required 
to support smallholder production. JVs thus become the only way for smallholders to enter the 
highly competitive commercial agriculture sector, and this is clearly not unique to the South 
African context.  
 
In the context of Indonesia, McCarthy (2010) likewise emphasises how many landowners, who 
have been incorporated under ‘unfavourable terms’ into the oil palm sector, have found 
themselves facing deeper poverty than before the intervention. However, the question must be 
asked if deepening poverty in the face of these interventions is really all to do with ‘the terms’ 
under which customary landowners are being incorporated? More favourable terms might go 
some way in limiting negative outcomes and ensuring a more transparent distribution of 
benefits to communities. However, is there not something more fundamental going on in the 
wake of these interventions?  
 
Arguments, such as Murray Li’s (2011), Manenzhe (2018) and Mackintosh’s (1989), are in my 
opinion more convincing explanations. They have all asserted, that it is in fact the tensions 
which capitalist farming catalyses, and the contradictions it poses to social reproduction, which 
explains unfavourable outcomes. The implications of this view is that ‘changing the terms’ and 
improving ‘governance’ may not fundamentally reverse the types of negative impacts 
documented in the literature. Another important point is that these investments often fail to 
take account of the differentiated aspirations and needs of communities along lines of class, 
gender and generation in particular (Cotula and Buxton, 2010). Grouping people’s land rights 
together into one large-scale farm and limiting how the land can be used, as is the case in many 
of the JVs, doesn’t allow for differentiated models to meet a diverse array of needs. 
 
The failure of many JVs in the South African context, particularly in the Limpopo province has 
led to the development of some alternative business models. These have been motivated by the 
desire to reduce the risks posed to the communities, avoid the complexity of JV arrangements 
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and to ensure more reliable income streams to communities. In Moletele, for example, 
“community-private partnerships” replaced the JV, which involved a long-term lease along 
with some other social benefits. In Levubu the community opted for a “management contract” 
(Lahiff et al., 2012). There are, however, negative implications of these ‘lease’ based models 
particularly the concern that agribusiness firms are motivated by increasing profits in the short-
term. Thus the reality is that reinvesting in the farm for the long-term would diminish their 
profits. The inherent incentive structure of this model thus may lead to the deterioration of the 
farms fixed assets over time (Lahiff et al., 2012).  
 
Manenzhe (2018: 15) suggests an alternative policy option to JVs which looks at restructuring 
land use to allow for small-scale production to meet reproduction demands, alongside large-
scale production: 
 
“The model of commercial partnerships uncritically accepts large scale commercial 
farming without giving options for smallholder and family farming. One policy option 
might be to seek the complementarity of large-scale commercial farming and 
smallholder farming systems, both on land restored to CPAs through restitution and in 
communal areas”.  
 
3.6 Conclusion: Joint Ventures and the Agrarian Question  
 
This chapter has illustrated that evaluations of inclusive business models touch on very 
different aspects of focus, across various theoretical paradigms. Much of the existing literature 
on agricultural investments has failed to explain the full significance of these interventions in 
terms of the questions of interest to Marxist political economy. Populist representations of 
agricultural investments, as struggles between ‘predatory capital’ on the one hand, and 
‘homogenous peasants/ small farmers’ on the other, obscure the messier reality of local politics 
on the ground. Neoliberal representations of agricultural investments as potential ‘win-wins’, if 
strong and equitable contracts can be put in place, ignores the inherent dynamic of exploitation 
in capital/labour relations. Both of these approaches tend to treat communities as homogenous 
and thus fail to elicit relations of power and dynamics of social differentiation.  
 
There has been an unfortunate tendency in much of the literature across theoretical paradigms, 
to focus merely on whether relations are ‘inclusive’ between agribusiness and communities/ 
small farmers. However, from a Marxist political economy perspective, ‘communities’, ‘small 
farmers’ or ‘households’ themselves are often not ‘inclusive’ spaces and are subject to 
dynamics of power and exploitation along class, gender, generational, racial, ethnic and other 
lines of social identity (Bernstein, 2010; Berry, 1993; Peters, 2004). Ignoring this fact, albeit 
sometimes with the good intensions of protecting poor ‘communities’ from the exploitation of 
agribusiness and governments, is obfuscating the more significant impacts of how agricultural 
investments are precipitating a reorganization of social life and work, driven by dynamics of 
social differentiation (Mackintosh, 1989).  
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This review has illustrated the need to investigate these dynamics and how they can explain 
emerging intragroup conflicts around JV investments. These conflicts are shaped by the 
particular ways in which identities of belonging are constructed in rural South Africa 
(Manenzhe, 2016). Of particular importance are notions of custom and social difference in 
terms of class, gender and generation (Aliber and Maluleke, 2010; Pellizzoli, 2009; Davis, 
2014; Manenzhe, 2016). 
 
A number of studies from the agrarian political economy and Marxist schools of thought will 
be drawn on in the proceeding chapters, to explain the full significance of the JV model for 
processes of agrarian change in South Africa. Some of these studies have highlighted the 
tensions and contradiction which capitalist farming introduces to existing livelihood systems. 
Large-scale capitalist farming often sits uncomfortably with the pressures of social 
reproduction that poorer communities are subject to (Murray Li, 2011; Manenzhe, 2016/8; 
Mackintosh, 1989; Hornby, 2014).  
 
The dynamics driving inclusive business models in the South African context can be linked to 
emerging trends of how global capitalism is reorganizing capital/ labour relations. Moreover, 
the ways in which agrarian capital is organizing in these models is not unique to agriculture. 
Similarities can be drawn across sectors, for example the tendency to give workers shares in 
companies in the industrial sector. These types of mechanisms, ultimately seek to diffuse 
tensions between capital and labour by obscuring class positions.  Importantly the state plays 
an integral role at both a policy level and in mediating and enforcing these types of contracts 
(Minns, 1996; Sesil et al., 2001).  
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Chapter 4. Research Design and Methodology  
 
“A research design is a strategic framework for action that serves as a bridge between 
research questions and the execution or implementation of the research” (Durrheim, 
2002: 29). 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter I explain in detail my research design and methodology and reflect on the 
possible limitations of the study. This PhD makes use of a Marxist political economy 
conceptual framework. This has certain implications for methodology, how reality is 
comprehended, and how knowledge is created. This chapter thus begins by discussing the 
underlying principles inherent to a political economy conceptual framework and the critical 
realist approach, which has guided the research design. I will then look in detail at the methods 
that were used to gather data in the field for my comparative case study, which utilised a mix 
of intensive and extensive methods.  
 
My research questions (see Chapter 1) entail a longitudinal analysis of livelihoods and land 
rights. I however tread cautiously in making assertions about definite ‘impacts’ of the JV on 
household livelihoods, land rights and dynamics of social differentiation. This is both because 
it is a complex endeavour to separate the impact of the JV from numerous other impacting 
factors, and because the JVs have been implemented in relatively short time frames. From 
when the JV farms were set up until the end of 2016 when the household survey was 
conducted, the JV had been operating for six years in Keiskammahoek and five years in Shiloh. 
Differentiated access to land and livelihoods, stretching back to establishment of the irrigation 
scheme during the Ciskei era, would intersect in complicated ways with the current JV 
intervention. The research questions thus entail a methodology that brings together my 
empirical evidence and contextualizes it in the historical context. There are various hazards that 
can arise in the process of synthesis, which I will also discuss in this chapter. 
4.2 Materialist Dialectics and Critical Realism 
Marxist political economy and a methodology of materialist dialectics 
 
Marx did not write anything substantial on his method but it came to be known as materialist 
dialectics. In the Grundrisse, Marx (1973: 100) does comment briefly on the ‘Method of 
Political Economy’. However, it is by no means a clear guide of how to implement his method.  
Rather, his method was revealed through the way he constructed his arguments, particularly in 
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Attempts have since been made by Marxist scholars 
to clarify his methods, resulting in various and often dissenting views (Fine and Saad-Filho, 
2004; Mandel, 1976; Harvey, 2010; Brenner, 1982).  
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While appreciating that there are opposing views35, a cursory interpretation of his ontological 
approach is that: the world is real and exists apart from us, whether or not we experience it. 
There is a disconnection between how things appear (or form) and the actual reality (or 
content). An interpretation of Marx’s epistemological approach is that: knowledge is the 
integration of appearances/form and reality/content. Knowledge can’t be separated from 
material reality or historical context. Marx’s methodological approach is one of materialist 
dialectics: a method of logical and historical analysis, rising from the abstract (derived from 
elements of the material) to the concrete. Phenomena are treated within a totality, located in a 
mode of production (e.g. capitalism) (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2004; Mandel, 1976).  
 
The following exert from the Grundrisse, is revealing of Marx’s (1973: 100) methodology: 
 
“It seems correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition, 
thus to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and the 
subject of the entire social act of production. However, on closer examination this 
proves false. The population is an extraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of 
which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar 
with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage labour, capital etc. […] Thus, if I were 
to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception of the whole, and I 
would then, by means of further determinations, move analytically towards ever more 
simple concepts, from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I 
arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be 
retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the 
chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and 
relations” (emphasis added).  
 
The method of inquiry, which Marx is describing above, is to begin with the surface 
appearance, with reality as it is observed and experienced, and then to work from there to ever 
deeper concepts. The result of this process reveals the actual reality or content (Harvey, 2010). 
Marx (1973) refers to this as a method of descent and ascent, which is clearly described by 
Harvey (2010: 8) as follows: 
 
“ …The method of descent- we proceed from the immediate reality around us, looking 
ever deeper for the concepts fundamental to that reality. Equipped with those 
fundamental concepts, we can begin working back to the surface- the method of ascent- 
and discover how deceiving the world of appearances can be. From this vantage we are 
in a position to interpret that world in radically different terms”.   
 
The way Marx constructs his arguments has been described as ‘onion-like’. This is contrasted 
to a dominant positivist approach that would usually build an argument ‘brick by brick’. In 
                                                 
35 Harvey (2010:13) explains that there have been various interpretations of Marx, which have resulted in opposing views. There are Marxists 
that have rejected the dialectic approach and have attempted to use his ‘concepts’ in a positivist manner to test his theory against empirical 
data. Some authors have made use of his arguments to construct a ‘causal model of the world’. There are also ‘analytical Marxists’ that 
likewise reject dialectics, and make use purely of his analytical propositions, for example Robert Brenner. While others, like Harvey (2010), 
Fine and Saad-Filho, (2004), attempt to make use of a ‘dialectical reading’ of Marx. 
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contrast, Marx starts with the appearance (the outside of the onion) and slowly works his way 
towards the conceptual core, while illustrating how he is peeling back the layers of external 
reality to reach it. He then develops the argument outwards again, returning to the original 
premise, to illustrate how the layers of theory have brought together form and content (Harvey, 
2010).  
 
Marx’s method is derived from dialectics, which was inspired by Hegel. However, Marx 
(1990: 102) notes that his resulting “dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different 
from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it”. Marx found the Hegelian dialectic mystifying of 
the true nature of reality, particularly because it was unable to take into account the ‘transient’ 
nature of society, which in Marx’s view was “in a fluid state, in motion” (ibid). Marx thus set 
out to develop a method of materialist dialectics, which could fully grasp and represent 
processes of transformation, motion and change and “take account of the unfolding and 
dynamic relations between elements within a capitalist system” (Harvey, 2010: 11-12).  
 
Comprehending social reality as inherently in motion, always subject to change and historically 
and contextually contingent, is a critical aspect of understanding Marx’s method. It is for this 
reason that Marx (1990), for example, doesn’t see Capital as a finite thing but instead he 
comprehends it as a mutable process, which only exists as long as it is in motion. Likewise he 
refers to the labour process rather than just labour. The concepts that Marx makes use of to 
understand reality, thus hinge on fluid ideas of relations, dynamics and processes that describe 
transformative activity, rather than stagnant, unitary principles which can be applied to a 
moment of time (Harvey, 2010). 
 
Critical Realism 
 
A critical realist approach fits particularly well with a Marxist conceptual framework because 
of the comparable tenants of their epistemological and ontological approach. The following 
quote from Sayer (1992: 234) illustrates how critical realism is commensurate with Marxist 
dialectics, which emphasises the transient nature of society and social phenomena, which are 
always in motion: 
 
“Any explanation, be it of natural or social phenomena is incomplete for the 
epistemological reason that all knowledge is revisable, but explanations of social 
phenomena are also incomplete for the ontological reasons given above that the objects 
of study are undergoing continuous historical, and not merely evolutionary change”.   
 
This has important implications for research findings and the ‘problem of explanation’. Any 
investigation of ‘class’ position, for example, must acknowledge both the fluidity of an 
individual’s or a group’s position, as well as the inherent possibility that research and the 
‘knowledge’ it creates is subject to revision and there is a possibility that it is fallible, partial 
and incomplete (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2007; Wai-Chung Yeung, 1997; Sayer, 1992). From 
the Critical Realist view, social realities and the ‘objects’ of social science are regarded as a 
‘structured mess’ (Sayer, 1992). This poses particular challenges in research which has to 
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comprehend the chaos of this reality, and the inevitability that class, for example, is 
intermeshed with many other 'determinations', and is thus complex, contingent and subject to 
processes of constant change (Scoones et al. 2012; Cousins 2010; Bernstein 2010).  
 
Sayer (1992) contends that the problem of explanation in the social science and lack of 
perceived ‘success’ as compared to the natural sciences is less linked to inappropriate methods, 
and more likely a result of the peculiarities of the ‘object’ under study. A key challenge is that 
people are “self-interpreting beings who can learn from and change their interpretations” (ibid: 
234). The object under study is thus susceptible to change by the researcher, in the process of 
investigation. This is a distinctively opposite notion to Positivism, for example, which 
postulates that the empirical researcher can objectively observe the world.  
 
In the view of Critical Realism, social realities are inter-subjective. Social objects of research 
are not impervious to the meanings focused on in the social interactions involved in research. 
These interactions involve shared meanings, as well as contestations over meanings. Successful 
explanations and shared meanings between researchers and respondents are also conditional on 
the meanings of terms and conceptual frameworks being ‘mutually intelligible’ (Sayer, 1992). 
For Critical Realism, the ontological approach contends that in spite of the inter-subjective 
nature of social realities and its characteristic fluidity, there is still an objective world out there 
that exists whether or not we are able to perceive it (Wai-Chung Yeung, 1997).  We can’t, 
however, observe the world without understanding what it is that we are seeing. It is not 
possible to perceive reality solely through empirical observation, as Positivism contends. For 
Critical Realism, all observation is theory laden, or in other words, we require theory to bring 
together appearances and reality (Sayer, 1992).  
 
Inherent to a Critical Realist approach is that social science should evaluate the object of 
research in a critical way if it is to understand social phenomena (Sayer, 1992). The researcher 
needs to question their ‘first impressions’ of social reality, which are being ‘observed’ in the 
field and seek to understand reality by the application of appropriate theory. It also entails 
subjecting the views and opinions of key informants, to the same level of intellectual rigour 
and scrutiny. Both the researcher and key informant impressions of social reality will unlikely 
reflect the full reality of substantial relations in all their complexity.  
 
A key aim of a realist approach is providing meaningful explanations of reality, which requires 
identifying ‘causal mechanisms’. These mechanisms must be understood within their historical 
and contextual conditions. Making sense of complex wholes often entails abstracting objects 
or events and excluding some of their aspects and characteristics (perhaps momentarily) that 
are not relevant to the focus of investigation. This allows the researcher to more closely 
perceive those aspects that have significant causal effect (Sayer, 2010; Wai-Chung Yeung, 
1997). Sayer, (1992:87) emphasises that,  
 
“[…] Concrete objects are likely to be superficial or chaotic. In order to understand 
their diverse determinations we need to abstract systematically. When each of the 
abstracted aspects has been examined it is possible to combine the abstraction to and 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 73 
from concepts which grasp the concreteness of their objects”.  
 
This might also be achieved as part of an ‘iterative process of abstraction’ whereby the 
researcher continuously revises their focus of abstraction while collecting empirical evidence, 
through a process of continuous reflection, moving backwards and forwards between empirical 
evidence and theory. This process is continued until there is no longer any contradictory 
evidence and the identified mechanisms are believed to be robust (Wai-Chung Yeung, 1997). I 
integrated this type of approach in my research design, which will be discussed further below.  
4.3 Research Design and Approach 
 
Sayer (1992) notes that the type of research design that is chosen for a particular study must be 
appropriate to ‘the thing-to-be-explained’. He draws comparisons between concrete research, 
abstract research, generalization and synthesis. These approaches are summarized in the table 
below. In certain cases where the thing-to-be-explained is quite specific, it can be explained 
solely through reference to abstract theory. Sayer (1992: 236) provides the example of the 
research question of “why do tenants have to pay rent?” It is feasible that such a research 
question might be answered through reference to abstract theory that explains, for example, the 
nature of class relations under capitalism and the existence of a class of landlords. However, 
when we are investigating complex and concrete phenomena like particular trajectories of 
economic development or instances of war or conflict, explanations might demand other types 
of research, such as a combination of types of research or a synthesis approach. Clearly, my 
research questions, which seek to understand the livelihoods, land rights and use, and processes 
of social differentiation in the context of very specific ‘development interventions’, demand a 
type of research that expands beyond the abstract. 
 
Table 1. Types of Research  
Types of 
Research 
Definition 
Abstract 
research 
‘Deals with the constitution and possible ways of acting of social objects, and 
actual events are only dealt with as possible outcomes’ 
Concrete 
research 
‘Studies actual events and objects as ‘unities of diverse determinations’, each 
of which has been isolated and examined through abstract research’ 
Generalisation ‘Tends not to involve abstraction, at least not self-consciously, and treats 
events and objects as simple rather than concrete. It’s main purpose is to seek 
regularities and common properties at this level’ 
Synthesis ‘Attempts to explain major parts of whole systems by combining abstract and 
concrete research findings with generalisations covering a wide range of 
constitutive structures, mechanisms and events’ 
Source: based on Sayer (1992) 
 
Sayer (1992: 238) notes that, “the functions of these types of research are often misunderstood 
both by users and critics. In particular, researchers often over-extend them by expecting one 
type to do the job of others”. For example, one might run in to trouble if you expect abstract 
theory to directly explain specific events, without any empirical research. Sayer (1992: 238-9) 
further notes that such an approach “reduces the concrete to the abstract”. This is a common 
fault in Marxism and sociology […] abstractions are indispensable for providing some of the 
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means by which we study the concrete, but they owe their origins to a process of abstraction 
which takes concrete objects as its starting point and raw material”. Furthermore, Sayer (ibid) 
emphasises that research must also be open to developing new abstractions, rather than relying 
solely on existing Marxist theory to do the work of making sense of concrete objects.  
 
Sayer (1992: 239-40) aptly warns that,  
“…Abstract (i.e. one-sided) concepts are wrongly expected to pre-empt the specificities 
of the concrete […] Perhaps the best-known instance of this mistake is the expectation 
that Marxist concepts of class should enable one to partition the population into classes 
according to shared attributes at the concrete level, so that income, education and 
attitude etc., polarize neatly around the labour-capital divide. When it is found that this 
doesn’t happen, the abstraction is thrown out on the spurious conclusion that class has 
been shown not to exist. By such simple misconceptions, numerous social scientists 
have disavailed themselves of the most powerful concepts” 
 
This is a critical point given our premise that social reality is constantly changing and in flux 
and thus it is unreasonable to expect that the concepts and theories found in Marx’s seminal 
works will necessarily ‘neatly fit’ our specific contemporary contexts. It may be necessary to 
work from the concrete context as the starting point, and then to make sense of this by using a 
range of appropriate theories to develop new abstractions. I have applied this type of approach, 
which is detailed in Chapter 12 of this thesis. I develop a context specific class typology 
drawing on a range of existing typologies and theories but I also adjust them to suit the 
particularities of class dynamics that emerged from my empirical research.  
 
Figure 1. Sayer's (1992: 237) Figure of 'Types of Research' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure above demonstrates the relationships between these various types of research, 
identified by Sayer (1992). The research design for this PhD thesis draws primarily on concrete 
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research. This type of research design focuses on specific ‘events’ or ‘objects’ that can be 
empirically investigated (the JV interventions) and examines their constitutive parts through 
the use of abstract research, to understand how specific ‘mechanisms’ and larger social 
‘structures’ interact with the concrete object. The figure below illustrates how concrete 
research makes use of both abstract research (because as mentioned above all research, 
including empirical observation is theory laden), as well as a degree of generalisation 
(extensive). Given the limited focus of the research, (a comparative case study of two JV 
farms), I believe this to be a sensible choice of research design.  
4.4 Units of Analysis: Households, Taxonomic Groups and Class Categories 
 
The household as the unit of analysis 
 
I have made use of various units of analysis in this PhD, which demands explanation. The 
household is used as the key unit of analysis for understanding the impact of the JV on the 
‘beneficiary communities’. Households can then be understood as nested within broader units 
of analysis, including kin and other social networks (Berry, 1993). The ‘household’ as a social 
unit is a contested space, both in ‘lived reality’ and in the social science literature. The 
literature debates both whether the household is a useful unit of analysis, and how it should be 
defined. Ellis (2000:18) argues that the household is a relevant unit of analysis, because 
individuals are integral parts of wider social spaces, and the household is a particularly 
important site of “intense social and economic interdependences”. Ellis (1993:14) notes that, 
“economists find the household a useful unit of analysis, given the assumption that within the 
household resources are pooled, income is shared, and decisions are made jointly by adult 
household members”.  
 
Feminist critiques, however, caution of the tendency to highlight views of household heads 
(almost always men), to the detriment of other individuals in the household, especially women 
(Jacobs, 2010). To overcome this, a key focus of my research was on intra-household 
dynamics, particularly in term of gender and generational relations (Ellis, 1993; Mackintosh, 
1989). I also made sure to have a more or less equal representation of key respondents, in terms 
of gender (see below).  
 
The particular history of the former ‘homelands’ as labour reserves, and the phenomenon of 
migrant labour, poses challenges in delineating boundaries of the household. Historical 
migratory patterns persist, while new trends include migration to smaller regional towns in the 
Eastern Cape, rather than exclusively to big cities, and increased migration among women 
(Neves and du Toit, 2008). Many rural dwellers live and work in urban areas for significant 
periods of the year. This reality makes it necessary to distinguish between two types of 
residency when defining ‘households’. Firstly, there is the ‘strict residency criterion’, which 
necessitates that an individual be present in the household for most of the year. On the other 
hand, ‘a broad residency rule’, makes provisions for individuals who live elsewhere, for a part, 
or even most of the year (Posel et al, 2004).  
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Research in the Eastern Cape has illustrated, how even in cases where household members are 
not co-resident in the same dwelling for much of the year, they continue to be committed to 
maintaining the household as a social unit. This is particularly noted in the negative 
perceptions around household members who ‘abandon’ the household, by failing to remit or 
contribute to preserving the unity of the household in other ways (Neves and du Toit, 2008). 
Mtero (2014:104) notes that “while some people may not remit or visit on a regular basis they 
may still be part of the household and contribute to the ceremonial fund when the need arises”, 
through contributions to funerals, initiations and other important ceremonies. For these reasons 
I adopted a ‘broad residency rule’ in defining the boundaries of the household.  
Taxonomic groups relating to the joint venture farms 
 
At the stage of fieldwork, I drew on four ‘taxonomic groups’, which could be readily 
distinguished by the ways in which they related to the JV. Sampling according to these 
taxonomic groups ensured that I included a variety of households ‘benefiting’ in different 
ways. These groups included:  
 
• JV dividend receiving households: receiving profits and land rents from the JV 
• JV dividend and wage receiving households: receiving profits and land rents and also 
employed in JV jobs 
• JV wage receiving households: employed in JV jobs 
• No JV benefits households: a control group, comprising households which do not 
benefit directly from either JV dividends or jobs 
 
The latter group is a control group that was included for two reasons. Firstly, it allows for a 
comparison between households not benefiting from the JV and those benefiting from the JV 
(either through jobs, dividends or both). Secondly, I was also concerned with what effects 
establishing a JV may have on the livelihoods and land rights or use of other households in the 
community.  
Asset groups 
 
Asset ownership is considered by some social scientists to be a reliable proxy for household 
wealth (June et al., 2012; Dekker, 2006; Ewerling et al., 2017; Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). This 
method is considered by some to be more theoretically robust, since the asset portfolio of a 
household is likely to be a more reliable indication of long term economic status compared to 
capturing their income and expenditure at any given time.  I must stress, however, that they are 
merely statistical categories, which are important only as a starting point from which to 
identify patterns of differentiation among households. They don’t in themselves attempt to 
represent class categories. Class is understood as foremost having a ‘relational quality’ 
underpinned by capital-labour relations (Olin Wright, 2015; Perez Nino, 2014).  Class must be 
investigated through intensive methods, which reveal how groups relate to one another causally 
or structurally (Sayer, 1992).   
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“Asset scores aim at the quantification of household wellbeing, whereas in contrast 
class analysis is interested in the relational aspects of the social division of labour and 
the ownership of the means of production” (Perez Nino, 2014).   
 
Rather than taking the view that asset groups alone can explain causal relationships, which they 
cannot, I made use of them as one variable among many to explain just one part of the picture. 
Data on household assets was gathered through the household survey. In order to construct 
asset indices a list of predetermined durable assets are allocated weights, which allow for the 
calculation of household scores. Different assets were assigned weights (1, 2 or 3), based on 
their approximate value, and an overall asset score was assigned to each household. This was 
used to divide households into asset groups. Importantly these indices are established 
separately for Keiskammahoek and Shiloh. I established asset groups for the variables of: 
household assets 36  (poor, middle and rich); cattle (no cattle, poor, middle and rich); and 
agricultural asset ownership (poor, middle and rich) according to data for each case study site. 
Investigating social differentiation and class categories: challenges with using income 
data 
 
I am not going to discuss my methodology for investigating social differentiation and class 
categories in depth here because I reserve a complete treatment of my class-analytic approach 
for Chapter 12 of this thesis. I will, however, briefly note here some methodological 
approaches and concerns, especially in relation to the perils of using income data. Perez Nino, 
(2014) notes that a popular way of studying social differentiation, which is commonly used in 
the rural development literature, is to classify populations using indices for total income, 
outputs and the size of landholdings (Perez Nino, 2014). Perez Nino notes that in the context of 
contract farming (2014: 273):     
 
“One advantage of conducting research with contract farmers is that, unlike farmers 
deriving income from trade in commodities sold in open markets… (Contract) farmers 
receive a single payment per year …this is convenient for the purpose of quantifying 
the household’s monetary income, as respondents recall the amount received with 
exactitude”. 
 
 I made use of income data to calculate the labour exploitation ratio of households. However, 
unlike in the case of contract farming as noted above, researching own-account farming 
engaged in by households for both own-consumption and for sale on open markets, posed 
considerably more challenges. My methodology also tries to capture the complex interrelations 
between class differences in agriculture and social reproduction strategies located largely, or 
entirely, off-farm. This entailed capturing income data for a range of off-farm activities as well.  
 
Patnaik (1987) notes that when defining a labour exploitation ratio for households, the unit of 
measurement could be labour-days, product or income. I chose to use income data as my key 
measure for the practical reason that in my household survey I gathered detailed data on 
                                                 
36 This included domestic, transport, electronic/communication and agricultural assets.  
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incomes but not on labour-days. I must, however, acknowledge that there are definite 
limitations in the use of income data for calculating a labour exploitation ratio. I briefly detail 
these here, since future research may be able to overcome these limitations by designing 
appropriate household survey instruments. The most obvious limitation is that income data 
relies on the honest and accurate recall of income data by key informants, who for various 
reasons may under- or over-estimate incomes or provide inaccurate information. In my case, 
every care was taken to gather accurate data, and although a few expected discrepancies were 
observed, I was reassured of the general accuracy of my data when I observed clear patterns for 
particular types of income sources. In addition, incomes from social grants and public works 
programmes could be independently verified, and incomes from JV jobs could be verified 
through pay-slips.  
 
Another limitation of income data derives from the challenges of operationalising the 'labour 
exploitation criterion'. Income data does not allow for a neat division into different types of 
labour, in the same way that data on working days might allow. This challenge presented itself 
particularly clearly in relation to 'own-account farming' where labour was being hired in. In 
many (but not all) cases this scale of farming entails some use of household labour as well. It is 
somewhat easier to distinguish between household labour days and labour days hired in, than it 
is to clearly distinguish income derived from these two forms of labour. One would need a 
great deal of detailed income data in order to accurately calculate the total surplus value being 
appropriated through hiring of labour, as opposed to self-exploitation (see Marx 1973 for rate 
of surplus value). Detailed information of this kind was not available in my survey, however, 
and thus a more in-depth analysis was not attempted.  
 
I resigned myself to accepting that given that relatively little labour was being hired in in this 
context, if labour was being hired in more frequently for own-account farming this in itself was 
significant and indicative of class location. For the purpose of calculating the labour 
exploitation ratio, it was thus sufficient to categorise income as being derived either from 
'labour hired in' or from 'family labour', without dividing it into approximate proportions of 
total labour days. Since incomes derived from own-account farming were relatively 
insignificant, compared to other sources of income, it did not exert much influence on the 
overall patterns that emerged.  
 
In contexts where own-account farming is a predominant activity, involving both hiring in 
labour and self-employment, it would probably be worth the effort to develop a more 
discerning approach. In retrospect, had I known from the onset that I would be using Patnaik’s 
(1987) framework, I would have also gathered information on working days. It would have 
been interesting to see whether applying the data from working days would make a big 
difference to the class typology that emerged. However, as Chapter 12 will demonstrate, the 
results of employing the class typology, illuminates the definite patterns between the class 
categories. This indicates that despite limitations in using income data, the modifications to 
Patnaik’s (1989) labour exploitation ratio were successful in distinguishing class categories 
with common characteristics. 
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4.5 Research Methods 
 
This study makes use of both intensive and extensive methods. The distinction between 
intensive and extensive methods includes 1) issues of scale versus depth; 2) a difference in 
what methods and techniques are used; 3) the kinds of questions asked; 4) how boundaries and 
objects are defined (Sayer, 1992). Attempts to provide adequate explanations for different 
types of research questions entail the use of different methods. A summary of my approach is 
provided in the table below. 
 
Table 2. Intensive and Extensive Methods   
 Extensive Methods Intensive Methods  
Purpose: Identify common patterns and characteristics 
of a population; 
Produce statistical categories (taxonomic 
groups) based on household composition, 
assets, income or economic activities;  
Categories are important as a starting point to 
identify patterns of social differentiation 
among households 
Identify significant relations of connection;  
Explore how causal processes unfold in particular 
cases, what different stakeholders do, and how 
change is produced in social groups; 
Elaborates on statistical categories to explain causal 
process and relational aspects underpinning social 
differentiation in a particular context 
Relations Formal relations of similarity: people are 
connected analytically e.g. households 
owning 1-3 heads of cattle (these households 
are only analytically related together) 
Substantial relations of connection: between people 
of real connection and relations (they react in reality 
together) e.g. farmers working together in a 
cooperative 
Conception 
of groups: 
Taxonomic groups  Causal groups 
Methods: Large-scale household survey (focused on a 
population or representative group); 
Standardised interviews; 
Statistical analysis;  
= Gathers largely quantitative data 
Ethnographic immersion and participant 
observation; 
Interactive interviews, informal ‘conversations’ & 
focus groups; 
Participatory methods e.g. wealth ranking;  
Qualitative analysis: structural and causal; 
= Gathers largely qualitative data 
Limitations: Limited explanatory power. Representative of 
a population but unlikely to be generalizable 
to other populations in different contexts and 
times. 
Concrete patterns and contingent relationships can’t 
be representative or generalizable.  
Sources: Sayer, 1992; Mtero, 2014; Hornby, 2014; Davis, 2014; Loewenson et al., 2014. 
 
Overview of fieldwork activities 
 
My fieldwork first commenced in September 2015 to identify potential case study sites. 
Between September 2015 and April 2016 I periodically conducted exploratory research37 for a 
total of 8 weeks (September 2015, February 2016, March 2016, April 2016). I also began 
piloting a household survey in April 2016. During this time, I would come back to Cape Town 
to analyse the data and readjust the research focus and data collection instruments where 
                                                 
37 Exploratory research was not limited to field research, as it also involved comprehensive desk research and telephone ‘conversations’ and 
emails with agribusiness partners and community cooperatives and trusts (although the latter were more difficult to make contact with). I also 
managed to interview some agribusiness partners in Cape Town, Bathurst and East London out of the allocated fieldwork times.  
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necessary. After deciding on case study sites I then returned to the field in June/ July 2016 for 
4 weeks of intensive research, where I conducted interviews, life histories and finished piloting 
revised versions of a household survey. In October and November 2016 I spent a further 7 
weeks in the field conducting my household survey as well as further intensive research. 
Therefore in total I spent 19 weeks in the field during 2015 and 2016. The table below 
summarises the intensive and extensive methods used in each site in relation to the spread of 
key informants 38. 
 
Table 3. Record of Interviews Conducted on Amadlelo Agri Case Studies: September 2015 to 
December 2016 
Theme of 
Interviews Category of Respondents Shiloh  Keiskammahoek Middledrift 
General 
(insights on all 
Amadlelo JVs) 
Interviews 
(unstructured 
and semi-
structured) 
JV dividend receiving 
households 12 7 9   
JV dividend and wage receiving 
households 8 10 1   
JV wage receiving households 7 11 3   
No JV benefits households 5 7 3   
Student interns39  1 2     
JV farm managers 5 7 1 1 
Amadlelo Agri representatives       9 
Other agribusiness firms and 
white commercial farmers       7 
Traditional leaders 2     2 
Government officials        2 
Total: 40 44 17 21 
Life histories 
JV dividend receiving 
households 5 4     
JV dividend and wage receiving 
households 4 5     
JV wage receiving households 3 3     
No JV benefits households 3 2     
  Total: 15 14     
Focus groups 
Community Cooperative 
members   1 1   
Household 
survey 
JV dividend receiving 
households 23 8     
JV dividend and wage receiving 
households 10 11     
JV wage receiving households 9 21     
No JV benefits households 20 15     
  JV farm managers 1 3     
  Total: 63 58     
 
                                                 
38 Additional fieldwork was conducted on another four JVs in the Ciskei, all of which have contributed to general insights. In particular I 
conducted quite extensive research on two pineapple joint ventures over this period. This included 36 interviews with a range of key 
informants at the Binqala cooperative farm, 17 household surveys and 1 focus group. I also conducted 8 interviews with a range of key 
informants at the Pineco farm. See the exploratory research section below for more details on why this data is not directly reported as part of 
this PhD thesis. 
39 Some student interns are employed on Amadlelo’s farms as part of their skills development programme for university and technicon 
graduates. Some of these interns have gone on to become JV farm managers, as was the case for a dairy manager at Keiskammahoek.  
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Scoping/ exploratory fieldwork and choosing case study sites 
 
In total, this exploratory research phase included twelve different JV farms, of a total of 
seventeen that I had identified through desk research. Fieldwork made use largely of intensive 
methods including semi-structured interviews, open-ended unstructured interviews, focus 
groups and participant observation40. Some identified JVs were not visited, since they had 
since fallen out of production, for example a JV involving Cape Concentrate as the main 
agribusiness firm producing tomatoes on the Tyefu irrigation scheme.  
 
Table 4. JV Farms Included in Scoping Fieldwork  
Name of Joint Venture 
Arrangement (and 
date of est.) 
Agribusiness 
partner(s) 
Community 
Partner 
Commodity 
Produced 
Location in the Eastern 
Cape (former Ciskei) 
Keiskammahoek Seven 
Stars Trust  (2010) 
Amadlelo Agri Seven Stars 
Cooperative 
Milk Keiskammahoek village 
Shiloh Dairies Trust 
(2011) 
Amadlelo Agri Mayime 
Cooperative 
Milk Shiloh village 
Middledrift Dairy 
(2009) 
Amadlelo Agri Gwebindlala 
Trust 
Milk Middledrift village 
Bingqala Cooperative 
(2013) 
Summerpride 
Foods 
Bingqala 
Cooperative 
Pineapples Binqala village in 
Peddie  
The Peddie Pineapple 
Project/ PineCo (1998) 
Summerpride 
Foods 
PineCo and the 
Peddie Trust 
Pineapples Tainton, Cornfields and 
Long Ridge farms in 
Peddie area 
Ncera Macadamia Farm 
(2005) 
Kula Investment 
Group, Amadlelo 
Agri, TGK 
Farming Group 
Vulindlela 
Investment Trust 
and Imidushane 
Traditional 
Authority 
 
Macadamia Ncera village 
The Peddie Ostrich 
Project Farms (4 farms) 
2012 
Klein Karoo 
International 
(KKI) 
Transformation 
Trust 
Ostrich Pikoli, 
Ndlambe/Ndwayana, 
Ntloko and Nobumba 
villages in Peddie 
Ndlambe Pomegranate 
JV Scheme (1997)  
Bonifruit (1997) 
and were in the 
process of signing 
with Farm Vision 
(2016) 
SacuNdlambe 
Primary 
Cooperative 
Pomegranate Ndlambe village 
Glenmore Pomegranate 
JV Scheme (1997) 
Glenpom (2016) 
First with 
Bonifruit (1997) 
and had recently 
signed with 
Pomona and 
Zontwa (2016) 
Zakhe Gqukani 
Cooperative 
Pomegranate Glenmore village 
 
This stage of the research process gave me a better understanding of the scope of investment by 
agrarian capital, since many of the same agribusiness partners were involved in the different 
schemes. For example, it emerged during the research process that Amadlelo Agri was also 
                                                 
40 I also attended a ‘farming day’ held by Amathole District Municipality on the 17 March 2016 in Peddie, which was attended by some JV 
partners listed below and government officials who were informally interviewed. 
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invested in Ncera Macadamia farm and had also been involved in the tomato JV that failed to 
get off the ground. I developed a better understanding of the politics around investigating JVs, 
largely through my experiences of being denied access to research certain JVs I had included in 
my desk research e.g. a maize JV in Kentani in the Transkei involving Wiphold and 
Technoserve as the strategic partners. The table below summarises the JVs that I investigated 
during scoping fieldwork.  
 
After the initial scoping phase of research (September 2015 to April 2016), I decided to 
exclude some of the above case study sites. I didn’t exclude Ncera Macadamia out of choice, 
but rather because the strategic partner Kula subsequently became nervous about the research 
and withdrew my access. Prior and during the course of the preparatory fieldwork, the Peddie 
Ostrich Farms were vandalised by the community and most of them had fallen out of 
production and were thus excluded. The two pomegranate farms were also excluded since they 
had been out of production for some time and were only just reaching agreements to restart the 
irrigation schemes under new strategic partners.  
 
I decided that the three Amadlelo Agri JV farms would comprise the core focus of the PhD41. I 
however decided to continue to do limited fieldwork at the two pineapple JV farms, involving 
Summerpride Foods since they provided what I believed was an interesting comparison. 
However, when it came to the phase of analysis I realised that there were too many disparate 
variables to control between the dairy and pineapple farms and I was concerned about not 
doing justice to either by including both in this PhD thesis. These differences include, the 
different commodities produces, very different governance and financial arrangements, 
different tenure systems, very different historical contexts and the dairy farms are located on 
irrigation schemes while the pineapple farms are not. The Amadlelo Agri farms are clearly 
arranged as JVs, however, the pineapple farms are referred to as JVs but are in reality set up as 
contract farming arrangements because the agribusiness partner is not financially invested in 
the farms.  
 
It was also only much later in the research process, in August 2016, that I decided I would only 
conduct the household survey in Shiloh and Keiskammahoek and not in Middledrift. After 
conducting fieldwork in June and July on all three case studies, I felt these two sites would 
make for a more fruitful comparison. The similar historical contexts and time frames at Shiloh 
and Keiskammahoek allow for some common features in these schemes that facilitate 
comparison. However, they also differ in fundamental ways, which I thought could point to 
causal mechanisms that explain divergent outcomes.  
 
Both of these farms are established on homeland era irrigation schemes, whereas the irrigation 
infrastructure was only introduced in Middledrift subsequently as part of the JV in 2009. Both 
Keiskammahoek and Shiloh irrigation schemes were resuscitated through ReCap grants42 and 
                                                 
41 I also gathered some data on Amadlelo’s farms at Fort Hare and Ncora. This contributes to the overall picture of the Amadlelo Model, 
however these sites were not included as case studies since the former is a JV with the University of Fort Hare and the latter is located in the 
former Transkei. 
42 Government has made access to ReCap funding conditional upon beneficiaries entering into an arrangement with a 'strategic partner' 
(DRDLR 2013). There is thus pressure placed on both communities and agribusiness to enter into JVs if they want to access scarce 
government funding (Lahiff et al. 2012). 
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both farms were operating at a profit and generating dividends for landowners. However, the 
JV farm at Middledrift was established in 2009 on loan funding and was not distributing any 
dividends to landowners. It didn’t seem like a prudent use of time or resources to conduct a 
lengthily household survey where it was clear from intensive fieldwork that there were no 
benefits deriving to these households.  
Intensive Methods 
 
As detailed in Table 3 above, my intensive methods included interviews and life histories, 
focus groups, field observations drawn from ethnographic immersion, review of primary 
documentation and research reports and making sense of this range of data through the 
application of abstract theory. I made use of an iterative and exploratory approach to these 
methods i.e. the focus of investigation and focus was reflexively revised as I learnt more about 
the case studies.  
 
a) Unstructured and semi-structured in-depth interviews 
 
I made use of unstructured and semi structured interviews with a range of different 
respondents. The focus of these interviews varied depending on the respondent and the 
changing focus of the research. They covered a range of topics relevant to interrogating my 
research questions. Some of my respondents were interviewed several times over the fieldwork 
period whereas others were only interviewed once. I generally allowed for a degree of 
diversion and reflexivity in semi-structured interviews. I found the diversions that respondents 
would make in the interviews were often revealing of key dynamics. The iterative nature of 
intensive methods means that data analysis often occurs alongside data collection (Manenzhe, 
2015). Flexibility in the interview process allows for the continuous process of learning in the 
field to redirect the line of questioning and flow of conversation.  
 
Unstructured interviews and informal conversations were also a useful way to gather data in a 
way that often made respondents feel at ease. When staying on the farm or in the case study 
site for longer periods, the informal conversations had sharing lunch, a coffee break or passing 
on the street often provided useful insights that could be followed up later in semi-structured 
interviews or through participant observation. Informal engagements also included ‘walks’ in 
which respondents could clarify issues relating to land rights and use. 
 
Among my taxonomic groups I began the interview process in the first stages of fieldwork by 
making use of a random sample drawn from the lists of JV workers and members of 
community cooperatives (and board members) and opportunistic sampling among the ‘no JV 
benefits group’ and ‘dividend receiving households’ in Shiloh. In qualitative data collection it 
is not generally necessary to have a statistically representative random sample. Depending on 
what I was investigating, the sampling strategy would change. Once I became more aware of 
the case studies and the actors involved I would make use of purposeful sampling to select 
‘information-rich cases’ (Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 2002). In Shiloh, for example, when I 
became aware of various intragroup conflicts I made use of a ‘snowball approach’ where 
respondents referred me on to other key informants. I made use of a ‘sampling to redundancy 
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approach’ with interviews, which involves “interviewing more and more people until the same 
themes and issues come up over and over again… no new information can be gained from 
increasing the sample size” (Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 2002: 45).   
 
b) Life histories 
 
Life histories were only conducted later in the research process and key informants were 
identified through a previous semi-structured interview or in the course of the household 
survey. The sampling was thus purposeful in that I chose specific cases which were 
theoretically important (they explained certain causal mechanisms or livelihood trajectories), 
were extreme cases (e.g. uncommon examples of accumulation), or was a typical case and 
represented common trajectories that stood out through the household survey or interview 
process. I used life histories to gain a detailed understanding of household reproductive 
strategies in a historical, longitudinal sense and to understand how these strategies interacted 
with the JV intervention. The length of these interviews depended on the availability of the 
respondents but could be anywhere from 1.5 hours to 3 hours long, and in some cases I would 
return on another occasion.    
 
“Life story interview has been taught as a method for capturing people’s own 
perceptions of their lives” (Adriansen, 2012: 2).  
 
Life histories, like other qualitative data, represent a certain perception of reality, which then 
needs to be further interrogated by the researcher. They also suffer from the potential difficulty 
respondents might have to recall events over an entire life span. However, in spite of these 
pitfalls they are very useful in providing a holistic view of a household and its individual 
members. Life stories are embedded within a whole range of socio-historical contexts and 
relations, which is an integrated way of studying life trajectories (Goodson and Sikes, 2001). I 
found life histories a particularly useful way for perceiving the fluidity and changeability of 
class formation in particular. As such, life histories were used to highlight the relational aspects 
of class, in conjunction with the extensive methods, which used quantitative methods to 
construct a class typology.  
 
c) Focus groups 
 
I didn’t make use of many focus group discussions and I only conducted two at 
Keiskammahoek and Middledrift farm, along with some focus groups at other JVs during 
exploratory fieldwork. The focus groups I did conduct were with the board members of the 
community cooperatives. A focus group was not conducted at Shiloh because only the 
Chairperson of the Cooperative showed up and subsequent attempts to meet with other 
members of the board failed. I was able to witness the internal dynamics of this group instead 
by sitting in on a cooperative meeting. However, given the heightened intragroup conflicts, I 
decided that individual interviews would be a better method to pursue.  
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d) Ethnographic immersion and participant observation 
 
I made use of an ethnographic approach.  Ethnography emphasises the significance of context 
in understanding social phenomena (Hammersley, 1992). In practice an ethnographic approach 
entails spending fairly long periods in the communities being studied. This approach enables 
one to observe household and community dynamics, cultural and productive activities and how 
these interact with the intervention studied (Hornby, 2014) i.e. the JVs.  Geertz (1973) asserts 
that an ethnographic approach should present a ‘thick description’, which must include facts 
along with the researcher’s interpretations and analysis. Participant observation thus went hand 
in hand with interviews and I kept a fieldwork journal in which to write down my impressions 
and observations.  
 
During October 2016, I spent two weeks living on the Seven Stars Farm in Keiskammahoek in 
the on-farm accommodation, among workers who very graciously accommodated my 
translator and I. This gave me the opportunity to gain a more in depth understanding of how the 
farm is run, the social relations of production and an understanding of the politics and social 
dynamics among different groups. It allowed me to have many ‘informal conversations’, 
particularly with general workers, JV managers and landowners whose houses were located on 
the farm. It also gave me a deeper understanding of the immense commitment that is required 
in running a dairy farm, where the nature of farming with sensitive dairy animals demands 
around the clock attention.  
 
In Shiloh, the same opportunity was unfortunately not available to me. I decided not to stay in 
the community itself during fieldwork because of the heightened tensions present among the 
customary landowning group. A choice of which households to stay with, would have 
inevitably lead to a perception that I was ‘siding’ with one of the various oppositional ‘groups’ 
and hence I therefore decided to stay between Shiloh and Queenstown.  
Extensive Methods 
a) Household survey 
 
The most widely used method for assessing the socio-economic status of households by 
collecting data on household income, expenditure and consumption are ‘household surveys’. 
However they have limitations and are criticised for how they conceptualise poverty and 
human wellbeing in purely monetary terms (Ravallion, 1996). They also face technical 
challenges regarding the accuracy of data, which is gathered including misreporting of 
information, sample bias and the inadequacy of a once-off observation, which doesn’t take into 
account transitory shocks to households. Issues around limited literacy and numeracy and the 
sensitive nature of discussing incomes may also present challenges to this approach (Perez 
Nino, 2014; Wall and Johnston, 2008). Despite these limitations I found that the data gathered 
was very illuminating, and took every precaution to ensure accuracy. 
 
The livelihood survey included 121 households in the two rural settlements of Keiskammahoek 
and Shiloh. This comprises 62 households in Shiloh and 55 households in Keiskammahoek. In 
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addition, four JV Managers were surveyed; their data was analysed separately since managers 
are in a qualitatively different position from other ‘beneficiaries’, and their households are 
outside of these rural communities. Data were gathered on household composition, livelihood 
sources and incomes, labour relations, land ownership and use, household and farming assets 
and the distribution of JV benefits and risks. A twelve-month recall period was used for 
gathering information on household composition, income, land use, cropping and livestock 
activities.  In Keiskammahoek the recall period was from October 2015- September 2016 and 
in Shiloh from November 2015- October 2016. Information on asset and landownership 
referred to the status of household ownership at the time of interview. 
 
I conducted all of the interviews myself with the assistance of my translator for both the 
household survey and qualitative interviews and life histories. Prior piloting, discussions and 
training sessions on the household survey, ensured that my translator and I were in agreement 
regarding the type of language we used, ethical guidelines and avoiding raising expectations 
around the outcomes of the research. The research instruments were also translated in isiXhosa 
to ensure standard use of language (see appendix for household survey).  
 
The approach for deciding who in the household should be interviewed was to request to speak 
to an adult member (over 18), who could effectively recall detailed information. However, 
since the household survey sought to capture detailed income data and data about own-account 
farming, I would also confer with the relevant household members where the key respondent 
was unsure. Table 5 below illustrates that a more or less equal spread was reached between 
male and female respondents in Keiskammahoek. In Shiloh there are slightly more female than 
male respondents, which is commensurate with the relatively higher proportion of female-
headed households in the total sample (see Chapter 11 below).  
 
Table 5. Gender of Respondent for Household Survey in Keiskammahoek and Shiloh 
Gender of Respondent for Household Survey 
 Case Study  Gender Frequency Percent 
Shiloh 
Female 35 56.5 
Male 27 43.5 
Total 62 100.0 
 
 
Keiskammahoek 
Female 28 50.9 
Male 27 49.1 
Total 55 100.0 
 
In Keiskammahoek for all the taxonomic groups, except the no JV benefits households, 
household lists were available to apply a random sampling of households, and groups were 
manageable enough to ensure a representative sample. In Shiloh I was only able to obtain a list 
of all the workers from the JV farm, which was used to sample households from. This was 
done by randomly selecting a household number to begin interviewing and then attempting to 
interview, for example, every second household on the list to reach the target sample size. If 
households sampled from lists could not be reached, I would then move on to the next 
household on the list and so forth.  
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Defining the geographical boundaries of the no JV benefits households involved looking at 
maps of the boundary of the JV farm (see maps in Chapter 5) and sampling households in an 
equal as possible spread from across the villages or settlements, which surround the farm. For 
the no JV benefits households (in both sites) and the JV dividend receiving households in 
Shiloh I had to make use of opportunistic sampling. I tried to be cognisant of sampling an array 
of households with visibly differentiated asset bases. These groups were very large, which 
didn’t allow a representative sample to be achieved. The limitations of the sampling method, is 
that it was necessarily imprecise due to these constraints, and thus my conclusions about these 
groups are tentative. However, for the other taxonomic groups, I can be relatively confident 
about the validity of the findings. The total sample and the final sample reached for the 
household survey is detailed in Table 6 below.  
 
Table 6. Sample for Household Survey by Category of Respondent in Keiskammahoek (N=55) 
and Shiloh (N=62) 
Category of Respondents (COR) 
Total Households in 
COR Groups 
Number of 
Households Reached 
in sample 
% each taxonomic 
group comprises of 
total sample 
Shiloh 
Keiskam
mahoek Shiloh 
Keiskam
mahoek Shiloh 
Keiskam
mahoek 
JV dividend receiving 
households 385 21 23 8 35% 15% 
JV dividend and wage receiving 
households 10 14 10 11 18% 20% 
JV wage receiving households 16 37 9 21 15% 38% 
No JV benefits households 3910 1850 20 15 32% 27% 
Total N: 4321 1922 62 55 100% 100% 
 
 A focus on gathering rich data during the interviews meant that the breadth of the study was 
compromised in favour of depth. Therefore the sample size, especially for the ‘no JV benefits 
group’, is not very large or statistically representative given the large size of these rural 
communities: 1922 households in Keiskammahoek and 3910 in Shiloh. Given that the study 
focused on the livelihood and land use impacts of the JV, and that the three other taxonomic 
groups are the primary beneficiaries, this seemed like a reasonable approach given the limited 
resources.  
4.6 Data Analysis  
 
As already described above the research design was iterative, whereby data analysis took place 
alongside data collection in order to reflexively revise the focus and approach of the research, 
and of the fieldwork. I made use of the software package SPSS statistics to analyse quantitative 
data collected through the household survey. Rather than a once-off analysis, I periodically 
returned to analysing the data in SPSS as my ideas changed around what types of analyses 
should be undertaken or how to group the data e.g. asset groups, cattle wealth groups and my 
class typology. As part of our NRF Agrarian Political Economy reading group, we had 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 88 
workshops on methodology and data analysis (including using SPSS), which was most useful 
in assisting this process.  
 
My household survey was conducted on a handheld tablet computer using a programme called 
GoFORMZ. This allows you to digitise your household survey form and then to upload it to 
‘the cloud’ and send a copy to your email. This was a far more practical way to conduct 
hundreds of surveys both in the field and in the analysis stage. The programme allows you to 
download the data into a excel spreadsheet which can then be uploaded into SPSS.  This saved 
some time in terms of entering data for analysis. Although there was still some cleaning and 
checking of data that was required in the spreadsheet before it could be uploaded to SPSS. The 
other benefit of using a digitised form in my particular contexts, in light of the conflicts and 
contentions in the field, was that respondents liked the idea that it was password protected as 
opposed to paper-surveys, which could find their way into the ‘wrong hands’.  
 
I made use of ‘ATLAS.ti’, which is a software programme for coding and analysing qualitative 
data. I found this a useful way to arrange my data under certain emerging themes (using codes), 
since I had hundreds of pages of interviews and other resources to work through. Some of my 
interviews were recorded on a voice recorder and later transcribed. After I became more aware 
of the dynamics in the field I decided to abandon the voice recorder because I thought it made 
people nervous. Many of my interviews were conducted on a tablet, which allowed them to be 
easily uploaded into ATLAS.ti, although I also kept a fieldwork journal.  
 
As mentioned above, I undertook periodic analysis of my fieldwork data. Depending on the 
emerging issues that came to the fore from the concrete research, I would drew on different 
aspects of theory in an attempt to synthesis the concrete and abstract to explain what I was 
seeing in my case studies. I presented at several international and national conferences 
throughout my PhD. This gave me the opportunity to periodically reflect on my research and 
write-up working papers for conferences. The feedback I received on my conference 
presentations allowed me to rethink my conceptualisations in some cases. I also managed to 
publish a working paper and several blogs through the Institute of Development Studies, at the 
University of Sussex. The NRF reading group undertook an intensive one year reading 
programme in 2015-2016 on Agrarian Political Economy, including reading Marx’s first 
volume of Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. This provided a very useful forum to 
debate ideas, link it to our relevant research projects and to receive critical feedback on our 
evolving conceptual frameworks.  
 
The key challenge for me has been to find a way to explain the significance of JVs in terms of 
the key concerns of Agrarian Political Economy. As chapter two and three illustrated, unlike 
other agricultural investments like contract farming where there is a wealth of robust analysis, 
JVs are a relatively newer phenomenon and many of the studies have thus been largely 
descriptive. Finding a conceptual framework that worked, involved applying a multitude of 
‘conceptual lenses’ in an exploratory way. In these attempts to integrate my qualitative and 
quantitative data with abstract theory, I would critically reflect on and evaluate which 
explanations were most powerful. Along this journey, I have written up hundreds of pages of 
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‘findings’, which never found their way into the pages of this thesis. This was my experimental 
way of conducting data analysis and developing explanations that I felt provided useful 
insights, which both explained the dynamics emerging in my concrete case studies, while also 
linking them to broader theory and trends of agrarian change.  
4.7 Reflections on Fieldwork and Limitations of the Research 
 
At the onset of the research I struggled to secure access to some of the possible case study 
farms. Local elites and agribusiness partners were generally very hesitant to allow access to the 
JV farms. It was a lengthy and difficult process to gain access to the farms. I was initially very 
interested in including Ncera Macadamia JV as a key case study, given the interest of 
government and strategic partners to roll the model out over an extensive area across 
communal areas of the Eastern Cape, including establishing outgrower schemes. However, the 
strategic partner Kula Investments, withdrew access after two field visits. My last 
correspondence with Kula was on the 30 March 2016. Notably, only 10 weeks later on the 15 
June 2016, the Daily Dispatch43 reported that ‘Ncera residents’ had vandalised the macadamia 
plantations (cutting down over 900 trees), set fire to sheds, ripped out water connections and 
destroyed fertilisers, seeds and other inputs. The opposition group raised questions regarding 
the transparent governance of the JV and distribution of benefits to the customary landowners, 
laying the blame on the same individual at Kula whom I had dealt with. The timing of this was 
striking, and it may be possible that growing tensions among beneficiaries contributed to 
Kula’s decision to withdraw my access to the field sites.  
 
These experiences raise several important issues about research approach, ethics and the 
possible limitations of my study as well. It is important to note that Amadlelo Agri owns a 23% 
share in Ncera Macadamia, although they do not seem to play an active role in the management 
of the JV, in the same way as Kula Investments does. I was initially very concerned that the 
strained relationship with Ncera Macadamia would affect my access to Amadlelo Agri’s JVs. 
However, this wasn’t the case in the end, and over my many interviews with management at 
Amadlelo Agri I felt, that on the whole, representatives from Amadlelo Agri approached the 
research with quite an enthusiastic attitude of openness.  
 
My challenges in gaining and maintaining access to JV farms, illustrates how much more 
challenging it is to research JV-type arrangements or other interventions involving private 
sector actors and agribusiness firms. This is contrasted to the relative ease of researching PCPs 
or 'smallholder farmers', where production is predominantly organised around the labour 
regime of a household. In some respects, these difficulties and tensions in the research process 
reflect power dynamics in the agrarian space, and how capital and elite interests are being 
guarded and protected. At the Shiloh farm the resistance I experienced came mostly from the 
Mayime cooperative. This reflects the on-going intragroup conflicts and power struggles 
among elites and various other groups. Cramer et al (2015), however, also make the valuable 
                                                 
43 See: https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/daily-dispatch/20160615/281526520336292; see also 
https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2016-06-22-nutty-to-ruin-macadamias/ as a response to this article by board members aligned to Kula 
and Eastern Cape Macadamia 
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point that instead of viewing such disruptions to fieldwork as an inconvenience, we should 
focus on how they shed a light on local dynamics of power.  
 
Quite early on in the fieldwork, I noticed that respondents were nervous about being personally 
identified in the research due to the politics around the JVs. I therefore decided to ensure 
anonymity for all my respondents. This was a way to avoid potential conflicts between 
stakeholders and also to ensure respondents felt more at ease to share candid evaluations of the 
JV interventions. Before every interview or interaction, working with the help of my translator 
in certain cases, we would briefly describe the aims of the research, the University’s ethical 
principles that I was bound by and reiterate my commitment to ensuring their anonymity. We 
spent a fair amount of time discussing what kinds of language we would use in the interviews 
and ensuring the translations were commensurate. However, since some of the interviews 
required me to speak through my translator, I cannot always be certain of how we were 
presenting ourselves and this is a limitation of the research.  
 
Although I put great care into how we presented ourselves in the field, in Shiloh at certain 
points of the research I experienced hostility from some groups to the field research. In 
Keiskammahoek on the contrary, we were quite warmly welcomed and apart from the expected 
initial suspicions during the scoping fieldwork, we didn’t have any problems in maintaining 
access or with hostile reactions to the research. Initially the chairperson of the Mayime 
Cooperative was very suspicious of the intentions of the fieldwork. When I contacted her to set 
up a follow up meeting and let her know I would be conducting further fieldwork, she was 
wary. I subsequently realized that this might be related to an ongoing court case between 
Mayime Cooperative and an opposition group opposed to the current leadership. After allaying 
her fears and interviewing and meeting with the traditional leader, access was permitted and 
everything seemed to run smoothly for a while. However, following intensive research in July 
2016, where I interviewed four households from the group of ’17 dairy farmers’ with land 
claims to plots farmed by the JV (see Chapter 9), I experienced a new round of hostility to the 
fieldwork. A rumour spread that I was a lawyer who was following up on their land claim case. 
The following quote from a female worker on the farm, who approached me to warn me about 
some misgivings members of the community had about my research, is telling:  
 
“Some information slipped out of someone's mouth and they mentioned your 
name…those people living on the farm before are claiming money for the livestock and 
land. Some of them thought that you are investigating something like that but I told 
him, no she is still a student… I advised them that they mustn't take it that you are 
doing research on their own claims.” 
 
After my field research in July 2016, I received several text messages and calls from 
individuals aligned to different sides of this conflict. It was a challenging experience to try and 
clarify among these various groups, that I was indeed not a lawyer and that I needed to 
maintain my objectivity by not taking sides in the emerging conflicts. I did however affirm the 
prospect that conducting unbiased research could assist in clarifying the various issues of 
contention, which could be useful for all parties concerned. In October 2016 I was requested to 
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have a meeting with the committee of the Mayime Cooperative and the traditional leader, in 
which I had to reiterate again the purpose of the research and of the household survey that I had 
planned to conduct that month. Thankfully, at that meeting members accepted my proposal and 
I went ahead with the survey. Amadlelo Agri representatives were also present to report back 
to the cooperative on farm progress and this allowed me to view the interactions between the 
cooperative members and the agribusiness partner. However, I was also aware that it was very 
likely that my presence would influence these interactions. 
 
I did, however, experience certain cases of hostility during this time. This included a few 
households refusing to participate in the survey because they thought I was aligned with either 
the ‘opposition group’ or the ’17 dairy farmers’. For example, on one occasion we were chased 
out of a household, after we failed to allay a woman’s fears that we were not on the side of the 
‘opposition group’. She had threatened to call some ‘youngsters’ on us and so we 
apologetically took our leave. I must confess that in the many years of field research that I have 
conducted in rural areas, this was the first time in which I feared somewhat for my safety and 
that of my translator, who was also very concerned.  
 
Mayime’s committee members promised that they would give us the list of ‘landowners’, 
however, on four separate occasions where I had arranged to come to the office to get the list, 
everyone had mysteriously disappeared or the ‘right person’ with access to the list was not 
present. It was for this reason that we had to go ahead with an ‘opportunistic sampling method’ 
in Shiloh. Some members of the Mayime Cooperative also declined to be interviewed in 
October / November 2016.  
 
These palpable tensions did definitely calm down after a week or so, perhaps after ‘new 
rumours’ spread among household clarifying our intentions. Also because of the many positive 
interactions we had with the household that we were interviewing for the survey. However, I 
recount these experiences here because of the possible limitations it poses to the data that was 
gathered, in a context where the research project itself became embroiled in local dynamics of 
politics and conflict, in a way that sharply contrasted to the relative ease of research in 
Keiskammahoek. Even if this experience was somewhat unsettling, I did learn a great deal 
about the dynamics of politics on the ground through these challenges and I have tried my best 
to remain very aware of how respondents might be constructing their own discourses in light of 
these dynamics.  
 
The final and critical consideration of the limitations of this study is related to my positionality 
as a relatively young, white, female, ‘middle-class’, English-speaking South African. This 
particular mix of social labels would have had a definite impact on how I was perceived by 
respondents as an ‘outsider’ and necessarily on how they might have constructed the narratives 
they shared with me. As discussed above, Sayer (1992) notes that successful shared meanings 
between researchers and respondents are also conditional on the meanings of terms and 
conceptual frameworks being ‘mutually intelligible’ (Sayer, 1992). It is quite possible that at 
times respondents might have felt that I couldn’t possibly understand their struggles, or they 
altered their explanations to what they thought would be intelligible or ‘appropriate’ to me. It is 
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also conceivable that I might have unintentionally used language or presented myself in ways 
that were alienating to respondents.  
 
It is not only race which carries a heavy burden of mistrust in South Africa, but also my 
identity as a women and a person in her early 30s, in a society where both gender and 
generational struggles are stark. I felt that the fact that my translator was a male, Xhosa-
speaker, a resident of the former Ciskei, and in his mid- 40s, somewhat eased these initial 
impressions of us as a research team. I also felt that the initial hesitations people had to my 
presence, definitely eased the longer I researched in these sites (barring the above experiences) 
and I slowly became less of a ‘stranger’. I firmly believe that all of these perceived social 
labels can be transcended and people can connect in terms of their common humanity. 
However, at the same time, it would be naïve to assume that everyone feels this way and that 
my social positionality did not affect the responses I received.    
4.8 Conclusion 
 
Marx’s method of dialectics and the tenants of Critical Realism described above, form the basis 
of the methodological approach in this thesis. The approach is employed in this study, with the 
aim of moving from ‘appearances’ to ‘reality’ (Marx, 1973). The empirical data has been 
analysed by making use of relevant theoretical concepts and analytical categories that Marxist 
political economy provides. The resulting explanation of reality offered in this thesis 
emphasises the transient nature of social phenomena, complexities and contingencies, the 
specificities of the historical context, and locates these within the Capitalist mode of production 
(Sayer, 1992; Marx, 1973).  
 
Trying to comprehend the significance of JVs entails grappling with various aspects of social 
reality. It requires systematically working one’s way from what can be directly observed, from 
the shared meanings drawn from the lived experiences of key informants, and then digging 
below this surface, peeling away the appearances, to get to the conceptual core of these 
relations and dynamic social processes using abstract theory. Parts of this PhD thesis involve a 
‘thick description’ of social phenomena in an ethnographic approach (Geertz, 1973). However, 
this is drawn not only from what was observable but also my analysis and commentary on the 
empirical research. I slowly add, layer-by-layer, appropriate concepts and theories, in an 
explorative fashion to attempt to get to grips with the fundamental relations, which underpin 
and explain what is going on in these JV arrangements.  
 
Applying a methodology of Marxist dialectics, doesn’t lend itself to an easily implementable 
step-by-step guide in the way that, for example, Vermeulen and Cotula’s (2010) “Ownership, 
Voice, Risk and Reward” framework does44. This perhaps accounts for the few serious Marxist 
analyses to date. Marxist political economy, by its nature, embraces complexity. It is not a 
simple task to bridge the divide between how things might first appear to the researcher (with 
due consideration to the researchers positionality and social conditioning) and the actual 
                                                 
44 Vermeulen and Cotula’s (2010) framework has become perhaps the most dominant conceptual framework for evaluating inclusive business 
models, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
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‘reality’. The task of materialist dialectics is to provide the tools by which the researcher can 
integrate appearances/form and reality/content, and to uncover the contradictions and forces, 
which are hidden from the empiricist observer (Mandel, 1976). Although this PhD thesis 
makes use primarily of a Marxist lens, there are times in which other social theories are drawn 
on to provide the sufficient conceptual force to evaluate the implications of the JV model. 
There are certain social dynamics that have been more convincingly explained outside of 
Marxist approaches, for example dynamics of gender, culture, ethnicity, kinship and other 
modes of belonging (Peters, 2004; Berry, 1993; Oomen, 2005; Knowles, 1991; Fay, 2005; 
Manenzhe, 2016) 
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Chapter 5. Case Study Contexts: Keiskammahoek and Shiloh in Historical 
Perspective  
5.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Four, a key focus of any serious analysis of an agricultural 
intervention from within a Marxist political economy approach needs to consider the historical 
and contemporary context of the case study sites. This chapter thus aims to describe in detail 
the contexts of the two rural settlements of Keiskammahoek and Shiloh, in which the JV farms 
have been established. The location of the former Ciskei homeland and Shiloh (near 
Whittlesea) and Keiskammahoek villages are indicated on the map below. Both farms are 
located on the site of homeland-era irrigation schemes, originally established in 1976 at 
Keiskammhoek and in the mid 1960s at Shiloh (and subsequently revitalised in 1979).  
 
Figure 2. Map of the Former Ciskei Homeland and Location of Shiloh and Keiskammahoek Case 
Study Sites 45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I begin by discussing the historical context of the Ciskei and some relevant dynamics that help 
us understand the particular social relations of land, labour and capital in this part of the 
Eastern Cape Province. I then will be discussing the historical development of the irrigation 
schemes in Keiskammahoek and Shiloh, highlighting differences in the social relations of 
production and land tenure systems, drawing on historical records, case studies and my own 
life history interviews.  This background assists us in moving on to a description of the 
contemporary context and how these rural settlements are constituted.  
                                                 
45 Source: Wikimedia Commons, Topographic map of the Ciskei 
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5.2. The Former Homeland of the Ciskei 
 
The former 'homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’ are a key legacy of the 1913 and 1936 land acts, which 
reserved only 13 % of the land for black South Africans. There were 10 'homelands' designated 
for different South African 'tribes'. The Ciskei, which is the focus of this study, was one of four 
homelands that became a 'nominally independent state' in 1981 and was designated for the 
Rharhabe Xhosa (Claasens 2015; Switzer, 1993). The map below indicates the location of the 
Ciskei in yellow, along with the other former homeland territories.  
 
   Figure 3. Map of Bantustan Territories 46  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘Ciskei’ literally means ‘on this side of the Kei River’, which refers to the side closest to 
Cape Town. The term ‘Ciskei’ was used long before the Ciskei Bantustan was created as a 
result of the 1913 Land Act. Its use can be tracked to as far back as the 1840s to refer to Bantu-
speaking African locations located west of the boundary of the Kei River (Switzer 1993). The 
term also reflects the colonial project of this specific point of history, which aimed to carve out 
a political entity from the territories of Xhosaland. This was first achieved in the mid-1850s 
with the formation of the Crown Reserve, which later became the Keiskammahoek district. In 
1866 the Cape colony further extended its control of Xhosa territory by annexing a territory 
that became British Kaffraria (Mager, 1999). The map47 below indicates the territories after 
1866, the location of Shiloh (further north) and Keiskammahoek are indicated on the map with 
stars. 
 
The Ciskei is thus a historically significant region, being the site of early conflict between 
Bantu speaking Africans and European settlers on the eastern frontier. This region was host to 
over 100 years of the Cape-Xhosa Wars or Cape Frontier Wars between 1779 and 1879 
                                                 
46 Source: Encyclopedia Britannica (2009): https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bantustan 
47 See: http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/hsmith/autobiography/620.gif 
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(Switzer, 1993).  After 1853 the Cape Colony began settling those considered friendly to the 
colonial power with freehold and quitrent tenure in the district of Keiskammahoek. Along with 
white settlers this also included the Mfengus48 who had assisted the colonial powers in their 
conquest. Mager (1999:2) explains how the intention of this was to create a ‘buffer strip’ 
particularly in the region between King William’s Town and Fort Hare between white farmers 
and ‘unfriendly Africans to the east’. “This “chessboard” pattern was also intended to ensure 
“an adequate labour supply” to adjacent white farms. The key criterion for access to freehold 
tenure was loyalty to the colonial government” (ibid).  
 
  Figure 4. Map of Xhosaland and British Kaffraria after 1866 
 
 
The history of the Ciskei (which can’t be done adequate justice here) presents a very complex 
picture of shifting land rights and their linked allegiances, which are critical to understanding 
historical trajectories of class, racial and gender relations. The fact that the private titles or 
quitrents of the Mfengus continue to be referred to as umhlaba webaso or ‘reward land’ 
(Mager, 1999) or that the black landowners with private titles to irrigation plots in 
Keiskammahoek continue to be referred to as ‘settlers’, must be conceived from within this 
larger historical picture.     
 
                                                 
48 The origins of the Mfengu are contested, clearly because they at times sided with colonial powers and thus the discourse was controlled by 
the British Colony which constructed a version that suited their political aims. Bundy (1979) however, notes that they are believed to originate 
from Natal and to have been displaced by the Zulu kingdom and emigrated in scattered or larger groups and originate from the Zizi, Hlubi and 
Bhele clans. In my particular case study sites, including in Peddie, Middledrift, Keiskammahoek and Shiloh, it was common to hear references 
to the ‘amaZizi who own land’. Kingwill (2014) explains the contested origins of the Mfengu as follows: “identified as ‘Fingo’ by the British, 
an anglicisation of ‘Mfengu’, meaning supplicants… history of displacement as temporary refugees among far-flung corners of Xhosa 
territory. The neologism ‘Fingo’ denotes a category of displaced people identified and so-named by the coloniser, and was not an indigenous 
name of an ethnic group or tribe. The historiography of the amaMfengu is contested ... the amaMfengu entered a political relationship of 
strategic alliance with the British and fought alongside British soldiers against the Xhosa resisters. They responded positively to many of the 
opportunities on offer, such as education, the franchise and private land tenure”. See also: R. Moyer, ‘A History of the Mfengu of the Eastern 
Cape 1815–1865’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1976), 260. 
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The Ciskei has a long history of popular protest stretching not only across the colonial but also 
the Apartheid eras. In the 1940s and 50s the Ciskei was an important locale for protest groups 
who established a militant base of operations that united both ‘urban and rural dissidents’ 
during the Defiance Campaign. The Ciskei has therefore had a long history of bridging urban 
and rural identities in ways, which saw unlikely class alliances forming between a 
differentiated rural peasantry and urban workers. The Ciskei was also an important site of 
struggle against Apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s (Switzer, 1993). This historical character of 
struggle that bridges rural and urban areas and identities is important to keep in mind when 
contextualizing the struggles over JVs.  
Capitalist Development in the Ciskei 
 
Switzer (1993), Peires (1981) and Bundy (1979) have all tracked the development of capitalism 
in the Ciskei during the period of Cape colonial rule. The origins of capitalist development are 
found first in the expansion of mercantile capitalism, which supplanted the precapitalist 
economy. Following this, the mineral revolution of the 1870s and 80s, both ‘modernized’ and 
fundamentally restructured the peasant economy, and is believed to have catalysed processes of 
proletarianization on the African population in the Ciskei (Switzer, 1993). The on-going 
frontier wars also provide an impetus for African migrant labour into the Cape colony. 
Illustrative of this, was the large number of ‘impoverished Bantu speakers’ who were driven 
into the Cape seeking work after the frontier War of 1834-5 (Switzer, 1993: 85). Peires (1981) 
however emphasizes that at this stage migrant labour was still largely 'voluntary'.  
 
“But as long as they still had an independent subsistence base in Xhosaland, the Xhosa 
as a people could not be forced on to the labour market, whatever the fate of some 
individuals. They could still opt out when wages were too low. Before 1846 
proletarianisation was still partial, temporary, and to some extent voluntary. The War of 
the Axe49 changed all that” (Peires, 1981: 106).  
 
Peires (1981: 165) goes on to explain the new context after the 7th frontier war (War of the 
Axe) had devastated the Xhosa population: “ By 1847 things were very different. The Xhosa 
Kingdom had shrunk, and in shrinking it had lost vast tracks of its most fertile territory… No 
longer did the summer pastures guarantee the health and well-being of the people’s cattle”. 
During the course of the frontier wars, in a process of what we have explored in Chapter 2 as 
‘primitive accumulation’, the Xhosa were systematically removed from ever-greater stretches 
of productive land, that undoubtedly disrupted the ability of households to reproduce 
themselves, forcing them to sell their labour on the market to survive (Peires, 1981).  
 
Capitalist relations also took root in processes beyond expropriation of land, particularly in 
how people were inextricably drawn into commodity relations to reproduce themselves. Trade 
between the Cape colony and Ciskei Xhosa accelerated with the lifting of restriction on trading 
with Africans outside the Cape in 1830 (Switzer, 1993). However, the Xhosa peasant economy 
had not been entirely destroyed by these years of war and colonial subversion. Colin Bundy 
                                                 
49 This refers to the seventh frontier war from 1846-47. It was the first war in which the Xhosa made use of firearms and also entailed 
widespread use of scorched earth' tactics by the Cape forces (Peires, 1981). 
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(1979), for example, identifies an emergent African peasantry in the Eastern Cape Ciskei that 
was able to effectively respond to the development of the market economy between 1840 and 
the 1870s. Bundy (1979) illustrates how this peasantry expanded from its origins in the Ciskei, 
moving into the Transkei and further into Natal, the north-east Cape and Orange Free State. 
This pioneering thesis links the decline of this Ciskei peasantry to the mineral discoveries. 
Bundy proposes that every African household had been drawn into the commodity economy by 
the 1870s and to differing degrees were producing surplus agricultural goods for the market, as 
well as purchasing European manufactured goods. 
 
This Ciskei peasantry was already differentiated by this early stage.  Bundy (1979) estimates, 
for example, that by 1890 an ‘upper-ranked rural peasantry’ or ‘rich peasantry’ existed, 
although small in numbers, amounting to between 1000 and 2000 households. They employed 
wage labour as well as family labour and were politically powerful enough to secure good 
quality land (many with quitrent titles)50 and produced cash crops for markets. Lewis (1984)51 
has, however, questioned Bundy's (1979) idea of a ‘rich peasantry’ in the Ciskei. According to 
Lewis very few households benefitted by engaging in the market and he contends that the so-
called surplus being sold was in fact a portion of their subsistence rations. He does, however, 
like Bundy suggest that the Mfengu became the most prominent peasant innovators. 
 
According to Switzer (1993) the poorest peasants remained subject to traditional communal 
forms of tenure. Many were involved in subsistence production on small plots and marginally 
participated in the mercantile economy as petty traders. Some worked as tenant or wage labour 
on the commercial farms of rich African peasants, however, the majority survived 
predominantly through migrant labour in the white Cape Colony. The availability of land in 
freehold for some African residents (mostly the Mfengus) undoubtedly hastened processes of 
social differentiation among the peasantry (Switzer, 1993). 
 
In both Shiloh and Keiskammahoek there is historical evidence of successful peasant 
producers, who managed to prevail even in the last years of the devastating frontier war. 
Historical records show that African farmers from Keiskammahoek won prizes at agricultural 
fairs, outcompeting European farmers in the 1870s. Keiskammahoek was also an active trading 
venue and Queenstown was a major market town for African farmers coming from nearby 
Shiloh. Queenstown and King Williamstown (bordering Keiskammahoek district) were also 
the first districts where African farmer cooperatives were established (Switzer, 1993). Bundy 
(1979: 48) refers to a section of residents in Shiloh in the mid 1800s as ‘peasants proper’: 
 
 “…Faring relatively well in the midst of poverty, committed more fully to production 
for exchange. Still predominantly attached to mission stations, these peasants included 
an increasing number of non-mission members, and the scale and output of their 
farming activity were rising steadily. Seven hundred inhabitants of the Moravian 
mission at Shiloh (Mfengu and Thembu) greatly impressed Merriman 52 in January 
                                                 
50 “”Most individual plots were held in quitrent tenure: households received title to the land on payment of a quitrent that was initially set at 
one pound a year” (Switzer, 1993: 89). 
51 See: Lewis (1984) “An economic history of the Ciskei, 1848 - 1900 “, unpublished PhD Thesis. 
52 He was an Archdeacon in the 1850s (Bundy, 1979.  
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1850, when he saw them reaping a fine wheat harvest- a spectacle not matched 
elsewhere in Africa, he declared” (emphasis added). 
 
However, at the same time, there was social differentiation and not all sections of society in 
Shiloh and Keiskammahoek managed to successfully negotiate livelihoods for themselves. The 
so-called ‘lower levels of Nguni society’ were severely affected by the ravages of war and 
poverty, and were forced into the market economy in desperation, rather than for profit. For 
example, Bundy (1979) notes reports at the time of groups of women from both 
Keiskammahoek and settlements near Whittlesea (Shiloh) in 1850, begging, selling or trading 
meagre goods from their gardens, along with animal skins and firewood (Bundy, 1979). 
 
Switzer (1993: 4) contends, that although capitalist transformation was characterized by a slow, 
uneven and incomplete process of proletarianisation, the vast majority of Ciskei peasants had 
declined into a category of ‘poor peasants’ or ‘super exploited excluded classes’ by 1910. In 
particular this had important and rather dire implications for the position of women (especially 
unmarried women) whose land rights, social power and economic opportunities were severely 
compromised (Switzer, 1993; Peires, 1981; Mager, 1999). 
 
Knight and Lenta (1980) propose that peasant production per capita then steadily declined 
further between 1918 and 1974 across the homelands. The economic conditions and food 
insecurity in the Ciskei were noted by the central government as being the most severe and the 
government attempted to intervene directly to boost production between 1920 and 1950 
(Switzer, 1993). However there are disagreements among authors as to the cause of agricultural 
decline and when exactly this period of decline started in the Ciskei.  
 
Hebinck and van Averbeke, (2007: 34) note that “the decline was most likely set in motion by 
a combination of factors involving population dynamics, labour migration, market formation, 
mounting pressure on the land, declining fertility, and adverse agro-ecological conditions. 
Policy and the ways in which the state attempted to intervene in black agrarian society were 
also important”. Simkins (1981) further identifies the move by the Apartheid government in the 
mid 1950’s to limit migration and redirect it back to the homelands as a key trigger for severe 
decline. This supports findings by other authors that have emphasised that in the apartheid 
period wages and remittances were central to sustaining agricultural production (Murray 1981; 
Spiegel 1986; James 1985; Beinart et al. 1986).  
 
By 1974, allegedly, peasant producers in the Ciskei were unable to supply significant portions 
of subsistence requirements (Simkins, 1981/4). It is interesting yet unsurprising that his 
periodization of agricultural decline among peasant producers fits neatly with the establishment 
of the Keiskammahoek scheme in 1976 and the revitalization of the Shiloh scheme in 1979. 
The irrigation schemes can thus be contextualised as efforts by the South African state and 
Bantustan governments to reengineer the development of an African farming class, to deal with 
unemployment and declining food production in the Ciskei, and also as a wider policy response 
aimed at placating growing political opposition to the Apartheid regime.   
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5.3. Agricultural Development on Smallholder Irrigation Schemes Under the Former 
Ciskei 
 
In South Africa around 10 % (1.3 million hectares) of arable land is irrigated (Cousins, 2012). 
Approximately 100, 000 hectares of this irrigated land is farmed by smallholders, mostly 
located in the former homelands (Van Averbeke and Khosa, 2011). There are 317 smallholder 
irrigation schemes across the country, of which around one-third were reported as inactive in 
2007 (Cousins, 2012). Averbeeke et al (2011: 799) remark that of the key constraints noted by 
extension workers on 164 smallholder schemes researched across the country, “poor 
management topped the list (50% of the cases); followed by infrastructural problems (15%); 
water inadequacies (13%); conflict (12%); and theft (7%). This suggests that human (capacity) 
and social (institutional) resource problems were at the heart of the below-expected 
performance of smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa identified by nearly all 
assessments that were made (Bembridge, 1997; Bembridge, 2000; Kamara et al., 2001; Shah et 
al., 2002; Machete et al., 2004; iSeneke Developments, 2004; Tlou et al., 2006; Speelman et 
al., 2008; Yokwe, 2009; Mnkeni et al., 2010).”  
 
From 1950 the state began upgrading existing smallholder schemes and also developed a 
number of new irrigation schemes, all of which were canal schemes (Van Averbeke, 2008). 
Shiloh was established in the 1960s during a period in which the government through 
“segregation and apartheid-era government policies aimed to support ‘full-time farmers’ on 
small plots, and seventy-four schemes were constructed”(Cousins, 2012: 125-126).  From 1975 
onwards the state stopped developing canal schemes, which were replaced by overhead 
irrigation systems, reflecting global modernisation trends (Faurès et al., 2007).  
 
Between 1975 and 1985, a number of smallholder irrigation schemes were developed 
especially in the Eastern Cape (Van Averbeke et al., 1998). A number of these irrigation 
schemes were established as gravity-fed systems, as is the case in Keiskammahoek. A few very 
large schemes were established, notably Keiskammahoek, Shiloh, Ncora, Tyefu and Zanyokwe 
in the Eastern Cape (the first three are all operated by Amadlelo Agri as dairy JVs). All of 
these irrigation schemes were immensely capital-intensive (Averbeeke et al., 2011; Bembridge, 
1987; Van Averbeke et al., 1998; Laker, 2000). Until around 1996 these irrigation schemes 
were governed by the relevant Bantustan governments and their agricultural parastatals 
(Ulimocor in the Ciskei) (Van Averbeke and Khosa, 2011). The reason for implementation of 
modern and capital-intensive farming systems is explained by Laker (2004) as follows: 
 
“Since consultants always received a fee based on a percentage of the capital 
expenditure, it was to their advantage to plan the most capital expensive system. The 
South African government funded only capital expenditures and not running costs and 
it was thus easy to convince homeland governments to go for capital intensive projects, 
rather than those with higher running costs, e.g., labour intensive ones”.   
 
The plan to create ‘a class of permanent farmers’ on these irrigation schemes, however, faced 
tremendous challenges. Among the reasons for this were the unreasonable pressures placed on 
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household reproduction, and the connected challenge of overcrowding in the former 
homelands, as Switzer (1993: 326) notes: 
 
“ To establish a class of permanent farmers, the commissioners estimated that each 
family farm unit would have to earn 120 pounds a year to survive in full-time 
employment, and 80 percent of the resident reserve population would have to be 
resettled in nonfarm townships. Since a relocation of the resident reserve population on 
this scale was politically unacceptable, the commissioners arbitrarily reduced the self-
sufficiency figure to about 60 pounds per farm unit… and the surplus farm population 
to just under 50 percent of the 1951 reserve population.” 
 
Both the Keiskammahoek and Shiloh schemes, like other large irrigation schemes, included a 
central commercial estate or unit that was managed by the Bantustan parastatal, ‘commercial 
smallholder’ units on mini-farms of between 4-12 hectares, alongside ‘subsistence’ units of 
small food plots for household production of 0.1-0.25 hectares (Cousins, 2012; Van Averbeke 
et al., 1998). Averbeke et al. (1998: xi) note that: 
 
“... Conceived as the social component of irrigation scheme development, food plot 
sections were introduced into irrigation scheme design primarily to compensate land 
right holders for making available their land for the development the scheme”.  
 
Averbeke et al., (2011) note that “the mechanised farming system that prevailed on these 
schemes carried high operational and maintenance costs and required sophisticated 
management systems”. As a result many of these smallholders were never really able to farm 
independently and thus when the homeland parastatals were liquidated in the democratic era, 
many of these schemes fell into disrepair (Cousins, 2012). When the Ciskei was dissolved and 
reincorporated into South Africa, there was a total lack of handover in terms of key 
organizational functions to the democratic regime. Hence financial and institutional support to 
farming households was withdrawn in a chaotic manner. This resulted in a near total collapse 
of production following the dismantling of the parastatals and in Shiloh the scheme was 
vandalised (Van Averbeke and Khosa, 2011). This historical context has shaped the particular 
character of these irrigation schemes, intragroup conflicts and the class and gender relations in 
these locations. These historical contexts have important implications for analysing the JV 
schemes. 
 
Historical Narratives of the Keiskammahoek Irrigation Scheme: Land Consolidation 
under ‘Settler Farmers’, ‘Glorified Workers’ or Differentiated ‘Petty Commodity 
Producers’? 
 
Planning for the Keiskammahoek irrigation scheme commenced in 1970 and was implemented 
in 1976 by consultants Loxton and Venn ‘under the direction of the Department of Agriculture 
and Rural Development of Ciskei’ (Averbeke et al., 1998: 61). According to my life histories, 
during the first years of the schemes establishment households reported gaining access to a plot 
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on the irrigation scheme between 1976 and 198253. The Ciskei Agricultural Corporation and 
Ulimocor54 took over management of the scheme from 198355 onwards until Ulimocor was 
liquidated in 1997. The land was operated predominantly as a dairy from 1976 until 1997. 
However the scheme also produced other crops at certain points, including planting tobacco 
briefly in 1980 56 . Most landowners continued with at least marginal dairy production, 
alongside a mixed farming system, after Ulimocor left. 
 
The majority of the farming households that settled on the scheme came from outside of the 
Keiskammahoek area. Most of those farmers that were interviewed and who gained access to 
their land in the late 1970s and 1980s, reported having responded to a radio or newspaper 
advert. The size of the original group of farmers that settled on the scheme from 1976 is 
contested. Holbrooke (1996) mentions an original group of 97 farmers. Various respondents 
however mentioned 88, 120 or 105 farming households. The conditions of joining the scheme 
were that at least one person from the households had to be a ‘full-time’ farmer on the land, 
they were limited to 4 heads of cattle, and they were not allowed to keep goats or sheep (de 
Wet, 2008).  The Ciskei government officials screened the applicants who also needed to be 
less than 40 years, married and have a minimum education level of Standard 4 (Holbrooke, 
1996). A respondent from a dividend receiving household (Farmer T) for example explains,  
 
“I grew up in Stutterheim. I was in Joburg in 1982 and I heard an advert on the radio for 
the irrigation scheme.  I came to the scheme and they gave me a form but they told me I 
am not educated so I must get someone educated to help me fill the form. My uncle 
helped me. They said they wanted someone who was married and I told my uncle he 
must say I am and I will get a wife!”  
 
The statement represents a long legacy stretching over the Colonial and Apartheid era of state 
interference in the domestic and particularly marital affairs of black Africans. This was 
foremost a way to control labour and restrict women’s rights to land (Claasens, 2013; Cousins, 
2013b). Holbrook (1996: 606) also notes that: “Most participants came from outside the 
Keiskammahoek district because local men resented not being allowed to keep their own cattle 
on the scheme”. Nightingale (1983: 106-7) reported that 85 % of scheme settlers came from 
outside Keiskammahoek. Nightingale makes use of survey data to demonstrate that in fact ‘4 
720 men’ from nearby villages met the criteria for selection but were nevertheless refused. This 
explains why today there continues to be some animosity among the wider community towards 
landowners, who continue to be referred to as settlers and the legitimacy of their land rights 
questioned. 
                                                 
53 Of the 21 households with irrigation plots interviewed, two households could not remember the year, one reported accessing land in 1976, 6 
households in 1977, two households in 1978, three households in 1979, one household in 1981, one household in 1982. Four households 
reported gaining access to their current plots after democracy, three of which had previously lost access to other plots on the scheme after 
being ‘squeezed out’ and one  who bought their land from a relative.  
54 Averbeke clarifies in a personal correspondence the relationship between Ulimocor and the Ciskei Agricultural Corporation “Ciskei 
Agricultural Corporation sat on top of Ulimocor (an umbrella as it were).”  
55 In my life histories there are conflicting dates. The majority note that Ulimocor took over in 1983 while two households said they took over 
in 1980. Averbeke et al (1998: 61) do not mention an exact date that Ulimocor took over but they do state that “when Ciskei became 
independent in 1981 many things changed”, inferring that the change of management may have taken place earlier than 1983. 
56 Farmer T for example notes” in 1980 we planted tobacco but we just planted it once because we found out there are other white farmers 
selling it so they didn't take our tobacco, they just cut it down because there was enough tobacco there in the factory. I still had to pay for the 
tobacco even though the factory didn't take it. Unit 1,4 and 5 all planted tobacco” 
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The first group of ‘settler farmers’ received 4has of land. During the Ciskei era the land was 
farmed in 6 different units, which were organised as cooperatives of household units that 
milked around 6-10 cows with mostly family labour but many also hired-in some labour. The 
following map below from Averbeke et al (1998) illustrates the different units of the irrigation 
scheme. Unit 11 is ‘Upper Gxulu’, which is where the irrigated food plot scheme was located. 
This unit with food plots has not been incorporated into the JV scheme. Units 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
and 8 are incorporated under the current JV scheme. Unit 3 is the central unit, which was and 
remains municipal land owned by the local municipality and rented by the JV scheme. 
 
   Figure 5. Map of Keiskammahoek Irrigation Scheme 57 
 
 
The contested history of land consolidation in Keiskammahoek: from 97 to 35 settler 
farmers  
 
After an initial period of probation from 1976-1983, a large number of the original group of 
settler farmers were asked to leave the scheme by Ulimocor. This allowed for the consolidation 
of larger farming units of a minimum of 12 ha with some as large as 19 ha. A respondent from 
a dividend and wage receiving household (Farmer X) for example notes, “There were about 
105 farmers and only 27 passed. Some of them were not working right or didn’t have quality of 
farming skills. Others failed and they went home. They came from villages all around South 
Africa, just a few were from Keiskammahoek”. The history of how and why the scheme 
                                                 
57 Source: Averbeke et al (2011) 
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reduced the number of farming households from 97 to 2758 farming households is a contested 
history. Holbrooke (1996: 606-607) recounts the process as follows: 
 
“…towards the end of the first decade of implementation at Keiskamma… a decision 
was taken to reduce the number of settlers at Keiskamma. In 1984 a process began 
whereby three farms of four hectares were consolidated into one 12 ha farm. 
Keiskamma farmers, some of whom were doing better than others, decided among 
themselves who would continue farming. The number of dairy farmers dropped from 
97 to 33, and those who lost land were compensated by government with cash to the 
order of several thousand rand... A direct cause was crowding; another the increased 
price of agricultural input. More importantly, the 4 ha farms were aimed at providing a 
net income of around R2 400 per annum, even after allowing for rental and the cost of 
input, but research showed that the mean profit per settler was less than R2 000 for the 
1983-84 year”. 
 
 The life histories revealed varying discourses around how the farmers were chosen. One view 
is that the decision was made according to ‘production quotas’ and the most successful farmers 
were chosen. Other respondents emphasise that the scheme was exploiting farmers, and that 
those who were forced to find outside employment to survive were asked to leave. Yet another 
viewpoint suggests that farmers were chosen on the basis of political allegiance and corruption. 
The following statement from a respondent (Farmer N) in a dividend receiving household who 
got pushed off his land in 1983 (but returned ten years later) reveals the latter perspective.  
 
“Those 27 farmers that got chosen were not from around here they were from far away... 
Those farmers they chose each other to stay here. They told the project manager that they 
have no homes so they must chose those people who don't have homes to go back to. So 
there was a bit of corruption involved. All the ones that had a home around 
Keiskammahoek got pushed off and just went home to the villages. We were working 
equally so I don't believe it was about production only. I saw that those people staying 
around got taken out even if they were very good in their production. I assume that they 
know the Minister who was doing that process, so they were politically connected. This 
is an area of problem among us farmers. There are some politics but now it is ok because 
we have got our land as well.” 
 
It was quite common for those farmers who were chosen to remain on the scheme to suggest 
that the decision was made according to ‘production quotas’ and to refer to those who were 
removed as ‘failed farmers’. A dividend and wage receiving household (Farmer A), for 
example notes: “I started with 4 hectares under Loxton and Venn and then with Ulimocor if 
you work hard they select you to go to 12 hectares” (emphasis added). A dividend receiving 
household (Farmer B), likewise explains: “During the time when they reduced the number of 
people they selected people according to their production. They looked how good you are with 
the cows. It was Ulimocor at that time that made the decision.” (emphasis added). Another 
dividend receiving household (Farmer M) explains, “I have three houses on my plot because 
                                                 
58 Or 33 farming households according to Holbrooke (1996). 
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it’s the houses that other people were removed from. The people who were removed, some left 
and others went to unit 859 because they were failed farmers” (emphasis added).  
 
I interviewed the three farmers who were removed and managed to be reallocated land in unit 8 
a few years later. Among them is Farmer T from a dividend receiving household, he explains 
his household’s story below: 
 
“When Ulimocor came around 1984, I didn't work well with Ulimocor. I just left my 
family at unit 4 and went to look for a job to feed my children. Most of the farmers 
were looking for other jobs to feed their families at that time. We weren’t allowed to 
work though and also have the land, we had to be full time! So we got asked to leave. 
When we left unit 4 I was doing building jobs, most of the work was in Dimbaza but I 
also worked around here... It wasn't a company just informal work. We were renting a 
house in Dimbaza during that time. The other farmers called me in 1992 and said that I 
should come back and I could get land at unit 8... we moved to unit 8 in 1996, because 
there was no water there at first. We don't have a title yet for this land at Unit 8. Unit 8 
used to belong to white farmers and Ulimocor bought this land for the farmers”.  
 
This life history serves to illustrate some of the nuances of the Keiskammahoek case. It also 
illustrates that although these farmers benefited in ways their neighbours did not, their lives 
under the Ciskei era, and particularly under Ulimocor were by no means easy. Households 
were clearly exploited by Ulimocor and the money they received from the scheme was barely 
enough to survive (van Averbeeke et al., 1998). Many of these households were forced to 
labour in secret to try and meet their simple reproduction and some were caught out and asked 
to leave. Many households could no longer ‘resist’ under the ‘squeeze’ and their land was 
accumulated by their neighbours.  
 
When one looks more carefully at the life trajectories of those who did survive, those farmers 
who had previously accumulated savings and other assets through for example public 
employment faired better. Household composition factors are also important. Those households 
with several children and other dependents to support were often forced onto the labour market 
to supplement their farm income. Farmer T’s story (and Farmer N’s story below) illustrates this 
trajectory. Farmer T came from a humble beginning and his household is comprised of 9 
people, 4 of which are his children, who were young dependants at that time.  
 
A continuation of Farmer N’s story below illustrates that it was not only his contention that 
politics and corruption drove the choice of which households were able to stay. It is a classic 
story of differentiation among PCP households, in which his household struggled to meet the 
pressures of their reproduction without recourse to their labour-power. The story also illustrates 
the uncertainties and dynamism of class place and how they managed to regain access to land, 
in part through political patronage to the Sebe regime, which reallocated them land. 
 
                                                 
59 Unit 8 is the section of land that is owned by the municipality 
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“In 1984 there was a performance report which says that I was recently disciplined for 
outside employment…That time I was only being paid R50 and I couldn't look after all 
my children so I left my wife to look after the cows and went to look for employment at 
Gita hospital ... Me and Mr (T) both got into trouble for seeking outside work because 
we couldn't afford to keep our families on the money we were making. The other 
farmers didn't need to work outside the scheme. Some of them had elder children at that 
time that were working at the big cities and sending them money. Some only had one 
small child and the older ones were helping them. At that time, all of my 9 children 
were very young. When the farmers came here we weren't at the same level. Some of 
them were carpenters, policemen and some of the wives like Mr (X’s) wife was a 
teacher. I was not at the same level as some of them, that’s why it was harder for me” 
 
The above contrasting discourses around how land consolidation proceeded illustrate the 
contested nature of the history of the scheme.  These contestations still play out, not only 
among the landowners themselves, but also the relationship between them and the wider 
community that continue to question their rights to the land. 
Labour relations during the Ciskei era: differentiated petty commodity producers or 
glorified labourers? 
 
During the Ciskei era the labour relations differed on the various household farms. A dividend 
receiving household (Farmer B) for example notes “You just worked with your family, we 
didn’t hire labour because then you have to pay them, there wasn’t enough money for that”. 
While other farmers noted employing at least a single labourer, as Farmer X from a dividend 
and wage receiving household describes: “Under Ulimocor I hired just one labourer. Then me 
and my wife worked there too. After Ulimocor I still had one labourer and I also would hire 
piece workers from time to time”. Farmer X’s wife was a teacher and the household was 
believed to be relatively wealthy by other scheme members, as Farmer N’s statement above 
indicates. Access to well-paid salaried employment would definitely have had an impact on the 
ability of households to hire labour or not on their farms.  
 
Holbrook (1996: 607-609) also notes that after the scheme was reduced from ‘97 landowners to 
33’ and hence farms increased from 4 hectares to 12 or as much as 18, this necessitated a need 
for more hired labour from the surrounding villages. Furthermore he notes that it was during 
this time that differentiation among farmers became more accentuated. 
 
These household units can be thought of during this time as petty commodity producers since 
production was based predominantly on family labour, and they internalised the class position 
of capital and labour. However some, such as Laker (2004), who was involved in the first soil 
surveys when the Keiskammahoek scheme was first being planned has referred to these 
farmers as ‘glorified labourers’, a term also used by Averbeke et al., (1998/ 2011) and other 
authors since. Laker notes in a personal correspondence: 
 
“I actually coined the phrase “glorified labourers” because of the way that the farmers 
of Keiskammahoek were managed, yes managed, by the central unit. KKH is/was 
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probably the ultimate example of how a development project should NOT be done… 
And, of course, KKH should never have been put under pastures for dairy cows. With 
its high potential soils it should have been under high value cash crops.”  
 
At the beginning stages of the irrigation schemes development, when the ‘settler farmers’ did 
not own their means of production, it might have been plausible to refer to them as ‘glorified 
labourers’. However after some time working on their plots, they paid off the land, inputs and 
dairy cows and thus came to own the means of production. Although many aspects of the 
circulation process (e.g. milk sales) and some aspects of production was managed and overseen 
by Ulimocor’s managers, households still controlled the labour process on their farms. Perhaps 
their class position was unclear but I would still maintain that referring to those who hire-in 
labour (or control their family labour) and own the means of production as ‘labourers’, serves 
only to further obscure their class position. A similar argument has been made by Little and 
Watts (1994) about contract farmers as ‘disguised labourers’, which similarly obscures the type 
of exploitation that they face by larger capitals. In my view it makes more sense to view them 
as differentiated petty commodity producers, who exploited mostly their own household labour 
(but some also hired labour). This doesn’t negate the fact that these households might have 
themselves been exploited in the ‘sphere of circulation’ by the Ciskei parastatal.  
Shiloh irrigation scheme: The Moravian mission and a complex history of land and 
intragroup conflicts 
 
The Shiloh Irrigation Scheme is located 35 km south of Queenstown. In 1818 Shiloh was 
founded as part of the Moravian Missionary Society, which claimed to serve the isiXhosa 
speaking Thembu people. The mission station gained control of over 30 000 ha of land in the 
area. The Moravian Church can still be seen today in Shiloh village and continues to be an 
active part of social and cultural life among the customary landowners. Many respondents 
reported having first acquired access to their land through a church allocation. A respondent 
from a dividend and wage receiving household, for example, notes: “The land was first given 
to my great grandfather by the Ministers and Reverends that arrived here at Shiloh. There was 
a tendency that the oldest son must have the land, so then my mother’s father got it. It used to 
be a mission station. The people were coming from Germany. And when you decided to 
become a member of the Movarian Church you were given a piece of land with your family.” 
A few kilometres north of Shiloh is the small town of Whittlesea, which was established in the 
late 1840s as a village for white settlers involved mostly in trading.  
 
In the mid 1960s, an irrigation scheme of 334 ha was developed by the South African 
government at Shiloh. 278 households received irrigated plots of 1.2 ha (van Averbeke et al., 
1998). A dividend receiving household explains: “ In the 60’s each and every household had a 
plot, a bit more than a hectare- " isikhonkwane" is what they used to call it. Before everyone 
would use it to cultivate on. It was a farrow system with Mr Joko who was here before 
Ulimocor. After Ulimocor came they gave everyone smaller food plots and they used a 
sprinkler irrigation”. The development of the irrigation scheme in the 60’s and allocation of 
plots coincided with the resettlement of people as part of Apartheid’s forced removals onto 
Shiloh’s customary grazing land, which became the Sada Township and industrial complex. 
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The irrigation scheme however struggled to get off its feet and by 1978 was allegedly in a state 
of ‘terminal decline’ (van Averbeke et al., 1998).   
 
In 1979 the Ciskei Marketing and Development Board commissioned the same consultants that 
developed Keiskammahoek, Loxton, Hunting and Associates (also referred to as Loxton and 
Venn by respondents), to prepare a plan for the expansion and revitalization of the Shiloh 
Irrigation Scheme. The 1979 report incorporated the 334 ha of the existing 278 customary 
landowners, as well as an additional area of state acquired land (van Averbeke et al., 1998).  
The Department of Agriculture and Forestry (1984) explains how production and benefits were 
organized on the Shiloh Irrigation Scheme: 
 
"... the majority of the existing land right holders agreed to pool their resources of land 
and form a Group Farm to be operated and managed on their behalf by a Central Unit, 
and as shareholders they would participate in the profits of the venture. Each land right 
holder was also granted a 0, 25 ha food plot on which he could satisfy his subsistence 
requirements and produce a small surplus for sale. Provision was made for land right 
holders who did not wish to participate in the Group Farm to receive an annual rental for 
their plots and relinquish their rights to participate in the Group Farm and the food plots" 
(in Averbeke et al., 1998: 73). 
 
The Nkosana briefly describes the history of the irrigation scheme at Shiloh in the statement 
below. The reduction of household plots to a ¼ ha clearly had an impact on the ability of 
households to meet their reproductive needs and their ability to produce a surplus above it. This 
was apparently easier to do before the scheme was ‘revitalised’ by Loxton and Venn.  
 
“ The scheme started in 1961 it was a farrow irrigation scheme. All the landowners had 
about a hectare. Then you got a lot of money- peas, peanuts and carrots, we grew. In 
1981 the Ciskei got independence and they changed to sprinkle irrigation and took it to a 
commercial level. They gave households a ¼ hectare for food plots. And then all of this 
land was under Ulimocor, ¾ hectares was commercial land for Ulimocor and we got 
some dividend from them at the end of the year. But it was very little like R75 or R100. 
They give you seeds and tractors and you must pay this at the end from the profits. 
People still made some money from the food plots and they would sell some vegetables. 
The food plots was a better way to get some money. There were summer and winter 
crops”.  
 
The majority of the land was thus pooled into a Group Farm, on which the customary 
landowners would not directly be involved in production. However, the plan also made 
provision for 17 commercial dairy farmers who operated on 4 ha commercial farms, as was the 
case in Keiskammahoek in the first years of its establishment. These commercial farmers 
allegedly rented the land and dairy cows (deducted from their milk cheque). They hired in 
labour from the surrounding areas as is evidenced in this statement by a dividend receiving 
household: 
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“There used to be two dairies on the scheme… At that time the dairy farmers were 
renting their land, they didn't own the land. The cows also belonged to the company. 
There were labourers also hired, especially in the dairy, so unemployment wasn't so 
high. The people who were employed on the farms came from around Whittlesea so it 
attracted jobs.”  
 
By 1982 the irrigation scheme had extended from 334ha to 394,75 ha.  This included 68 ha of 
commercial farms under the 17 dairy farmers, a 120 ha Group Farm60, 93 ha occupied by the 
Central Unit and 113,75 ha61 of food plots for household production. Later, an additional 60 ha 
of land (unit 4) was developed as commercial farms where commercial breeding of dairy cows 
was practiced, which meant that the total area of the Irrigation Scheme extended over 454,75 
ha. The area occupied by the Scheme has remained unchanged since 1982, a part from more 
food plots which were being developed near Whittlesea along the Oxkraal river (van Averbeke 
et al., 1998). Interestingly a respondent working for Amadlelo Agri was involved in the 
restructuring of the Irrigation Scheme by Loxton and Venn in 1979 and explains how it was 
structured as follows: 
 
“I was involved in the irrigation scheme way back when it was under Interscience which 
was the operating arm for the Zimbabwean consultant firm Loxton and Venn. I started it 
in 1978 and ran it until 1982 and then I decided to part ways and do my own thing. 
Loxton and Venn was also involved in Keiskammahoek. I helped set Shiloh up at that 
point... There were two dairies, same as the Keiskammahoek model with each farmer 
having 6 cows and milking around a central unit. They had a central unit and then they 
had quarter hectare plots where people grew their veggies. The JV is now renting the 
central unit and those quarter hectare plots because people don't want to use them. Under 
the JV now the households with quarter hectare plots get paid a land use fee, and the rest 
of the beneficiaries get a profit but not a land use fee” 
 
The fact that Management personnel at Amadlelo Agri had been involved in the development 
of the irrigation scheme over a long period that stretched back into the homeland era is of 
particular interest. It may in part explain why the agribusiness firm has continued to choose a 
model of organizing production that resembles the kind of ‘central unit’, large-scale, capital-
intensive method of farming that was developed during this time, first under Loxton and Venn 
and then continued under the Ciskei parastatal Ulimocor.  
 
However, the Shiloh Irrigation scheme operated slightly differently as compared to 
Keiskammahoek. The main distinction is that a part from food plots of 0.25 ha, which were 
cultivated for household subsistence, the remainder of their land was farmed by a Central Unit 
and households just received a dividend. As a respondent from a dividend and wage receiving 
                                                 
60 Averbeke et al (1998: 74) notes in relation to the Group Farm that “Commercial farming is carried out on behalf of 272 members who have 
land occupational rights”. Hence 6 households appear to have opted out. This also emphasises that households were not involved directly in 
production on this part of the irrigation scheme. 
61 Averbeke et al (1998: 73) clarifies that “the 113,75 ha of food plots consisted of 280 plots (70 ha) allocated to land right holders and 175 
plots (43,75 ha) part of which were allocated to people who lost arable land when Sada Township was developed and the rest was offered for 
rent to households who did not have land rights”. 
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household reflects,  
 
“All this land you see here each and every person had a Morgen62. They sat down and put 
their heads together and decided the land must be farmed grouped. We gave the land to 
government improvements under our name. We were left with ¼ ha per person to plant 
our vegetables. “  
 
 Figure 6. Map of Shiloh Irrigation Scheme 63 
 
 
This clearly differs to the set up at Keiskammahoek, where although the Central Unit played a 
major role in management of production, finances and marketing, the households undertook the 
actual farming. The bulk of the landowners at Shiloh thus did not directly produce on the 
Group Farm and received either a portion of the profits as shareholders or could opt to receive 
a land use fee. Interestingly, this model doesn’t differ substantially from the current JV scheme 
where in reality households are just shareholders that receive dividends and land use fees and 
production is undertaken by Amadlelo Agri. This does beg the question of why one would 
chose to repeat a model of managing smallholder irrigation schemes that has been widely 
reported as failing. Van Averbeke et al (1998: 81) comments on the economic failure of the 
Shiloh Irrigation Scheme, which appears to have operated at a loss: 
 
“There has not been a single year when the anticipated flow of income exceeded the 
                                                 
62 1 Morgen is equal to 0.8 hectare or two acres 
63 Source: van Averbeke et al. (1998: 74). The map indicates the layout of the irrigation scheme. The JV is situated over the entire area, a part 
from some food plots, which have been reserved for the cultivation of grapes by Mayime Cooperative.  
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anticipated flow of costs. This simply indicates that the scheme was not economical even 
at budgeting level… It is obvious that the scheme was operating at a loss for each of the 
years that were covered”. 
 
According to Averbeke et al (1998) a relatively successful aspect of the scheme was the food 
plots, at least from the perspective of supporting simple reproduction. However because of the 
small size of the plots many households were not able to sell a surplus, depending on the 
reproductive demands of their household and theft and access to markets was noted as 
challenges. This is further emphasized by van Averbeke et al’s (1998) findings that the main 
constraints of production on the food plots in Shiloh were found foremost to be ‘theft’ 
accounting for 61% of responses. This is contrasted to Keiskammahoek where theft accounted 
for only 3% of responses and failure was largely believed to be a problem of delayed ploughing 
(accounting for 83% of responses). Some respondents do however recall that during the Ciskei 
era they were able to sell a surplus from their food plots. 
 
“Nothing was difficult at that time. Children went to school, people bought our 
vegetables and people made money and there was no poverty at all. People would 
cultivate their food plots individually but it was marketed collectively. There was an 
office in the middle of the land where people sold their produce. The trucks would come 
from all over to buy the vegetables and milk. The money from veg and livestock could 
send the kids to school. People weren't burdened like they are now. The cost of living is 
so high now so there is a big change" (Dividend receiving household). 
 
Some of these food plots in Shiloh have now been incorporated under the JV farm. As a 
historical context, this begs the question of whether there could be better livelihood outcomes 
deriving from these food plots if household production was promoted alongside the JV 
intervention, rather than incorporating them as part of the land farmed by the JV.  
5.4. Contemporary Context of Keiskammahoek and Shiloh Villages  
 
The Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, where Keiskammahoek and Shiloh are located, is 
the country’s poorest province. Statistic SA (2017: 34) notes “There was a notable 17,5 
percentage point drop in multidimensional poverty in the Eastern Cape since 2001. However, 
the Eastern Cape remained the poorest province in 2016, with 12,7% of its households 
classified as multi-dimensionally poor”.  When poverty is measured according to the Upper 
Bound Poverty Line64 (UBPL), the rates are much higher and the Eastern Cape remains the 
poorest province in the country, with a headcount of 72, 9% of the population classified as poor 
in 2015. This has been an enduring legacy because the Eastern Cape has remained among the 
countries three poorest provinces between 2006 and 2015 “In the Eastern Cape, the poverty 
headcount was 76,6% in 2006; 77,4% in 2009; 69,0% in 2011; and 72,9% in 2015” (StatsSA, 
2017: 65). Many of these poor households rely strongly on social grants to meet their 
reproduction.  
 
                                                 
64 The Upper Bound Poverty Line adjusted for inflation, per person per month in rands was R992 in 2015 and R1138 in 2017 (StatsSA, 2017). 
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Much of this poverty is concentrated in the Eastern Cape Province’s two former homeland 
areas of the Ciskei and Transkei. Wage labour and remittances have long been the dominant 
income sources for rural households. However, a growing crisis of unemployment in recent 
years has meant that the livelihood contributions of formal employment are declining, and 
social grants have become increasingly central to meeting household reproduction needs 
(Neves and du Toit 2013). The Eastern Cape notably has the highest percentage (95,4%) 
among all the provinces of older poor persons who are claiming an old-age grant (StatsSA, 
2017). Along with increased dependence on off-farm income and state grants, as well as 
population increase, the ability of rural households to engage in farming has been compromised 
(Hebinck and van Averbeke 2013).  
 
Hebinck and van Averbeke (2013) report a weakening link between the agrarian and rural in 
the communal areas of the Ciskei. They support the notion strongly emphasized by Bryceson 
(2000) and others that a process of deagrarianisation is underway. However agrarian activities 
continue to contribute significantly to household reproduction in spite of their contribution to 
monetary income being relatively low (Hebinck and van Averbeke, 2013). The value of 
communal lands and land-based livelihoods is commonly underestimated because their full 
social, cultural and economic values are not adequately taken into account (Shackleton et al., 
2001; Cousins, 1999). Conventional survey methods often neglect the use of these resources 
for exchange in informal markets, underestimate their contribution towards reducing 
vulnerability to diminished cash income and overlook own-consumption of natural resources 
and agricultural produce (Cavendish, 1999; Cousins, 1999; Shackleton et al., 2001).  
 
Figure 7. Map of Case Study Sites: Amadlelo Agri Dairy Farms and Municipal Boundaries 65 
 
 
*Shiloh (red star) and * Keiskammahoek (blue star) *Middledrift (green star on map above), 
 
                                                 
65 Source: Municipal Demarcation Board, 2013. 
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The case study sites in contemporary context 
 
Keiskammahoek 'Seven Stars Trust' was established in 2010 and the 'Shiloh Dairies Trust' 
were established in 2011.  As discussed above, both farms are located on the site of homeland-
era irrigation schemes. Both of the schemes had fallen out of full commercial production, 
although to differing degrees. The similar contexts and time frames allow for some common 
features that ease a comparison, however they differ in a few fundamental ways. Some key 
features of the farms are captured in the table below.  
 
The much larger group of 395 households at Shiloh, with rights to relatively small irrigation 
plots, is sharply contrasted to the historical context at Keiskammahoek, where land 
consolidation benefited only 35 households. Most of the remaining 35 households have private 
title to their land (or are in the process of finalising their titles), unlike Shiloh, where irrigation 
plots are held under a form of communal tenure first accessed through the Moravian Church or 
traditional leaders (van Averbeke et al.  1998). The land tenure systems thus provide an 
interesting contrast, which reflects the complex history of the Ciskei. 
 
In the 2015/16 financial year beneficiaries at Keiskammahoek got a median of R110, 000 each 
in dividend payments. At Shiloh, on the contrary beneficiaries received R2096 but with a lot of 
variation reported. The differing benefits are in part a function of the size of the beneficiary 
group and scale of production. In Keiskammahoek 2000 cows are kept on 745 hectares, with 
dividends deriving to only 35 landowners. This sharply contrasts to Shiloh where you have 900 
cows on 450 hectares and a huge beneficiary group of 395 households receiving dividends and 
land use fees.  
 
Table 7. Key Features and Main Contrasts Between Keiskammahoek and Shiloh JV Farms 
Name of JV 
Farm 
Gov'nt 
funding 
 
Hectares 
of land 
under JV 
Dairy 
herd size 
Land 
tenure 
Size of 
plots per 
household 
Mean 
dividends 
per 
household 
in 2015/16  
Households 
receiving 
dividends 
Number of 
permanent 
labourers 
Keiskammahoek 
Seven Stars Dairy 
Trust 
R66 million  745 2000 Private 
title, deed 
of sale & 
municipal 
land 
12-20 
hectares 
R110, 000  35 50 
Shiloh 
Shiloh Dairies 
Trust 
R30 million  450 900 Customary 
tenure 
+/- 1 
hectare 
R2096  395 26 
 
At Keiskammahoek 50 permanent jobs have been created and 26 at Shiloh. At both farms 
because of the high demand for jobs in the area and the need for the farm to legitimize its use 
of ‘communal land’ they employ more labourers than a regular commercial dairy farm would. 
Keiskammahoek employs 1 worker for every 40 cows and Shiloh 1 worker for every 35 cows. 
When you look at sharemilkers operating white commercial farms in the Eastern Cape, I found 
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a mean ratio of 1 worker for every 62 cows. The maps of the irrigation schemes at 
Keiskammahoek and Shiloh below, and the densely populated surrounding villages give a 
sense that 'questions of labour' feature strongly. Pervasive unemployment means that there are 
high demands from the surrounding community for jobs, which the farms are unable to meet 
given the relatively low labour requirements of capital-intensive dairy farming.  
 
Many respondents expressed the violence exerted on the social fabric of the community by the 
astonishing spectacle of hundreds of hectares of fenced green pastures, latest technology in 
rotary dairy parlours and the numerous high value dairy animals, amongst the extreme poverty 
of the residential locations. This was especially glaring because fieldwork took place during 
one of the worst droughts the country has experienced in decades. The contradictions this 
evokes are erupting into conflict in more obvious ways in Shiloh but nonetheless bubbling 
under the surface in Keiskammahoek. The reported acts of seemingly senseless vandalism 
against both farms, like the amputation or butchering of dairy cows in fields, can be explained 
by these tensions and crisis of social reproduction. The Agribusiness partner is aware of this 
tension, which is demonstrated in the following statement: “I was criticized the other day, 
someone saying this is a diamond on a coal heap but what am I supposed to do … nothing?” 
Keiskammahoek Seven Stars Dairy Trust 
 
Keiskammahoek is located in the Amahlathi local municipality in the Amathole District of the 
Eastern Cape Province. Outlined in red on the map below are the areas considered part of the 
‘Keiskammahoek’ settlement, including part of the irrigation scheme where one of the two 
dairies is located as well as the Seven Stars Trust headquarters. The 745 hectares that forms 
part of the irrigation scheme, run by Amadlelo Agri and Seven Stars Cooperative (in the Seven 
Stars Trust) can be clearly seen on the map by its green pastures. The Sandile dam, which feeds 
the irrigation scheme, is located on the bottom left corner of the map. Its construction involved 
the removal of some residents from their ancestral land by the Ciskei regime.  
 
Table 8. Population Statistics for Settlements Surrounding the Seven Stars Trust Farm 
Name of Village/ 
Settlement 
Number of 
households 
Population 
Total  
Percentage 
Female 
Percentage 
Male 
Bomapass 134 372 55,91 44,09 
Keiskammahoek 
SP 
714 2029 56,23 43,72 
Lower Gxulu 419 1400 52,43 47,64 
Masincedane 81 278 46,04 54,32 
Ngqudela 86 320 56,56 43,44 
Tshoxa 488 1807 51,3 48,75 
Total: 1922 6206 53 47 
(Source: Census 2011) 
 
The entire area of the farm (745 hectares) is spread over a significant area of this rural 
settlement, which extends beyond Keiskammahoek village into the surrounding villages of 
Bomapass, Tshoxa, Ngqudela, Masincedane and Lower Gxulu; from which households were 
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sampled for the livelihood survey and interviews. Merely looking at the maps themselves gives 
us quite an intricate understanding of the levels of inequality present in this community, which 
is most visually expressed by the extensive fields, which are owned by only 35 households 
within a surrounding community of 1922 households.66  
 
Some of the 35 landowners still live on their properties within the bounds of the pasture fields, 
which typically include between one and three residential structures. This speaks to a history of 
land consolidation where these 35 landowners accumulated the land of their neighbouring 
farmers who were ‘squeezed-out’. The extensive irrigated fields are juxtaposed by the densely 
populated surrounding settlements.  
 
Figure 8. Map of Keiskammahoek Irrigation Scheme and Surrounding Villages 
 
 
The Map below indicates the location of the two dairies (red stars) operated by Seven Stars 
Trust. These two rotary dairy parlours can each milk 60 cows at a time. The same technology is 
used at Shiloh. Dairy cows are milked twice daily, beginning at 4am until around 8.00am and 
then again from around 2pm to around 6pm. One of the dairies is located in the middle of the 
pasture fields, which can be seen adjacent to Lower Gxulu village. The other dairy is located in 
the bottom right corner of the map and is close to the Seven Stars Trust headquarters, a number 
of storage sheds, several houses for accommodation for labourers (including three managers), 
pens for calves, and a structure from which milk is sold to the community at a discounted rate.  
 
The map gives a sense of how densely populated the residential land surrounding the farm is. 
Sophumelela Township, which is located on the other side of the road from the pasture fields is 
especially densely populated with many poor households living in small RDP houses, 
makeshift structures or as backyard tenants. Very few of these households keep household 
gardens and livestock, in part due to shortage of land, water and inputs but also due to high 
rates of crime and theft. Many of the labourers and some landowners live in this settlement, the 
                                                 
66  Or 2454 households if you include an additional 532 households that make up the greater area of Keiskammahoek including Gidda 
Hospital, Keiskammahoek village, Khayelitsha, Kom and Pumlani -which were not included in the survey. 
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latter due to old age (preferring to live with their children) or after being relocated for the 
construction of new centre pivots.  
Figure 9. Map of Seven Stars Dairy Trust and Location of its Two Dairies 
 
 
One can see from the aerial maps that Masincedane, Lower Gxulu, Ngqudela and parts of the 
outskirts of Tshoxa are less densely populated. In these settlements it is more common for 
households to keep household gardens, some have access to fields and some keep livestock 
within their yard (pigs and chickens) as well as on the communal grazing lands (sheep, goats, 
cattle). The communal grazing lands are mostly in the hills surrounding Keiskammahoek and 
some people graze as far as the mountain range extending towards Hogsback. Households also 
graze in and around the settlements and its common to see livestock along the side of the road. 
There are shortages of grazing land in this area, which have become more acute with the 
droughts.  
 
In the first years of the farms establishment, community members would frequently cut fences 
to let their livestock on to the pastures, which caused serious challenges for the biosecurity of 
the farm’s dairy herd. This can also be linked in part to animosity between the wider 
community and the households with rights to the irrigation plots. The local community 
continues to refer to the landowners as ‘settlers’, since many originate from other parts of 
South Africa. The legitimacy of their rights to the land is frequently questioned, framed by 
discourses of belonging and membership to customary groups, which endure in-spite of the 
title-deeds these farmers hold.  
Shiloh Dairies Trust 
Shiloh is in the Lukanji Municipality in the Chris Hani District of the Eastern Cape. Shiloh 
village (highlighted in the maps in red) is located on the R67 road and is about 40 kilometres 
south of Queenstown and bordering the small town of Whittlesea. The irrigation scheme, 
which is spread over 450 hectares, is feed by the Klipplaat/ Oxkraal catchment, jointly from the 
Waterdown and Oxkraal Dams (DWAF, 2018).  The landowners and labourers live in 
residential plots in Shiloh, indicated on the maps in red. ‘No JV benefits households’ for my 
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sample, who are not directly benefiting from the JV, were sampled both in Shiloh villages and 
in Sada Township.  
Shiloh is split by the R67 road into two settlements- Upper and Lower Shiloh. Upper Shiloh 
(on the right side of the R67 facing the direction of Whittlesea) is bordered by the irrigation 
fields and is where the historic Moravian Church is located. The church forms a central part of 
both the history and contemporary social life of this rural community. Lower Shiloh, is nestled 
alongside the sprawling and densely populated Sada Township, a historical site of relocation 
for households subject to historical forced removals and also the site of a collective land claim 
by Shiloh residents. The Claimants contend that Sada was their customary grazing land and the 
traditional leader intends to use the land to extend the pastures for the dairy farm67. This 
conflict plays out in the distribution of benefits from the JV farm because residents from Sada 
are not eligible to apply for jobs. This and other land conflicts will be described in more detail 
in Chapter 9. 
Figure 10. Map of Shiloh Irrigation Scheme, Location of the Dairy and the Surrounding Villages 
 
The location of the dairy is indicated with a red star on the map above. A manager at the farm 
explains the current land use for the farm:  
“The dairy is located at unit one, where we are now. There is another dairy on the other 
side of the road, which may be opened at some stage, it is from the old dairy under the 
                                                 
67 It is highly unlikely that this restitution claim would result in the restitution of this land and is much more likely to be settled in cash. 
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Ciskei. Unit 2 is towards Beaufort West, we use it for grazing heifers and for annual 
ryegrass. We have a lot of cows now so space is running out. There are 443 dry cows 
and the milk cows are 523. There is not enough land at the moment for them. The farm 
is also using the land for the food plots, which is on the opposite side of the road to the 
main dairy. It is being planted with ryegrass and clover for the cows. Those people are 
also getting some money for their food plots”  
The map below illustrates that the entire area of Shiloh and Sada are densely populated. 
However Sada is far more densely populated than Shiloh is. This is also indicated by census 
data (2011), which reveals that Shiloh is spread over an area of 2.00 km² with a population of 
2193 residents (1099.09 per km²) and 616 households (308.73 per km²). The entire area of 
Sada is over an area of 4.57 km² with a population of 13493 (2952.04 per km²) and 3294 
households (720.67 per km²). These figures give a sense of the juxtaposition of these two 
settlements and the historically unequal distribution of land among its residents. The 
neighbouring town of Whittlesea, not included in the sample, includes an additional 4051 
households (263.56 per km²).  
Table 9. Population Statistics for Settlements Surrounding the Shiloh Dairies Trust Farm 
Name of 
Village/ 
Settlement 
Number of 
households 
Population 
Total  
Percentage 
Female 
Percentage 
Male 
Shiloh 616 2193 49,79 50,21 
Sada 3294 13493 51,78 48,21 
Total:  3910 15686 50,79 49,21 
(Source: Census, 2011) 
These demographic characteristics reflect the realities of a rural area that defies preconceived 
notions of ‘rural’ or ‘agrarian’. These residents, many of which were the victims of forced 
removals during Apartheid, retain strong linkages to urban areas. Many of their livelihoods are 
strongly linked to wage labour opportunities that can be found in nearby Queenstown and 
Whittlesea and also further afield in the Eastern Cape and in other provinces. Households 
without access to wage labour opportunities rely heavily on social grants, the Expanded Public 
Works Programme and opportunities to work on road works projects led by the South African 
National Roads Agency (SANRAL). At the time of research, the household survey affirmed 
that these were all still central sources to livelihoods. Construction was taking place along the 
R67 providing access to much needed jobs. Once this construction is finished however 
unemployment will again be a pressure on livelihoods and could likely increase tensions 
around the JV scheme.  
In Sada many households live in small RDP houses many without space for a household 
garden, although there are also a number of households cultivating small and productive 
household gardens. The Sada residents do not have access to fields for cropping.  In Shiloh the 
aerial map illustrates how many households have much larger residential plots, providing space 
for household gardens or a kraal to keep livestock. The open space in the middle of Lower 
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Shiloh, on the left side of the R67 are a number of fields (not used by the JV scheme), which 
however have fallen into disuse. 
 
Figure 11. Map of Shiloh Village and Sada Township 
 
  
5.5. Conclusion 
The diverse historical contexts described above for Keiskammahoek and Shiloh in terms of 
relations of land, capital and labour, illustrate that not only does each former homeland have a 
distinguishing history but also different settlements within former homelands are unique. This 
serves to illustrate that common assumptions of linear processes of ‘proletarianisation’ among 
homeland residents are misleading (Levin and Neocosmos 1989). Historical trajectories of 
social differentiation in each settlement have important implications for understanding 
contemporary dynamics, which are clearly playing out in the face of the JVs.  
  
The JV model that is currently being implemented in Shiloh and Keiskammahoek by Amadlelo 
Agri is capital-intensive and involves the customary landowners primarily in the roles of 
landowning shareholders and workers. However, this doesn’t represent a radical departure of 
production systems but rather continuity, in some senses, with a historical trajectory that was 
inherited from the Bantustan era. From 1975 onwards irrigation schemes, including Shiloh and 
Keiskammahoek, were established with the key ethos of ‘modernization’ and capital-intensive 
methods.  
 
Another focus was on the engineering of a class of full-time commercial farmers. This was 
undertaken with more zeal in Keiskammahoek, where the group of 35 landowners managed to 
accumulate large plots (many with private titles), dairy cows and other assets. This took place 
fundamentally through processes of social differentiation among a larger group of 97 PCPs, 
most of which were ‘squeezed out’. In Keiskammahoek there has been somewhat of a break in 
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capital-labour relations since landowning households no longer control the production process 
as they did before. Instead, they now receive dividends and can ‘chose’ to labour on the farm 
for a wage. Although there is considerably less politics and conflict around the JV as compared 
to Shiloh, there are still noticeable tensions, particularly between the Keiskammahoek 
landowners and the wider community who continue to refer to them as ‘settlers’. 
 
For Shiloh’s customary landowners, during the Bantustan era, the central group farm was run 
by Ulimocor and they received land rents and profits. Hence the capital- labour relations do not 
represent such a drastic departure with the past. However, a key change is that the food plots, 
previously farmed by households prior to 1994-1997, have been acquired by the JV. The only 
households that were producing along similar lines as the Keiskammahoek dairy farmers are 
the 17 commercial dairy farmers. The majority of these households are not beneficiaries of the 
current JV farm. The on-going land conflict surrounding the history of their removal, as well as 
other divisions within the current customary landowning group sparked by the vandalism that 
took place when Ulimocor left the scheme in 1997, are important contextual factors in 
understanding the intragroup conflicts that are now emerging around the JV itself68. These 
conflicts have historical roots that cannot be understood or explained solely in the 
contemporary context as a result of how the JV is structured, for example. The impact of these 
divergent historical trajectories has produced noticeably different intragroup relations and 
character of class dynamics in each site, this will be discussed in depth in Chapter 12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6. The South African Dairy Sector: Competition, Volatility and 
Large-Scale Capitalist Farmers  
6.1 Introduction 
 
                                                 
68 See Chapter 9 for more detail 
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This chapter provides an in-depth look at the political economy of dairy in South Africa. It is 
essential to sketch the contours of the dairy sector, in order to better understand how the 
structuring of Amadlelo Agri’s JV model has been influenced by the specific opportunities and 
challenges of the dairy sector in South Africa. I briefly provide an overview of the historical 
trajectory of dairy farming in South Africa. I look at some of the underlying political and 
economic dynamics that are responsible for the contemporary context, which is dominated by a 
few highly efficient large capitalist dairy farmers and large processors. I draw on the agrarian 
question(s) to provide some explanations for this trajectory. I then briefly consider the 
prospects of alternative models to sharemilking joint ventures. These insights about the nature 
and dynamics of the dairy sector, and the limitations they pose to smallholder production 
elucidate why joint ventures are currently the government’s preferred mechanism for 
organising milk production, in the context of land and agrarian reform.  
6.2 Overview of the Political Economy of South Africa’s Dairy Sector 
 
Some of the salient features of the dairy sector in South Africa are summarised in Table 10 
below. The character and structuring of the dairy sector in South Africa has undergone some 
drastic changes over the last few decades. The dairy industry has transformed from being 
highly regulated, subsidized and protected, with its activities overseen by a dairy marketing 
board, to the exact opposite. The contemporary context is a dairy sector that is unregulated, 
unsubsidized and unprotected. The sector is dominated by ‘market forces’, large processors and 
few highly efficient, large capitalist farmers. 
 
A brief look at some key historical events and processes, aids an understanding of how this 
radical transformation occurred. In 1930 the Dairy Industry Control Board was established. 
Following the Marketing Act of 193769, the Board was reconstituted in 1939 in line with the 
terms of the act. The Dairy Board had the exclusive rights to sell milk. Milk producers were 
paid a fixed price for their milk, which was established by the Minister of Agriculture and 
renegotiated periodically in consultation with The Dairy Board (ARC, undated). This historical 
context created an environment in which dairy farmers were able to accumulate, under the 
economic and political certainty and support assured by the state. Interestingly, these reforms 
in South Africa matched international trends: “most Western countries had instituted some type 
of regulatory mechanisms in the 1930s to provide stability and order to an otherwise volatile 
market” (Schwarzweller and Davidson, 2015: 4). This is perhaps not surprising since dairy has 
always been a commodity susceptible to international market volatility. 
 
Table 10. Salient Features of the South African Dairy Sector 
Number of dairy 
farmers 
1683 (0.003% of the 55 million total population) (MPO, 2016). 
Jobs created in the 60 000 farm workers and 40 000 people with indirect jobs within the 
                                                 
69 The act aimed “to protect agriculture in South Africa, where continuing surpluses and low agricultural prices were being experienced… to 
give stability to farmers and to reduce the gap between producer and consumer prices" (Black Sash, 1962: 22). See: 
http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/sites/default/files/pdf_files/BSJun62.0036.4843.006.002.Jun%201962.15_0.pdf 
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dairy industry extended value chain, including the milk processing and milling 
industry (DAFF, 2017) 
Contribution to 
world production of 
milk 
South Africa contributes 0.5% of world production  (MPO, 2016; 
DAFF, 2017). 
Cost of production +- US$35 per 100KGs. Produces competitively due to irrigated and 
rainfed pasture-based systems, large herd sizes and cheap wage labour 
(Hemme et al., 2014). 
Contribution of dairy 
to GDP 
4th most important agricultural commodity, accounting for 7% of 
agricultural GDP. In terms of production (tonnage), it is the third 
largest agricultural product (MPO, 2016; Midgley, 2016; DAFF, 
2017).   
Markets for dairy 96% of milk sold in formal market, 2% informally and 2% for on-farm 
consumption (MPO, 2016). 
Dairy products The dairy market is divided into 60% liquid and 40% concentrated 
products. Pasteurized milk and UHT milk are the major liquid 
products. Hard and semi-hard cheese is the major concentrated product 
(DAFF, 2017). 
Dairy animals 1.7 million dairy cows in production in 2016. Relatively high 
productivity. 4th largest herd sizes in the world with the average at 399 
dairy animals (MPO, 2015/6).  
 
The Cooperatives Societies Acts of 1922 and 1939 (which provided a framework to secure 
input supply and output marketing services), created an enabling environment for dairy farmers 
to organize in agricultural cooperatives. The Land Bank (first formed in 1912) used 
cooperatives to provide credit services to commercial farmers at subsidized interest rates. The 
state also used cooperatives as the preferred institution to direct disaster assistance to farmers 
(Ortmann and King, 2007). During this time agricultural cooperatives were thus important 
financial intermediaries. The incentives created to organise in this way, led to the emergence of 
many thriving dairy cooperatives (Piesse et  al.,  2003). However, changes to the dairy sector 
began in the 1980s, before the democratic era. Ortmann and King, (2007: 46) note: 
 
“With political change also happening, a series of reforms commenced in the 1980s, 
including removal of subsidies and tax concessions and deregulation of agricultural 
financing and marketing, which reduced the role of agricultural cooperatives and made 
them less dependent on government support”.  
 
The state employed several measures to end ‘statutory intervention in the dairy industry’. In 
1983 retail price control of fresh milk was abolished and this was followed by a number of 
other measures to liberalise the dairy market. On the 31 December 1993 the Dairy Board was 
terminated. A new Dairy Board and Milk Producers Organisation replaced it in 1994. 
However, a key difference is that it only represents the interests of dairy producers, whereas its 
predecessor had also handled the affairs of the secondary dairy industry. The new Marketing of 
Agricultural Productions Act of 1996 also created very different conditions for the dairy sector. 
The act stated that, “producers can now produce milk on their own responsibility and sell to 
milk buyers of their choice at a mutually agreed price”. In the 1990s all subsidies were 
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abolished and by 1998 all agricultural marketing boards had been phased out and the state no 
longer controlled agricultural commodities (ARC, undated).  
 
These major policy reforms had an immense effect on the role of cooperatives in agriculture in 
general, and on dairy in particular. The reforms also compromised the relative bargaining 
power of producers in favour of processors, distributors and retailers. Cooperatives were 
stripped of the privilege of serving as agents on marketing boards and distributing government 
subsidies. Thus they lost the considerable regional monopoly powers they had enjoyed for so 
long. They could still provide credit to farmers, however, like the Land Bank they also had to 
compete with commercial banks to provide this service. With this inhospitable political 
environment, most cooperatives converted to investor-owned firms (IOFs) and many listed on 
the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (Piesse et al., 2003; Ortmann and King, 2007).  
 
Cooperatives no longer play the role they used to in the dairy industry. Stanford’s (2012:5) 
research on commercial dairy farmers revealed that the departure of cooperatives from the 
dairy industry, has made it difficult for smaller farmers to survive. One dairy farmer that she 
interviewed noted, for example, that:  
 
“The few big players that dominate supply to farms, and that market the produce, make 
for huge problems for farming. The processing companies are too big and powerful and 
can really squeeze the farmers. Even if the competition commission steps in to deal 
with the problem, the farmer ends up paying, as the cost of fines to the processors are 
simply recovered from the farmers.”   
 
Many dairy farmers note that the disintegration of the cooperative system has had a negative 
impact on farming. However, they also concede that the new political and economic 
environment does not provide the right conditions to re-establish cooperatives. Another farmer 
Stanford interviewed (2012) notes: “It would be difficult for farmers to agree and form the 
types of coops that gave them stability in the past. The legislation has changed, but a greater 
difficulty is for farmers to work together - it would be hard to regain the advantages of the 
coops of the past.” While another states unequivocally: “we would have to agree as farmers 
and that is difficult. Essentially I see other farmers as my competitors. I need to be more 
efficient than them” (ibid). Competition is the new logic of the dairy game, which neither 
provides promising prospects for cooperation, nor for new entrants to the dairy industry.  
 
In South Africa, capitalist relations of production have become firmly established in dairy 
farming. The basis for this immense accumulation of capital and for the establishment of 
productive forces in dairy was undoubtedly aided by the period of state protection of dairy 
farming from the 1930s to the 1980s. The dairy sector is now characterised by an increasingly 
small number of large capitalist farmers, producing on relatively extensive landholdings. These 
farms have large herd-sizes 70 , use capital-intensive production systems and employ wage 
labour (Midgley, 2016; DAFF, 2017). The prevailing discourse around ‘viability’ is that to 
                                                 
70 South Africa has the 4th largest herd sizes in the world with an average of 399 dairy animals (MPO, 2016). In South Africa there are four 
major dairy breeds: Jersey, Holstein, Guernsey and Ayrshire. Farms make use of imported semen for artificial insemination of dairy cows 
(DAFF, 2017). Therefore the sector is technically innovative and highly productive, which presents barriers of entry to new-comers. 
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compete in the formal market one requires at least 300 cows, with the average herd size at 399 
(Milk SA, 2013; Standford, 2012).  
 
Increasingly capital-intensive production systems have also been employed by these on 
average larger farms e.g. use of rotary dairy parlours, which can take between 40 and 80 cows 
at a time, milking between 180 and 440 cows per hour71. A labourer on the Keiskammahoek 
farm notes some of implications for production and labour requirements, with the introduction 
of the high-tech rotary dairy parlours. The statement illustrates how mechanisation of dairy 
farming means little labour is required, which poses questions for the suitability of dairy 
farming for land and agrarian reform: 
 
 “During the Ciskei we could milk 6 cows at one time. The difference is now the milk 
goes straight to the tank. With the old system, you would have to empty the bottles in a 
bucket and then you write down how much it takes. You used your hands to change the 
milk... This new one is automatic. This one is easier and we need fewer workers. Even 
one person can milk all 2000 cows on these machines... The computer feeds the cows 
and records everything now. On the old one you must take a dish to feed the cows”. 
 
The dairy sector is mainly involved in production for the domestic economy and food security. 
However, due to the drop in value of the Rand and an appealing international price for milk, 
the South African dairy industry is increasingly supplying neighbouring SADC countries, 
especially Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola. Since 2010 export earnings have risen 
steadily to around R1.1 billion (DAFF, 2014).  Dairy products and milk imports have 
fluctuated, at times depressing local production and profits. In 2014 the value of imports 
peaked at R1.4 billion but has since decreased in part as a result of the depreciating value of the 
Rand (Midgley, 2016; DAFF, 2017).  
 
The South African dairy industry produces competitively, with the cost of milk production per 
farm lower than many other dairy producing countries. The cost per 100KGs of milk is around 
US$35, which is equal to that of New Zealand, considered a leader in the world dairy industry. 
However, due to lower grain prices in South America, countries such as Argentina are able to 
produce with even lower production costs. As the figure below demonstrates, the total gross 
value of production for fresh milk has been increasing over the last 10 years and reached its 
peak in 2014/15 at R15 billion (DAFF, 2017). The gross value of production is determined 
both by the producer price for fresh milk and the quantity produced; both of which necessarily 
influence each other (Midgley, 2016). 
 
The increasing demand for dairy products in South Africa (especially a growth in demand for 
cheese) is expected to continue over the next decade. If favourable weather conditions remain, 
and if the milk-to-feed price ratio remains stable, conditions for production are expected to be 
favourable and to meet rising demand. It is estimated that this will be accompanied by a rising 
producer price, which will drive milk production upwards by 28% (BFAP, 2015).  The dairy 
value chain is, however, vulnerable to the continued depreciation of the value of the Rand. 
                                                 
71 See: http://www.waikatosa.co.za/product_categories/7-milking-systems 
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Although currency depreciation is offset by a rise in dairy exports, it also negatively impacts 
the cost of production, since it increases the costs of imports such as fuel, fertilisers and feed 
(Midgley, 2016).  
 
Figure 12. Gross (Nominal) Value of Fresh Milk Production in South Africa 2006-2016 
 
 
The limited availability of land and water restricts the growth of the dairy sector. Climate 
change also poses a risk to the favourable forecasts for the dairy sector (Midgley, 2016).  
Climate change is expected to impact dairy production through lower fodder and pasture 
yields, feed scarcity and increasing cost of feed, increased disease pressure, rising energy costs 
and demand, and possible damage to infrastructure. Dairy cows are particularly vulnerable to 
heat stress at temperatures above 25 degrees Celsius. Rising temperatures will therefore affect 
the frequency and intensity of heat stress, which impacts negatively on milk yield and quality, 
and on conception rates in dairy herds (Du Preez, 2014; Midgley, 2016). Another lesser 
emphasised impact of the pressures of climate change is the change of land use patterns in 
coastal areas, which could be precipitated by a possible demographic shift towards the cooler 
coastal areas, limiting access to land for dairy farming (Midgley, 2016). 
 
This is particularly important in the South African context, since production has shifted to the 
coastal regions, which have milder climates and where pasture-based systems (some with 
irrigation and others rain-fed) are cheaper to produce on. These favourable climatic conditions 
bring down the cost of production, which has become necessary in order to survive in an 
unprotected dairy market where producers are price-takers. The interior regions struggle to be 
competitive, since they must make use of more expensive, intensive feedlot production systems 
(Midgley, 2016). In 2016 the coastal regions produced 83% of South Africa’s milk and the 
Eastern Cape Province was responsible for 28% of production (DAFF, 2017). This also 
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explains the attraction of entering a JV with communities in the former homeland areas. In the 
milder coastal regions of the Ciskei and Transkei, agribusiness can reap the benefits of mild 
climates with gravity-fed irrigation on pasture-based systems.  
 
These key features, explained above, of a ‘competitive dairy farm’ have become essential if 
producers want to avoid being ‘squeezed out’.  For example, Mkhabela and Mndeme (2010: 
122) note that for milk producers “economies of size exist, with larger farms able to produce 
any given level of output at lower costs compared to their smaller counterparts”. As an 
illustration of the scale of production we are taking about, the largest dairy farmer, operating 
under the company ‘Grasslands’, owns 14 extensive dairy farms, milking 15 000 cows, and 
also sharemilks72 on one other farm owned by land reform beneficiaries, with plans to extend 
to another one (Mysen, 2017; Key Informant Interview, 2016).  
 
Research and official government reports (DAFF, 2014; Migley, 2016) reveal that dairy 
producers can be characterised as predominantly large capitalist farmers (or large-scale 
commercial farmers to use the government’s terminology), along with a marginal number of 
small- to medium-sized producers (MPO, 2015; DAFF, 2014; Milk SA, 2014). One can infer 
from government documents, that these categories are defined in terms of the size of the farm, 
herd size and which markets they target (the latter two categories selling directly to consumers) 
(DAFF, 2014). However, there are no exact statistics on the relative numbers of each of these 
three categories73.  
 
The figure below from DAFF (2014 74) maps the ‘dairy supply value chain’. However, it 
excludes providers of inputs to dairy producers, (including renting of dairy cows which is a 
prominent practice), provision of grain for feed, fertilisers and herbicides for pastures, 
medicine and other infrastructural inputs etc. The dairy industry generates 60, 000 on-farm jobs 
and the extended value chain provides a further 40, 000 jobs (Midgley, 2016; DAFF, 2014). 
There is also a lot of vertical integration of the dairy value chain, which is a means to capture 
scattered value. For example, Amadlelo Agri also has an equity stake in a processing firm, 
COEGA Dairy.   
 
As the figure below demonstrates, the few existing small and medium dairy farms mostly sell 
informally to consumers, and thus they are not capturing much of the market. Only 2% of total 
milk is sold informally, while 96% is sold in the formal market (and the remaining 2% is for 
on-farm consumption) (MPO, 2016). This constricting ‘market reality’ has likely contributed to 
government’s decision to partner customary landowners up with commercial farmers and 
agribusiness, rather than transforming the value chain, which would require more intensive 
interventions and investment. 
 
                                                 
72 See below section on sharemilking for more details. 
73 There is, however, data on the distribution of herd sizes, which could be used as a basis to differentiate between producers, although this 
would exclude important factors for a class-based analysis, such as the use of wage labour versus household labour. This analysis is thus not 
attempted here. 
74 In Midgley (2016) 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 127 
Concentration of land and dairy herds is evident in how two decades ago there were around 50, 
000 dairy farmers, this reduced in 1994 to around 9000 dairy farmers1, but only 1683 remain 
today (MPO, 2016, McCullough, 2017; Key informant interviews). This entailed a decrease of 
30% between 2001 and 2007 to 3 727 dairy producers (Scholtz and Grobler, 2009). Then 
between 2007 and 2015 the number of milk producers in South Africa decreased even more 
radically by 53%, leading us to the current context where only 168375 milk producers remain as 
of January 2016 (MPO, 2016; Midgley, 2016). In spite of the fact that the numbers of 
producers have reduced drastically, between 2006 and 2016 the number of dairy cows in 
production increased by 28% and milk production increased by 23% (DAFF, 2017). This 
indicates that the surviving enterprises are highly productive. This obviously poses many 
barriers of entry for new farmers and to the viability of smallholders (Mkhabela and Mndeme, 
2010).  
 
Figure 13. The Dairy Supply Value Chain in South Africa 
 
 
Over the years both the global and national markets for dairy have become increasingly 
competitive. In South Africa, coupled with varying other factors, this environment has become 
near impossible for small producers to survive in, and many have been squeezed out. This has 
resulted in concentration of land under fewer dairy producers (Midgley, 2016; MPO, 2015). 
Mkhabela and Mndeme (2010: 122) note that:  
 
“There are those in the agricultural industry that hold the view that there is no future for 
the small dairy farm in SA agriculture, since its unit cost of production is perceived to 
be higher than that of its larger counterpart”.  
 
The deregulated market for dairy means that farms must produce competitively and their 
survival rests on their ability to lower costs of production, given that individual farms cannot 
influence the producer price for milk (Mkhabela and Mndeme, 2010). Another defining feature 
of the South African dairy industry is that the dairy processing sector is dominated by four 
large national processors – Clover, Parmalat, Nestlé and Dairybelle (Daff, 2017; Stanford, 
2012). These processors force dairy producers into a price-taking position. However, 
                                                 
75 DAFF (2017) reported in their Dairy Value Chain Analysis report that there were now 1961 milk producers. However I use the 2016 
statistics since my case study was conducted in 2015 - 2016. 
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processors also complain that they are in turn being squeezed by retailers, particularly large 
supermarkets that conduct immense power in the value chain (interviews with key informants). 
 
 In South Africa the dairy market experiences cyclical periods of milk shortages, which are 
often followed by surpluses. These are said to be the result of market forces, in many cases, 
which force several dairy producers out of production (Scholtz and Grobler, 2009). For 
example, Scholtz and Grobler, (2009) note that several milk producers left the dairy industry in 
2005 due to an unexpected decline in the milk price during winter, when producers generally 
receive higher milk prices (due to a seasonal reduction in milk production). This resulted in 
significant milk shortages in the South African market at a time when demand had actually 
increased for dairy products. Demand for dairy products was met between 2005 and 2007 
through net imports and was sustained by a sharp increase in the producer price (35% year-on-
year) for milk. However, we experienced an opposite trend from 2008, possibly linked to the 
financial crisis. There was a decrease in demand for dairy products, which resulted in a surplus 
and a drop in the producer price of milk. These types of fluctuations in the dairy market are 
common in South Africa and demonstrate the vulnerability of milk producers to market 
volatility.   
 
Figure 14. Local Milk Consumption and Producer Prices for Fresh Milk 76 
 
 
The local producer price for milk and consumption are mapped out on the above figure from 
DAFF (2017). The chart indicates that consumption of milk has been fluctuating but it reached 
a peak of 2.1 million tons in 2014/15. During the period relevant to this study (when fieldwork 
was undertaken in the case study sites in 2015/16), the milk price experienced a 4% decline 
and consumption also decreased by 0.7%. In 2015/16 the gross value of fresh milk77 also 
experienced a decrease of 6%, which is believed to be connected to the drought. Despite the 
fluctuations, milk consumption increased by 17% between 2006/07 to 2015/16 (and is expected 
to continue to grow). Rising consumption is driven by population growth and changing 
consumption patterns. Between 2006 and 2016 South Africa experienced an exponential 
increase in the value of milk by 136% (DAFF, 2017).  The National Development Plan (2011) 
                                                 
76 Source: DAFF (2017: 4).  
77 “The gross value of production for milk is dependent on the quantity produced and prices received by producers” (DAFF, 2017: 1). 
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also identified dairy as having high growth potential. In spite of market volatility, the growth 
potential of milk thus still makes the sector attractive to (large) agrarian capitals, which are 
able to effectively navigate risks.  
 
Volatility, however, is an international character of the dairy sector and is not specific to South 
Africa. Major milk producing countries around the world have experienced similar pressures to 
production and profitability. Schwarzweller and Davidson, (2015: 1) for example note: 
 
“Dairy farmers and their families, in almost every industrialized country of the world, 
face an extremely uncertain future. The forces of change - locally, regionally, and 
globally - are formidable, persistent, and extremely complex. Many dairy farmers, in an 
effort to remain competitive, are being pressed to restructure their enterprises and to 
rearrange their lives. Some will make it, and some will not.”  
 
The reasons for the drastic changes taking place and the pervasive volatility of the dairy 
market, however, remain somewhat under-researched. In spite of the voluminous literature on 
agrarian political economy “scant attention has been accorded to structural shifts within the 
rapidly changing dairy industry, both in terms of description and theorisation” (ibid.: 4). This is 
startling because the dairy sector resembles many of the tendencies unleashed by 
transformations to capitalist agriculture, since it is arguably the most heavily capitalized 
agricultural commodity sector in the world.   
 
Key threats which are commonly noted to the survival and profitability of dairy farmers in 
South Africa include: the threat of land reform, undervalued land, financial insecurity, 
difficulty in accessing credit, rising prices of inputs (especially the price of grain), the threat of 
cheap imports, low producer price for milk, distributors and retailers are capturing profit 
margins and forcing producers into the position of ‘price-takers’, climate change, the 
increasing cost of wages for farm labour, and the impact of HIV on labour productivity 
(Findlay, 2006; Midgley, 2016; DAFF, 2017; Scholtz and Grobler, 2009; Key informant 
interviews).  
 
The threat of cheap imports is frequently noted to create havoc for the dairy industry, both 
from the producer and processor perspective. For example, Melt Loubser, the chief executive 
officer of Fair Cape Dairies noted in an interview in 2017 that, “South Africa exports dairy 
produce as well but is a net importer. With cheap imports coming into the country there is no 
way we can compete on a national basis…Our prices fell and with so many farmers leaving the 
dairy industry it is concerning to see where it will end up."78 All of the above factors have 
intertwined to produce a context where profitability has suffered over the years. Findlay (2006: 
5) explains the effect of this context from the milk producer’s perspective: 
 
“The most immediate threat to dairy farmers was identified as small and declining 
profit margins. In 1973 dairy farmers experienced an average cash flow margin of 
                                                 
78 See: McCullough, (2017): https://www.independent.ie/business/farming/dairy/why-the-number-of-south-african-dairy-farmers-has-slumped-
from-50000-in-1997-to-just-1600-today-35629779.html 
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R1.50 per liter. By 1986 this had dropped to 80c per liter. In October 2006 the average 
cash flow margin on a liter of milk was 20c. Farmers believe they are in the middle of a 
“price squeeze” between increasing input costs (maize, fertiliser, labour), which 
average around R1.75 per liter, and decreasing prices offered by distributors and 
processors.” 
This statement was made in 2006, however, it doesn’t seem like things have changed much 
since then. In April 2016 a respondent from Amadlelo Agri noted that the JV dairy farms were 
making around 20c profit per litre of milk. He explains the volatility of the milk market in the 
statement below: 
 
“The market is ever-changing. Last year the equivalent of a month and half was 
imported into this country in a day. So it threw our milk market on its head! The price 
crashed from R4.50 to R3.50 a litre. Remember that the price of production is R3.30, so 
we were making 20 cents a litre. So a farm like Middledrift that is producing 3000 litres 
went from R3.5 million profit to R600, 000. And our commitments on borrowed money 
are R1.5 million, so we were down the drain by R900, 000. This year there are threats 
of imports again… 
 
The inputs worry us more than the imports though, especially the price of maize. We 
have disproportionate labour and security costs, because of where we operate. So we 
have to strive to get our costs down to R3 per litre, so last year’s pricing put us in a 
difficult spot. The price of maize has gone from R2000 per ton to R3000 per ton, which 
put us in a difficult position. The biggest component that we buy-in is grain. At Ncora 
you can grow dry land maize but it doesn’t pay for us to grow grain where you can 
irrigate the land like in Shiloh and Keiskammahoek. A hectare of grazing land irrigated 
gives me R20, 000 net profit, a hectare of grain gives me R5000 per hectare.” 
 
The above statement gives one an idea of the immense uncertainty and volatility within which 
dairy farmers are forced to operate. Producing profitably has become increasingly difficult 
within this context. It also demonstrates how having access to government funding e.g. as was 
the case in Shiloh and Keiskammahoek, assists in surviving through these periodic price-
squeezes resulting from unanticipated cheap imports, the rising costs of inputs and the 
dominance of processors and distributors in determining milk prices. A farm like Middledrift 
really suffers through periods of increased market volatility, while profitability will be affected 
at Shiloh and Keiskammahoek but not to the same extent, since they do not have the burden of 
loan repayments. This somewhat more secure set-up would obviously be an incentive for 
agribusiness to engage in sharemilking JVs. A key informant from Amadlelo Agri notes,  
 
“ In dairy farming you generally get a 12% to 15% return on capital but if someone lent 
you all the start-up money you will basically be working for them forever. This is the 
case at Middledrift, the debt is creating zero benefits for the community! I will never 
get myself into the same arrangement again, there has to be a government grant for the 
infrastructure!” 
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Those producers who manage to survive the volatility of the dairy industry have engaged in a 
few notable strategies. Firstly, some have undertaken horizontal integration (e.g. like 
Grasslands’ strategy above, buying more land and producing at scale) and investing in capital 
inputs to boost income and profit margins. Some rely on cost-saving measures like accessing 
‘gravity irrigation’ or particular grain growing practices. Some diversify into niche markets e.g. 
producing organic milk or selling a portion of milk informally as unpasteurised milk,79 which 
both have higher profit margins. While many also survive by investing in enterprises outside of 
agriculture, or engaging in vertical integration ‘upstream and downstream from the farm gate’ 
(Genis, 2012:17).   
I interviewed a number of white commercial dairy farmers, in an attempt to get a better sense 
of the dairy sector. Some of these respondents were shareholders of Amadlelo Agri (from the 
50 white commercial dairy farmers) and others were not. Among the former group, one such 
respondent was a sharemilker, who milks predominantly on white commercial farms in the 
Alexandria area, which is a dry land area (i.e. rainfed) of the Eastern Cape. However, the 
sharemilk business is a part of a much larger, diversified family business- TGK Farming. They 
have utilised the latter strategy, mentioned above, of investing across the agricultural value 
chain, as well as in other sectors outside of agriculture. These businesses include macadamia 
farms (including Ncera Macadamia JV mentioned in Chapter 4), three sharemilking farms, a 
consultancy, a transport business and a medical distribution business. The following statement 
from an interview in July 2016 illustrates their business strategy and how central their other 
businesses are to ‘riding-out’ the challenging times in the dairy industry: 
“Farming has become corporatized, if you don’t have six or seven operations it’s hard 
to survive… My brother went the macadamia route and I started sharemilking, so we 
have a corporate structure TGK Farming Group and we have the sharemilking farms, 
private macadamia farms in KZN and then the community macadamia farms. These all 
fall under one umbrella. It really helps sharing your assets. Now Macadamia is 
booming and dairy is suffering, so they are giving me money. When they are in trouble 
hopefully we can help them. So diversification really helps. You will battle as a 
sharemilker if you don’t have investment … what keeps us in the dryland game is the 
consultancy revenue on community farms, our transport business, and our distribution 
business [medical]. For the first three years TGK was putting money in those 
businesses and now it is putting money into the sharemilking. For me to capitalise on 
opportunities in this area I need diversified portfolios. If you are a family business you 
must become corporatized. You have big troughs and peaks, and those troughs are 
deep! You need to plug those gaps with income from elsewhere” 
 
The above analysis has illustrated that the potential for profitability in the dairy sector has 
                                                 
79 It is technically illegal to sell unpasteurized milk but many farmers, including the Amadlelo Agri dairy farms sell it because there is a high 
demand for it to make sour milk or Amasi and it is more profitable. A key informant from Amadlelo Agri notes, “Our customers don’t want 
pasteurized milk. They can buy from us for R5.50 a liter or at the shops it costs R10… so what do you let your people starve? …From my view 
as long as your cattle tests negative to CA (contagious abortion) and TB (bovine tuberculosis) its fine… None of us growing up on a farm had 
anything but raw milk… We sell about 10% or 15% of our milk unpasteurized. It gives us a price of 10 cents more than the average price for 
milk. Remember our farms do about 4- 10 million liters, 10 cents on 4 million liters is R400, 000 per year, giving a bottom line increase of 
about 10%. Those are the little things we are seeking to mitigate where we can to improve profitability”.  
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suffered over the years, contributing to the declining number of dairy farmers. The reality is 
that if one is not operating at scale or diversifying, it is difficult to survive the competitive 
pressures of the dairy market. Findlay’s (2006:6) comment, for example, represents the 
dominating logic that drives the structuring of the dairy sector in South Africa: “Due to 
globalisation, the world market is far more competitive than it has been in the past. Essentially, 
the biggest player wins”. The specific nature of dairy as an agricultural commodity, which is 
particularly amenable to technological innovations and capital-intensive methods, has resulted 
in extreme competition between producers and a necessity to produce cheaply to keep up with 
the largest competitors. This specific nature of the industry must be considered when coming 
up with new avenues for black emerging farmers to enter the sector and also when envisioning 
alternatives to JVs.  
6.3 South African Dairy and the Agrarian Question 
 
In this section I will explore explanations for how South Africa’s pathway of capital-intensive 
dairy production has been produced under the pressures of a pervasive system of global 
capitalism, liberalisation of the international market for dairy and deregulation of the dairy 
sector which occurred in South Africa in 1997 (Milk SA, 2016). A brief look at how the 
agrarian question in South Africa has unfolded can shed some light on the particular trajectory 
of development of South Africa’s dairy sector, and also what contributions dairy can 
realistically make to economic and social development in the country.  
 
Firstly, there is the ‘problematic of accumulation’ (Bernstein, 2009) and the question of what 
contribution agriculture and the transfer of agricultural surpluses can makes to industrialisation, 
accumulation and the emergence of capital (Preobrazhensky, 1926; Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 
2009; Byres, 1991; Lerche, 2013). It has been proposed in South Africa that this question has 
been resolved for white capital (at least). Moreover as Bernstein (2009) suggests, the agrarian 
question of capital has been resolved on a world-scale.  
 
In South Africa the service sector has become increasingly dominant as the main source of 
capital accumulation, accounting for 60% of GDP and therefore capital transfers from 
agriculture may no longer be significant. However, in spite of this we may contend that cheap 
food remains important to national capital and processes of accumulation in the countryside 
have political significance as a national concern. Dairy is especially important, as it is a central 
component of a basic food basket. There is a tension that plays out between on the one hand, 
the interests of industrial capital which benefits from low food prices, (which directly impact 
wages) and on the other hand, the interests of milk producers to receive a fair price for their 
produce. In South Africa this dynamic plays out in terms of frequent flooding of the market 
with cheap European dairy products, as discussed above.  
 
In South Africa there is a dominant and increasing urban population of more than two-thirds, 
which is expected to grow to 80% by 2050 and only 4.6% of people derive employment from 
agriculture (ILO, 2014). A higher price for dairy products would impact the urban poor 
negatively and could compromise employment in the industrial sector, thus negatively 
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affecting the overall position of labour.  In this context, the government’s interests are in 
keeping food prices low, possibly even if this means squeezing out producers. This explains 
why milk producers in South Africa are extremely vulnerable to fluctuations of global dairy 
prices and to the threat of cheap imports (Midgley, 2016; DAFF, 2015).  
 
Dairy producers are not a politically important constituent in the eyes of the state, when 
compared to industrial capital and labour. From a politically pragmatic position, this perhaps 
doesn’t bode well for the prospects of supporting a smallholder dairy sector; since we know 
they would be unable to produce as cheaply as the larger farms (Mkhabela and Mndeme, 
2010). To survive they would need to target niche markets, government would need to provide 
effective extension support (which is notably poor in South Africa), and importantly, to secure 
markets for smallholder produce, such as procurement to state schools, prisons and hospitals 
(Aliber and Hall, 2012; Cousins, 2015). This would require considerable changes to the current 
trajectory of land and agrarian reform in South Africa; however, it doesn’t appear that there is 
political appetite to lead these types of reforms. The JV model on the other hand allows the 
state to leave the market for dairy as is. 
 
Let’s now consider the second agrarian question, concerned with the problematic of 
‘production’ (Bernstein, 2009). This investigates the extent to which capitalism has penetrated 
the countryside and agriculture and which class relations remain obstacles to it (Kautsky, 1899; 
Lenin, 1899; Byres, 1991; Lerche et al., 2013; Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2009). Here tendencies 
towards or limitations of class differentiation could be explored, as possible explanations for 
the dominance of capitalist dairy farming in South Africa. The trajectories of capitalist 
agriculture in general, have already been explored in Chapter 2. As noted above dairy is a 
commodity particularly susceptible to technological innovation and capital-intensive methods, 
and thus the dairy sector exemplifies what Bernstein (2013) has described as ‘natural, simply 
capitalism’. The many decades of state support for dairy farmers has contributed to the 
establishment of highly efficient, large-scale capitalist dairy farmers. However processes of 
differentiation are on going, which have been exacerbated by the liberalisation of the dairy 
market, resulting in many smaller producers being squeezed out.  
 
‘Sharemilking joint ventures’, aimed at creating livelihoods for previously disadvantaged 
communities, are likewise premised on this capitalist farming model. The introduction of 
wage-labour on this land in some cases has replaced the household-labour regimes of previous 
petty commodity producers. However, these communities themselves are also highly 
differentiated and these context specific class dynamics have important implications for how 
JV interventions fare.  
 
In these arrangements communities mostly cease to be involved in the productive process, 
although some are employed as wage-labourers. They thus occupy an ambiguous class position 
as landowners, shareholders and labour. Under certain conditions this can create a labour 
disciplining effect. However, in other contexts it can result in conflict, which is ultimately 
shaped by currents of class formation. It is these tensions that the new capitalist social relations 
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of production introduce to processes of social reproduction engaged in by diverse households 
that is driving these divergent outcomes.  
 
Third, let’s consider the agrarian question as a political question of the nature of class struggle 
and emerging alliances between classes, both in and outside the countryside, including which 
classes the state supports. How might these dynamics shape the organisation of dairy 
production? Liberalisation of the dairy sector since 1997 and the immense competitive forces 
this exposed South Africa’s dairy farmers to, helps to explain the radical reduction of dairy 
producers over the years to a mere 1683 (Midgley, 2016; MPO, 2016). However processes of 
class formation in South Africa’s countryside, described in Chapter 2, point to a longer-term 
trajectory across the agrarian landscape, which has seen smaller producers being squeezed out 
overtime (Bernstein, 1996; Cousins, 2015; Genis, 2012).  
 
Political uncertainty around land reform, coupled with a volatile market for milk in South 
Africa, also explains in part why white agrarian capital is looking to enter into dairy joint 
ventures with black landowners, as a strategy to ‘hang in’ and access government funding to 
make investments less risky. The political significance of the ambiguous class position of these 
‘beneficiary communities’, who are at once landed property, labour and a smaller form of 
capital (with shares in the farm operating company) is not entirely clear.  Neither is it clear 
what impact this will have on the productivity of agriculture. The disguised class position may 
serve the continued survival of white agrarian capital in its profit extracting relationship, in 
complex ways.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, under modern capitalism providing employees, or other ‘vulnerable 
classes’, with equity ownership in a firm has become a global trend. Social or worker 
ownership is a way to deal with the inability of firms to raise wages in a context of economic 
stagnation (Minns, 1996; Sesil et al., 2001). These types of arrangements can be seen as a 
compact between the state and capital, to jointly manage the threat of labour and political 
unrest that might arise from falling living standards in contexts like South Africa that suffers 
from pervasive unemployment. Although it might be acknowledged that arrangements like JVs 
cannot provide opportunities for wealth and capital accumulation among beneficiaries, they 
might be seen by the state as contributing to social welfare for the growing masses of the poor 
in the former homelands.  
 
Lastly, there is the addition to the classical agrarian question, of Bernstein’s (2007) ‘agrarian 
question of labour’. This is concerned with the reproductive demands of ‘fragmented classes of 
labour’, who pursue their reproduction through complex combinations of self and wage-
employment. Here we consider both wage labourers on dairy farms and poor farmers, who are 
not dispossessed entirely of the means of production but do not possess sufficient means to 
reproduce themselves (Bernstein, 2010). 
 
In respect to the Sharemilking JV model, which one can assert is intended to be a mechanism 
with which to address South Africa’s agrarian question of labour in the former homelands, we 
see divergent outcomes. The dividends that landowners receive vary depending on the size of 
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beneficiary groups. At Shiloh, the large beneficiary group translates into limited benefits. 
Whereas, at Keiskammahoek they receive more substantial benefits because of the much 
smaller beneficiary group. Unlike the household consumption of milk by petty commodity 
producing entities, here JV farms are run as strictly capitalist operations and although labourers 
receive some milk, landowners do not, which is an area of contention. In general, tensions arise 
in this sharemilking JV model between the immediate reproductive demands of poor 
landholding groups and the profit imperative of capitalist agriculture. Difficult choices must be 
made between paying out dividends to landowners or reinvesting them in the sharemilking 
business, as we will see in the coming chapters this creates conflicts and contestations.  
 
Figure 15. Agricultural Growth and Employment Potential: A Matrix of Agricultural 
Commodities 
 
 
Although formal employment provides some security to labouring households, along with 
dividends and land use fees, there is still the question of whether dairy is the right kind of 
commodity to produce in the communal areas, where there are high demands for employment. 
The National Development Plan (2011) identified dairy as an agricultural commodity with 
relatively high growth potential but with a limited capacity to absorb labour, given high levels 
of mechanization. As the matrix above indicates, alternative commodities have been identified 
which have high-growth potential and importantly absorb more labour, since they are less 
ameliorable to mechanisation. In the context of market-oriented smallholder farmers, Cousins 
(2015) particularly suggests that we should consider 'labour-intensive fresh produce on 
irrigation schemes’ and ‘indigenous goats and cattle on communal rangelands’. 
 
6.4 Viable Alternatives to Large-Scale Capitalist Dairy Farms and Sharemilking Joint 
Ventures? 
 
“… The emphasis on partnerships involving agribusiness companies does not imply 
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that family farmers need to partner up with large outside investors in order to succeed. 
There is plenty of evidence that suggests that, where placed in a condition to work 
through enabling policies and appropriate infrastructure, small-scale producers are able 
to farm competitively and seize new market opportunities” (Cotula and Buxton, 2010: 
7). 
 
Chapter 3 on inclusive business models, along with Chapter 2 on South Africa’s agrarian 
question, provided some insights on possible alternatives to JVs. Particularly, the promotion of 
‘small- to medium-scale market-oriented farmers’. Research has suggested that they can indeed 
be successful if producing crops that are well suited to their labour regimes, capital 
requirements and scale of production, such as horticultural crops (Cousins, 2015; Aliber and 
Hall, 2012). However, what are the prospects of supporting smallholder dairy in South Africa, 
given the extremely competitive, capital-intensive production systems and market volatility 
sketched above? Realistically, the ‘political economy of dairy’ in South Africa seems to be 
quite hostile to the conditions required to make production viable for smallholders. However, 
there are examples to be found elsewhere, where smallholder dairying has been successful in 
creating livelihoods for rural people.  
 
Small-scale dairy production and cooperatives in India  
 
Despite all the conflicting reports of successes and failure, farmer cooperatives for 
smallholders have shown promise where they are properly supported by government. The case 
of small-scale dairy production in India is a good example of their potential. Although given 
the concentrated nature of dairy in the South African context and our failure to support 
cooperatives, I would argue that replicability is questionable (Bunce, 2016). In India around 
50% of the milk processed and marketed in the ‘formal sector’ is handled by cooperatives 
(IFPRI, 2011). Cooperative dairy farming is a major policy focus of government and there are 
around 110, 000 village-level cooperatives (Gupta and Roy, 2012) with 11 million milk-
producer members (Rajendran and Mohanty, 2004).  
 
Much of India’s success in raising milk production has been attributed to ‘Operation Flood.’80 
This national dairy development programme was implemented between 1970 and 1996. It is 
responsible for building the successful cooperative sector that remains so prominent today 
across many parts of India (Gautam et al., 2010). Along with productivity gains, it is also 
acclaimed for the livelihood benefits it has afforded to poor, marginal and landless farmers, 
women, and vulnerable groups (Banerjee, 1994). In sharp contrast to South Africa, in India the 
majority of dairy farmers are ‘smallholders’, as well as a substantial number of landless people. 
These producers rely primarily on household labour (Shukla and Brahmankar, 1999). In India 
dairy farming is almost exclusively undertaken as a component of a mixed farming system 
(usually complemented by crop production), along with other livelihood activities both in and 
outside the countryside. While crops provide seasonal income, the fact that dairying can 
                                                 
80 Operation flood is widely hailed as one of the most successful dairy programmes implemented at such a large scale. It is seen as a unique 
way of using foreign food aid, which is anti-inflationary, to build a productive agricultural sector rather than pushing local farmers out of 
production (Banerjee, 1994; Gautam et al., 2010). 
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provide year-around income, is a critical incentive for many people engaged in dairy 
production (Banerjee, 1994; Gautam et al., 2010).  
  
A part of what makes the dairy cooperative sector in India function relatively effectively, is the 
well-organised system of vertical coordination and comprehensive extension services provided 
to the farmers. Cooperatives are under the regulation of the National Dairy Development Board 
(NDDB) that has been in existence since 1965 (Banerjee, 1994). Gupta and Roy, (2012) 
evaluated the impacts on household livelihoods for producers integrated under the Milkfed 
cooperative. They found that cooperative producers received around twice the net profit, in 
comparison to independent producers. This was not linked to higher prices received, as the 
cooperative members actually received lower prices for their milk, compared to the ‘outside 
market price’. Rather, the higher profitability was a result of the significantly cheaper inputs 
procured through the cooperative at below market prices. These inputs are delivered to the 
village cooperative societies, along with extension services. This meant that operating costs 
were on average 27% lower for cooperative members and marketing costs were 29% lower.  
 
This stands in sharp contrast to South Africa, where the government’s assistance to agricultural 
cooperatives is primarily limited to registering the cooperatives (Impact Economix, 2014). 
Research has found, for example, that in South Africa a mere 2 644 of the 22 619 registered 
cooperatives in 2010 could actually be regarded as functional, amounting to a failure rate of 88% 
(Wessels, 2016). The Indian government’s thorough support to dairy cooperatives and the 
extensive investment in procurement infrastructure makes a smallholder sector viable. This 
stands in contrast to milk producers in South Africa, who are left to the whims of private 
processors. They are often unwilling to procure milk from rural producers in remote areas, as it 
is not ‘economical’ in the context of competition between capitals (different milk processors). 
In fact Amadlelo Agri claims that their incentive for setting up their own processing company 
(COEGA Dairy 81), was premised on the fact that none of the processors were willing to 
procure milk from some of the rural areas where they were setting up community dairies e.g. 
Ncora and Port St Johns in the former Transkei.  
 
The table below compares the salient features of the dairy sector in India and South Africa. The 
sharp contrasts also reflect the very different agrarian structures. India has a large agrarian 
population, with only 32% of the population categorised as urban and 49.7% of the population 
is employed in the agricultural sector (ILO, 2013). In South Africa two-thirds of the population 
lives in urban areas and only 4.6% of people derive employment from agriculture (ILO, 2014).  
 
In short, South Africa’s agricultural sector is dominated by a path towards what Bernstein 
(2013) coined as “natural, simply capitalism”, while in India “the common man is a petty 
producer” (Harriss-White, 2012). While South Africa is dominated by 1683 large-scale 
capitalist farming enterprises, in India dairy provides livelihoods to 75 million people (many of 
them women and landless producers), with an average herd size of 1-2 dairy animals (as 
compared to South Africa’s 399) (Hemme et al., 2003; Rajendran & Mohanty, 2004).  
                                                 
81 See the following section for more detail. Clover previously procured their milk but was unwilling to procure milk from more remote rural 
farms in the communal areas, where transport costs would be punitive. 
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Table 11. Salient Features of Dairy Farming in India and South Africa: Contrasting Agrarian 
Structures 
 India South Africa 
Number of 
dairy farmers 
75 million people involved in dairy 
production (5.72% of the total 1.311 billion 
population).  
1683 (0.003% of the 55 million total 
population). 
Contribution to 
world 
production of 
milk 
India is the world’s largest milk producer and 
contributes 18% to world milk production. 
South Africa contributes 0.5% of world 
production. 
Cost of 
production 
<US$30 per 100KGs. Dairy is predominantly 
part of a mixed farming, low-input system, 
characterized by cheap feed from crop 
residues and household labour (Hemme et 
al., 2014). 
+- US$35 per 100KGs. Produces competitively 
due to irrigated and rain-fed pasture-based 
systems, large herd sizes and cheap wage labour 
(Hemme et al., 2014). 
Contribution of 
dairy to GDP 
Most important agricultural commodity in 
India, accounting for 24.8% of agricultural 
GDP.  
4th most important agricultural commodity 
accounting for 7% of agricultural GDP.  
Markets for 
dairy 
30% consumed in households and never 
reaches the market, thereafter, 80% is sold in 
informal markets and 20% in the cooperative 
and private sectors. 
96% of milk is sold in the formal market, 2% 
informally and 2% for on-farm consumption. 
Dairy animals The largest herds of dairy cows and buffalo 
in the world (over 300 million), however, 
productivity of dairy animals is low. Over 
80% of dairy animals are kept in herds of 2-8 
and the average herd size is 1-2 dairy 
animals (Hemme et al., 2003; Farmers 
Weekly UK, 2015). 
1.7 million dairy cows in production in 2016. 
Relatively high productivity. 4th largest herd 
sizes in the world with the average at 399 dairy 
animals (MPO, 2016).  
 
While it has been proposed that the ‘problematic of accumulation’ has been resolved for white 
capital in South Africa (Bernstein, 2013), in India it has been ‘bypassed’ since Petty 
Commodity Producers continue to dominant and they expand by multiplication rather than 
through accumulation (Lerche, 2013; Harriss-White, 2012). In South Africa where we have 
experienced concentration of land and dairy herds (Cousins, 2015; Bernstein, 2013; MPO, 
2016), India has experienced an opposite trajectory of subdivision of land (Harriss-White, 
2012; Basu and Das, 2013). For dairy farming, sub-division means land holdings can’t support 
large herds which prevents the introduction of technologies like rotary milking parlours that 
mark the penetration of capital into dairy farming. These factors together explain the 
dominance of small-scale, petty production in India's dairy industry. 
 
 
 
 
African examples of small-scale dairy production  
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Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda also provide some African examples of relatively successful 
small-scale dairy cooperative production. Like India, many of these systems are also dairy-crop 
mixed farming systems, which are supported by wage labour incomes as well (Moll et al., 
2006; Bebe, 2003; Muriuki and Thorpe, 2001; Kurwijila, 2001). In Kenya, which has the most 
prolific smallholder dairy sector, it has been estimated that dairy production, contributes to the 
livelihoods of around 1 million smallholder farmers (IFAD 2006; Odero-Waitituh, 2017). 
Smallholder Dairy farmers comprise 80% of all the country’s dairy producers and produce 
56% of Kenya’s milk. Unlike South Africa, in Kenya about 80% of milk is sold on the 
informal market and bought by the consumer in raw form (Odero-Waitituh, 2017).  
 
The dairy production system for smallholders is based on the integration of dairy farming into 
the predominantly maize-based farms. Many farmers also grow cash crops such as tea, coffee 
and pyrethrum. Manure from dairy cows is used to fertilize crops, while maize Stover and 
other feed is grown including Napier grass and crop residues for cattle (Njarui et al., 2011). 
Therefore the dairy-crop mixed farming system has been developed to suit smallholdings and 
reduce vulnerability. Farms are small in size (a few acres) and 71% of farmers keep between 
one to three dairy cows (pure and crossbred cows) (Bebe et al., 2003; Mugambi et al., 2015). 
 
Fostering a productive smallholder dairy sector in South Africa, along the lines of its African 
neighbours, would necessitate drastic changes in how government supports milk producers. 
However, it seems that there are perhaps both ecological as well as policy and economic 
constraints to establishing a successful smallholder cooperative sector in South Africa: 
 
“By contrast, in Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the mid altitude, mono-modal 
rainfall agro-ecologies of southern Africa (with their lower potential for biomass 
production), the risk for cattle diseases and, until recent years, the policy and 
institutional environments have inhibited adoption of dairy production by 
smallholders… Furthermore, as yet, market mechanisms are not in place to extract milk 
from traditional systems, which, in any case, are largely in agro-ecologies adverse to 
producing milk in excess of the needs of the producer households and their neighbours. 
Most countries in E&SA have, therefore, not benefited in the way that Kenya has and to 
lesser extents Tanzania and Uganda have from smallholder dairy development” 
(Muriuki and Thorpe, 2001: 193). 
 
Cotula and Buxton (2010: 18) comment in regards to the proliferation of inclusive business 
models that: “it is better for farmers to have their own lands and farm for themselves rather 
than to work for somebody on a farm”. However, this statement would obviously not hold true 
in all situations and in some cases landowners may prefer to have access to jobs and dividends 
rather than face the risks and uncertainties of farming themselves. This may very well be the 
case in regards to South Africa’s competitive dairy sector. Sender and Johnston (2004) have 
also argued the contrary to Cotula and Buxton (2010), that creating rural jobs may do more to 
alleviate poverty for the poorest classes of the rural poor than promoting smallholder 
production.  
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Clearly supporting a differentiated smallholder sector does hold promise for South African land 
and agrarian reform. However, there are many limitations of integrating smallholders into the 
competitive dairy sector. This explains to a large degree why large-scale capitalist JV farms 
have been seen as a more practical way of ensuring the viability of land reform farms. 
However, given the context of extreme poverty and unemployment in which these JV farms are 
being established, there is also a question of whether dairy is the right kind of commodity to 
produce.  
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The volatile and highly competitive nature of the dairy industry has shaped the type of large-
scale JV sharemilking arrangements that are emerging in the communal areas of South Africa. 
The above review has illustrated, however, that alternative models of integrating new entrants 
into the dairy sector are limited. Unfortunately, reality seems to demand that even proponents 
of smallholder models need to pragmatically consider whether there is a future for dairy 
smallholders in South Africa. Without a significant shift in the way government supports and 
protects the dairy sector, the review seems to indicate that it would set up customary 
landowners to fail. The National Development Plan (2011) identified dairy as an agricultural 
commodity with relatively high growth potential, but which has limited capacity to absorb 
labour given high levels of mechanization. Other crops have been identified which are high-
value, have high-growth potential and importantly absorb far more labour, since they are less 
ameliorable to mechanisation e.g. vegetable farming and various fruit and nut tree crops. 
 
The way sharemilking JVs are shaped also represents how the dairy sector and the political 
climate for land and agrarian reform has reshaped agrarian capitals strategies, in an attempt to 
remain profitable and mitigate risks. Agribusiness firms now focus on capturing value across 
the value chain and minimizing risks in the production process (e.g. by investing solely in 
moveable assets). It is argued in this thesis, that JVs provide such an opportunity and incentive 
to agrarian capital to survive in this highly competitive sector. 
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Chapter 7. Amadlelo Agri’s Joint Venture Model: Governance and 
Financial Arrangements 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter describes how the Amadlelo Agri sharemilking model is structured as a joint 
venture, in relation to financial arrangements, property rights, production systems, capital-
labour relations and governance arrangements. Sharemilking is a form of organising dairy 
production that originated from New Zealand, which Amadlelo Agri has adapted in the JV 
schemes. I look at the financial and governance arrangements of Amadlelo Agri as an 
agribusiness firm, the community cooperatives and the farm operating trusts (the jointly owned 
governance structures). I briefly document and analyse some of the governance challenges and 
how these might impact the outcomes at each farm. This chapter also describes how Amadlelo 
Agri’s 50/50 sharemilking model is structured in terms of the relative ownership of assets, the 
social relations of production on the farm, and how benefits and risks are distributed. A more in 
depth analysis of how this model might be theorised is reserved for the following chapter.  
7.2 Amadlelo Agri’s Sharemilking Joint Venture Model 
 
Amadlelo Agri’s model has built on the sharemilking model from New Zealand, with some 
adjustments that, in their view, have simplified the model. The 50/50 sharemilking model82 
involves the community through government investment, bringing the fixed assets to the 
business, including the land, irrigation infrastructure and the milking parlour.  The land and 
fixed assets are owned by the respective community cooperatives:  
 
• Mayime Cooperative at Shiloh; and  
• Seven Stars Cooperative at Keiskammahoek.  
 
Amadlelo Agri contributes the cows83 and other movable assets to the business. Amadlelo Agri 
is also responsible for the day-to-day running of the farms, for which they employ farm 
managers84. After a 10% management fee85 has been deducted, profits from milk sales are 
equally split between Amadlelo Agri and households affiliated to the community cooperatives, 
in the form of dividend payments. A key informant from Amadlelo Agri explains the 10% 
management fee:  
 
“That 10% we take is in essence a 10% community facilitation fee, because that’s 
where it goes, it doesn’t go anywhere else. I spend 80 to 90% of my time just doing 
that, so it’s a tough environment we have chosen." 
 
                                                 
82 Although the Shiloh and Keiskammahoek farms are run as '50/50 sharemilking'82 agreements, Amadlelo Agri also employs a range of other 
complex governance arrangements across their other JV farms (see the figure below). A key informant from Amadlelo Agri explains the nature 
of ownership of the JV farms at Keiskammahoek (and Shiloh is similarly structured) as follows: “This is not a company, this is a sharemilk 
business. It’s not an equity joint venture like Middledrift. In other words all the land and infrastructure belongs to the 35 people.” 
83 The majority of cows are rented from commercial farmers. In the long-term Amadlelo Agri plans to buyout these leases in order to own all 
of its livestock. 
84 Farm managers are essentially employed by the Trust, like all other workers. However, Amadlelo Agri plays the key role in ensuring both 
skills development and profitable operation. 
85 The management fee is however, conditional upon profits being made by the farm. 
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The sharemilking JV farms involve residents from the surrounding rural settlements as both 
landowners and workers. At Keiskammahoek, Amadlelo Agri signed a five-year sharemilk 
contract with the Seven Stars Cooperative in 2010, which was extended for a further five years 
in 2015. Amadlelo Agri entered into a 10-year sharemilk contract with Mayime Cooperative at 
Shiloh in 2011, with options to renew it in 2021. The sharemilk agreement specifies the assets 
owned by the parties, a list of equipment and implements contributed by Amadlelo Agri and 
outlines the financial and governance arrangements. Each of these JV sharemilking farms has 
an operating company in the form of a farm trust (respectively Seven Stars Trust and Shiloh 
Dairies Trust). The trusts serve as the agent for the implementation of the sharemilk agreement. 
 
Leasing and ownership of dairy cows on the JV farms 
 
Leasing of dairy cows has been a common practice in South Africa for at least 25 years. It is 
increasingly popular with both commercial farmers and urban investors as a means of earning a 
substantial passive income. It allows farmers to quickly grow their herd and achieve economies 
of scale with limited available capital, earn profits on milk from the leased cattle, and to benefit 
from growth of capital from calves born (although they bare the risk of mortalities). The lessor 
carries very little risk since the original number of animals, at the same value (and same age), 
is owed back to them at the close of the contract. As a farm manager at Keiskammahoek notes:  
 
“On a lease agreement if I give you 10 pregnant heifers this year, in 5 years time you 
must give me back 10 pregnant heifers... So cows don't get old in lease agreements”.  
 
Alternatively the lessee can opt to purchase the cattle. In general the lessee pays around 12% of 
the value of the cows per month, which amounts to a 2% return on investment above the prime 
lending rate (Du Preez, 2011; key informant interviews). Amadlelo does not own the majority 
of their dairy cows, which are leased through a dairy cattle broker86. A manager at Amadlelo 
Agri notes:  
 
”Our aim is to own all our own cows. But that's going to take a while, maybe 10 years. 
Of the 8000 cows we are milking across our farms, in total we own 1000”.  
 
Amadlelo plans to buy out these leases over time so as to own all the livestock and improve 
their returns from the JV projects. On their website they explain the financial challenge of 
becoming a 50/50 sharemilker at all of their JV schemes:  
 
“To date Amadlelo has not had the funding to purchase the required livestock and 
assets (R12 million for a 1000 cow unit) to be the 50/50 sharemilker and have got 
                                                 
86 Amadlelo rents the majority of their cows through the ECSIT division of Agricultural Consulting Services (ACS). This is a consulting firm 
that the Chief Executive Director of Amadlelo Agri used to be involved in several years ago. After talking to a number of other commercial 
dairy farmers, I realised that they are central to the industry. One of the 50 commercial farmers from the Amadlelo Milk Producers states 
”When we were leasing cows we leased from ACS which is an accounting firm, they are in the know! They are a good place to network. They 
provide a platform for farmers to get together, they are also doing management consulting. They are the glue in a lot of these deals. They put 
me in touch with one of the farms I am sharemilking on. They create circles of trust and integrity… They do accounting, auditing and 
consulting. They facilitate leasing of cows, and then get a little bit of commission here and there. They are critical to the industry. They are 
based in PE... Amadlelo is probably one of their biggest clients and they do all of our books for all of our five sharemilking operations”. 
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commercial farmers involved to fund the livestock and assets, or leased the livestock 
from commercial farmers.”87 
 
The farm operating companies don’t have to pay for the expenses related to the dairy cows or 
rental fees because Amadlelo Agri is responsible for this. However, the Mayime and Seven 
Stars cooperatives do share in the benefits from calves born on the farms. A key informant 
from Amadlelo Agri explains: 
 
“If there were 100 surplus heifers, 50 belong to Amadlelo and 50 to Mayime. We tell 
them to take the animals and lease them out which will help them to buy more animals. 
We want them to build up stock so they can get other income and then if Amadlelo or 
Mayime, for example, call it a day, then they have enough stock… the community can 
build livestock numbers to the point that they can buy us out. Cows that die, cows that 
are old etc… those ones will be replaced and any surplus is shared 50/50”.  
 
A member of the Seven Stars Cooperative confirmed that at Keiskammahoek 300 cows are 
owned by the landholders and leased to Amadlelo Agri. Dairy heifers (female calves) born on 
the farm may be reintroduced to the dairy herd and raised as replacement heifers. Beef heifers 
and bulls born on the farm are sold to the surrounding community or other commercial farmers. 
Fieldwork revealed that surrounding communities were purchasing these, especially for 
ceremonial purposes.  
 
A key motivation for dairy farmers to accumulate cattle for lease to other farmers is the tax 
benefit. It can be used as a way to avoid paying tax on farm profits. A key informant from 
Amadlelo Agri explains: 
 
“If I have 5 million worth of tax income I can rather go and buy cows and then I don’t 
have a tax problem… So two things happen I have surplus animals that I can’t use but I 
don’t want to sell them and pay tax on that money, so I prefer to lease them. And, I 
want to build another milking parlour so I can park my profits in cows and pay no tax... 
one day I sell the cows and build a milking parlour for 10 million and still pay no tax. 
So it all relates to sensible use of the law as it stands, in terms of accumulating my 
money for something in the future. If I can sell my cows and put in irrigation and pay 
no tax etc. So it’s born out of that. There are some guys making a significant 
contribution to their income this way, like R2 million bucks a year. I rent out cows 
too!”  
 
The high profitability potential of accumulating dairy cows and renting them out, in part 
explains the sharemilker’s motivation (Amadlelo Agri) to be involved in production this way. 
Although Amadlelo Agri is not yet at the point where they own all the dairy cows, the aim is to 
achieve this in the future. In the meantime the rental market is allowing them to accumulate 
cows through the birth of heifers on the farm. This is obviously mediated by the high bio-
                                                 
87 See Amadlelo Agri website: http://www.amadlelo.co.za/company-profile/ 
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security risk on these farms, in part due to outside cattle being let on to pastures by the 
surrounding community, which leads to high calf mortality rates.  
Sourcing labour from the local communities 
 
The JV farms commit themselves to hiring labour from the local communities. Amadlelo Agri 
concedes to a preference to hire landowning households, which are perceived to be more 
invested and easier to manage. There is also considerable pressure placed on the farm operating 
companies to hire landowners' household members and kin. However, the farms' legitimacy 
also rests on meeting demands for labour from the wider community. This has produced 
several tensions, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 10 and 11.  
 
The technical nature of dairy farming requires a high level of skill from the labour force, which 
must be adequately trained to work with valuable, disease sensitive animals. A manager at 
Shiloh explains the impact of having to source labour locally:  
 
“There is a lot of politics here! Because it’s a communal farm, we must take staff from 
here but the quality of the workers is not up to standards. We have a high calf mortality 
rate here because guys don’t follow procedures. We are not building our equity because 
you have so many animals dying”. 
 
Currently these higher labour and production costs are being mitigated by the benefits of access 
to gravity irrigation, government funding for fixed assets and Amadlelo’s investments in 
processing downstream of the value chain (which ensures a favourable milk price). However, 
in the long-term the farms may struggle to continue to meet high demands for labour, while 
maintaining profitability within the context of South Africa’s competitive dairy sector. The 
need to maintain social networks in the community and the continued legitimacy of 
landowners' rights to the land is mostly addressed at the farms by hiring more labour than is 
required, as well as by the sale of calves and cheap unpasteurised milk to the community.  
Training and mentoring of black farm managers 
 
An important focus of Amadlelo’s JV model is to train and mentor skilled black farm 
managers. Amadlelo Agri has partnered with Fort Hare University to develop a one-year 
diploma programme in dairy training, with a focus on management training. Graduates of this 
programme (and from other university programmes) also get the opportunity to intern on the 
JV farms, or on the farms of those 50 commercial dairy farmers who are shareholders of 
'Amadlelo Milk Producers'. Many of the current managers at the JV farms have come through 
this programme, including the managers of Middledrift and Fort Hare, a senior manager at 
Keiskammahoek and a junior manager at Shiloh. A respondent from Amadelo Agri notes:  
 
“It’s a holistic training and we also teach students how to be financially savvy. How to 
give up money now to make money later. We teach them the principles in Robert 
Kiyosaki's book ‘Rich Dad, Poor Dad’…we put a target that by the time our guys are 
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40 they should own 1000 cows ... We are trying to keep our managers away from the 
BMWs and Blackberries… it’s not sexy to own a cow but we are trying to change that”.  
 
Amadlelo Agri also arranges for their managers to spend a year in New Zealand on a 
sharemilking farm internship. This was an experience that many of the managers spoke highly 
of. Amadlelo Agri has therefore been successful in facilitating the entrance of black managers 
into a sector dominated by white commercial farmers and managers. Therefore, from this 
perspective, they are contributing to transformation of the dairy sector. This has obviously been 
the most positive impact of their JV model.  
 
All nine senior and junior managers I interviewed across four JV farms (Keiskammahoek, 
Shiloh, Middledrift and Fort Hare) were complimentary of the opportunities the Amadlelo Agri 
model afforded them for professional growth, skills development and a competitive salary 
package. It is, however, important to note, that apart from one of the junior managers at Shiloh, 
none of the managers come from the beneficiary communities. The explanation for this, from 
the viewpoint of the farm managers and Amadlelo Agri is twofold. Firstly, there is a lack of 
skills in the host communities. Secondly, because of the difficult dynamics of having a young 
person managing other workers from their own community.  
 
The production manager’s case is illustrative of the accumulation path of their farm managers. 
When asked how joining Amadlelo Agri had impacted his livelihood he explained: 
 
“To break into the industry in farming as a black person is not an easy one, it requires 
character. I was lucky that I managed to get the job with Amadlelo, I took a chance 
quitting my previous job, but accumulating cattle has really changed my life. Since I am 
a 10% sharemilker, I sign my own check.  I made R1.1 million last year. This year 
[2016] I got a new opportunity as the production manager at all of the farms. This 
opportunity is huge, the assets that I have, everything is because of Amadlelo!”  
 
Amadlelo Agri encourages its farm managers to accumulate cattle. Shareholders from 
Amadlelo Milk Producers have stood surety for two managers to take loans to purchase heifers. 
One female farm manager had accumulated 92 dairy cows over eight years, which are being 
leased on the Middledrift JV farm that she manages. The production manager had accumulated 
160 dairy cows over nine years, which are being leased on different farms across the Eastern 
Cape. The rentals from their dairy herds provide significant passive incomes for these 
managers. The production manager notes:  
 
“So far the rented cows are generating R16, 000 per month for me but I keep it as 
passive income. At the end of the year I use it to buy more cows... I also encourage the 
junior managers to do this... The rest still want to do it, but you need discipline for this. 
They all bought cars long before I did. You have to be someone to see the long-term 
goal. You need at least 60 cows for them to begin paying for themselves and giving 
profits”.  
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Another farm manager, who has not yet invested in dairy cattle, explains the limitations of this 
type of accumulation path. His ability to invest his income in cattle is limited by the demands 
of social reproduction from his wider kin network, which he refers to in the common colloquial 
of ‘black tax’:  
 
“I haven't invested in livestock yet, but I plan to. The challenge is starting to save 
money. So far I spent everything on clothes, cars and entertainment. It's a personal 
choice. But black tax is also a big problem! At varsity they don't teach us how money 
works. After varsity all we want is a job and a fancy car. Success is driving a big car 
and having a house and you don't realize the debt that puts you in. They don't teach us 
and by time we realise it, it's too late, you can't pull out!” 
 
Interviews and life histories revealed that the JV jobs had made a significant impact on the 
livelihoods of managers and their households. In many cases senior managers had also 
managed to accumulate dairy cattle and other assets e.g. another manager invested in tractors, 
which were rented out. As the quote above illustrates, others have not invested in ‘productive 
assets’ but their lifestyles have changed drastically, and in the end, it is a matter of ‘personal 
choice’ how salaries are used.  
7.3 Governance and Financial Arrangements in Amadlelo Agri’s JV Model 
Amadlelo Agri agribusiness firm 
 
Amadlelo Agri is an agribusiness firm whose stated vision is 'to contribute to transformation by 
creating profitable, sustainable, black empowered agribusiness’. On their website Amadlelo 
Agri’s mission statement is as follows: 
 
“Contribute to the transformation of agribusiness in South Africa through the training 
and mentoring of black farmers by entering into long term partnerships. Transforming 
latent community assets into profitable business upliftment, poverty relief, job creation 
and food security. Growing and empowering business through investing and sharing". 
 
Amadlelo Agri was first established in 2004 by 70 commercial dairy farmers 88  from the 
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. Amadlelo Agri has since established seven dairy 
JV farms in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. They are located in Shiloh, 
Keiskammahoek, Middledrift, Ncora, Fort Hare and Port St Johns89 in the Eastern Cape and 
Makhoba in KwaZulu-Natal. In addition Amadlelo Agri also has shares in a Macadamia JV in 
Ncera90 and a Piggery JV in Fort Hare, both located in the Eastern Cape.  
 
Amadlelo Agri’s shareholders include: Vuwa Investments (a black empowerment company) 
which has a 35% share, Amadlelo Milk Producers Investment Company (owned by 50 white 
commercial dairy farmers) which has a 49.9% share and the Amadlelo Empowerment Trust 
                                                 
88 At the time of interviews in 2015 and 2016 the shareholders had reduced to 50 commercial farmers. 
89 At the time of research Port St Johns was still in the planning phases and Amadlelo Agri was negotiating with the community and 
government. 
90 As discussed in chapter 4 of this PhD I conducted preliminary fieldwork at this JV farm. 
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(500 workers from the 50 commercial dairy farms) which has a 15.1% share (see the figure 
below).  
 
Figure 16. Amadlelo Agri Shareholding and Governance Arrangements on JV Farms 91 
 
 
Amadlelo Agri’s board of directors meets quarterly and is chaired by an individual from Vuwa 
Investments. Vuwa Investments main role in the organisation is as the ‘empowerment player’ 
and they don’t play a role beyond the affairs of the Board of Directors. A representative from 
Amadlelo Milk Producers notes “Vuwa Investments doesn’t really play any role other than 
their representation on the organisation. They only made one small loan of R1.5 million to 
Amadlelo Agri in the beginning of the organisation’s formation”.  
 
Both the vice chairperson and chief executive director of Amadlelo Agri are from Amadlelo 
Milk Producers Investment Company (AMPIC). Then there are an additional five directors, of 
which one is from Vuwa Investments, one from Amadlelo Empowerment Trust and the 
remainder from AMPIC (who have the largest share in the company). Amadlelo Empowerment 
Trust also does not play a role beyond its representation on the board of directors. They were 
not required to make any investment in the company to receive their 15.1% share, since their 
share is essentially a BBBEE deal (Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment). Members of 
Amadlelo Empowerment Trust are workers on the 50 farms owned by the shareholders of 
AMPIC.   
                                                 
91 Source: Amadlelo Agri: http://amadlelo.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Annexure-A.pdf. The figure describes the governance 
arrangements both of Amadlelo Agri as an agribusiness firm as well as the governance arrangements at their eight JV farms. 
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A key informant from Amadlelo Agri asserts that no profits are currently distributed to its 
shareholders because of debt repayments. Management confirmed that R100 million went into 
building Amadlelo Agri, with an initial investment of only R25 million from the white 
commercial dairy farmers at AMPIC. Debts are therefore still being paid off to private 
financial institutions and to national development finance institutions like the Industrial 
Development Corporation and the National Empowerment Fund, which among other things, 
went into building the ‘equity JV farms’ in Middledrift and Fort Hare.  
 
Besides the chief executive director of Amadlelo Agri and two other white commercial dairy 
farmers from AMPIC, that seem to play an active role in aspects of the organisation, the rest of 
AMPIC’s 47 shareholders do not play a major role. A key informant explains: 
 
“The short answer of what is the role of the fifty white farmers in Amadlelo Agri is- 
there is none! The other twenty farmers, from the original seventy, dropped out. I’m not 
sure why, but I think this empowerment thing is not for everyone. The remaining 
shareholders don’t really do much in the organization except for a few like (Mr B92) 
and Mr V. Mr V has mentored the farm manager at Middledrift and our production 
manager. Mr B is involved in identifying scholars for the Fort Hare training 
programme. The other farmers may assist in sourcing cows for the projects if need be, 
but they don’t have a big role besides that “. 
 
Amadlelo Agri is largely driven by the chief executive director, who is a member of AMPIC. 
He is responsible for liaising with government, maintaining relationships with the community 
structures, handling monthly farm trust meetings and training sessions for farm managers, and 
liaising with Amadlelo Agri’s shareholders and other partner organisations. During the 
fieldwork, I noted that he was constantly driving between the various JV farms to communicate 
with the community structures, resolve conflicts and attend to issues pertaining to the 
management and productivity of the farms. In many senses the organisation is very personality 
driven, and the name of the chief executive director is synonymous with Amadlelo Agri as a 
firm.  This is a limitation to the sustainability of the model and has been noted by the chief 
executive director. To address this, he had identified the production manager, who was being 
trained to succeed him in the future. 
 
Government is essential to the JV deals in terms of sanctioning and funding them, especially 
those on communally owned land. However, apart from initial negotiations in setting up the JV 
schemes and providing funding for the fixed assets, government plays a very minor role in 
these JV farms93. The financial management of the farms is the responsibility of the farm trusts 
and government does not sit on these structures. Government also does not actively monitor the 
                                                 
92 I have replaced names with pseudonyms  
93 A manager at Amadlelo Agri notes “We take DRDLR on a helicopter trip around to all the farms once a year and ask for a Christmas list...  
We show them what the issues are and how they can resolve it. But we never really get what we ask for. Today someone from DRDLR’s M&E 
office came around to Middledrift asking how the three million had been spent on the project. This is the three million that never arrived and 
disappeared somewhere... “ This statement indicates the very limited role that DRDLR plays in monitoring and overseeing the JVs. The poor 
functioning of the M&E branch of DRDLR is something that has been noted in previous research (see Impact Economix, 2013). 
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performance of these JV schemes, apart perhaps from yearly visits and habitual meetings that 
are held with the chief executive director of AMPIC.   
 
Joint governance structures: Seven Stars Trust and Shiloh Dairies Trust 
 
Both the Seven Stars Trust and the Shiloh Dairies Trust have a board of trustees, which is 
governed by representatives from Amadlelo Agri (through Keiskammahoek and Shiloh 
Livestock (Pty94)) and the community cooperatives (Mayime and Seven Stars cooperatives). 
The representatives on the board of trustees are responsible for the financial management of the 
farms and for reporting back to the members of their relevant organisations. They meet once a 
month. The farm managers will usually be called into these meetings to give a brief report of 
the status of production on the farm. The trusts also have quarterly meetings with the 
cooperative committees to discuss the financial outlook of the farm. 
 
The members of the board of trustees receive a ‘sitting allowance’ of R300 per person, for 
attending monthly meetings. The chairperson doesn’t receive a sitting allowance but rather 
receives a monthly allowance. The chairpersons at both Shiloh and Keiskammahoek are 
women from the respective community cooperatives. The former receives R3000 per month 
and the latter R5000 because “she works every day because they are chasing the issue of title 
deeds at Keiskammahoek”, according to a key informant at Amadlelo Agri. The chairperson of 
Shiloh Dairies Trust explains how she understands the role of the trust:  
 
“These members of the dairy trust are making money for Shiloh, they deal with wages 
and salaries for the business. When we finish doing our operational costs then there is 
money that is left over, we call it a profit, and this is where we share between Amadlelo 
and Mayime. In this marriage the sharing of profits is 50/50.”  
 
From the list I received of members of the Seven Stars Trust, there are two representatives 
from Amadlelo Agri and seven members from Seven Stars Cooperative95. There is meant to be 
a representative from every primary cooperative represented on the Trust. However, at the time 
of research there was no representative from Unit 4 and two representatives from Unit 1 
(although one had recently passed on). Three landowners serve on both the Board of the Seven 
Stars Trust and the Committee of the Seven Stars Cooperative (as additional members); this 
includes the Chairperson of the Trust. These three members all appeared to be in positions of 
notable power among the other landowners and also in positions of relatively higher income 
and asset ownership. Key informant interviews revealed that there are certain tensions among 
the Seven Stars Cooperative members, which are also linked to historical relations that precede 
the JV farms establishment, as discussed in Chapter 5. However, a member of the trust from 
Amadlelo Agri, noted that “these issues do not spill out onto the farm”, in the same way as they 
do in Shiloh.  
                                                 
94 Amadlelo Agri owns 100% of these entities unlike at their other JV farms where they share the equity with other partner firms.  
95 Although one member had recently passed away and has not been replaced, his widow notes: “I am just a farmer not a member of the 
committee. My husband was on the trust committee, but I didn't take his place when he passed. I didn't want to take his place because I am too 
old now to manage it.” 
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Some key informants mentioned that the working relationship between the landowners and 
Amadlelo Agri on the trust was difficult at the start, but that overtime it has improved. For 
example, a respondent from a dividend receiving household in Keiskammahoek notes:  
 
“During the first time we didn't understand each other, the company and the farmers, 
but now that we know each other, things are going smoothly. Here we are few people 
so it's easier and we know each other since 1984”.  
 
One farm manager at Keiskammahoek similarly noted that:  
 
“When I arrived they said the farmers were interfering … most of the guys wanted to 
sell their farms, but now they changed their mind because they see things are getting 
better… After they started getting their dividends they were so happy!”  
 
The factor of larger dividends at Keiskammahoek, as compared to Shiloh, is an important 
factor to take into account. It is not only the different history of intragroup conflict and the 
character of class dynamics at Shiloh which is creating more conflict there, it is also the simple 
fact of discontent around the small benefits derived from the JV farm that provokes these 
tensions. It is possible that the perceived environment of contentment among the beneficiaries, 
as well as in the governance structures in Keiskammahoek, is significantly influenced by the 
larger dividends. 
 
I was unable to receive lists of members for either the trust or Mayime Cooperative committee 
from Shiloh. However, key informant interviews confirmed that the trust committee is 
composed of twelve members, six from Amadlelo Agri 96  and six from the Mayime 
Cooperative. Three of the Mayime Cooperative members serve on Mayime Cooperative's 
committee as well as Shiloh Dairies Trust's board of trustees. Thus these members wield 
considerable power and influence in the community structures. This is particularly the case 
with regards to the chairperson of the Shiloh Dairies Trust. Several key informant interviews 
and participant observation97 revealed that the chairperson of the Shiloh Dairies Trust has a 
very autocratic leadership style, which has contributed to the pervasive environment of fear and 
conflict among the customary landowners at Shiloh. Many have stopped attending meetings 
due to what was described as ‘fear’, or just an acknowledgement that it was ‘pointless’ to 
participate, as their concerns ‘wouldn’t be heard’.   
 
A key informant from Amadlelo Agri also described the chairperson as ‘very self serving’. She 
was reported to have pressured the farm into employing her family members. It was eventually 
agreed that one of her sons would be employed at Keiskammahoek, to avoid uproar from the 
wider community about unfair patronage. The Shiloh Dairies Trust appears to struggle to 
operate exclusively according to unbiased business practices, and feels compelled at times to 
give into demands by its members for preferential treatment. Amadlelo Agri also notes “An 
                                                 
96 However, allegedly, generally only one member attends meetings, due to the transport costs involved. 
97 Including observing a meeting of the Trust and a Mayime cooperative meeting. 
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issue at Shiloh is the level of business understanding and education which is very low”. This 
also feeds into the way that the community representatives conduct the affairs of the 
cooperative and engage with the trust. Amadlelo Agri did not mention the same challenge of 
working with Keiskammahoek’s beneficiaries.  
 
At the time of research one of the community representatives had been dismissed from the 
Shiloh Dairies Trust. The chairperson of the Shiloh Dairies Trust notes:  
 
“We were 6 before on our side but (he) was dishonest, he couldn’t attend the meetings 
regularly and he was taking confidential things out into the villages before we reported 
it at the cooperative meetings. He formed an opposition party that is now fighting us”.  
 
A representative from Amadlelo Agri noted about the dismissal:  
 
“At Shiloh when we employed a member of the board of trustees it was fine in the 
beginning and then it caused an issue. He was a supervisor on the food plots side, 
supervising the irrigation. But he had all sorts of demands above his productive ability. 
In the end he got fired from the board of trustees”.  
 
It is clear that the governance challenges at Shiloh are linked to numerous, complex and 
overlapping factors. The power dynamics within the landowning group clearly spill over into 
the functioning of the trust. This is complicated by the autocratic leadership style of the 
chairperson, who also plays a prominent role on the Mayime Cooperative. However, even if 
she were to be replaced, as many key informants demanded, the decades old tensions among 
the landowning group would likely surface in other ways, and in new power struggles. The 
small dividends that are distributed to beneficiaries at Shiloh clearly aggravate these tensions. 
Democratic reform of the governance structures and financial management of the Mayime 
Cooperative would likely ameliorate some of the tensions. However, these types of reforms 
wouldn’t resolve the wider contradiction that the JV model poses to the reproduction of poorer 
households. 
Financial arrangements at Keiskammahoek and Shiloh 
 
The farm operating trusts are the key entities that control the finances of the JV farms. The 
figure below maps out the financial flows at the Seven Stars Trust Farm in Keiskammahoek. It 
illustrates that at Keiskammahoek R66 million98 of government funding alone has gone into 
establishing the fixed assets on the farm, which are owned by the Seven Stars Cooperative. 
Amadlelo Agri has also contributed an estimated R20 million in movable assets, which remain 
the property of the agribusiness firm. The trust pays a nominal fee of R2 per hectare per month 
to the Amahlati Municipality for the 145 hectares that it rents.  
 
                                                 
98 Whytske Chamerlain (2015) and key informants reported that R66 million of government funding was invested into the Seven Stars Dairy 
JV Farm. They provide a breakdown of government funding as follows: an initial grant from the provincial Department of Agriculture of R17 
million was used to rebuild the irrigation infrastructure on 150ha of land and to construct a milking parlour on the central unit which is leased 
from the municipality. The National Department of Rural Development and Land Reform granted Seven Stars Trust R35 million in 2012 under 
the ReCap programme. In 2013 a second tranche of R14 million was awarded.  
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In principle 50% of the profits (after deduction of a 10% management fee) should be paid from 
the Seven Stars Trust to the Seven Stars Cooperative. This ‘secondary’ cooperative should then 
pay the six ‘primary’ cooperatives the dividends (minus operating costs and investments), 
which should in turn pay the affiliated households. However, this has not been happening due 
to governance issues within the Seven Stars Cooperative and the primary cooperatives. At the 
time of research (2015/16), as an interim measure, the trust was paying the individual 
landowners their dividends directly.  A key informant from Amadlelo Agri notes:  
 
“We are bypassing the Seven Stars Cooperative and paying the beneficiaries directly … 
The secondary cooperative didn’t have their ducks in a row and the primary 
cooperatives underneath it also don’t work. There is no capacity within these structures 
to run themselves. The Seven Stars Cooperative doesn’t even have a managing director 
… cooperatives are formed because government gives money to them but they are not 
functioning properly.” 
 
Figure 17. Keiskammahoek Seven Stars Trust: Financial Arrangements 99  
 
 
                                                 
99 Based on Whytske Chamerlain (2015) with own edits from fieldwork insights 
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At Shiloh around R30 million100 of government funding alone has gone into establishing the 
fixed assets on the farm, excluding Amadlelo’s investments in movable assets of around R11 
million. Unlike at Keiskammahoek where the farm trust pays the beneficiaries their dividends, 
at Shiloh Mayime Cooperative is responsible for the dividend payments to the 395 households. 
This was an area of contention mentioned by some of households, who asserted that they 
would prefer that the Shiloh Dairies Trust distribute the dividends. Mayime Cooperative has 
not agreed to a financial audit and its committee is accused of misappropriating funds (by a so-
called ‘opposition group’ that has formed among the customary landowners). A respondent 
from a JV Dividend receiving household notes: 
 
 “We want things to be transparent, we want to know how much they make and how 
much is paid to workers and how much is left.” 
 
Figure 18. Shiloh Dairies Trust: Financial Arrangements 
 
 
 
Government has claimed that Amadlelo Agri’s sharemilking model exploits the community 
because of the relatively higher value of the land and other fixed assets that the community 
brings to the farming business, as opposed to the value of the cows, other movable assets and 
management skills that Amadlelo Agri brings. Several key respondents, from among the 
landowning households at both case study sites, also emphasised that the 10% management fee 
and 50% of remaining profits deriving to Amadlelo was ‘not fair’. They argued that the 
community beneficiaries should receive a larger share. Amadlelo Agri, however, maintains that 
the costs involved in managing the complex dynamics involved in a communal farming 
operation, the (biosecurity) risk to their cows and the costs of replacing movable assets, means 
                                                 
100 Government funding was in the form of a ReCap grant, according to key informants. I could not obtain accurate information regarding 
Amadlelo’s investment in movable assets at this farm, however, on their website they note that livestock and assets for a 1000 cow unit 
amounts to R12 million and Shiloh was milking 900 cows at the time. 
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that in reality the investment of the respective parties is even. Amadlelo Agri also argues that 
the landowners benefit from land appreciation, whereas their assets are at risk of depreciating.  
 
The kind of financial data required to do a thorough analysis of the relative return on 
investment to the community cooperatives, compared to Amadlelo Agri, was not made 
available to me, and therefore I cannot attempt to unequivocally answer the question of 
whether the community beneficiaries are being exploited. While I do not have a reliable break 
down of investments made at each farm, a key informant from Amadlelo Agri notes:  
 
“The incentive at Keiskammahoek is that government has spent money 
disproportionately to what we have, they spent about R60 million and we’ve spent 
about R20 million… so it’s a gripe of theirs that we get 50% of the profits when they 
invested more.” 
 
Moreover, Amadlelo Agri reports that government investment in fixed assets, across all of their 
projects to date has amounted to R197 million, while they have invested R92 million in dairy 
animals and movable equipment. Evaluating the return on investment on the provided figures 
alone does seem to indicate that the profits deriving to the various parties is a mismatch to 
capital investments. However, this is only a partial and inevitably inconclusive analysis. I will 
pick up on this discussion in the following chapter, which looks at the implications of the 
adjustments Amadlelo Agri has made to New Zealand's 50/50 sharemilking model. 
COEGA Dairy: Vertical integration of the value chain 
 
The political credibility gained, through supporting black emerging farmers in JV 
arrangements, has also opened up opportunities in other parts of the dairy value chain for 
Amadlelo Agri. For example, Amadlelo Agri has invested in the processing firm COEGA 
Dairy, which started operating in September 2011. Amadlelo Agri’s chief executive director is 
also a non-executive director on COEGA Dairy’s board of directors. COEGA Dairy procures 
20% of its milk from what they refer to as ‘empowerment farms’, including Keiskammahoek 
and Shiloh JV farms.  
 
Increasing vertical integration of the dairy value chain disperses risks, especially those 
associated with low producer milk prices. The future prospect of a market willing to pay a 
premium for 'land reform products' was mentioned as another incentive. Amadlelo Agri’s 
contract with Famous Brands is already evidence of this. This arrangement has led to a further 
investment between COEGA Dairy and Famous Brands to open up a cheese factory in 
Queenstown. A key respondent from Amadlelo Agri explained the status in April 2016 as 
follows: 
 
“Coega Dairy has made an agreement with Famous Brands, who owns Debonairs, 
Wimpy, Steers, Vovo Telo and many more and twisted their arm to do a ‘social spend’. 
Now all the cheese for Debonairs comes from these dairy farms… At the moment we 
produce cheese and cream cheese for Famous Brands. It’s a very nice market, nice 
prices and no nonsense like from the supermarkets who pay you R9.50 but by the time 
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they’ve deducted everything you only get R6.50 ... COEGA Cheese is a JV between 
COEGA Dairy and Famous Brands doing cheese for Famous Brands. But we want to 
put up a factory that will do 150,000 litres per day and grab milk from Ncora, 
Queenstown and Cradock to make Cheddar and Gouda. We are going to tap AgriPark 
funding, commercial farmers funding etc.… it will take a while to set up.”  
 
 Figure 19. JV Farms' Equity Stake in COEGA Dairy 101 
 
 
 
 
Although COEGA makes good money, it is struggling to be profitable due to large loan 
repayments of R100 million. Once the loans are repaid, benefits are expected to be directed to 
the JV farms as well. The above figure demonstrates that the JV farms at Shiloh and 
Keiskammahoek are members of the COEGA Empowerment Trust. A key respondent from 
Amadlelo Agri explains some of the tensions involved in this arrangement, since expectations 
of profits from customary landowners have been difficult to manage. The quote clearly 
represents a dilemma inherent in the JV model. Unlike agrarian capital, which has access to an 
investment fund, over and above meeting its requirements for reproduction, the poorer 
communities with which they partner have urgent demands on their social reproduction. 
  
“People who own their own processing facilities make money out of it, there’s no doubt 
about it! We need to own the value chain, we don’t want to leave it to someone else. 
The dilemma for us on COEGA Empowerment Trust102 is that at the moment there are 
no profits coming back to the JVs…This is crucial to understand for funding for 
communal areas projects, because for the next ten to fifteen years nothing will be 
flowing back to the communities. You tell communities that they own a share in 
                                                 
101 Source: Whytske Chamerlain (2015: 8) 
102 The JV Farms have a share in COEGA Empowerment Trust, which has a 38% share of COEGA Dairy. Of this percentage, 40% belongs to 
COEGA workers trust at COEGA Dairies (the factory), 40% to the JV projects (each farm has a percentage) and 20% to the farm workers on 
the 13 commercial dairy farms that own 62% equity stake in COEGA. See the figure below. 
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COEGA Dairy and the first thing they ask is- 'where is the money?' You say, no but 
you got it for free because the IDC lent you the money, but you have to pay them back 
first before you get any money. And they say, 'no we’ll be dead by then'. It’s very 
difficult to get people to understand the concept of giving up something now to get 
something in the future. We have this culture that says, you’ve given me shares now 
give me the money.” 
 
There were a number of motivating factors that led to the establishment of COEGA, according 
to key informants. Firstly, providing the opportunity to expand milk production in the Eastern 
Cape, which was being limited by Clover and other processors. Secondly, the farmers were 
being penalised for higher milk production during spring and summer due to seasonal calving 
practices. COEGA recovers the cost of seasonality by processing surplus milk into UHT in 
spring, which is stored and then sold in winter. Lastly, Clover wasn’t willing to source milk 
from Amadlelo Agri’s newest JV farm at Ncora, due to its distance from the processing 
factory. COEGA, however, subsidises the cost of transportation so that all the farms, in spite of 
their location, pay 25c per litre, instead of the usual 60c per litre. 
 
There are, however, some red flags regarding the character of decision-making and power 
around these investments in the value chain. I noticed that at Keiskammahoek, Shiloh and 
Middledrift, besides those landowning members who sat on the cooperatives or trusts, many 
landowners did not know that COEGA Dairy existed. In fact, most of the landowners would 
commonly refer to ‘Clover’ collecting the milk. Clover did procure milk from the farms in the 
early years of their establishment, which might account for some confusion. This does, 
however, reflect a problem in how the governance of the JV is arranged. Despite the fact that 
Amadlelo Agri engages with trust members over these decisions, they in turn do not appear to 
seek collective agreement from the customary landowners.   
7.4 Community Governance Structures: The Character of Decision-Making and 
Power 
 
A cooperative is defined in the new Cooperatives Act (No. 14 of 2005) as “an autonomous 
association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic and social needs and 
aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise organised and 
operated on co-operative principles”. Since 2002, many cooperatives have been set up in South 
Africa as a response to the ‘Cooperative Incentive Grant’, which provided R350, 000 per 
cooperative (Twalo, 2012). As a response to government legislation and incentives, registered 
cooperatives increased from 4 061 in 2007 to 43 062 in 2013 (Wessels, 2016).  
 
Mayime Cooperative was established in 2003, at the suggestion of officials from Chris Hani 
Municipality and the Eastern Cape Department of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform. 
Previously, the landowners were organized under the Masibambane Trust. In 2003 many of the 
primary cooperatives and the secondary cooperative at Keiskammahoek were also encouraged by 
government to reregister under the terms of the new legislation. However, in 2016 some reported 
not yet having reregistered their primary cooperatives.  
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In 2010 Eising and Shenxane (2011) found that a mere 2, 644 of 22, 619 registered cooperatives, 
could actually be regarded as functional, amounting to a failure rate of 88%. The key challenges 
responsible for this failure are government's failure to adequately grasp cooperatives ‘as a form 
of business’ and a lack of institutional capacity to support cooperatives (Wessels, 2016). Some 
of the governance challenges that are experienced by both the Seven Stars Cooperative and 
Mayime Cooperative are not contextually unique. They reflect a general failure in South Africa to 
adequately support and sustain the healthy functioning of cooperatives. 
 
Keiskammahoek Seven Stars Cooperative 
 
Seven Stars Cooperative is the structure that represents the Keiskammahoek landowners in the 
Seven Stars Trust. This ‘secondary cooperative’ is made up of six ‘primary cooperatives’, 
which represent the various units of land (units 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8). The primary cooperatives 
are mostly dormant or not functioning. Many still need to be registered in line with the new 
Cooperatives Act. The name ‘Seven Stars’ comes from the six primary cooperatives, with the 
seventh being the secondary cooperative.  
 
The committee for the Seven Stars Cooperative is made up of five primary members and six 
additional members. The members do not get paid to sit on the committee but sometimes get a 
stipend for travel. The members of the primary cooperatives elect a ‘board of directors’ for the 
secondary cooperative, which is commonly referred to as ‘the committee’. They can elect 
members from any primary cooperatives and thus not every primary cooperative is represented 
on the Seven Stars Cooperative board of directors. In fact, it is composed of three members 
from Unit 6 and two from Unit 1. All of the units are represented on the cooperative 
committee, although some only as ‘additional members’. Several key informants, however, 
noted that the unequal representation from across the units was creating power issues:  
 
“The negative we've had is a power issue. The secondary coop members have more 
members on the coop board from unit six than the others.... So the board of directors on 
the trust is also not properly represented from all the land units. Primary coops should 
be equally represented on the secondary coop. There are power issues... the only reason 
people are happy is because they are getting money” (Respondent from Amadlelo 
Agri). 
 
The cooperative committee has monthly meetings with its members, or sometimes more 
frequently if required. The production manager attends the monthly meetings, where he 
explains that they “give them a report of the targets that we have met, and what is happening 
on the farm and I ask for their assistance if needed”. As a result the landowners, who were 
neither members of the cooperative committee nor the trust, were much more aware of the 
status of the JV farm, as compared to Shiloh’s customary landowners, who must rely on trust 
members to report back to them.  
 
Notably, female members from amongst the landowners at Keiskammahoek chair both the 
cooperative and the trust. However, this hasn’t necessarily led to an environment more 
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conducive to participation from other female members; some of who expressed concerns with 
the leadership style and fear of expressing their views in meetings. There are three female 
members103 and seven male members on the cooperative committee; hence the gender divide is 
still unequal. This is in part a reflection of the individualised private land rights, which in most 
cases are bestowed on male household heads. It was common for women in these households 
to be referred to as ‘wives of landowners’. The female chairperson of the Seven Stars 
Cooperative was a widower, and hence became ‘the landowner’.  
 
Women in Keiskammahoek have allegedly played a prominent role in the life and management 
of the farm in the past. However, if you analyze the quote below, this speaks more to their role 
as ‘labour’ in petty commodity producing households, with the role of ‘capital’ played by their 
husbands. For example, Van Averbeke et al. (1998) note that: 
 
“A study of the role of women involving the wives of farmers in Keiskammahoek 
Irrigation Scheme, revealed that nearly three quarters of the women were actively 
farming, and that women play an important role on the farm, especially when men are 
away on other business. The women indicated that men usually still did all the hard work. 
Yet, tending to the vegetable garden, hoeing and harvesting of the fields, and herding of 
cows were functions mostly carried out by women (Williams, 1994)”. 
 
There are some generational tensions emerging between older landowners on the cooperative 
committee and their younger kin. As noted by a key informant:  
 
“At Seven Stars Cooperative, there are now some younger members of the coops that 
have economics degrees etc. and they are saying ‘get out the way’ to the older ones,  
‘it’s time for us to run this business’ “.  
 
However, as of yet there hasn’t been much of a shift of power to the younger generation. In 
most cases the first landholders, dating back to the time the scheme was run by Ulimocor, 
represent the affairs of the cooperative. These youngsters do, however, attend cooperative 
meetings to make themselves heard. There are also, however, many farmers that complained 
that their children were not interested in the affairs of the business, since they had more 
attractive opportunities in the cities. Many landowners thus expressed concern regarding the 
future handover of the business in the future to their kin.  
 
There have been attempts to develop technical farming skills among the children of the 
landowners, in the hope they could manage the dairy farm in the future. Four youths from the 
households of landowners were selected for a training programme. It included two years of 
practical experience on the farm and two years at Fort Cox agricultural college. However, only 
one of the members finished the practical experience and managed to progress to go on to Fort 
Cox (Whytske Chamerlain, 2015).  
 
                                                 
103 Although one member abstained from being interviewed and said she no longer sat on the cooperative. 
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At the time of research, all of the interns on the farm and the senior farm managers were 
sourced from outside the community. This is an area of concern regarding the sustainability of 
the JV. The landowning households risk remaining in the position of labourers and passive 
recipients of dividends, with production and governance largely managed by outsiders.  
 
The poor functioning of the Seven Stars Cooperative is also a key challenge to the 
sustainability of the farm. Chapter 10 will illustrate that there are individual farmers that are 
making good use of the dividends they receive to invest in their own farming enterprises and 
other businesses. However, the dysfunctionality of both the secondary and primary 
cooperatives, limits their members from working together to attract alternative income streams 
or government funding, and prohibits the possibility of marketing their produce together. Only 
Unit 6's primary cooperative had plans to start a nursery to sell seedlings and generate 
alternative income and jobs for the youth. When asked about some of the challenges in running 
the cooperative, the chairperson notes: 
 
“The first challenge is the knowledge, we don't have enough knowledge to run the 
business but we try. There are courses that we have been given, we had some people 
from America that have helped us and Farm Vision has helped us as well with training 
on what a cooperative is and how to run the farm and its finances. Only the managers of 
the cooperative get on those courses, the top five or seven people. Sometimes the rest 
go on courses too. Our children also sometimes go on those courses”.  
 
The Seven Stars Cooperative also does not have a business plan in place. Poor governance 
limits its ability to invest portions of JV profits into other productive activities. However, that 
said, interviews revealed that there were only a handful of households interested in extending 
the scope of the business. Households relying exclusively on pensions and JV dividends would 
unlikely be willing to divert their dividends into other investments.  
 
Social differentiation among the landowners, thus also plays into the cooperative’s ability to 
come to an agreement on a way forward. In light of this, issues of unequal representation on 
the secondary cooperative should be addressed to ensure all interests are represented. The fact 
that unit 4 does not have a representative on the farm trust is particularly concerning. 
Households from this unit were noticeably in a poorer position and some were headed by 
widows. Despite the fact that on the whole Keiskammahoek is running more smoothly than 
Shiloh and there are decidedly less tensions among the cooperative members, these various 
challenges don’t put the Seven Stars Cooperative in a secure position, should they one day 
want to manage the enterprise on their own. 
 
 
Shiloh Mayime Cooperative 
 
The Mayime Cooperative has a ‘committee’ comprised of 6 members in total, including the 
headman who is the chairperson. There are also a number of Mayime Cooperative committee 
members, who serve on the Shiloh Dairies Trust as well. This includes the chairperson of the 
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Shiloh Dairies Trust, along with two other members. This, along with the fact that the 
committee members have been the same since 2003, indicates the centralisation of power and 
decision-making, which was a common area of dispute.  
 
There are some key differences between the roles of Seven Stars Cooperative and Mayime 
Cooperative in the JV farms. In the latter’s case they organise the sale of unpasteurised milk 
from the cooperative's offices and they also source workers for the farm104. In the former's 
case, the farm trust undertakes these tasks. This at least ensures some impartiality with worker 
recruitment and financial oversight of milk sales. A member of Mayime Cooperative notes: 
 
“There was a cry from people that they don’t own this milk… so I suggested we need to 
let them buy 1 litre so they can feel this thing belongs to them. There is the Mayime 
office here that the community and schools buy from. We sell a litre of unpasteurized 
milk for R6”.  
 
A representative at Amadlelo Agri, however, contends that this creates some challenges: 
 
“The problem with Shiloh is that they actually do the business themselves on the side, 
for example selling the milk, whereas at our other farms we all share in this”.  
 
Secrecy around the operations of the Mayime Cooperative and the inability to access any 
formal documentation, made it difficult to conclusively evaluate its governance structures. 
However, the impressions of key informants were overwhelmingly negative, apart from those 
represented on its committee and the households aligned to them. I documented numerous 
claims of mismanagement and corruption. The want of a constitution, the absence of regular 
elections to select new committee members, irregular meetings with customary landowners, 
and the undemocratic leadership style of committee members, were all frequently mentioned as 
concerns. The chairperson of the trust and member of the Mayime committee notes about 
meetings that:  
 
“The committee has meetings with the community just when there is something to take 
to the community”.  
 
A manager at Amadlelo Agri also expressed concern regarding the governance and constitution 
of Mayime Cooperative:  
 
“All of the cooperatives that we work with have a board of directors but at Shiloh they 
refer to ‘the committee’ and I’m not sure if they are legally constituted… A part of the 
weakness of our system is that we can't influence what goes on in the cooperatives. At 
Shiloh, we've been stonewalled in our ability to deal with coop leaders and governance... 
At Shiloh, for example, (the headman) has kept us at arm’s length, which is not a good 
option, we prefer to work differently, to work directly with them”.  
 
                                                 
104 See Chapter 11 for a more detailed discussion on conflicts around JV jobs at Shiloh. 
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The fact that a traditional leader (the headman) is the chairperson of Mayime Cooperative also 
influences the character of decision-making on this cooperative. There appears to be a 
mismatch between the democratic and cooperative ethos that should drive the governance of a 
cooperative, and the authoritative ethos characteristic of the institution of traditional leadership. 
For example, a member from a dividend receiving household notes:  
 
“There is too much corruption here because in this village there are two parts, the first 
is the part of the headman and his supporters and the other is the opposition... If you 
talk the truth about what is happening and ask questions at the committee meetings they 
will just take you out. Some of us don't want corruption and those on the headman side 
are corrupt”.  
 
Another member from a different dividend receiving household further commented about the 
character of decision-making and governance:  
 
“When you are the leader of the people you must listen to them but the headmen just 
selects the committee. If the committee changes all the time then people don't get a 
chance to make corruption. But since the beginning they are the same people, for all of 
these years! I was on the side of those people who took the committee to court and we 
are still paying a lawyer for that. If they don't sort out the issue of reelection of this 
committee, we are going to have a problem with the running of this project. That 
lawyer found out that there is some corruption with Mayime”. 
 
Allegiance to the traditional leader, however, appears not to be the only aspect that mediates 
participation in the affairs of the Mayime Cooperative. Whether or not one is a member of the 
Moravian Church was also noted as a key factor, as illustrated by the quote from a dividend 
receiving household below:  
 
“I stopped going because I'm not satisfied about how they handle the meetings- you 
can't say what you think! It was the German missionaries that founded this land and the 
Moravian Church is still here in the village. The coop committee are from that church. 
It is like that church is the ANC in this village and if you are not from that church they 
don’t want to listen to you. The Isibonda (headman) belongs to the Moravian church. 
They have meetings in that church and they announce the committee meetings in the 
church”. 
 
When asked about elections on the Mayime Cooperative, a member of the cooperative (who is 
also the chairperson of the Trust) disregarded them saying that the community was happy with 
the leadership and wanted them to continue:  
 
“Since 2003 we have had the same committee because people say we must continue. 
We are working, because they believe in us. We told people that the term has ended and 
we can reselect and they said they don't want to select a new one because they are 
afraid. We must carry on to rebuild this village”.  
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There was clearly a range of divergent perspectives on this. A member from a dividend 
receiving household and a member of the ‘opposition’ contends:  
 
“The committee has been for over five years and we think they should be reelected for 
five years every time”.  
 
Another member from a dividend and JV wage receiving household emphasised, however, that 
the unhappiness with the way the committee is run can be explained by a failure to attend 
meetings and to be informed about the JV project:  
 
“People who are around the area, some don't like the way the project is being run by 
those who are running it on the committee, so it makes some problems. It makes it hard 
for us to work on the dairy when there is too much politics about the farm. The people 
that have a problem are the ones that don't come to the meetings, those who come to the 
meetings don't have a problem”.  
 
This statement from a dividend receiving household, and others similar to it, seems to 
emphasise that there are indeed households that don’t attend meetings:  
 
“I have no idea how the amount is decided. I don't even know if I'm a member of 
Mayime. I only go to the meetings when the amounts are paid.”  
 
However, clearly the intragroup conflict and politics around the running of Mayime 
Cooperative also explains why some people do not attend the meetings, rather than disinterest. 
In some cases, old age was also a reason why people were not attending, especially where 
younger members of the household were migrant labourers spending little time in their rural 
households. 
 
Decisions regarding how Mayime Cooperative handles profits were particularly unclear. 
According to members of the cooperative committee, the decision on what is distributed as 
dividends and what is saved or reinvested is meant to be decided at a general meeting of the 
Mayime Cooperative. A member of the Mayime Cooperative committee explains:  
 
“We go to a general meeting with this money and report how much we have. We decide 
all of us as the landowners- this little must be kept in bank, and this must go to people. 
We keep some in the bank so we can keep it for doing things as the business grows.”  
 
However, most customary landowners had a very different perspective. They complained about 
not being informed about the total profits allocated to Mayime by the trust and not being party 
to the decisions regarding how much was paid out as dividends.  
 
Another aspect of contention was how the income from the dairy JV and those from the 
vineyard project were distinguished. Amadlelo Agri is not involved with the vineyard 
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project105, which was set up in 2013 by Mayime through grants received from Chris Hani 
Municipality and the Eastern Cape Department of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform. 
The EPWP programme pays for the 17 labourers working on the project and the seasonal 
labour sourced for harvesting and other informal work.  Some landowners feared that their 
dividends from the dairy were being reinvested in the vineyards, without their knowledge or 
approval. For example, a respondent from a dividend receiving household exclaims:  
 
“We are not sure how we benefit from the vineyard. We haven't got anything, they just 
said they take grapes to Cape Town and we are not getting anything from it. I don't 
have information. Maybe they are taking our money from the dairy to invest in the 
grapes. So I don't know where they take the money.”  
 
Another respondent from a dividend receiving household asserted:  
 
“There were no discussions with the landowners over the profit share between grapes 
and dairy. I’m not sure how we will benefit from those grapevines. I don't think the 
landowners will benefit!”  
 
The headman denied these claims and maintained that no profits from the dairy are reinvested 
in the vineyards; however, clearly numerous customary landowners harboured doubts. 
Allegedly, in spite of requests by cooperative members to have the cooperative subjected to an 
audit, this has not occurred. The general discontent around transparency of the cooperative's 
finances, coupled with the failure of the cooperative to hold fresh elections for its committee, 
were described as the key reasons for the formation of the opposition group. The firing of a 
trust member, as described above, also added heat to this conflict, as he had become involved 
in driving the opposition.  
 
In conclusion, untangling the politics at Shiloh is no easy task and there are no clear villains or 
victors. There is only a complex assemblage of different interests, contestations and 
alignments, which in particular seem to mirror class, generational, religious and customary 
identities. Much of these conflicts are linked to contestations over land rights and use, and thus 
a more thorough analysis will be reserved for Chapter 9. Amadlelo Agri asserts that much of 
their energies are focused on dealing with the complexities of community politics to ensure 
buy-in. However, they appear hesitant to tackle face-on the claims of corruption within the 
Mayime Cooperative. Without resolving these tensions and the issue of democratic and 
transparent governance of the cooperative, the long-term viability of the JV is uncertain. 
Moreover the effect, particularly in Shiloh, that politics surrounding the JV is having on 
eroding social cohesion could have potentially violent and explosive effects.   
                                                 
105 The headman noted that, “we want to make a partnership with a white man (Mr V)... We are looking into a joint venture with him. We must 
get a seller for that vineyard. The grapes are for wine... The first harvest we took to Worcester. We want to make our own cellar here to make 
the wine here that is why we take to Cape Town now because we don't have a cellar. We want to build a cellar.” It would be critical that the 
governance challenges plaguing Mayime Cooperative are dealt with before any further investments are undertaken. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
Some of the challenges discussed in this chapter illustrate that the JV model, premised on the 
logic of capitalist farming, faces enormous challenges operating in contexts where social 
reproduction is under immense strain and where rights to and use of land are contested by 
numerous overlapping claims. The very poor governance of the community cooperatives has 
further complicated this and produced numerous tensions. This is particularly the case at 
Shiloh, where claims of corruption and mismanagement regarding the Mayime cooperative 
have resulted in intense intragroup conflict and even violence.  
The JV model is designed to operate according to the imperatives of profit inherent to capitalist 
farming, free from concerns of maintaining social networks. However, this sits uneasily with 
the realities prevalent in the communal areas, in which these JVs are being implemented. These 
tensions are reflected in the emerging conflict over whether all profits should be paid out as 
dividends to customary landowners, or reinvested. The demands placed on the farm to hire 
landowner’s kin and how cooperatives are embroiled in local identity politics, are also rooted 
in the complexities of social reproduction. Therefore, there appears to be an inherent mismatch 
between the logic of the JV model and that of social reproduction engaged in by diverse 
households. This is a conclusion, previously made by other authors, including Manenzhe 
(2016) regarding JV arrangements in Limpopo, and Hornby (2016) regarding the operations of 
CPAs in KwaZulu-Natal. 
This chapter did reveal that one seemingly positive aspect of Amadlelo's sharemilking model is 
its contribution to the transformation of a historically white dairy sector, by mentoring a 
number of highly capable black farm managers. Many have been provided the opportunity to 
accumulate significant herds of dairy cows, which are rented to generate substantial passive 
incomes. Thus the model seems to provide the right conditions to support the emergence of a 
class of black capitalist farmers. However notably, apart from one junior manager at Shiloh, 
none of the latter is from the households of the customary landowners, who are involved 
predominantly as shareholders and workers. 
In spite of the praises that respondents from Amadlelo Agri had for the apparent success of 
their JV model, the chief executive director was willing to acknowledge that the JV model as a 
whole has its limitations, and that it may not be incentivising the creation of a class of 
productive black farmers.  
 
“I don't think that the JV model is mobilizing people to be excited about agriculture, it 
just makes them wait for their dividend. So we are not solving the complacency issue 
we have in South Africa. However, we can't just stand back and say because people 
won't do anything, we won't do anything. We have an attitude and culture in our 
country that is a problem …you need to find people who are already doing something 
and support them. The government’s programme for ‘1 hectare, one cow106’ is just 
                                                 
106 This is the proposed model for Port St Johns 
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going to attract people who want a subsidy. Access to livelihoods has also become 
based on political clout, and this is creating unhealthy political dynamics.” 
 
A definite limitation of the model is that it is centred on agribusiness directing the production 
and management of the JV farms. Apart from imparting skills to the black farm managers, the 
cooperatives are not being sufficiently trained to take over the financial management of their 
farms. This function remains quite centralised under Amadlelo Agri. In essence the JV model 
with its vision of agrarian reform is at risk of equating ‘black emerging farmers’ with a group 
of customary landowners, who are in reality passive recipients of JV dividends and jobs.  
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Chapter 8. Theorising the Political Economy of Sharemilking 
 
“Sharemilking has traditionally been the first step to farm ownership. Sharemilking 
involves operating a farm on behalf of the farm owner for an agreed share of the farm 
receipts (as opposed to a set wage) “ (DairyNZ, 2016). 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter I discuss how the social relations of production involved in sharemilking might 
be theorized. I look at the implications of the adjustments Amadlelo Agri has made to the 
original model and how this affects how we evaluate it, in terms of the relative benefits 
accruing to the customary landowners. I investigate the ‘logic of the model’ from the 
perspective of agribusiness. The incentives to structure production in JVs as ‘sharemilk’ 
arrangements clearly diverge from those documented in the case of New Zealand, where the 
model first emerged.  
 
In New Zealand the motivation for the sharemilker is commonly articulated as enabling 
accumulation of capital, in order to purchase land to farm. Generational dynamics are key to 
the model and older landowners often contract the services of a younger sharemilker. However, 
the incentives inherent in the sharemilking system in South Africa diverge quite radically to 
those in New Zealand. In this Chapter, I attempt to answer the question of how the specific 
social relations of production in sharemilking JVs, and the opportunities and limitations of our 
dairy market provide opportunities for accumulation for agribusiness in the South African 
context. I conclude by offering a framework to theorize the political economy of sharemilking, 
drawing on Patnaik’s (1983) application of Marxist theories of rent to sharecropping. 
8.2 The Origins of Sharemilking and its Social Relations of Production in New 
Zealand 
 
“Sharemilking is an arrangement between a farm owner and a sharemilker, who 
combine their resources (land, labour, capital, and expertise) towards the production of 
milk. The farmer owner’s main contribution is land, whereas sharemilkers most often 
contribute livestock, labour and machinery” (Blunden et al., 1997: 1765). 
 
In the global dairy industry, New Zealand is at the top of the game, in terms of milking 
cheaply. Sharemilking arrangements are a prominent model in New Zealand dairy farming. 
30% of all herds are operated by sharemilkers and the remaining 70% are operated by owner-
operators 107  and contract milkers 108  (DairyNZ, 2016). Sharemilkers have however been 
declining over the years, for example from 35.4% in 2006/07 to just 30% of herds in 2015/16. 
Traditionally, the average size of sharemilking farms was larger than owner-operators, since 
                                                 
107 “Owner operators are farmers who own and operate their own farms, or who employ a manager to operate the farm for a fixed wage” 
(DairyNZ, 2016: 20). 
108 “Contract milkers are contracted to milk a herd at a set price per kilogram of milk solids produced. The rate is set according to the amount 
of farm work done.” (DairyNZ, 2015) The distinction between owner operators and contract milkers is not known in New Zealand and so they 
are combined in official statistics.  
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they needed to generate enough income for both the landowner and the sharemilker. For 
example, in 1997 the average herd size for owner-operators was around 165 cows, whereas for 
sharemilkers it was 200 cows (du Faur, 1997).  
 
The average herd size in New Zealand has been growing over the years, as a response to 
mechanisation and global competition. However, the total number of dairy cows in production 
has declined in the country, indicating concentration of production under a smaller number of 
larger farms. The average herd size, for all types of dairy farmers was 419109 in 2015/16 
(DairyNZ, 2016), which is similar to South Africa at 399. In 2015/16 the average herd size for 
owner-operators was 420 cows and 417 for sharemilkers, showing little difference between the 
two as compared to twenty years previously (DairyNZ, 2016). Changing conditions in the milk 
industry are contributing to the decline of sharemilkers and making it increasingly difficult for 
these types of arrangements to be as profitable as they were in the past (DairyNZ, 2016; 
Pepper, 2013).  
 
The sharefarming model in Scotland, as well as the sharecropping system in the United States 
allegedly influenced the design of early share contracts, which originated around 1884 in New 
Zealand (Pepper, 2013). Many of the first dairy farmers in New Zealand came from Scotland. 
It is believed that a form of sharemilking was practised there in the early nineteenth century, 
which greatly influenced the model in New Zealand (Gardner, 2005). The model originated out 
of ‘generational dynamics’, in the sense that it provided a way for ‘owner-operator’ dairy 
farmers to retire, while young aspiring dairy farmers, without access to a family farm, could 
accumulate the necessary capital and experience to be owner-operators in the future. For 
sharemilkers, the arrangement was seen as a vital step in their dairy career and a pathway to 
accumulation and eventual farm ownership (Pepper, 2013; Gardner, 2011; DairyNZ, 2015; du 
Faur, 1997). As du Faur (1997: 7) notes regarding the purpose that sharemilking plays in New 
Zealand’s dairy industry: 
 
“Sharemilking is a vital cog in our dairy industry, and it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, for young farmers who are not farmers’ sons, to achieve farm ownership 
without the benefit of a few years in this form of occupation. Not only does 
sharemilking provide a spring-board directly to farm ownership, it also enables farm 
owners to semi-retire gracefully.” 
 
The changing nature of the dairy industry in New Zealand has transformed the environment for 
sharemilking. New Zealand’s dairy industry has become increasingly susceptible to 
international competition, financialisation, market volatility, and rising prices of land. The 
creation of future’s markets for dairy has played a pivotal role in changing this landscape 
(Henry and Prince, 2018). As one might imagine, this has meant that larger agribusiness firms 
and cooperatives (which are in practice structured like large firms) are playing a greater role, 
than the characteristic dairy family farms that dominated the dairy sector in the past. As du 
                                                 
109 50% of herds have between 100 and 349 cows, (29%) have 500 or more cows, 12% have 750 or more cows, and 5% have 1,000 cows or 
more (DairyNZ, 2016).  
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Faur (1997: 7) notes below, sharemilking has also become a popular way for agribusiness 
firms,110 with access to land, to organise production: 
 
“[Sharemilking] also provides an effective business partnership form of farm operations 
for estate properties and farms owned by syndicates or the so-called Queen Street 
fraternity”.   
 
Since sharemilkers are considered ‘independent contractors’, many landowners and 
agribusiness firms prefer to hire them. It is a strategy to avoid the hassles of labour laws, which 
bind owner-operator enterprises that hire employees (Gardner, 2005). In New Zealand 
sharemilking has also been used extensively to organise production on Maori111 land (Kingi, 
2008). In this sense the model has been used with a similar goal as in South Africa, in the 
context of land reform and BBBEE deals. 
 
In New Zealand there are two types of sharemilkers, a ‘variable order sharemilker’ and a 
‘50/50 sharemilker’ (also referred to as a ‘herd owning sharemilker’). Historically, aspiring 
dairy farmers, without access to land or capital, might begin their career as a variable order 
sharemilker’, and then graduate to a ‘50/50 sharemilker’ (Pepper, 2013; Gardner, 2005). A 
‘variable order sharemilker’ doesn’t own a herd, and is protected by the Sharemilkers 
Agreement Act, 1937, which is aimed at safeguarding the sharemilker from exploitation by the 
landowner. This illustrates that the labour government, at the time, considered this type of 
sharemiker to be a labourer warranting state protection (Gardner, 2011; Pepper, 2013).  
 
Variable order sharemilkers remain protected by state legislation today, through the updated 
Sharemilking Agreements Order 2011. It stipulates in detail the terms and conditions of 
sharemilking agreements where the farm owner provides the herd (New Zealand Government, 
2011; DairyNZ, 2016). However, the updated legislation notes:  
 
“The relationship of the parties to this Agreement is that of farm owner and 
independent contractor and is not that of employer and employee, nor that of a 
partnership” (New Zealand Government, 2011: 6).  
 
Some commentators believe this to be a move by the liberal government to avoid labour 
disputes, as mentioned above. Labour disputes can no longer be settled through the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 (Gardner, 2005; NZ Herald, 2001). For both variable order 
sharemilkers and 50/50 sharemilkers, it is the Contractual Remedies Act and Case law that now 
covers breaches of contract (Pepper, 2013).  
 
                                                 
110 For example, in the South Island of New Zealand a large agribusiness firm, Tasman Agriculture Ltd for example, bought up around 78 dairy 
farms in South Island as well as 23 in Tasmania in Australia, which were all operated by sharemilkers110. The company “was the largest 
pastoral based dairy farming company in the world”, until in 2002 it sold all of its properties and was incorporated into Fonterra, which is a 
cooperative owned by 10, 000 supplying dairy farmers and is presently the world’s largest dairy exporter110. “The introduction of the Dairy 
Industry Restructuring Act 2001 opened the way for New Zealand’s largest dairy companies, Kiwi Co-operative Dairy Company (Kiwi) and 
New Zealand Dairy Group (NZDG) to merge with the Dairy Board to form Fonterra” (DairyNZ, 2016). 
111 The Maori are the indigenous Polynesian people who are believed to have arrived in New Zealand between 1250 and 1300. 
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“A number of principles have changed over time. One of these is that sharemilkers are 
independent contractors, not employees… Owners are not required to provide paid 
holidays for sharemilkers, nor do they face the risk of a “personal grievance claim” for 
“unjustified dismissal”. The relationship between the employer and employee is a 
contractual one; a dispute between them is seen as a possible breach of contract and is 
resolved by mediation or arbitration. Although the issue could go to litigation this is 
very expensive and no sharemilking disputes have been resolved in the Courts since 
1967” (Gardner, 2005: 130). 
 
A standard “50/50 Sharemilking Agreement” has also been designed for arrangements where 
the sharemilker provides the cows. This was designed by dairy companies and cooperatives112 
and is thus not a piece of state legislation, like the former is. It is, however, widely adopted as 
the norm for 50/50 sharemilking contracts and is a legally binding document (du Faur, 1997). 
This is a key difference with the South African context, where there is no framework by which 
to monitor the agreements. Changes might be made to contracts, which are not in the interest of 
either the landowners or the sharemilker. It was for this reason that the agribusiness partner 
Grasslands Agriculture decided to adopt New Zealand's 50/50 sharemilking contract, exactly 
as designed, for Schoonfontein land reform farm. 
 
Under variable order sharemilking agreements the landowner supplies the dairy herd, and the 
contract stipulates maximum and minimum herd sizes. The sharemilker receives a share of the 
profits, which can vary between 21% and 50% (New Zealand Government, 2011; Gardner, 
2011; Pepper, 2013). The majority of variable order sharemilkers, however, receive between 21 
and 29% of the milk income (DairyNZ, 2016). The share of income depends on the herd size. 
Variable order sharemilkers, milking larger herds, tend to get lower proportions of the profits. 
All costs involved in employing labour are the sharemilkers responsibility. However, the 
contractual relationship may stipulate that the landowner can also be involved in decision-
making. The landowner provides more inputs in variable order arrangements, including all 
necessary infrastructures. For many people (or families) who take on these sharemilking 
contracts, this might be their first position as independent contractors, having previously been 
farm labourers (Gardner, 2011; Pepper, 2013).  
 
 ‘50/50 sharemilking’ or ‘herd owning sharemilking’ is the model that has been adapted by 
Amadlelo Agri. The sharemilker owns the dairy herd, and is responsible for all stock related 
expenses, milk-harvesting expenses, and the costs related to labour for milking and farm 
maintenance. The landowner provides the milking plant, which is a fixed asset to the land and 
is "responsible for expenses related to maintaining the property" (NZDairy, 2016: 20). These 
arrangements usually entail longer contracts, around three years, because of the substantial 
amount of capital investment required by the sharemilker. Whereas, variable order 
sharemilkers might enter into contracts as short as one year. Although the capital outlay is 
larger for the 50/50 sharemilker, the opportunity to make profits and accumulate assets is also 
much greater. 50/50 sharemilkers receive 50% of the milk income113, 100% of the income from 
                                                 
112 This included NZ Dairy Group of Companies, NZ Society of Farm Management, Waikato Valley Co-op Dairies, Livestock Improvement 
Corporation, Federated Farmers of New Zealand and Waikato sharemilking conciliators (du Faur, 1997). 
113 While the percentage of milk sales is commonly 50%, it can differ depending on the contract and range from 45% to 55% (DairyNZ, 2016). 
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the sale of cull cows and bulls, 50% of the income from the sales of bobby calves114 (Dairy 
NZ, 2016; Pepper, 2013; Gardner, 2011; du Faur, 1997).  
 
In New Zealand 56% of all sharemilkers are 50/50 sharemilkers (NZDairy, 2016). However, in 
an earlier publication, du Faur (1997) noted that in 1997 around 2000 farms were operated by 
50/50 sharemilkers (83%) and only 400 by variable order sharemilkers. This illustrates a 
drastic decline over the last twenty years. Pepper (2013) notes that the career path that 50/50 
agreements previously provided for eventual farm ownership has been eroded over the years by 
changing conditions in the political economy of dairy. Pepper (2013:10) particularly notes the 
growing sizes of profitable farms, which has increased competition. This makes it hard for new 
sharemilkers to accumulate the assets required to own their own farms. This has been 
exacerbated by the widening “gap between land values and cow values”, with the price of land 
having risen steeply. A key informant I interviewed mentioned this same point: 
 
“The escalation of land prices in New Zealand has skewed the return of investment. 
The price of land is so much higher now so the landowner’s return on investment is 
lower than the sharemilkers. So the sharemilker gets 15% return and the farmer only 
gets 5%. In South Africa we have a similar situation, dairy land prices are going 
through the roof and the price of cows is remaining stagnant115 “ 
 
 In this changing context, many landowners no longer find it profitable to contract the services 
of a 50/50 sharemilker and prefer to hire variable order sharemilkers, contract milkers or farm 
managers (Pepper, 2013). This dynamic is also noted in the following statement:  
 
“Recently there has been a tendency for farm owners to put on lower order 
sharemilkers, which helped shrink the number of more lucrative 50:50 jobs. Other 
industry commentators have reported a few farmers replacing farm managers' jobs with 
petty percentage sharemilking contracts, apparently in an effort to escape their 
responsibilities in occupational health and safety, employment contracts and ACC, 
because sharemilkers were deemed to be self-employed” (NZ Herald, 2001). 
 
8.3 Amadlelo Agri’s Revisions to the 50/50 Sharemilking Contract: Evaluation of the 
Benefits and Return on Investment for Landowners  
 
Amadlelo Agri adapted New Zealand’s 50/50 sharemilking model and in their view simplified 
it. The founders of Amadlelo Agri had been experimenting with the sharemilking model for at 
least 15 years as consultants with white commercial farmers, before implementing the model in 
the communal areas of the former 'homelands'. The model allegedly operates no differently in a 
communal area setting, a part from the different social dynamics involved in dealing with a 
‘community’ and government, versus a single commercial farmer. However, there are clearly 
                                                 
114 These are newborn calves less than 30 days old and separated from their mothers (milking/lactating cows). Most bobby calves are ‘surplus’ 
to the dairy enterprise, as most are not required for the milking herd. Heifers (female calves) may be reintroduced to the herd, depending on 
agreements with the landowner on stocking rates, while male calves will be sold or slaughtered. 
115 This statement would support the fact that the various value of the land as opposed to the cows and movable assets, makes it unfair that an 
agribusiness partner should receive 50% of the profits where the value of the land is much higher. This appears to be a poor return on 
investment for the landowners in Amadlelo Agri’s JVs from this perspective. 
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some fundamental and important differences between the model as envisioned in New Zealand 
and Amadlelo’s revised version of it. These differences have implications for our evaluation of 
the ‘fairness’ of the model, from the viewpoint of the beneficiary communities.  
 
In the Amadlelo Agri model the costs of replacing assets or of further capital investment 
remain separate, like in New Zealand. For example, if capital development is required, like 
new centre-pivot irrigation, the landowner (through government) must pay for this, and if more 
cows are required or a new tractor then Amadlelo must fund these expenses. However, unlike 
in New Zealand where costs of maintaining assets are strictly separated, at the Amadlelo farms 
all the operating and maintenance costs are paid for by the JV farm operating trust, on a joint 
account. For example, this includes repairs to the tractor or irrigation pivots, along with the 
costs of fertilizer, rubber ware and feed for cows etc. A farm manager from the 
Keiskammahoek farm explains the separation between the investment and operations accounts 
of the farm as follows: 
 
“In New Zealand one guy owns the land and one guy owns the movable assets, so it's 
just two people and it’s easier. But here we need to deal with too many people owning 
the fixed assets. We maintain the fixed and movable assets on a joint account- the 
operations account. For example, you can't hold Amadlelo accountable if a tractor 
breaks. Only when it is time to buy a new one, Amadlelo must pay. There is no 
slowness around this account because it is based on the farm manager’s decision. It's 
the investment account that is slow. Expenditure has to be approved with the 
landowners in a trust meeting. But now they are starting to see progress and profits in 
the business and it’s no longer so hard. In a set up with more beneficiaries it’s harder to 
get them on your side, because there is no money, so they can't see the long term plan. 
If you spend money they want it back in 6 months, it’s too long for them to wait.” 
 
The logic behind sharing the operating and maintenance costs, in the view of Amadlelo Agri, is 
that it is easier to manage and to act quickly in a farming environment rather than fighting over 
whom should bear the costs. It may be true that one can’t expect that dealing with a single 
landowner116 in New Zealand, is the same as dealing with what are generally poorly governed 
cooperatives that represent numerous households (395 in Shiloh and 35 in Keiskammahoek). 
Given the demand among members of these cooperatives to pay out all income as dividends, 
there certainly would be some risk in following the New Zealand model, as is, whereby the 
landowners are responsible for the maintenance of their fixed assets. However, as discussed 
below, there are examples where the New Zealand 50/50 sharemilking model is being 
implemented in land reform contexts in South Africa, allegedly without problems.  
 
As discussed above, the New Zealand 50/50 sharemilking model delineates much more 
carefully between the landowner costs and the sharemilkers costs in the dairy farming 
operation. For example, regarding the irrigation and water supply, the 50/50 sharemilking 
agreement states: 
                                                 
116 This is generally the case in New Zealand, unless the land is owned by an agribusiness firm, which is generally well organised in any case 
and thus sharemilking contracts would still be easy to administer. 
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“THE OWNER shall provide for the land at the owner’s expense a continuous and 
adequate supply of water for the stock, cowshed and domestic purposes including all 
necessary motors, pumps and piping and troughs. THE SHAREMILKER shall pay for 
all fuel, electric power, belting and oil used therein. The cost of power for pumping 
water to stock and sheds and for household purposes shall be borne and paid for by the 
SHAREMILKER” (50/50 Sharemilking Agreement in du Faur, 1997: 53, emphasis 
added). 
 
The quote regarding costs related to irrigation, illustrates that there is careful separation of the 
capital costs (e.g. those entailed in maintaining the irrigation infrastructure) and those entailed 
in the use of that infrastructure, such as the cost of power, which is a cost that the sharemilker 
should pay. Keiskammahoek has gravity irrigation, and thus there are no power charges. At 
Shiloh, there are plans to change to gravity irrigation but government currently pays the price 
of pumping the water. Thus Amadlelo Agri is also saving on this front, because they are 
exempt from paying the costs that a sharemilker would traditionally need to.  
 
In New Zealand, the sharemilker is responsible for all costs related to the ‘cowshed operating 
expenses’. This includes the “power charges, lubricating oil and supply of brushes, buckets, 
brooms and pump belting” (in du Faur, 1997: 63). The sharemilker is also responsible for 
certain maintenance costs involved in the upkeep of the landowner’s fixed assets, which may 
experience ‘wear and tear’, for example:  
 
"[The sharemilker] must supply, at his own cost, and install new claw tubes, inflations, 
milk rubbers and all other rubber ware at the commencement of and during the terms of 
the agreement… [And] must supply and maintain hose and nozzle for washing down 
plant” (ibid). 
 
In the New Zealand 50/50 model, although the owner is responsible for the ‘material’ costs 
involved in maintaining the property, the sharemilker usually undertakes the labour involved in 
maintaining the property. For example, as stated in the contract, the sharemilker “is responsible 
for all general farm and maintenance work, but owner must provide materials” (in Faur, 1997: 
63). The sharemilker is also responsible for all the costs related to hiring of labour, whereas in 
Amadlelo Agri’s model the workers and farm managers are employed and paid by the JV farm 
trusts.  
 
In the standard “50/50 Sharemilking Agreement” in New Zealand, it states: “the relationship of 
the parties shall be deemed to be that of employer and independent contractor” (in du Faur, 
1997: 47). This is clearly different to Amadlelo Agri’s arrangements where the two parties are 
deemed to be ‘partners’ who share equity of the farm operating company. They are also 
‘partners’ in the sense that they jointly share the operating and maintenance costs of the 
farming operation. In Amadlelo Agri's model the parties share in the profits, unlike in New 
Zealand where it is milk income that is shared.  
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 173 
A key respondent from Grasslands Agriculture, who is using the New Zealand model at their 
Schoonfontein farm, noted that the very idea of sharemilking being a ‘joint venture’, entailing 
‘shared risk’, goes contrary to how the 50/50 sharemilking model was designed to ensure that 
neither party need bare the risk of the other. Grasslands Agriculture asserted that the benefit of 
New Zealand's 50/50 sharemilking model, is that the parties are not liable to bail each other out 
in a crisis, as they are not ‘partners’ per say.  
 
The key question is what impact these modifications to the ‘tried and tested’ New Zealand 
50/50 sharemilking model have on the benefits deriving to the beneficiary communities, and 
the distribution of benefits and risks between them and Amadlelo Agri? A key informant from 
Grasslands Agriculture firmly asserted that they believe the New Zealand model is "fairer for 
the landowners".  In spite of Amadlelo Agri’s concern about the practicality of maintaining the 
assets of the various parties, the key informant from Grasslands Agriculture noted: “We 
haven’t found it difficult to maintain assets separately”. In the quote below he explains that 
sharing the milk income (as opposed to Amadlelo Agri’s sharing profits) provides a much 
better return on investment for the landowners, and is thus more suitable for use with land 
reform beneficiaries. 
 
“ Amadlelo calls their model sharemilking but it’s essentially not, they just split the 
profits… If you share the milk income 50/50 and not the profit, the end result is that the 
landowner ends up with about 60% of the profit and the sharemilker with 40%, because 
you need an equitable share of investment. You can’t say the land costs 10 million and 
the cows 5 million but you get the same amount, that’s not fair ... I don’t agree with 
sharing maintenance costs. Then the landowner has no say in the matter… If you had 
that in New Zealand they would be in court all the time. So over 120 years there, they 
have eliminated all the areas of possible disagreement. The reason why we use the New 
Zealand model exactly as it is, is because it’s been experimented with for 120 years and 
it’s a recognised formula… It is more profitable for the sharemilker to share the profit 
versus the milk income. It’s a better return on investment for the sharemillker, which is 
why they may have chosen it”. 
 
Table 12 below compares the scale of production and benefits to landowners across three 
Amadlelo Agri sharemilking farms and Grasslands Agriculture’s Schoonfontein sharemilking 
farm, demonstrates that the latter distributes the largest dividends to the landowners. 
Grasslands Agriculture’s 50/50 Schoonfontein sharemilking farm involves 49 land reform 
beneficiaries117, much less than Shiloh but more than Keiskammahoek. A key informant from 
Grasslands Agriculture stressed that they would not set up sharemilking schemes with larger 
beneficiary groups: “we would have to expand otherwise you just dilute the benefits for 
existing beneficiaries”. Therefore, clearly the size of the beneficiary group is a crucial factor to 
consider in ensuring adequate benefits for landowning households.  
                                                 
117 These beneficiaries are farmworkers from Grassland Agriculture’s other commercial dairy farms, along with previous labourers (employed 
for two years or longer) that had worked on the former farm, which was acquired through an LRAD grant. The 425 hectare farm was 
previously run as a dairy farm and was sold by a farmer who immigrated to Australia. Government investment (including LRAD grant and 
CASP grant for the milking shed) covered 35% of the investment and the remaining investment was a commercial loan from Standard Bank. 
The commercial loans were paid off within three years of operating. 
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Table 12. Comparative Analysis of Sharemilking Case Studies: Scale of Production and Benefits 
to Landowners 
 
 
However, if we compare the total benefits being paid out to landowners at the Shiloh farm and 
those at Schoonfontein, which are operating at a similar scale of production, clearly the latter is 
receiving far greater benefits (total dividends and land use fees are 6.6 times greater).  This is 
the case even though Shiloh’s fixed assets were funded entirely by ReCap grants, whereas 
government only covered 35% of the costs for fixed assets at Schoonfontein, according to 
Grasslands Agriculture. If we compare Schoonfontein and Keiskammahoek, the latter is 
milking 2000 cows and has 35 landowners, and the former with 1000 cows and 49 landowners. 
In spite of the fact that Keiskammahoek’s scale of production is double that of Schoonfontein’s 
and there are less beneficiary landowners, the latter is still producing superior benefits for the 
landowners. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Middledrift received no funding from 
government and its fixed assets were established through a loan from the Industrial 
Development Corporation. Key informants from Amadlelo Agri noted that it is unlikely to 
generate dividends for landowners for another 10 years.  
 
This financial analysis of the benefits deriving from Amadlelo Agri’s 50/50 sharemilking 
model, as opposed to Grassland’s model using the New Zealand 50/50 share contract, is 
however somewhat incomplete and imprecise. Firstly, all my financial data is based on key 
informant interviews with Grassland’s Agriculture and key informant interviews and a 
household survey at Amadlelo Agri’s JV farms. I was not able to obtain financial records from 
any of these farms to triangulate this data. Importantly, the analysis also doesn’t consider the 
time that the relative farms have been operating. Key informants noted that it takes a few years 
for a dairy farm to be operating optimally. A key informant from Amadlelo Agri noted, for 
example: “It takes three to four years to settle a dairy farm down”.  
 
Another sharemilker I interviewed, who is using the ‘50/50 share of profit’ model on white 
owned dairy farms noted: “In five years I know that I could get my capital investment back. I 
bought my herd in year one and by the time the agreement was over, we were sitting with a 
                                                 
118 This includes farm managers and junior managers who are paid salaries rather than a share of the profits 
119 See Chapter 11 for more detail. I could not get a reliable account of the dividends and land use fees paid at Shiloh. However this total 
amount is based on information received from the Chairperson Mayime Cooperative that the farm paid out R192, 000 in land rents for ¼ 
hectare food plots and distributed R986, 000 in dividends. 
Name of Farm Year 
established 
Hectares 
of land 
Number of 
cows 
milked 
Number of 
workers 
employed
118 
Number of 
beneficiaries 
/ landowners 
Mean 
dividends 
per 
household 
in 2015/16 
Land use 
fees paid to 
landowners 
per year (if 
relevant) 
Total 
dividends & 
land use fees 
paid to 
landowners 
in 2015/16 
Middledrift Dairy 2009  150  700 15 65 R0 R1200 R78, 000 
Shiloh Dairies 
Trust 
2011  450 900 27 395  R2096 R600 R1, 178 
000119 
Keiskammahoek 
Seven Stars Trust 
2010 750 2000 50 35 R110, 000 NA R3, 850 000 
Schoonfontein 
Dairy 
2004 425 1000 17 49 R160, 000 NA R7, 840 000 
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debt free herd”. Schoonfontein’s advantage is clearly the longer period of operation. 
Schoonfontein had been operating for 12 years by 2016, as opposed to only 6 years at 
Keiskammahoek and 5 years at Shiloh120. However, the latter two farms have an advantage 
over Schoonfontein because they received 100% of the costs of their fixed assets from 
government ReCap grants. 
 
The other key factor to consider is clearly the contexts. Amadlelo Agri’s farms are located in 
the former homelands with differing land tenure systems, local politics and agro-ecological 
conditions to the Schoonfontein farm, which is located on private land in well-situated 
Humansdorp in the Eastern Cape. At Amadlelo Agri’s farms, because of the high demand for 
jobs in the area and the need for the farm to legitimize its use of ‘communal land’, they employ 
more labourers than a regular commercial dairy farm would. Keiskammahoek employs one 
worker for every 40 cows, at Shiloh one worker for every 35 cows, while at Schoonfontein the 
ratio is one worker for every 58 cows121. Therefore clearly Schoonfontein also saves on labour 
costs. Although Amadlelo’s farms have less labour productivity and pay out less in dividends, 
they are creating more crucially needed jobs. However, given the competitive and highly 
concentrated dairy industry in South Africa, there are questions around the long-term 
feasibility of this from the logic of capital.  
 
In conclusion, a more in depth analysis would be needed to conclusively compare the benefits 
of each model for the landowners, and how contextual factors influence this. However, my 
crude financial analysis above, along with the comments from key informants and findings 
from documented research outlined above, all point to the initial conclusion that the New 
Zealand model may offer greater benefits for landowners122.  
8.4 Incentives of Sharemilking Joint Ventures: Logic of the Model from the 
Perspective of Agribusiness 
 
The way in which agrarian capital chooses to organise production is no accident. It tells one 
something about how capital is responding to the particular pressures inherent to a commodity 
market and the wider political economy. Capital must organise in ways that are profitable if it 
is to survive. In South Africa, the sharemilking model cannot be explained as a pathway to 
eventual farm ownership, as is commonly explained in New Zealand (Pepper, 2013; Gardner, 
2011; DairyNZ, 2015).  
 
My research reveals, that in sum, sharemilking in the South African context is a means by 
which to avoid tying capital up in costly fixed assets and land, as these are instead provided 
through government grants and communal land. This allows agribusiness to free up capital to 
                                                 
120 Although both these Amadlelo Agri farms are within the period of 3-5 years of operation, noted by most key respondents as a reasonable 
period to ‘settle a dairy farm down’. 
121 When you look at sharemilkers operating white commercial farms in the Eastern Cape, the ratio is even less. On three different farms 
operated by the same sharemilker I found a mean ratio of 1 worker for every 62 cows with the sharemilker rotating labourers across nearby 
farms to save on labour costs. All of these farms had rotary dairy parlours except for one using a herringbone system, generally requiring more 
labour to milk, so variations in the factors and means of production are unlikely explanations for such radically different employment of 
labour. As one indication one white commercial farm under a sharmilking agreement was milking 800 cows, 320 has with a rotary dairy 
parlour milking 54 cows at a time (very similar conditions to Shiloh) but only hiring 13 people which is half the amount of labourers at Shiloh.       
122 If sharemilking is to remain a key model in South Africa’s land reform, it is suggested that an in depth comparison is conducted of the 
relative benefits of Amadlelo Agri’s sharemilking model as opposed to Grassland Agriculture’s model. 
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rather accumulate large herds of valuable dairy cows. Amadlelo Agri benefits from a 10% 
management fee and 50% of the remaining profits, while investing far less capital in movable 
assets as compared to the value of the land, irrigation infrastructure and milking parlour. The 
model is thus a good return on investment for the sharemilker. Other incentives include: access 
to scarce irrigated pastures (which provide a differential rent as discussed below), increasing 
political creditability within the context of land reform, and the opportunities for investment in 
other parts of the dairy value chain, which arise from sharemilking ‘empowerment deals’. 
 
In many cases ‘main-stream economic logic’ states that strategic partners prefer to invest 
where there is private title. Besides difficulty in accessing credit, the main explanation for this 
is that tenure insecurity doesn’t provide adequate insurance on investments, especially for 
crops that require long-term investments e.g. tree crops (Bitzer, V & Bijman, J., 2014; Derman 
et al., 2006). For dairy, this restriction can be more easily overcome because of the nature of 
the commodity being produced, which involves twice-daily milking. If government invests in 
the fixed assets, as they have in a number of Amadlelo’s farms, risk is reduced for 
agribusiness, which can easily withdraw their cows or movable assets. The nature of dairy, as a 
commodity, provides a lot more manoeuvrability for agribusiness, as compared to say 
Macadamia where nuts can only be harvested after six years, or pineapples after two years. 
However, in some cases these investments go forward in spite of the perceived risks, since 
these crops involve far higher profit margins than milk does, with its low and unstable producer 
prices. To make dairy investments profitable, additional investments must be sought in the 
extended value-chain.  
 
Another declared disincentive to invest on communal land is that it creates complications for 
the JV business in terms of loan funding. For initial capital investment this conundrum can be 
easily overcome if government invests in the fixed assets for dairy farms, as was the case for 
Keiskammahoek and Shiloh. However, these grants seldom cover operating costs and once the 
five years of support runs out, if the farm wants to expand this may require taking out loans 
from financial institutions, which are generally hesitant to loan money without title deeds. 
Even in circumstances where landowners have tenure security, for example at Middledrift, 
there still remains the challenge of accessing loan funding at affordable interest rates. A key 
informant from Amadlelo Agri explains some of the dynamics involved:  
 
“The problem we have with all the projects in communal environment is infrastructure 
money, the land ownership or tenure model is such that there is no security on taking 
my money and putting milking infrastructure on someone else’s land. In Middledrift, it 
was possible because the community not government owns the land. But bar all the 
others, except Keiskammahoek where some land is owned, who is going to lend you 
money? Which bank would do it where there is no security of tenure?  
 
However title doesn’t solve the problem, the problem is money at the right price first. 
Title helps, but we borrowed money at Middledrift, but not at a good price… To set up 
these dairy farms a component of the infrastructure would have to be grant funding or 
a soft loan, there would have to be an element of subsidy somewhere in the system. 
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However, for operating capital you need funds to help you, for example, to survive 
through winter while your milk production is down. You can’t get those facilities with 
communal land because you can’t give the bank a tangible asset. So the only way we 
could possibly get small facilities is against our milk check. They may lend us R500, 
000 and then if we can’t pay them back, they take the milk cheque back”.  
 
If the discourse around strong disincentives to investing on communal land is so pervasive, 
then how do we explain the proliferation of investments in the former homelands? What is 
incentivising agribusiness to enter into JVs, if communal tenure or lack of clear property rights 
inhibits the ability to raise funds for example?  
Goodwill and political pragmatism 
 
A strong discourse on the part of Amadlelo Agri is the desire to actively participate in agrarian 
transformation, poverty alleviation and black economic empowerment, as this quote from a key 
respondent indicates: 
 
“For Amadlelo to do business in a communal areas is a hot issue, there is no logic for it 
from a business point of view. From a social perspective, entrepreneurship, 
empowerment perspective-yes! But those are not things that carry a rand value. In fact 
they carry a negative rand value. The motivation is to do something for unemployment 
in the Eastern Cape and utilise assets that are just lying there deteriorating. To protect 
them and do proper conservation farming on them”. 
 
To be fair, one should not rule out altogether that agribusiness may in part be motivated by 
‘goodwill’. Primary research and interviews with an array of key informants does support the 
notion that there is indeed a great deal of ‘goodwill’ at work on these farms, whether or not one 
agrees with the underlying logic of the model. However, there are also incentives from a profit 
perspective in investing in communal areas, some of which were expressed by management at 
Amadlelo Agri. Joint ventures are also driven by a sense of political pragmatism. They are 
white agrarian capital’s strategy for surviving within a changing political environment, within 
the context of land reform.  
Labour disciplining strategies 
 
The specific social relations of production on these farms, in various ways seem to have a 
disciplining effect on labour. This is especially the case in the context of sharemilking 
arrangements where the landowning shareholders are simultaneously in the class position of 
labour on the farm they own, or have household members and/or extended networks of kin who 
are workers. There are three main ways in which I have seen the disciplining effects of labour 
on these farms.  
 
Firstly, in many cases the presence of landowners among other labourers in the workforce 
seems to have an overall disciplining effect in the work environment, since the former is 
invested in the outcomes of their work through their share in profits. These landowning 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 178 
workers are less likely to make demands on management, strike or undermine production in 
other ways. The quote below from a manager at Amadlelo Agri illustrates this point. However, 
it also indicates that they have not always managed to retain landowners and their relatives in 
the workforce. In some cases, this reflected the class position of these households. Along with 
their dividends, households tended to have access to alternative income sources that rendered a 
demanding job on the dairy farm unnecessary.  
 
“At Keiskammahoek we find the children that are not of the farmers are the ones that 
stick around… the farmers children come and go. We want it to be the opposite way ... 
It takes us out of labour strikes etc.” 
 
Secondly, in some cases the agribusiness partner/ sharemilker may also have given workers 
shares in their holding company. These workers are not employed on the JV dairy farms but 
are employed in processing factories or on the farms of shareholders. This is the case in this 
model where the 50 white commercial farmers from Amadlelo Milk Producers have given 500 
workers from their farms a 15.1% share in the Amadlelo Agri firm. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
there is a tendency under contemporary capitalism towards giving workers equity shares in a 
discourse of ‘empowerment’ but which in reality has a labour ‘disciplining’ effect (Minn, 
1996).  
 
Apart from the fact that sharing equity in firms is a requirement of BBBEE policies in South 
Africa, these types of arrangements also have the effect of obscuring class positions. This is 
clear when one looks at the shareholders of Amadlelo Agri. Who is capital and who is labour? 
We can’t plainly claim that it is white agrarian capital exploiting labour or exploiting black 
customary landowners, which are the ‘beneficiaries’ in these JV deals. Black farm workers and 
black empowerment partners like Vuwa Investments are also shareholders of Amadlelo Agri. 
Intended or not, these arrangements make disentangling fundamental class relations and class 
exploitation very murky and haphazard.  
 
Lastly, at Grassland Agriculture’s Schoonfontein Farm, the landowners’ right to benefit from 
the income generated from the sharemilking arrangement is made conditional on their 
continued employment on Grassland Agriculture’s other dairy farms. In this case, they remain 
beneficiaries if they retire but not if they leave employment willingly or by dismissal. Their 
position as a landowner and membership on the farm operating trust is thus made conditional 
on their continued commitment as a worker. This seems to be, at least in part, motivated by the 
intension to ensure a stable and disciplined labour force.  
Investing in movable assets is more profitable and less risky 
 
“Amadlelo owns the cows, so if we stop tomorrow I could take my cows and go.”  
(Respondent from Amadlelo Agri) 
 
Investing in movable assets in the production process and in other parts of the value chain is 
believed to be both more profitable and less risky. As the quote above illustrates, it allows for 
more freedom in moving capital if farming ventures turn out to be unprofitable. Because of the 
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active rental market for dairy cows, these cows could easily be rented to other commercial 
farms. The analysis above indicates that the capital investment in movable assets was far less 
than that made by government in fixed assets. This also frees up capital to be invested in other 
parts of the value chain that can reap higher rates of profit. Amadlelo Agri, for example, has 
invested in processing, through COEGA Dairy.  
 
As discussed above, accumulating cattle is a profitable investment and the rental market is 
allowing Amadlelo to grow its dairy herd on the JV farms. Amadlelo Agri plans to try and buy 
the full herd at Keiskammahoek and Shiloh, where they own 100% of the Keiskamma and 
Shiloh Livestock companies. For Amadlelo Agri, a key motivation in accumulating dairy cows 
is the tax benefits. If they continue to invest profits in purchasing dairy cows, they avoid the 
burden of taxes. If they can get to the stage that they accumulate sufficient surplus of dairy 
cows, they can actually lease their dairy herd out, which amounts to a 2% return on investment 
above the prime lending rate (Du Preez, 2011). Within the current volatile and unpredictable 
environment regarding land reform, the strategy of investing in movable assets is a pragmatic 
alternative for agribusiness. 
 
Differential rent from specific conditions of land 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, pasture based systems in the milder coastal regions of the country 
have become crucial to farming competitively in the dairy industry. Access to scarce irrigation, 
particularly gravity irrigation where one doesn’t have to pay the price of pumping water 
increases profit margins. Keiskammahoek has gravity irrigation123 and at Shiloh there are plans 
to change to gravity irrigation, but government currently pays the price of pumping the water. 
The following comment by a key informant from Amadlelo Agri is illustrative:  
 
“Don’t underestimate the competitive advantage of gravity irrigation! To give you a 
simple story, the top 25% of dairy farmer currently would make R20 to 25, 000 per 
hectare, but pumping is R5000 per ha. So immediately we have a R5000 advantage 
because we don’t have to pump. On a 200ha farm that’s a million rand we don’t have to 
spend on pumping”124.  
 
A differential rent is accrued, in contexts where differing soil fertility and varying applications 
of capital allow individual capitals with access to superior soil or water sources, for example, 
to produce at lower prices than the ‘socially necessary price of production’ and therefore 
generate a surplus profit. The price of production in agriculture is determined by the average 
socially necessary conditions of production. Therefore, those with access to above average 
conditions will make surplus profit, above the average rate of profit. Landed property would, 
however, usually intervene to appropriate this surplus profit as a differential rent (Patnaik, 
1983). In other words, higher rents are usually paid for more fertile land. However, in the 
                                                 
123 This means that there are no electricity costs. Water comes from a high water source under pressure on its own without 
having to incur an energy cost. 
124 However, the manager at Amadlelo goes on to qualify that, “Empowering people takes a lot of time and effort that the average competitive 
commercial farmer, fully established, passed down from father to son don’t have to invest in… so they have a massive leap on us”. 
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sharemilking model this doesn’t happen because ‘the land’ is the landowners’ contribution to 
the business.   
 
The 50% of profits (after deduction of the 10% management fee), that the landowners receive, 
can be conceptualised as a rent. However, the differential rent from the soil quality and ‘free’ 
irrigation accrues to all the shareholders, including the sharemilker (agribusiness partner). In 
other forms of tenure, like a fixed rent, this surplus would instead be directed, more or less in 
its entirety, to landed property through a differential rent. In New Zealand, the strict separation 
of assets, sharing of the milk cheque rather than the profits, and the various types of share 
contracts (sharing different proportions of milk income in line with capital contributions) aims 
to ensure a fair return on capital investments. In Amadlelo Agri’s model, however, the 
sharemilker also benefits from the differential rent because of how they share in the profits 
from the JV business. The rent that they pay to landed property can in essence be seen as a 
form of absolute ground rent (discussed below).  
 
The low rents that are paid to landowners in sharemilking agreements in South Africa can 
possibly be explained by the relative weakness of landed property in its class relation with 
agrarian capital. This relationship is further enforced by the state, which mediates these 
agreements. This cannot be explained by ‘communal tenure’, since the majority of 
Keiskammahoek’s landowners have private titles, and the share contract is structured in the 
same way in Shiloh where landowners have communal tenure rights.  
Accessing capital intensive dairy production and vertical integration of the value-chain 
 
Entering into JVs facilitates access to government funding (for fixed-assets), allowing 
agribusiness to access a highly capital-intensive stream of agriculture. Without government 
investment it might be impossible to enter the dairy value chain and compete effectively. The 
fact that it took R66 million worth of government investment in fixed assets to set up 
Keiskammahoek farm, is evidence of the immense costs involved in setting up a profitable 
dairy farm (Whytske Chamerlain, 2015).  
 
The potential political credibility gained in supporting black emerging farmers through JVs, 
also opens up opportunities for investment and access to funding in other parts of the value 
chain. This is demonstrated by Amadlelo Agri’s investment in COEGA Dairy through the JV 
farms. The low and volatile producer milk price in South Africa is a key motivation for 
agribusiness to find other ways to improve profitability. Increasing vertical integration of the 
dairy value chain enables firms to capture value at different points in the chain, and to disperse 
risks. Respondents from Amadlelo Agri also mentioned the incentive of markets that are 
becoming increasingly interested in sourcing products from black emerging farms at a 
premium. Amadlelo Agri already managed to secure a lucrative contract with Famous Brands, 
whose cheese is made exclusively from milk procured from its JV farms. 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 181 
8.5 Theorizing the Political Economy of Sharemilking Joint Ventures 
 
Given the extensive use of sharemilking in New Zealand, there is surprisingly very little 
literature that theorises the political economy of sharemilking (Blunden et al. 1997; Kerr and 
Layton, 1983). The vast majority of the literature is more technical or descriptive in nature. In 
conceptualising the ‘share contract’ model, it is interesting to note that although it is widely 
used in the New Zealand dairy industry, it is not employed in any other dominant type of 
agriculture in the country e.g. sheep farming. Share contracts have, however, been used in rice 
farming in India, wheat farming in Taiwan and cotton farming in the American South during 
the reconstruction era following the American Civil War (Kerr and Layton, 1983). Clearly this 
indicates that there must be something about the nature of the agricultural commodity produced 
that explains why share contracts are used in some types of farming but not in others.  
 
Mainstream economics (especially NIE) generally provides three broad and interrelated 
explanations for the use of share contracts: the agricultural ladder, risk dispersion, and 
incentive-transaction costs explanations (Kerr and Layton, 1983). The first of these 
explanations, the agricultural ladder, is the most commonly cited explanation for sharemilking 
arrangements in New Zealand. Sharemilking is viewed as a step in the progression from 
wageworker, to variable order sharemilkers who accumulate capital and skills, perhaps 
becoming 50/50 sharemilkers, then fixed renters, and if they manage to successfully compete 
with other producers they ideally become owner-operators (Kerr and Layton, 1983; Gardner, 
2011; Pepper, 2013; NZDairy, 2016; du Faur, 1997).  
 
While some mainstream economists link the position of producers to their relative farming 
skills (Hallagan, 1978; Newbery, 1977), a more convincing argument is that their position on 
the ladder depends on their access to capital (Wright, 1979; Kerr and Layton, 1983). This 
explanation clearly also reflects generational dynamics discussed above; elder landowners are 
more likely to contract sharemilkers since they are unable to undertake the labour themselves 
or to supervise it. However, this explanation on its own fails to explain why share contracts are 
only used in the production of certain agricultural commodities (Kerr and Layton, 1983). It also 
clearly fails to explain the underlying conditions in the South African case. Several key 
informants noted that sharemilking in itself was profitable and was not seen as an incentive for 
eventual farm ownership. Fixed rent contracts were, for example, considered to be a poorer 
return on capital and to entail more risk than a share contract does for the sharemilker. 
 
Cheung (1969) argued that agricultural share contracts disperse yield and price risks among the 
parties. For owner-operators, under a wage contract the landowner bears most of the risks125, 
while under a fixed rent contract the tenant would bear most of the risks. Share contracts thus 
provide a way to spread the risks between the share tenant and the landowner. IFAD (2012) 
similarly argues about sharecropping that:  
 
“Historically, sharecropping has negative associations with indentured labour in the 
United States (for example as a system for freed slaves) but may be preferred to a fixed-
                                                 
125 Although wage labourers can be fired if the farming operation struggles. 
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rate tenancy because of the sharing of risk and better incentives for the sharecropper. 
Indeed, sharecropping has historically provided the landless with land access in many 
parts of the developing world.”  
 
Authors such as Stiglitz (1974) however, argued that Cheung’s (1969) explanation fails to 
explain why share contracts are used rather than other risk dispersing arrangements, for 
example, if the landowning were to produce part of the land under a wage contract and rent the 
rest on a fixed rent basis. Kerr and Layton, (1983) maintain that in types of agricultural 
production where economies of scale are important, like dairy, it is not practical to divide the 
land in this type of mixed agreement alternative, and thus in theory a share contract would still 
be the most efficient way to disperse risks.  
 
However, in spite of Kerr and Layton’s (1983) disagreement with Stiglitz (1974) line of 
argument, they agree in principle that risk dispersion does not explain the common use of 
sharemilking. This is because in the 1980s dairy was not considered particularly risky because 
of the favourable agro-ecological conditions, and more importantly because of government 
support to milk producers at the time, which included price and income stabilisation 
mechanisms. One could argue that since the liberalisation of the dairy sector in New Zealand 
this is no longer the case, and sharemilking may indeed be a risk dispersing strategy in some 
cases. Kerr and Layton, (1983) noted that the standardisation of sharemilking contracts at the 
time, into three major types (29%, 39% and 50% sharemilkers) seemed to suggest that risk 
aversion was not a concern, since this would likely have resulted in a diversity of contracts. 
Interestingly, statistics from Dairy New Zealand (2016) now provide for five main types of 
sharemilkers, and within these contracts there is also variation, which may indicate that 
contracts have changed to accommodate different degrees of risk dispersion.  
 
The incentive-transaction costs explanation states that share contracts allow the landowner to 
forego the costs of supervising wage labour, that would be required in owner-operator farming 
businesses. Moreover, a wage contract provides limited incentives to labourers to produce 
efficiently and may encourage opportunistic behaviour e.g. requests for increased wages during 
periods of peak labour demand. Labourers themselves are also vulnerable to wage reductions, 
informalisation or termination of employment during periods of decreased labour demand. In 
the context of fixed rent contracts, landowners have little incentive to provide managerial 
advice or monitor labour effort.  Whereas under share contracts, landowners have a shared 
interest in the productivity of the farm, which directly affects their income and tenants have a 
greater incentive from the returns of their labour (Kerr and Layton, 1988).  
 
Kerr and Layton, (1983:9) note that on its own this explanation doesn’t adequately account for 
the use of share contracts. However, together with the other explanations it can be more 
convincing. They note that monitoring labourers in dairy farming is not as difficult as other 
types of farming: “whether cows are regularly milked and given ample feed is fairly readily 
detectable from their health and output, and state of the pastures”. However, dairy farmers are 
more vulnerable to opportunistic actions of labour because of the nature of the production 
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process126: “There are few other types of farming in which a regular and assured supply of 
labour is required for such an extended period”. However, with a sharemilking contract, the 
method of payment, which is dependent on waiting for the milk cheque, makes it unlikely that 
a sharemilker would quit at short notice. Since the cows are their capital, the sharemilker is 
also incentivised to take good care of them and ensure they produce productively.  
 
Kerr and Layton, (1983) also contend that most data on sharemilking contracts illustrates that 
the majority of landowners engaging in sharemilking are elderly and this allows them to 
continue to reside on their farms (which fixed rent contracts may not allow). Sharemilking also 
allows them to continue to use their managerial expertise, some of which are particular to their 
own properties, to manage the land while foregoing much of the effort of the production 
process. This is clearly a different context to South Africa where the landowners mostly play 
no role in the management of the farms, and instead their household members may be hired as 
labourers on the farm by the sharemilker. 
 
Data on the trends of sharemilking in New Zealand indicate that its popularity has fluctuated 
with changing employment conditions. In the post WWII period New Zealand had very low 
levels of unemployment. This put landowners in a vulnerable position, as farm workers could 
leave at short notice and were in a stronger position to bargain for higher wages. Sharemilking 
thus became a preferred method of dispersing risks and managing incentive-transaction costs. 
From the late 60s, however, levels of unemployment began to rise in New Zealand and 
landowners were therefore in a stronger position to negotiate with labour and consequently the 
availability of share contracts has slowly decreased, with landowners preferring to hire labour 
in owner-operated farms (Kerr and Layton, 1983:9).  
 
As mentioned above, today owner-operator dairy farms are still the most common form in New 
Zealand (NZDairy, 2016). However, the fact that hiring lower order sharemilkers and contract 
milkers is on the rise, can be linked to changing labour laws which have put labour in a 
stronger position. The rising price of land, the entrance of agribusiness firms as ‘landowners’, 
the growing size of dairy farms, financilisation of dairy markets, and the rise in productivity 
and competition has slowly eroded the career ladder prospects of 50/50 sharemilkers, and the 
incentives from the perspective of landowners to hire them (since it is no longer considered a 
good return on capital). In fact, in the context of South Africa, the vulnerability to global 
markets and the conditions of global capitalism mean that many of the same reasons explain 
why sharemilking in land reform is considered a good return on capital. 
 
A key informant from Amadlelo Agri noted that the reason why sharemilking is not a very 
common form of production in South African dairy in general, apart from the lack of a 
supportive institutional framework, is that there is such an abundance of cheap labour that it is 
more profitable for a landowner to hire labour than engage in a share contract. Therefore 
sharemilking seems to flourish in contexts where there are low levels of unemployment or 
where other factors put labour in a strong bargaining position, which poses a disincentive for 
                                                 
126 Cows must be milked at the same time twice a day, failing to do so causes the health of the dairy herd to deteriorate rapidly. High value 
dairy cows, which are under immense pressure to produce milk, also tend to be susceptible to diseases and require constant monitoring and 
high levels of care. 
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owner operators to enter into wage contracts. In the context of land reform in South Africa, 
there are also the risks (land expropriation) and incentives (access to government grants) that 
explain the attraction of share contracts. Similarly landowners (and new land reform 
beneficiaries), given the historical context, are likewise undercapitalised. In New Zealand, 
sharemilking has also been used with Maori customary landowners, perhaps with similar 
incentives.  
 
The sharemilkers interviewed in South Africa who enter share contracts with white 
landowners, mentioned that agreements were commonly made with farmers who were ‘in 
distress’ due to competitive pressures, poor management and lack of capital and were trying to 
‘hang on’ to their land. Less common reasons were a ‘function of age’ with older landowners 
entering into share contracts. The above analysis has answered some questions about why share 
contracts are common in different contexts. But what about how we can conceptualise their 
social relations of production? 
Sharemilking as Sharecropping: Based on a Marxist Theory of Rent 
 
Much of the literature that has dealt with conceptualising the political economy of 
sharemilking has likened it to a form of sharecropping or sharefarming (Blunden et al. 1997; 
Kerr and Layton, 1983; Stiglitz, 1974; Allen, 1982; Gardner, 2011). Sharecropping 
arrangements include a diversity of relations, but in general involve a written or verbal contract 
between a landowner who provides the land for production and a family, person or enterprise 
that provides the labour, at the very least. Each party then receives an agreed upon share of the 
money from farm produce or an actual share of the produce (Cheung, 1969).  
 
“Tenant farming and sharecropping are versions of management contracts in which 
individual farmers, for example smallholders, work the land of larger scale 
agribusinesses or other farmers... In sharecropping the landowner and sharecropper split 
the crop (or its proceeds) in pre-agreed percentages” (IFAD, 2012) 
 
Blunden et al. (1997) argue that the relations inherent in sharemilking are commensurate with 
sharecropping, and explain its relative efficiency. They view sharecropping as a form of simple 
commodity production (SCP), centred on the unity of the household (labour) and enterprise 
(capital). SCP is seen as distinct from capitalist relations of production in agriculture 
(Friedmann, 1978). This conceptualisation of sharecropping as SCP, is however, contrary to 
much Marxist analysis. For example, Byres (1983) and Pearce (1983) consider sharecropping 
to be merely a transient social relation of production (particularly prominent after feudalism), 
and as merely a disguised labour contract. In this view, when sharecropping is subjected to 
more intense forms of surplus extraction, in the historical process of an agrarian transition, it 
will inevitably give way to new and more capitalist forms of production with sharecroppers 
becoming 'wage workers proper'.  
 
Blunden et al.’s (1997) arguments idealise family farming, in line with Chayanov’s (1925) 
assertion of the competitive power of peasant, family farms which are able to out-compete 
well-capitalised farming enterprises. Chayanov (1925) claimed there could be a ‘plurality of 
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simultaneously operating economic systems’. Family farms could exist parallel to other 
economic systems (capitalist farms). This he asserted was the case, even in an environment 
dominated by capitalism. The family farm may respond to and be influenced by the dominant 
political economy, but is not dissolved by it.  This sentiment is, however, subject to intense 
debate. It advocates a ‘dual economy’ that misrepresents the interrelationship between the 
dominant capitalist mode of production and petty commodity production (Mann and 
Dickinson, 1978). ‘Family farmers’ are also not a homogenous group and are better 
conceptualised as differentiated classes of petty commodity producers under capitalism 
(Bernstein, 2010; Mann, 1990). Moreover, conceptualising sharemilking as SCP and a form 
that is not ‘capitalist production’ misrepresents both the Amadlelo Agri case and New Zealand 
model, which are clearly both embedded in capitalist relations of production. 
A convincing rebuttal of viewing sharemilking or sharecropping as SCP, outside of capitalist 
relations, is provided by Patnaik (1983), in her application of Marxist theory of rent to 
sharecropping. Patnaik (1983:76-7) notes that: 
 
“The basic characteristic of pre-capitalist rent is that it constitutes the entire surplus 
value of the petty producer working with his own and family labour and owning means 
of production other than land; and it is extracted for the use of land by a superior class 
monopolising property in land” (emphasis added).  
 
Moreover, the form in which the rent is paid (labour, product or cash) also tells us, to a certain 
extent, whether rent is pre-capitalist, transitional or capitalist. Only labour rent is exclusively 
associated with feudal or pre-capitalist relations of production, while product or cash rent can 
be associated with all three forms of production (Patnaik, 1983).  
 
Under a capitalist mode of production, 'absolute ground rent' is inextricably linked to the 
existence of a class of landed property, which claims a monopoly of property over land. The 
existence of rent is explained thus by Patnaik (1983: 75):  
 
“Absolute ground rent is a tribute exacted by the class of landlords by virtue of their 
monopoly of landed property, from the capitalist class out of the total surplus value 
appropriated by the capitalist class from the working class”.  
 
In adopting this framework, I view the JV dividends that households with rights to irrigation 
plots receive, as a form of rent involving indirect exploitation of labour. In the New Zealand 
context, Gardner (2011: 170) also conceptualises the milk income share that the sharemilker 
pays to the landowner as a form of ‘rent’:  
 
”Sharemilking agreements are share leasing agreements. Sharemilkers pay rent in the 
form of a share of production for the use of the farm owner’s capital” (emphasis 
added).  
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Patnaik (1983: 81) notes regarding the form of production and rent inherent to sharecropping 
that: 
“Sharecropping is a specific sub-form of product rent such that rent is not fixed but 
varies in proportion to the harvest… the common tendency of identifying sharecropping 
with ‘feudal’ or ‘semi-feudal’ relations, is not really tenable. To establish whether a 
relation is semi-feudal or not, we have to look not at the form of rent but at who is 
procuring the rent: the petty producer, on the basis of family labour; or the capitalist 
entrepreneur, on the basis of wage labour… While sharecropping as a sub-form of kind-
rent payment is empirically associated with petty production, it is not restricted to petty 
production, but can be compatible with transitional and capitalist production as well”. 
 
Patnaik (1993: 81) notes that in the case of India, shares of crop rents are not only paid by the 
typical petty producer but also by ‘labour-hiring rich peasants, or by capitalist entrepreneurs’. 
She provides an example of a capitalist tenant in a sharecropping arrangement with a landlord 
and financier, in which the farm produced high-value commercial crops on a 150-acre 
property. The capitalist tenant paid fifty % of the output as a form of rent. Since the landlord 
had financed part of the capital required for production, this ‘rent’ was in essence a combined 
category of ‘profit and rent’. This theorisation appears commensurate with Amadlelo Agri’s 
model. Importantly, Patnaik (1993) notes that the key difference between this form of capitalist 
tenant or sharecropper, and a petty producer, is that the former produces for profit and 
therefore does not pay the whole of their surplus product as rent, whereas the latter does.  
 
“It follows that the rich peasant and capitalist tenant can only lease in land at the same 
absolute level of rent as the petty producer tenants if they succeed in producing a 
surplus per unit area, which is higher than the latter’s surplus by the amount of profit (at 
the going rate of profit)” (Patnaik, 1983: 83).  
 
In order to ensure, therefore, that a sharecropping or sharemilking arrangement is still 
profitable, the capitalist tenant must raise the output and surplus per unit of land by employing 
advanced techniques or technologies and/or by accessing land where a differential rent (as 
discussed above) can be reaped. Importantly, this may also explain why capitalist producers 
employ share contracts only with certain types of farming like dairy farming. Capitalist 
producers, entering share contracts, can only employ ‘advanced techniques’ which allow them 
to lower the proportion of their surplus product paid as a rent, where the commodity itself 
allows for the penetration of capital in the productive process.   
Dairy farming provides favourable conditions for technological innovation. However, in sheep 
farming (New Zealand’s other important agricultural industry), you do not see share contracts 
emerging (Kerr and Layton, 1983). Mann and Dickinson (1978), for example, discuss how 
Marx emphasised the peculiar nature of specific spheres of agriculture, which made them 
untenable for capitalist penetration. This explains the persistence of PCPs in these spheres, 
since they cannot be squeezed out by innovating capitalist producers.  
“Those agricultural commodities whose production is characterised by an excess of 
production time over labour time necessitate the inefficient use of constant capital, 
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labour recruitment problems, a lower rate of profit, and complications in the smooth 
realisation of value in the sphere of circulation. Unlike industry proper, where labour 
time and production time more or less coincide, in some areas of agriculture the ability 
to manipulate and vary production time and turnover time is circumscribed by the 
natural qualities of the object being produced. From the point of view of capitalism, 
then, these considerations make certain spheres of agricultural production unattractive. 
“ (Mann and Dickinson, 1978: 478) 
Patnaik’s (1993) conceptualisation of sharecropping as a form of capitalist rent is important, 
and helps us clarify the social relations of production inherent to sharemilking. Viewing 
sharecropping, in its widely held empirically associated character with petty production and 
pre-capitalist relations, does not adequately explain the concrete capital-labour relations we 
have investigated in sharemilking. At first application, conceptualising agrarian capital 
(Amadlelo Agri) as a sharecropper, with the ‘empirically’ associated relations of production 
historically relevant to the South African experience, seems to belie the relative social 
relations. Byres' (1983) and Pearce’s (1983) view of sharecropping, as a disguised labour 
contract, also is not useful. It hardly helps us to think of agribusiness as ‘labour’ by virtue of its 
position as the sharemilker/ sharecropper.  
 
However, Patnaik’s (1983) contention that sharecropping can, under certain contexts, be 
viewed as a form of capitalist rent is a much better fit. In the South African case, as we have 
seen, sharemilkers hire numerous wage labourers. Although the use of labour is less common 
in New Zealand, 50/50 sharemilkers milking larger herds would commonly hire at least one 
labourer, to supplement their family labour (du Faur, 1997; Pepper, 2013; Gardner 2011). The 
use predominantly of ‘family labour’ by some sharemilkers, represents the specificities of the 
production process for milk as an agricultural commodity, with its susceptibility to 
mechanisation. Operating a dairy farm requires very little labour. This doesn’t make 
sharemilkers themselves ‘disguised labourers’. As noted above, the preference to contract 
sharemilkers in New Zealand has been explained precisely by the fact that labour law does not 
cover them.  
 
Conceptualising the ‘share’ of the milk cheque or profits (in the South African case) as a form 
of rent, also allows us to clarify the dominant position of the landowners in the sharemilking 
arrangement as ‘landed property’. This is preferable to the perplexing terminology of ‘partners 
(infer capital)’ commonly used in the context of JVs in South Africa. The term ‘partner’ 
obfuscates more than it clarifies in regards to class relations. The element of peculiarity in the 
Amadlelo Agri model is that you have the ‘sharemilker’ regulating the labour of the 
landowners, who are in some cases labourers on the sharemilking farms. These class relations 
may be unclear, but as mentioned before in this thesis, the fact that capital-labour relations are 
unclear doesn’t mean they are not capitalist. Rather this reflects how under modern capitalism 
the fragmentation of labour makes it hard to distinguish class relations (Bernstein, 2011a). 
Sharing equity in an enterprise is also a way to “to reconcile the competing claims of capital 
and labour” (Minns, 1996: 42).  
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The reality of the class identities of the various landowning households would obviously be 
more complicated, given the ways in which class position is fragmented (Bernstein, 2011a). 
Therefore, in reality they are not only ‘landed property’ because the pressures of social 
reproduction in rural South Africa would allow very few people to live off rents alone. 
However, it is useful to momentarily abstract from the complexities of the class position of 
landowning households127, for the purpose of understanding the dominant social relations of 
the sharemilking model itself.   
8.6 Conclusion 
 
The review of the sharemilking model, in its original conception in New Zealand, has allowed 
us to evaluate the impact of the changes Amadlelo has made to their 50/50 sharemilking model 
on the Shiloh and Keiskammahoek JV farms. The comparison of Amadlelo Agri’s 50/50 
sharemilking model with the New Zealand 50/50 sharemilking model (also used by Grasslands 
Agriculture in South Africa) appears to indicate that the latter’s return on investment for 
landowners is greater than the formers. Strictly separating the maintenance of the fixed assets 
of the landowners (Mayime and Seven Stars Cooperatives) and the movable assets of the 
sharemilker (Amadlelo Agri in this case), and sharing the milk income (as opposed to the 
profits), appears to be a more beneficial way to structure a ‘sharemilk contract’ from the 
viewpoint of the landowners. 
 
This chapter also investigated the incentives from the perspective of agribusiness for engaging 
in sharemilking in the South African context. Besides the often-cited motivation to contribute 
to land reform and black economic empowerment, a number of other incentives were also 
noted. Some of these included the following:  
 
• Government funding allows access to the competitive dairy sector, which would be 
otherwise challenging for new entrants; 
• The sharemilking model allows agribusiness to avoid tying capital up in costly fixed 
assets and land and rather accumulate large herds of valuable dairy cows;  
• The lower contribution of movable assets makes the 50/50 profit model a good return 
on investment for the sharemilker;  
• Access to scarce irrigated pastures, in South Africa's milder coastal regions, provides a 
differential rent;  
• Having labourers as shareholders (and landowners) creates a labour disciplining effect;  
• JVs increase agribusiness' political creditability within the context of land reform;  
• JVs provide opportunities for investment in other parts of the dairy value chain. 
 
                                                 
127 A more complete theorization of class among the landowners is reserved for Chapter 12 
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This Chapter has also presented a way of theorizing sharemilking making use of Patnaik's 
(1983) application of Marxist theory of rent to sharecropping. She contends that sharecropping 
can, under certain contexts, be viewed as a form of capitalist rent. The 50% of profits (after 
deduction of the 10% management fee) that is paid to landowners can therefore be seen as a 
form of rent. This involves indirect exploitation of labour by landed property. This clarifies the 
fundamental social relations of production involved in sharemilking as one between landed 
property (the communal landowners) and a capitalist producer tenant (Amadlelo Agri).  
 
The key difference between the much more commonly researched form of a ‘petty producer 
sharecropper’, and a ‘capitalist producer sharecropper’, is that the latter produces for profit and 
therefore does not pay the whole of their surplus product as rent, whereas the former does. This 
theorization also allows us to explain why capitalist producers only enter into share contracts 
with specific agricultural commodities. Certain commodities like dairy allow for the 
penetration of capital, in the form of mechanisation. This allows capitalist tenants 
(sharemilkers in this case) to lower the proportion of the surplus product paid as a rent, making 
the arrangement profitable, in ways that other types of farming do not allow. 
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Chapter 9. Land Rights and Use and Some Emerging Conflicts and 
Contestations 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter looks at land rights and patterns of land use in Shiloh and Keiskammahoek. The 
historical context of land rights and use during the colonial and Apartheid eras has already 
been discussed in Chapter 5. Here I investigate the contemporary context of land rights and 
use. I also very briefly sketch the status of land rights and use, from the democratic period in 
1994 until the JV schemes were implemented (2010 in Keiskammahoek and 2011 in Shiloh). I 
do this with the view of understanding how the JV might have impacted land rights and use, 
and what effects this has had on livelihoods. I also highlight some emerging land conflicts, 
looking at their historical roots and how the JVs have heightened these contestations. 
 
9.2 Land Rights and Use in Keiskammahoek in Historical Perspective 
A history of privatization of communal land in Keiskammahoek 
 
Within this one JV farm, we see a patchwork of tenure regimes including freehold titles, deeds 
of sale and municipal land128. The character of land rights on the farm speaks to Bantustan era 
attempts to support a commercial farming class, as discussed in Chapter 5, and then counter-
attempts by the incumbent democratic regime to avoid ‘elitist privatisation’ (Hall, 2010). Land 
rights thus reflect dynamic and shifting political power and allegiances, and ultimately 
historical processes of class formation. During the Ciskei era farming households on the 
irrigation scheme had an opportunity to purchase the land and dairy cattle and now have either 
private ‘title deeds’ or ‘deeds of sale’. Those households who have ‘deeds of sale’ are still 
awaiting finalization of their title deeds due to the moratorium that was placed on private titling 
and transfer of SADT land in late 1993 (Hall, 2010).  
 
Historical documentation from an Ulimocor report in 1993 illustrates the urgency to finalise 
these title deeds: “Freehold title of the existing 27 holdings be granted to each farmer on an 
individual basis, at no further cost to him, and an extra cost required for land survey of 
approximately R3930. The balance of farms (7 in number) be sold to existing incumbents at 
ruling Government Land Policy rates inclusive of the costs of survey (approximately R15, 
000).”129 (Emphasis added) 
 
Some of these ‘existing incumbents’ were allocated land in an additional unit (unit 8) between 
1988 and 1993. This land is still officially state land, allegedly under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Public Works130. DRDLR has yet to survey and formalise a lease (or provide 
option to purchase) for farmers located on this land. It is currently being used by the JV to 
graze heifers and dry stock. There are also a few households (four that I interviewed) that were 
                                                 
128 Unit 3, where Dairy 1 and the Seven Stars Cooperative and JV Farm Trust offices are located is rented from the Amahlati municipality. 
129 I received this historical document from Averbeke who has done intensive research on the Keiskammahoek scheme. He notes in a personal 
correspondence about its origins: “I assume that this document was written by ULIMOCOR and was addressed to the Minister of Agriculture 
of the Ciskei. It has no author and no date, but the content suggests that it was written towards the end of 1992 or early 1993.” 
130 Interview with management respondent from Amadlelo Agri. 
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not farming the land during the Ciskei era. The vice chairperson of Seven Stars Cooperative 
(Farmer A) explains the current status of land rights among landowning members as follows: 
 
“24 farmers have titles, 3 have deeds of sale and have finished to pay but don’t have 
title, for the rest of the 8 households the land has been surveyed but not paid for. It was 
R15 000 that we all had to pay for the land at that time. The 3 with deeds of sale have 
finished to pay. The others who are surveyed haven't paid yet and will have to pay; they 
are willing to pay the R15 000. Those people without titles are not satisfied but it's the 
government’s fault not ours. We sent the names of those 8 people who have not 
received titles but there is no response yet”. 
 
Notably, of the 35 landowners, in all but five cases (where widows owned the land) land rights 
were held by males131.  This speaks to the highly gendered nature of landownership in this site, 
which is a historical legacy of Colonial and Apartheid land policy (Claasens, 2013; Cousins, 
2013b). The concentration of landownership under these 35 landowners over 600has of 
valuable irrigated pastures occurred long before the JV was established. In addition the JV 
farm also rents 145 hectares from the municipality. This has created various tensions with the 
surrounding community. Averbeeke et al (2011), comments on the “precarious social position 
of settler farmers at Keiskammahoek amidst a community that viewed them as intruders”. 
Conflicts over land continues to play out in the relations between these landowning farmers 
and the wider community, some of whom continue to question the legitimacy of their rights to 
the land. Their position is made somewhat more precarious by the fact that many of them are 
yet to receive their title deeds. 
Land use and livelihoods in Keiskammahoek: The democratic era until the establishment 
of the JV  
 
Many authors  (Laker, 2004; van Averbeke et al., 1998; Holbrooke, 1996) and the farmers 
themselves (in my life histories) emphasise that they were exploited during the Ciskei era. 
Farming households also, however, emphasised that the democratic government failed to put 
into place an adequate plan to ensure continued production when Ulimocor was liquidated. 
Thus some accounts spoke with reverence about the Ciskei era, when they compared it to the 
challenges they faced under the democratic government, as the following statement reflects:  
 
“Ulimocor stopped supporting the irrigation scheme here in 1996. But from 1993 things 
started to fall apart and when the Ciskei became part of South Africa everything 
changed. The Ciskei government used to give the farmers a lot but the new government 
said ‘the Ciskei government was spoon feeding you so now it's up to you to wake up 
and do something for yourself’. That's why we struggled at that time. The Ciskei gave 
us everything, if we needed feed or money, they would supply us... After 1993 I was 
planting veg, some of my cows died but I was still milking at that time. I would sell 
unpasteurized milk to the community. But then there were no vets here and all the cows 
                                                 
131 Confirmed in a list of 'landowners' and household survey. Of the 19 surveyed households owning land on the irrigation scheme, five were 
female-headed (one without a title-deed and four with title deeds) and fourteen were male-headed households (50% with title deeds and 50% 
without). 
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died.  During that time I still had a good quality of life but before 1993 it was much 
better” (Dividend and wage receiving household, Farmer X). 
 
Historical documentation illustrates that by 1992 the Keiskammahoek irrigation scheme was in 
peril. On September 28 1992, a Working Group was appointed by the Minister of Agriculture 
to investigate how the scheme could be restructured to address challenges and ensure its 
survival after Ulimocor officially withdrew management of the scheme. The Working Group 
suggested that financial assistance should be given to the 27 dairy farmers settled on the 
scheme at that stage, and that the scheme be radically restructured to according to a 'free 
market approach' to ensure its future viability. 132  The recommendations were heavily 
embedded in the language of neoliberal economics stating, “With regard to commercial 
farmers allow free market forces to determine their futures” (p.5). In the end in spite of the 
various scenarios discussed for restructuring the scheme, in reality Ulimocor withdrew without 
any comprehensive plan in place. Averbeke et al (1998:61) comment on the effect that this 
'free market approach' had on the farmers:  
 
“Over the years, the scheme has moved away from a central management approach, 
where farmers were by and large treated as labourers, towards privatisation, where 
decision making is in the hands of the farmers... However, total output by the Scheme 
declined to about 25% of capacity and the majority of private farmers are in serious 
debt... At present, production per unit of land is extremely low and there is great 
unhappiness amongst farmers at the scheme”. 
 
The extension officer that was eventually appointed to assist the farmers did a very poor job in 
the view of the farmers and Amadlelo Agri. This resulted in many of the farmer’s dairy cows 
dying and to a drastic reduction in production for many. Some of the key respondents explain 
the changes to land use and their livelihoods during this time in the statements below: 
 
“In 1994 or 1995 at The Land Bank we took a loan for the cows. Our primary 
cooperative bought about 300 cows at that time to add to the existing cows. But the 
manager government hired for us didn't have knowledge of farming. At that time many 
cows died because he didn't know how to look after cows. Until 2000 we struggled to 
get on our feet, there was no income at that time. We would just plough vegetables but 
there was no profit from milk because all the money went to labourers. Government 
was buying our milk for hospitals and schools. After 2000 that project ended and we 
sold our milk privately to the community... I had around 30 cows and was just milking 
them and selling to the community and planting maize and veg on my land.  When 
Nkwinti133 came here in 2010 he saw that we were frustrated and advised us to take a 
joint venture with white farmers” (Dividend receiving household, Farmer B). 
 
“I am a member of ‘Umzamo primary cooperative’, and we are 5 households. We set it 
                                                 
132 This letter was written on the 10 May 1993 by the CEO of the Ciskei Agricultural Cooperation (CAC) (Mr Farrow) addressed to the 
Minister of Finance and Economic Development in Bhisho.  
133 Nkwinti was the previous minister of the DRDLR from 2009 until 2018, prior to that he served as MEC for Agriculture in the Eastern Cape 
from 2005 to 2009. 
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up in 1994 and we were all milking together until 2000 and selling milk to Clover. We 
were milking and getting only 15 Litres a day. Business wasn’t good but we would join 
our milk together with the other units... We had two workers hired from outside the 
family and then with the family we all worked on the farm together. All my children 
have gone to Cape Town now, they are not interested in Dairy Farming. They want 
more money and when they left before the JV came here we were making too little here 
to keep them.” (Dividend receiving household, Farmer S) 
 
The above statements illustrate that livelihoods were difficult to secure for many of these 
households after Ulimocor withdrew management and support of the scheme. However, unlike 
in Shiloh, the use of their irrigation plots remained central to their livelihood strategies. Even 
today the JV scheme and the surrounding community refer to landowners as ‘farmers’ or 
‘settler farmers’. This contrasts to Shiloh for example where they are referred to as 
‘landowners’, ‘beneficiaries’ or ‘cooperative members’. In spite of their challenges at 
Keiskammahoek, many of these households still managed to hire in labour and to sell a 
surplus, however at times this may have involved selling a portion of their own subsistence 
needs as well.  
 
Table 13. Purpose of Land use and Labour Relations on Irrigation Plots in Keiskammahoek, 
1994-2009 
(N=55) 
 
 Category of 
respondent   
 Land use & 
labour relations Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Dividend 
Receiving 
Household 
 
 
 
 
Valid 
subsistence only, 
household labour 
only 2 25 33.3 33.3 
  
subsistence and 
sales, household 
labour only 1 12.5 16.7 50 
  
subsistence and 
sales, hired labour  
(frequently134) 3 37.5 50 100 
  Total 6 75 100   
Missing 
(unknown) 
 
2 25     
  Total   8 100     
Dividend & 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
  
Valid 
subsistence and 
sales, hired labour 
(frequently) 9 81.8 100 100 
Missing 
(unknown) 99 2 18.2     
  Total   11 100     
 
Table 13 above illustrates that among households that could recall land use and labour relations 
after the Ciskei era, 80% claimed that they were selling a surplus and hiring labour frequently. 
                                                 
134 Frequently here excludes labour that is hired seasonally, or only for soil preparation or harvest for example. These were included as possible 
pre-coded categories of labour but all of those hiring labour, did so frequently. The nature of dairy farming also explains why frequent labour 
is hired as opposed to seasonal labour. 
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However, for many households, social grants and wage incomes became increasingly 
important to ensure their simple reproduction. In this challenging context, where the new 
democratic government had failed to support them by providing adequate extension services 
and markets for their products and where many of the farmer's children had left to seek better 
opportunities in the cities, it is clear why these elder landowners felt that a JV was a more 
secure option than struggling to survive off the land.  
9.3 Keiskammahoek: Contemporary Context of Land Rights and Use in the Context 
of the JV  
 
The different types of residential land allocations for my sample of 55 households in 
Keiskammahoek are represented in Table 14 below. These proportions are, however, not a 
reflection of the general frequency distribution of forms of land tenure in Keiskammahoek, as 
they are affected by my sampling approach. 
 
Table. 14 Type of Land Allocation: Residential Land in the Keiskammahoek Sample 
(N=55) 
 
 Category of 
respondent  Type of land allocation Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Dividend 
Receiving 
Household 
  
SADT / Ciskei allocation with title 4 50 50 
SADT / Ciskei allocation without 
title 2 25 75 
On-farm housing for workers/ 
landowners 2 25 100 
Total 8 100   
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
  
  
customary allocation 8 38.1 38.1 
municipal allocation with title 7 33.3 71.4 
municipal allocation without title 3 14.3 85.7 
On-farm housing for workers/ 
landowners 1 4.8 90.5 
renting 2 9.5 100 
Total 21 100   
Dividend & JV 
Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
  
  
  
municipal allocation with title 2 18.2 18.2 
municipal allocation without title 1 9.1 27.3 
SADT / Ciskei allocation with title 3 27.3 54.5 
SADT / Ciskei allocation without 
title 3 27.3 81.8 
On-farm housing for workers/ 
landowners 2 18.2 100 
Total 11 100   
No JV Benefits 
Household 
  
  
  
customary allocation 7 46.7 46.7 
municipal allocation with title 6 40 86.7 
municipal allocation without title 1 6.7 93.3 
On-farm housing for workers/ 
landowners 1 6.7 100 
Total 15 100   
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Although 55 households were included in the survey, 14 of these households had access to two 
residential properties135. SADT / Ciskei allocations refer to South African Development Trust 
allocations. In all cases this is land that is located on the irrigation scheme and owned by the 35 
households who are members of Seven Stars Cooperative. In many of the villages surrounding 
the scheme, land was allocated through customary means. In some villages, such as Tshoxa, 
land is still allocated by traditional leaders. However, in a number of villages traditional leaders 
no longer play an active role in land allocations. There are some relatively new settlements, 
such as Sophumelela Township, which are dominated by RDP housing. These municipal 
allocations are mostly with title but some also lack title. 
 
 The tendency of land consolidation under fewer ‘landowners on the irrigation scheme is 
continuing, as some respondents on the Seven Stars Cooperative revealed the intention to 
purchase land from landowners no longer interested in being part of the cooperative, as the 
following statement from a member reveals: 
 
“We know the value of the land is going up and maybe in two years time it will rise 
even more. We want to purchase the land from other farmers who want to leave the 
scheme because then maybe after 20 years our children will get billions of Rands!”  
 
In 2013 a landowner sold his land to one of the secondary cooperatives under Seven Stars 
Dairy for R1.2 million.  In the course of my interviews I came across an additional three 
landowners that said they would consider selling their land. According to management at 
Amadlelo Agri an average plot of 12 hectares on the Keiskmamahoek scheme was worth R2.5 
million, as of July 2016. The increase of land values as a consequence of the establishment of 
the JV farms is one of the key impacts that Amadlelo Agri mentions when discussing the 
impact of the project on beneficiaries. Management at Amadlelo expressed frustration with 
government policies that are turning emerging black farmers into perpetual tenants of the state: 
“rising land values is something they won’t see if government owns the land!"  
Access to land for cropping and livestock farming 
 
The consolidation of this large stretch of 745136 hectares of land under 35 landowners has had a 
significant effect on the agrarian structure in this rural community, and on the character of 
social relations. It has contributed to the very uneven access to and use of land for cropping and 
livestock. Holbrook (1996: 606) notes that: “land for the scheme came from expropriated white 
farms and municipal and commonage land attached to the town of Keiskammahoek”. 
Surrounding households thus lost access to commonage land as a result of the historic 
establishment of the scheme. As the table below demonstrates, only 18% of the sample had 
access to fields: four JV wage receiving households, three JV dividend and wage receiving 
households; and three no JV benefits household. Only 30% of these households cultivated their 
                                                 
135 Some of these were due to being moved off the scheme (6 cases) for the construction of centre pivots, while some landowners had moved 
into the households of their children due to old age and illness. One dividend and wage receiving household had a customary allocation.  Four 
JV wage receiving households were provided with on-farm accommodation. 
136 Of which 145 hectares is rented from the municipality. 
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fields137. Crop production is primarily limited to household gardens, which reflects trends 
across the former 'homelands' (Bunce and Cousins, 2015).  
 
The level of engagement in agriculture varies a lot across and within the categories of 
respondents depending on factors such as asset base, soil quality, water, inputs, income, levels 
of theft, labour availability, and generational and health status. All of the irrigation plot owners, 
who are still living in households on the irrigation scheme, have maintained small plots of 
between 1 and 2 hectares for their own cropping and livestock. 
 
“I still have a 1 hectare garden, it’s next to my house. I didn’t have to stop growing 
vegetables when my fields joined the joint venture” (Dividend receiving household). 
 
 
Table. 15 Keiskammahoek: Labour Type in Household Gardens/ Fields and Contribution to 
Household Reproduction 
(N=55 households) 
 
  
 Type of labour and 
contribution to household 
reproduction 
Dividend 
Receiving 
Household 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
Dividend & 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
No JV 
Benefits 
Household 
Household 
gardens 
 
(Includes 
small plots 
remaining 
around 
households 
located on 
irrigation 
scheme) 
  
  
  
subsistence only, unpaid 
household labour only 0.00% 38.10% 9.10% 33.30% 
subsistence only, hired labour 
(more frequently) 12.50% 4.80% 0.00% 0.00% 
subsistence only, paid 
household labour 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
subsistence and sales, unpaid 
household labour only 25.00% 14.30% 36.30% 20.00% 
subsistence and sales, some 
hired labour  (soil prep and 
harvest) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.70% 
subsistence and sales, hired 
labour (more frequently) 12.50% 0.00% 27.30% 0.00% 
subsistence and sales, paid 
household labour 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Not applicable/ Garden not 
cultivated 25.00% 42.80% 27.30% 40.00% 
Fields  
 
(Only dry 
land, not 
irrigation 
plots) 
  
  
Proportion of HHs with access 
to fields 0.00% 19.00% 27.00% 20.00% 
subsistence only, household 
labour only 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 13.30% 
subsistence and sales, some 
hired labour  (soil prep and 
harvest) 0.00% 0.00% 9.10% 0.00% 
grazing own animals 0.00% 0.00% 9.10% 0.00% 
Proportion of those with fields 
not cultivating them NA 100.00% 33.00% 33.00% 
 
                                                 
13719% of 'JV wage receiving households' and 20% of 'no JV benefits households' had access to a field. 
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Table 15 above looks at the application of different types of labour (hired labour, unpaid 
household or paid household labour) in household gardens and fields, and the contribution of 
own account farming to reproduction138 i.e. a non-monetary contribution to subsistence or to 
generate income through sale of a surplus. It gives us a rough idea of labour relations in 
farming, across the taxonomic groups. 
 
Overall we can see that the two irrigation plot-owning groups make more use of hired labour in 
own-account farming, than either the JV wage receiving households or no JV benefits 
households. Among both of these latter groups most of the households were making use of 
unpaid household labour for subsistence only. Among the irrigation plot holders, however, 
cultivating with unpaid household labour for subsistence and selling a surplus was the most 
common form. Among the JV dividend and wage receiving households, 27.3% are also hiring 
labour (more frequently) for subsistence and sale of a surplus. There are a number of cases of 
quite dynamic producers, who are investing JV dividends and wages (along with off-farm 
incomes) into own-account farming. 
 
Among the households without access to irrigation plots, 42.8% of JV wage receiving 
households and 40% of no JV benefits households have not cultivated their gardens in the last 
year. All except three households had access to a household garden, two of which were JV 
wage receiving households and one which was a no JV benefits household. The most common 
reasons for not cultivating include, the drought and challenges with accessing water, lack of 
fencing, theft from household gardens, and lack of labour. JV wage receiving households, 
particularly noted, that they struggled to cultivate gardens due to the demands of their JV job, 
and other household member were unwilling or unable to continue cultivating. Health reasons 
are also commonly cited, as this statement from a no JV benefits household indicates, “We 
stopped with the garden and kept pigs because diabetes makes it hard to plant.”  
 
The Table 16 below illustrates that the JV wage receiving households make the most use of the 
communal grazing camps around Keiskammahoek. Only 33.3% of 'JV wage receiving 
households' and 20% of 'no JV benefits households' said there was enough grazing land in the 
community 139 . Six of the nineteen irrigation plot owning households used the communal 
grazing land, while two households said they would like to use it but had allegedly received 
threats from the community, who apparently assert that they have no right to use the communal 
grazing camps given they own land on the irrigation scheme. Many households are thus using 
the land around their households on the scheme to keep livestock in. For some this is a personal 
choice due to high rates of stock theft in the area.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 Responses were post-coded. 
139 Respondents note that the closest grazing camps are in most part 30 minutes walk from the households surrounding the JV farm, however, 
cattle can be seen grazing around the townships. Some households choose to graze their cattle as far as two hours walk from their households, 
towards Hogsback.  
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Table. 16 Keiskammahoek: Households that have used the communal grazing camps in the last 
year 
(N=55) 
 
Category of 
respondent 
 Used grazing land in 
last year? Frequency Percent 
Dividend Receiving 
Household 
 
 
Yes 3 37.5 
No 5 62.5 
Total 8 100.0 
JV Wage Receiving 
Household 
 
 
Yes 10 47.6 
No 11 52.4 
Total 21 100.0 
Dividend and JV 
Wage Receiving 
Household 
 
 
Yes 3 27.3 
No 8 72.7 
Total 11 100.0 
No JV Benefits 
Households 
 
Yes 5 33.3 
No 10 66.7 
Total 15 100.0 
 
Four of the landowning households using the communal grazing camps are those households 
that have moved off of the scheme into accommodation in other villages, and did not report 
having problems using the communal grazing camps. Their relocation into the villages may 
legitimise their access to the grazing camps. However, rights of access to grazing are complex 
and may have their roots deeper in social identities and other social networks. For example, 
some households originated from the Northern Cape and said that their Afrikaans surnames 
easily identified them as 'outsiders'. They emphasised that in spite of moving to the community 
between 1976-78 they are still referred to by ‘locals’ as ‘settlers’ and ‘foreigners’. However 
others are originally from other settlements in the former Ciskei like Whittlesea and are still 
considered outsiders as this quote suggests: 
 
“Sometimes people of the village don't want us to put our cattle there in the dip. They 
say you don't have a permit. The community chase us because we are not born here, 
they say 'get out you are from Whittlesea', now my cattle are gone they steal it at night. 
They were stealing about 10 sheep a day! They say why you come with your sheep and 
goats here I'll kill them at night because you are from Whittlesea. I'm here for over 30 
years and still they say ‘you are from Whittlesea’. “ 
 
However, some of the irrigation plot owners have managed to navigate these tensions to secure 
access to communal plots and grazing camps, as well as making full use of their land on the 
scheme, as the following quote suggests: 
 
“I use the grazing land by Tshoxa village. There is a shortage of grazing land in 
Keiskammahoek but it's better near that village. Anyone can use it even if you don't live 
in that village. I keep my goats and a few cows at unit 2 and then when they get big I 
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take them to the village to graze. I have fencing around my property so it's not a 
problem. Every night all the animals come back to my property”. 
 
This JV dividend and wage receiving household originated from nearby Stutterheim. The male 
head of the household also managed to secure an additional field plot, which was allocated to 
him by the traditional leader in 2016. The field plot of ½ hectare has been fenced and he uses it 
to keep his cattle in when they are being dosed, in addition to making use of the communal 
grazing camps. This landowner has been using his earnings from the dividend and JV job to 
invest in cattle and has accumulated 23 so far. 
9.4 Keiskammahoek: Some contestations and changes to land rights 
 
Removal of irrigation plot owner households from the scheme 
 
In the process of establishing the current JV scheme, nine households had to be removed from 
the irrigation scheme. Six of these were landowners who had to be moved from the pastures 
where new centre pivots were erected. Five of them were provided with alternative 
accommodation by the JV farm in nearby villages, or in on-farm accommodation, such as the 
area known as ‘four-rooms’. Three of these households said the condition of alternative 
accommodation was equal to their previous home, one said that it was better, and another 
complained that it was smaller than their previous home. The six households that had been 
removed from the scheme technically now own two residential properties. However, in reality, 
because the JV is using this land, it is unsuitable for residential occupation. Some houses have 
been demolished, while others have just been abandoned.  
 
The household that didn’t receive alternative accommodation is a female-headed household 
whose husband passed away recently. The deceased landowner was represented on the 
cooperative committee when he was still alive. The widower, however, seemed unsure about 
how they were compensated for their removal:  
 
“All the houses on the scheme are broken down now because they plant rye grass for 
the cows, that's why we were moved… I am not sure if we got money for the three 
houses that were knocked down. I think that money we receive at the end of the year 
[JV dividend] is maybe the money we get for being removed. I used that money to 
build a house. It was a long time I’ve been building that house and my children were 
helping me but when I received the R30 000 in December I just finished it. I will 
renovate my house more and put a fence around the property when I get more money”. 
 
This household recalled receiving a dividend amount of R30 000, which is less than the rest of 
the landowners who received R50 000. It is possible that recall may have been a challenge. 
However, one should not rule out the potential that some female-headed households are more 
susceptible to being marginalised from the landowning group. This appeared to be the case 
with an additional two female-headed households I interviewed. While some of the households 
that were moved off the scheme have got access to household gardens at their new residential 
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properties, clearly the disruption has affected the own-account farming for others, as the 
statement below reflects: 
 
“We were moved from unit 1 by the farm who put a centre pivot on our land.  The land 
where we now live is hired by the scheme from the municipality. We don’t have a title 
for this land… After I heard that Amadlelo was going to move us I stopped planting my 
field. The agreement was in 2003 but I didn’t know when we would be moved… One 
problem now is that there is a shortage of grazing land and water in this area. There is 
no water even in people’s houses. If people want to graze animals they must graze far... 
as far as Hogsback. I can take the chance to graze on the community land but they may 
kick me off. I am not counted by the community as a member but as a scheme member. 
There is a division between the landowners as outsiders and the rest of the community 
here” 
Removal of previous labouring households from 'Four Rooms'  
 
Of the nine households in the sample that were moved off the scheme, three households were 
‘previous labouring’ households who were residents in ‘Four Rooms’ 140 . However key 
informant interviews concluded that between six and eight households have been removed so 
far, and that there are an additional four households who will be moved from Four Rooms, 
once the municipality provides them with alternative housing141. These households worked on 
the farm before it was operated as a JV by Amadlelo Agri, and were subsequently removed to 
make way for JV landowners and labourers.  
 
Although this conflict has been officially ‘resolved’ through a court-case that ruled in favour of 
the landowners (represented by Seven Stars Cooperative), this remains an area of contention 
between the concerned households and the cooperative. None of the three households I 
interviewed had received alternative accommodation by the JV farm because they had already 
received RDP housing from the municipality, were waiting to receive it or gained access to 
housing through customary channels. The following statement explains the fate of some of 
these households: 
 
“There were others in the same situation about 8 households. Most got RDP houses 
only one hasn't got it. Some sold their RDP houses because they thought they could 
stay at 4 Rooms. Some left Keiskammahoek one to King Williams Town, one to 
Dimbaza, one to another village Ulenye and one inherited a house here.”  
 
One of the households that are still living at Four Rooms waiting to be removed is a 76 years 
old widower who lives on his own. He worked on the scheme when the Ciskei government and 
Loxton and Venn operated it. He survives off his old age pension, meagre remittances and the 
produce he grows in his 0.2 hectare plot next to his house. He labours on this plot alone and 
uses the produce primarily for home consumption, although he sells a small surplus to 
                                                 
140 This is located nearby Unit 3, which is municipal land and is used for labourer and landowner accommodation. It is called 'Four Rooms' 
because each house has four rooms. 
141 There were differing testimonies from key informants 
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neighbours. The plot is clearly critical for his reproduction and losing access to the plot is a 
great fear. His testimony speaks to the precarity of some 'classes of labour’ and the negative 
impacts that the JV has had on some households, although it is contributing to livelihoods for 
those with access to jobs and dividends: 
 
“These houses were for workers from Loxton and Venn and now they belong to Seven 
Stars. Some workers already moved out if they had another house but I have no house 
so I stayed here. There were four people the municipality promised to build houses for 
before they are moved, but they didn't so we are still here. Loxton and Venn didn't even 
pay me properly many years, now they want to move me out here again… this coop! I 
have 0.2 hectares of land in front of the house; I worry for this land when they move 
me. I can't tell the municipality that I need to have a garden because they are working 
with Seven Stars ... I can't relax, I'm worried because I don't know when I will be 
pushed out. We are all South Africans, I don't know... " 
 
A testimony from another household follows and illustrates the negative impact this has had on 
their livelihoods and the strong affirmation that they should have received compensation for 
their removal. Clearly this has created much conflict between the removed households and the 
Seven Stars Cooperative: 
 
“We were staying in a house on the irrigation plot before but they wanted to renovate 
the farm so they chased us away. My mother was working on irrigation scheme for 14 
years from the 80s and people working there were given houses but when they 
developed the farm that house was in the way. You can see the house from here, now it 
is demolished and it’s a grazing field. They moved us after Amadlelo came here. We 
received no compensation. I tried to prevent the removal at the magistrate’s office but 
they couldn't help me there. They [the landowners] wanted us to leave in 1 week but the 
court said they must give us at least 3 months. I know five families that were removed 
like me. They were all staying on the farm for more than 20 years but Amadlelo and the 
farmers chased them away. It was better in the house on the farm because we had a 
decent house and access to water. We only got water here in the last two years. 
Relations are bad now with the farmers. They should have given us compensation!” 
 
Another testimony relays how access to water has been used in Keiskammahoek to pressure 
these households to move. Water was also reported as being used as a tool to get some of the 
previous 17 commercial dairy farmers at Shiloh off their plots. Conflicts around access to 
water and the very real ways in which deprivation of this right threatens social reproduction 
and daily survival are commonly used in the context of irrigation schemes as unfortunate, yet 
clearly effective tools, in removing people from the land.  
 
"“We took a state lawyer but the farmers had a lawyer too. That case went on, but the 
farmers won and they kicked us off from that place. We received no compensation. 
That house had four rooms this one just has one! Those houses had tiles and electricity 
that we invested in because we thought it was ours! At the last house in four rooms we 
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had a plot but we couldn't use it because the farmers closed the water in 2014. The tap 
was outside next to the house but then there was no water and also none in the 
household. Some farmers live there and their houses in 4 rooms had water and all the 
labourers had to share one tap. It was a way to push us out". 
 
9.5 Land Rights and Use in Shiloh in Historical Perspective 
 
Shiloh Irrigation Scheme after the Ciskei era until the JV was established 
 
 
“… After Ulimocor left, this scheme was closed in 1997 but nothing happened on the 
land from after 1994. The land was all vandalized, and it was just used as grazing land. 
The irrigation scheme was closed” (Nkosana/ Headman). 
 
In Shiloh, land use after Ulimocor withdrew, took a very different trajectory to 
Keiskammahoek.  With the latter, all households except two (both for reasons of illness) 
reported using their irrigation plots, until the JV was established. The table below, however, 
illustrates that in Shiloh, among respondents who could recall the history of land use after 
Ulimocor withdrew, 60% of dividend receiving households and 89% of dividend and JV wage 
receiving households reported not having used their plots after the period between 1994-1997. 
Only two households could be identified who were hiring labour more frequently and 
producing a surplus for sale (one household was hiring labour for crop production and the other 
was paying a herder). This stands in stark contrast to Keiskammahoek where 80% of 
respondents reported doing so.  
 
A respondent from a dividend receiving household that used his plot up until the JV was 
established in 2010 explains his livelihood during this time. Notably this household is a 
member of the so-called ‘opposition group’ that opposes the current leadership of the Mayime 
Cooperative. His loss of livelihood might be a contributing factor for his position. 
 
 
“We last used the land in 2010. We were growing maize, beans and vegetables. I used 
to hire people from Sada township and I would sell the vegetables and take some home 
to the ancestral household. In 2010 I was making about R200 from sales each month. It 
doesn’t sound like much but overall I was making more income from the land before 
because I always had enough food on the table. I would work with other landowners to 
pool resources to plough and sell. I was influenced by the other land owners to hand my 
land over to Amadlelo but I am not pleased with the current status” 
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Table 17. Purpose of Land use and Labour Relations on Irrigation Plots in Shiloh, 1994-2010. 
(N=62) 
 
 Category of 
respondent   
 Land use and labour 
relations Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulat
ive 
Percent 
Dividend 
Receiving 
Household 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Valid 
subsistence and sales, 
household labour only 2 8.7 10 10 
  
subsistence and sales, some 
hired labour  (soil prep and 
harvest) 2 8.7 10 20 
  
subsistence and sales, hired 
labour (more frequently) 1 4.3 5 25 
  
Grazing only, subsistence and 
ceremonial 2 8.7 10 35 
  
Grazing only, subsistence, 
ceremonial and sales (hired 
herder) 1 4.3 5 40 
  
Non-applicable (land not 
used) 12 52.2 60 100 
  Total 20 87 100   
Missing 
(unknown) 
 
3 13     
  Total   23 100     
Dividend and 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
  
  
  
  
Valid 
subsistence only, household 
labour only 1 10 11.1 11.1 
  
Non-applicable (land not 
used) 8 80 88.9 100 
  Total 9 90 100   
Missing 
(unknown) 99 1 10     
Total   10 100     
 
 
Important contextual factors that also explain the lack of production on irrigation plots prior to 
the JV, are the high levels of unemployment and poverty. In 1998 van Averbeke et al. reported 
that: 
 “According to Shiloh Irrigation Scheme management about 60% of the population of 
Sada/Whittlesea area is below 20 years of age with low income levels and either 
unschooled or considered functionally illiterate. Unemployment in the area is 
approximated at 90%.” (p.75).  
 
Evidence reported from the household survey, in Chapter 5 and 11 of this PhD thesis, of the 
contemporary context seems to illustrate that this is an enduring legacy of the past. Incomes are 
decidedly lower than Keiskammahoek, the incidence of female-headed households is much 
higher, and unemployment remains rife. High levels of poverty and unemployment also explain 
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van Averbeke et al.’s (1998) findings, that the main constraints of production on food plots in 
Shiloh were found foremost to be ‘theft’. Seen from this perspective, we begin to understand 
why production after the Ciskei era perhaps seemed risky and unpractical to Shiloh 
landowners, and hence why the land stood largely idle from 1994 until the implementation of 
the JV. The following statement emphasises these points: 
  
“After the Ciskei government and before the irrigation scheme started to work with 
Amadlelo, the land was used for the cattle and grazing. Even the buildings were 
vandalized .... People weren't growing any crops on the land because even if you did 
people would steal the crops and there was no fencing around the scheme” (Dividend 
and wage receiving household). 
 
When asked what household’s main reason was for not using their irrigation plots after 
Ulimocor was liquidated. Respondents (post-coded) responses revealed that: 40% didn’t use 
their plots because they received no inputs or extension support from government, 35% 
mentioned vandalism to the irrigation scheme and/or theft, 10% said they were too old to 
cultivate land, 10% said they didn’t have enough time and/or a shortage of household labour, 
and 5% directly mentioned the community conflict over land as the principle reason.  
 
The intragroup conflicts that emerged following Ulimocor’s hasty departure do appear to have 
contributed to the land mostly standing idle until the JV was formed. This seems to be the case 
even if it isn’t always directly mentioned. Often respondents would purposefully evade the 
subject of community conflicts. The vandalism that occurred to the scheme infrastructure and 
the 17 Commercial Dairy farmers’ properties, following the parastatal’s departure, seems to 
have resulted in an enduring rift in the community. The following statements reflect this: 
 
“Peoples’ source of living was good under Ulimocor but when it was liquidated people 
invaded the land and stole resources without any authorization and the village has been 
divided after that happened. After Ulimocor closed they moved back to the village. Some 
erected their own houses others are RDP houses as compensation for leaving the scheme. 
The houses on the irrigation scheme were all vandalized .... Since the village was divided 
after the fighting, some of the members said they are not going to run the irrigation 
scheme again and those who want to must do it from scratch. Those divisions started 
immediately after Ulimocor left and those divisions continue in this community today” 
         (Dividend receiving household). 
 
“After 1994 the land was not being used because people stole everything and vandalized 
the farms. So we weren't able to plant again because people stole everything here! The 
land was not used for anything after that. Siyazondla came here and planted mielies for 
us and we got some money at that stage. But it wasn't even two years they were here and 
then they never came back again” (Dividend and JV wage receiving household). 
 
According to key informant interviews there were two attempts to revive production on the 
land during this time, both which failed to produce sustainable outcomes. The first is that 
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mentioned above, when a few landowners were briefly supported to produce under 
government’s Siyazondla programme. There also appears to have been a time when the 
Massive Food Production Programme attempted to get production going on a portion of the 
land, which also failed to be sustainable as a member of Mayime Cooperative’s committee 
explains below:  
  
“We formed Masibambane Trust in 1999, but it didn't really work. We went to 
government to say we want to revive the scheme. The government said we can't do 
anything with this Trust, they said we should form the cooperative and we did this in 
2003. Then government helped with fencing and we tried to plant mielies, beans and 
potatoes. There is a centre pivot there by the dairy and we tried to plant beans there but 
they were planted late and we got nothing. We got just a few hectares of potatoes. But we 
had no tractors, we hired a tractor at Cradock and they charged us R 40, 000, so in the 
end we lost. We planted mielies there on the food plots through the Massive Food 
Production Programme, about 68 hectares. The year they came I think was 2004... They 
only came one year and then in 2005 they stopped because people don't want to work in 
this village. So after that there was no one working it was just grazing land, all of it.” 
 
All of these failed experiments resulted in a suspicion towards government, when the support 
was withdrawn. It also explains why the community may have felt at the time that a partnership 
with agribusiness was a more secure option. However, on the other hand, there were not many 
other choices available to them as government encouraged the cooperative to enter into the JV 
as a condition to revive the scheme under ReCap. 
 
9.6 Shiloh: Contemporary Context of Land Rights and Use in the Context of the JV 
 
As a contrast to Keiskammahoek, in Shiloh all of the irrigation plot owners accessed their land 
through customary allocations, by a traditional leader or from the Moravian Church. When 
households received access to their residential plots in upper and lower Shiloh villages, this 
generally included a field plot (located on the land that is now farmed by the JV). In Shiloh, 
traditional leaders (Nkosana/ headman) continue to play an active role in mediating land rights 
and use, along with other nested layers of social networks such as the household, family, kin 
and membership to other social groups.  
 
In Shiloh the neighbouring Sada settlement borders part of the JV farm. Sada residents 
received residential land through municipal allocations but don't have access to fields or 
grazing land. Table 18 below reports the distribution of land allocations for the different 
categories of respondents. Unlike Keiskammahoek where a number of households had access 
to two residential properties, at Shiloh among the sample of 62 households I only recorded two 
cases from Dividend and JV Wage Receiving Household with access to a second customary 
allocation, both of which were located outside of Shiloh. 
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Table 18. Type of Land Allocation: Residential Land in Shiloh Sample 
(N=62) 
 
 Category of 
respondent  Type of allocation Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Dividend 
Receiving 
Household 
  
  
Customary 
allocation 19 82.6 82.6 
Moravian church 
allocation 4 17.4 100 
Total 23 100 
 JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
  
  
  
Customary 
allocation 7 77.8 77.8 
Moravian church 
allocation 1 11.1 88.9 
Renting 1 11.1 100 
Total 9 100 
 Dividend and JV 
Wage Receiving 
Household 
Customary 
allocation 10 100 100 
No JV Benefits 
Household 
  
  
  
Customary 
allocation 12 60 60 
Municipal 
allocation with title 7 35 95 
Moravian church 
allocation 1 5 100 
Total 20 100 
  
Access to land for cropping and livestock farming 
 
The table below looks at patterns of labour hiring in household gardens and their relative 
contribution to household reproduction. Firstly, what is noticeable is that dividend receiving 
households have the largest proportion of households cultivating household gardens and they 
are followed by JV wage receiving households. The latter aren’t hiring labour in household 
gardens, however, 33% of households are selling a marketable surplus. A significant 
proportion of dividend receiving households are hiring labour in household gardens. 31.8% hire 
labour occasionally for soil preparation and harvesting, and cultivate household gardens 
exclusively to meet household subsistence. A further 13.6% are hiring labour more frequently 
and selling a surplus. Dividend and JV wage receiving households have lower proportions 
hiring labour. Only 10% of households are hiring labour for soil preparation and harvesting but 
cultivating exclusively to meet household subsistence. The largest proportion of these 
households makes use of unpaid household labour for subsistence only (30%), followed by 
20% who also sell a surplus.  
 
A large proportion of No JV Benefits Households are not cultivating gardens (45%). 10% of 
households make use of paid household labour, all of which were cases of elder pensioners 
paying younger kin to help in household gardens. Only 5% of households are hiring labour 
more frequently to meet household subsistence and selling a surplus. The largest proportion of 
these households (30%), make use of unpaid household labour for subsistence only. Overall it 
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is clear that there is much less hiring of labour in Shiloh for household gardens, as compared to 
Keiskammahoek. I have not included field plots in the table below. Only four households had 
access to a field plot, one in each category of respondent. However, only two households had 
used their fields in the last year. One JV wage receiving household was using it for cropping, 
making use of household labour and selling a small surplus. Another dividend and JV wage 
receiving household was using the plot to graze their livestock. 
 
Table 19. Shiloh: Type of Labour in Household Gardens and Contribution to Household 
Reproduction 
(N=62 Households) 
 
Type of labour and contribution 
to reproduction (subsistence 
and/or 
 surplus sales) 
Dividend 
Receiving 
Household 
N=23 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
N=9 
Dividend and 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
N=10 
No JV 
Benefits 
Household 
N=20 
Subsistence only, unpaid 
household labour 13.60% 33.30% 30.00% 30.00% 
Subsistence only, some hired 
labour  
(soil preparation and harvest only) 31.80% 
 
10.00% 
 Subsistence only, paid household 
labour 
   
10.00% 
Subsistence and sales, unpaid 
household labour 13.60% 33.30% 20.00% 10.00% 
Subsistence and sales, hired labour 
(frequently) 13.60% 
  
5.00% 
Not applicable/ Garden not 
cultivated: 27.30% 33.30% 40.00% 45.00% 
 
When this data is disaggregated by gender of household members engaged in farming, in all 
types of labour application in farming except ‘with hired’ there are more males engaged in 
farming. This seemingly goes against research findings, which suggest that generally more 
women are involved in farming in the former homelands.  For farming 'with hired labour', 
however, what is interesting is that there are comparatively more females engaged in farming 
(65% of households hiring labour involved women). Many of these females are from female-
headed households. This data also speaks to generational aspects, since many of these females 
are elderly widows that commonly hire labour for tasks such as soil preparation. It also speaks 
to the domestic demands on the labour of female members of households, so they are less 
available to farm themselves. Many of these elder widows are looking after grandchildren and 
are hiring someone to assist with cropping and tending to livestock, however, mostly on a very 
limited basis. 
 
Table 20 below reports the data on use of the communal grazing land by different categories of 
respondents. It is clear that the no JV benefits households make the least use of the communal 
grazing camps. These households were all located in Shiloh village, although they do not have 
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access to field plots or irrigation plots, their membership to the customary community in Shiloh 
means they are able to access the camps. Residents of Sada are not allowed to access these 
camps, as they are not regarded as members of the customary community. Furthermore there is 
the on going conflict over their occupation of what is alleged to be the Shiloh residents' 
traditional grazing land.  
 
Table 20. Shiloh: Households that Have Used the Communal Grazing Camps in the Last Year 
 (N=62) 
 
Category of 
respondent 
 Used grazing land in 
last year? Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Dividend Receiving 
Households 
  
  
Yes 11 47.8 47.8 
No 12 52.2 100 
Total 23 100   
JV Wage Receiving 
Households 
  
  
Yes 4 44.4 44.4 
No 5 55.6 100 
Total 9 100   
Dividend and JV 
Wage Receiving 
Households 
  
  
Yes 7 70 70 
No 3 30 100 
Total 10 100   
No JV Benefits 
Households 
  
Yes 2 10 10 
No 18 90 100 
Total 20 100   
 
Dividend and JV wage receiving households make the most use of the grazing camps (70% of 
households), which is also linked to their relative wealth in livestock ownership, which will be 
reported in Chapter 11. They are followed by dividend receiving households (47.8%) and then 
JV wage receiving households (44.4%). Notably there is not much difference between the latter 
groups. Ownership of the irrigation plot land has not created the same degree of differentiation 
between the groups, as is the case in Keiskammahoek, since the plots are smaller and have 
remained largely unused from 1994 until the JV. This historical context, along with the smaller 
JV dividends has meant that accumulation through land is not occurring and translating into 
investment in livestock ownership. Wages remain relatively more important than land, in 
determining accumulation in Shiloh. 
9.7 Shiloh: Land Conflicts and Contestations 
 
The neighbouring Sada settlement was established during the Ciskei as a relocation site for 
forced removals. It remains the subject of fierce contention between Sada residents and 
customary landowners in Upper and Lower Shiloh. Shiloh residents contend that Sada was 
their customary grazing land before the Ciskei government reallocated it as residential land for 
households that had been forcibly removed. A collective land claim has been submitted to the 
area, which is yet to be resolved.  These conflicts play out in the distribution of benefits from 
the JV farm because residents from Sada are not eligible to apply for jobs on the JV farm- this 
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is a bone of contention in the community. The intention of a section of the claimants, led by the 
Nkosana, is to use the land currently occupied by Sada residents to extend the grazing land for 
the JV dairy farm. However, not all claimants agree with this proposed use of land. Many 
would prefer cash compensation or to use the land for cropping and grazing. It is most likely 
that cash compensation would be the outcome of the land claim. This conflict illustrates how 
the JV invention finds itself unavoidably embroiled in local politics around land rights and use.  
'Opposition Groups' Among the Landowners 
 
There are contentions over who the legitimate ‘landowners’ are in Shiloh village. I heard 
several claims that people are receiving dividends even though they are not ‘landowners’, as 
the quote below suggests.  
 
“278 people own the dairy who are supposed to get money ... But because of corruption 
there are 395 who are getting the money. There is a fight in this village about this, some 
of those top members of Mayime Cooperative are not even landowners.” 
 
Although the claims that some households are receiving dividends without being landowners 
through patronage to the traditional leader or corruption couldn’t be fully verified, they 
shouldn’t be ruled out as a possibility either.142 Despite several attempts to receive a list of 
landowners from the Mayime Cooperative, I was unsuccessful. Historical records143 of the 
Shiloh irrigation scheme however refer to 334 hectares owned by 278 landowners, which was 
pooled together to form a group farm (Van Averbeke, 1998). These 278 landowners also 
received ¼ hectare food plots, as discussed above. Additional households however also 
received food plots bringing the total number of ‘farming households’ with access to food plots 
to 558 144 . Some of the additional beneficiaries receiving dividends could be from these 
additional food plot holders, since the JV farm has extended from an initial area of 330 
hectares to a total area of 450 hectares after renting food plots.  
 
Azikiwe Isaac (2014: 73-4) notes in a PhD study on Shiloh Irrigation Scheme that “there are 
approximately 237 beneficiaries in the dairy project serviced by the scheme… In Shiloh, there 
were 450 ha of irrigated plots shared amongst 338 beneficiaries”. This illustrates the prevailing 
uncertainty around the number of beneficiaries. This has created tensions among the 
‘customary landowners’. These questions of who the legitimate beneficiaries of the project are, 
along with the tensions described in Chapter 7 over the governance of Mayime Cooperative has 
created an enduring rift in the community. Those who support the Mayime Cooperative and the 
JV project would commonly disregard the claims of the 'opposition members' by emphasising 
that they were opposed to 'development', as the following quote from a dividend receiving 
household reflects:  
                                                 
142 It is recommended that an investigation be carried out directed by government, since the Mayime Cooperative was not willing to share lists 
of beneficiaries/landowners or other documents and reports. The immense secrecy and distrust during research may also reflect the 
nervousness on the part of the cooperative because of an on-going court case led by an opposition group.  
143 Report prepared by consultants Loxton, Hunting and Associates in November 1979 who were commissioned by the Ciskei Marketing and 
Development Board to develop a plan to revitalize the Shiloh Irrigation Scheme (in Averbeke, 1998). 
144 “The 113,75 ha of food plots consisted of 280 plots (70 ha) allocated to (278) land right holders and 175 plots (43,75 ha) part of which were 
allocated to people who lost arable land when Sada Township was developed and the rest was offered for rent to households who did not have 
land rights.” (Averbeke, 1998) 
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“These divisions in this community started after Ulimocor left. You will meet people 
going around the village who are not supporting this Amadlelo project, they just want 
this land to be used for grazing land and building their shacks. They don't want progress 
here, they just vandalise!”  
 
The heightened tensions and politics among the landowners in Shiloh resulted in the opposition 
group taking the Cooperative to court. The Mayime Cooperative won this initial case, however, 
another round of court proceedings were in the planning at the time of research in November 
2016. This quote from a dividend receiving household explains some of the tensions around the 
conflict between the Mayime Cooperative Committee and the opposition group:  
 
“There has been resistance against the Mayime Cooperative from this community and 
there is a power struggle over the committee. We tried to invite the other side to our 
meetings to handle things in the right way and to meet with Chris Hani municipality but 
they all refused to talk to us. So we wrote a letter to Thuli Madonsela to ask her to come 
here. She sent someone here, an intelligence person. The Isibonda [headman] instead 
called the police and there was a shooting here when people came to give audience to 
the investigation… it was rubber bullets though. That investigation concentrated on the 
shooting incident instead of the problems of this dairy and we had to get our own legal 
team to defend us… but the other side won”. 
 
A respondent from Amadlelo Agri explains the conflict at Shiloh from his perspective: 
 
“The unwritten thing about the conflict at Shiloh is people want to be where the money 
is… At the end of the day their demands are to be closer to the bank account. They 
wanted access to the Mayime books but they don't have books, these structures are 
incredibly weak! When the thing at Shiloh first started I had endless sms’s and calls. I 
said I would meet with them as long as it's with government because we are here 
through government and Mayime is meant to be our port of call. The opposition party 
actively canvased but they said they don't want government involved. But I said I can 
only meet if government is present, and I was told Mayime is the cooperative… The 
court case ended last year but this won't solve anything.” 
 
A worker on the farm explains some of the issues of contention in this statement. It also 
reflects the difficulties of labouring in such a contentious environment, which was an issue 
raised by many labourers: 
 
“Some of the issues are that the dividends come after 6 months, but they want the 
money every month…. But the cooperative say if they pay every month there will be a 
loss. A lot of people are not happy with it, there are opposers of this project. Half of the 
beneficiaries I think are unhappy. One time they came here to take out the cows but we 
are workers and we can’t let them do that. They wanted to take them out the fields and 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 211 
put them just on the tar road to be knocked by the cars. Another thing they wanted is 
milk for every community member that is a landowner, but that will create a loss.” 
 
The above quote reflects the inherent tension between capitalist farming and social 
reproduction. The threat by a faction of customary landowners to harm the dairy cattle and 
therefore technically their own farm is not unique. I came across numerous similar examples, 
indicating that JVs seem particularly susceptible to acts of vandalism. In the case of Shiloh 
these conflicts have their roots in the intense reproductive squeeze many households are 
subject to. The establishment of rural labour markets through JV jobs, and differential access to 
them as a result of the undemocratic governance of the cooperative, has heightened processes 
of social differentiation and all the associated conflict this may bring along intersecting lines of 
class, generation, gender, ethnicity and religious affiliation. These tensions will be explored in 
more depth in the proceeding chapters.  
 
This quote from the headman below also reflects the tension between poorer households who 
want all the profits to be paid out as dividends, and other better-off households (and those who 
stand to benefit) who want to reinvest the profits. Clearly, at the time of research, the power 
balance had swayed to the latter group, which is creating a host of tensions and conflicts in the 
community: 
 
“There is a tension between investing to grow the business and the demand for 
dividends. People don't want to understand that we need to pay the operating costs of 
the business, they just want their payments…The beneficiaries are satisfied with the 
dividend but there are queries that it is so little. We had to explain to them that the 
money goes back into the business. Some people say we must keep some money to run 
this company when Amadlelo is gone. Mayime has some money that is saved, around 
R300, 000 in their fixed deposit account. After the ten year period, if Amadlelo says 
they must go, then we will have a way to try and do the project ourselves in the future... 
After ten years I would prefer to continue with Amadlelo Agri because we don't have 
the skills to do it”.  
 
Interestingly across several interviews with members of the opposition group, most did not 
raise alternative production models to the JV model 145 .  Their primary concern was the 
governance and financial transparency of the cooperative. This appeared to be, in part, a result 
of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the possible pathways of development available to them in 
a context where it is near impossible to receive access to state funding, without a strategic 
partner. Some said they would like to continue with Amadlelo Agri, while others said they 
would prefer to find a different strategic partner. 
 
The long history of intragroup conflict has certainly influenced the poor levels of trust among 
the customary landowners. Given this reality, people might prefer an outsider to run the 
business. As documented in the previous chapter the Shiloh Irrigation Scheme was also set up 
                                                 
145 There were some households however from among the 17 Dairy Farmers who said they would want to control production of the dairy 
themselves. And a few households who said they would prefer to have their small plots back to cultivate on their own, although this was a 
minority. Some asserted they made better use of the land before when it was grazing land. 
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by white consultants, after which it was managed by Ulimocor officials in a top down manner. 
Customary landowners received dividends from a group farm that they played no role in 
managing. The JV model thus simply provides continuity to these social relations of 
production, and the community’s role as ‘shareholders’ and ‘labourers’ is nothing new.  
 
Historical context of the land conflict surrounding the 17 commercial dairy farmers 
 
At Shiloh there were only 17 commercial dairy farmers146, where production was organized 
along similar lines as Keiskammahoek. However, the fortunes of the Shiloh dairy farmers did 
not prosper along the same trajectory as Keiskammahoek's dairy farmers, since they were 
never afforded the same opportunity to accumulate and purchase their land, inputs and dairy 
cows. Many of these 17 dairy farmers are in fact no longer beneficiaries of the irrigation 
scheme. Allegedly only two of these households receive dividends, through access to 
additional field or food plots, linked to a customary homestead located in Shiloh village147.  
 
During the Ciskei era, these 17 dairy farmers lived on properties located on the irrigation 
scheme. Some of these farming households lost access to their properties on the irrigation 
scheme when it was vandalized, following the liquidation of the Ciskei parastatal Ulimocor in 
1997. A few managed to hang on to their land, in spite of alleged attempts by various factions 
in the community and the state to displace them. However, these households have subsequently 
been relocated with the establishment of the JV. Some received alternative housing from the 
JV scheme, and others directly from the state. All four households that I interviewed were 
unsatisfied with their residential properties, which do not include sufficient land to farm on, a 
part from small household gardens. The following statement from one of these households is 
illustrative of this conflict: 
 
" My father was a commercial farmer on the Ciskei irrigation scheme from 1981-1997 
under Ulimocor. He was one of the dairy farmers. We were evicted in 1997 by the other 
landowners, 13 families were all evicted by people who are still living here in this 
community and two families left before. Our house was vandalized so we had to leave. 
The scraps of our tractors148 are still in the houses of some of those people now! Some 
of those people are on the Mayime Committee now. Some farmers managed to stay but 
my father had an option to move, so he did, and then he died that same year in 1997. 
People wanted that land, that's why they vandalized it. But it was from the Ciskei 
government, so they wanted to get rid of all those things connected to it. We have been 
talking to government in Bhisho about this, but we don't have any lawyers representing 
us. The outcome that I want is justice for those farmers ... some of those 17 dairy 
farmers don't have anything!"  
 
                                                 
146 Some respondents referred to 15 dairy farmers, the number is an area of dispute. 
147 This number is based on key informant interviews. However there is a possibility that this may be inaccurate and therefore I cannot 
unequivocally assert this without access to financial records.  
148 Note that the previous statement above claimed that it was the opposition group that stole Ulimocor equipment and this statement offers a 
counter claim. 
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The state’s continued failure since 1994 to resolve the dispossession of the 17 dairy farmers, in 
terms of both land and the means of production (particularly dairy animals owed to them), has 
meant that in desperation their frustrations have shifted focus to the JV and Amadlelo Agri at 
times. These land struggles form an important historical context to the emerging contemporary 
conflicts over land, which is playing out over the JV. The Nkosana (headman) explains this 
historical context in the statement below. The statement seems to emphasise that they ‘rented’, 
the land and that in reality this land always belonged to the ‘Shiloh’ customary community.  
 
“Under Ulimocor when they took this land there were some commercial farmers using it. 
There were 17 dairy farmers and each had 4 hectares. They were running the dairy at that 
time. But those commercial farmers gave us a rent for our land, but it went to Ulimocor 
and not to us the landowners. The 17 commercial farmers came from this community... 
maybe there were two or three coming from outside. But many of the outside ones are 
dead now".  
 
This type of framing was common among other respondents as well, who wanted to emphasise 
that these 17 farmers never really had substantial rights to this land. This is a way to justify that 
they currently do not have a right to claim benefits from the JV. The statement below also 
emphasises that the benefits of this commercial production under Ulimocor derived not to the 
customary landowners but to Ulimocor. Many respondents would also disregard the claims of 
these 17 farmers by noting that most of them ‘are dead now’, mostly referring to male heads of 
households, in spite of the fact that their kin may still have claims to these farms.  
 
“ During Ulimocor there were lots of dairy cows here and maybe 50 cows milked per 
farmer because there were two dairies on the land. Some of those 17 farmers are dead 
already. Others don't have a dividend ... for example, Farmer B is coloured and he lives 
in Queenstown since he was removed. Farmer S is not a landowner even though he 
comes from here. Those dairy farmers that are not from here didn't get to keep their land. 
They are just staying here in the village. The ones from outside can get access to a place 
to stay in the village but they can't be landowners on the irrigation land. There is no place 
for them, that place is for the landowners from Shiloh. People who are not from the 
community, can't own the land, they can only rent it… No one reallocated their land, it 
just went back to the community, on that central unit where the dairy is now”.  
        (Dividend receiving household)  
 
This conflict illustrates how the capitalist farming venture faces a complex challenge in 
operating in a context where the legitimacy of rights to and use of land are constantly contested 
by numerous overlapping claims. There is evidence of livelihood benefits from these JVs in the 
form of the creation of much needed jobs, dividend payments and some limited opportunities 
for accumulation. However, these benefits are entangled in contexts of historical dispossession 
and exploitation for other individuals and groups, which play out in complex ways around the 
JV. 
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9.8 Conclusion 
 
Land rights and changes to patterns of land use, diverge between the case studies. Most of 
Keiskammahoek's 35 irrigation plot owners have come to enjoy the benefits of private titles 
over relatively large stretches of land. At Keiskammahoek, unlike in Shiloh, irrigation plots 
remained central to their livelihoods from the democratic period up until the formation of the 
JV149. However, accumulation in farming was limited, and meeting the requirements of social 
reproduction, in most cases, necessitated combining farm and off-farm incomes. However, 
despite their challenges, 80% of Keiskammahoek farmers claimed that they were selling a 
surplus and hiring labour frequently. The new social relations of production that the JV entails, 
where these households are now in the position of workers and/ or passive recipients of 
dividends, have entailed quite a drastic change. The difficulties that these household's faced 
due to a lack of government support since 1994, along with the generational characteristics of 
elder household heads, (with migrant children), in part explains the decision to enter a JV. 
Most landowners have retained 1- 2 hectares of land for their own-account farming, unlike in 
Shiloh where the JV farms all of the land, including the food plots.  
 
In Shiloh, the way the irrigation scheme was historically structured, the different nature of land 
rights (small communal plots), and the history of land conflicts, all produced a very different 
historical trajectory of class formation. There are no examples to be found of historical 
accumulation through land and agriculture in Shiloh, in the same way that Keiskammahoek 
reveals. Those irrigation plot owners that have accumulated, have done so mostly outside of 
farming. In Shiloh most landowners have given over the use of all of their land to the JV, with 
a minority maintaining a few quarter hectare food plots. This has limited the ability of 
households in Shiloh to continue to engage in own-account farming to the same extent as 
households in Keiskammahoek. However, the majority150 of Shiloh’s customary landowners 
did not use their plots after 1997 and wage labour and social grants came to form the bedrock 
of livelihoods. During the Ciskei era, most households received dividends or wages from the 
group farm, which is a surprising continuity with the social relations that the JV entails. 
 
At both Shiloh and Keiskammahoek there are some noticeable conflicts and contestations 
around land. This creates a challenging context in which the JVs must operate. The 
Keiskammahoek case study illustrates that, in the context of the communal areas, even where 
land is privately owned, the legitimacy of land rights continue to be subject to negotiation 
based on membership to various, nested social groups (Berry, 1993; Moore, 1998).  
Landowners continue to be referred to as 'settlers' and in many cases treated as 'outsiders'. The 
JV has also resulted in a loss of land use rights for former labourers from the Ciskei era, who 
have been removed from on-farm housing.  
 
Similarly, at Shiloh an on-going land conflict from the post-Ciskei era has found a new 
expression in the context of the JV, because the state has failed to address the longstanding 
claims of 17 dairy farming households that lost land and dairy animals. At Shiloh, within the 
group of irrigation plot owners, the emergence of an 'opposition group' reflects another layer of 
                                                 
149 Only two households were not making use of their plots due to ill health. 
150 60% of dividend receiving households and 89% of dividend and JV wage receiving households 
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contention over rights to and use of communal plots. This intragroup conflict ultimately 
reflects complex dynamics of class, generation, religion and allegiance to customary groups. 
The heightened tensions around land in Shiloh have historical roots but the smaller dividends 
no doubt fuel this conflict. However, as I will now show in the preceding two chapters, they are 
also an expression of the more extreme pressures placed on social reproduction at Shiloh, as 
compared to Keiskammahoek. 
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Chapter 10. Household Composition and Livelihoods in Keiskammahoek 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the current 151  status of local livelihood systems and household 
composition in Keiskammahoek. The objective is to understand how households meet their 
social reproduction. I have captured a full picture of household incomes and assets, given that a 
number of off-farm income sources are critical to livelihoods in the former homelands. I also 
explore how the character of household composition affects social reproduction (e.g. dynamics 
of generation and gender). This allows me to create a fuller picture of how the benefits derived 
from the JV in the form of jobs, dividends and land rents, fit into the wider reproductive 
strategies of households. The character of livelihood systems prior to the JVs, and how they 
relate to land rights and use, has already been touched on in Chapters 5 and 9. In this chapter I 
also present some household perspectives about how livelihoods compare prior to and since the 
establishment of the JV farms.  
 
The primary unit of analysis in this chapter is the household152. I begin by providing a brief 
overview of some key features of the sample153. I also compare key features of households 
from my four ‘taxonomic groups’154, which relate to the JV in distinctive ways (as workers, 
landowners, both or with no direct connection). Besides these taxonomic groups, I also group 
households by ‘gender of household head’ and by ‘asset groups’155. This allows me to explore 
distinctive characteristics of households, and to determine whether there are any causal links 
between these variables e.g. ownership of an irrigation plot and household assets. The analysis 
employed thus makes use of complex and overlapping conceptions of groups. This provides a 
means to decipher which factors are determining of the position of households, and what this 
tells us about how the JV impacts livelihoods, land rights and dynamics of social 
differentiation. Instead of providing a conclusion at the end of this Chapter, I reserve this for 
Chapter 11, where I will provide a comparative analysis of Keiskammahoek and Shiloh.   
 
10.2 Overview of Livelihoods and Household Composition in Keiskammahoek 
 
Some key features of household composition in Keiskammahoek are reported in Table 21, for 
my sample of 55 households, which includes 368 individuals. The data on household income 
and assets, illustrates a wide range in the material status of households included in the sample, 
pointing towards differentiation within the sample as a whole. The median household size is 6, 
with the smallest household comprising a single person and the largest 14 people. The median 
age of a household head is 60 years.  
 
                                                 
151 The household survey was conducted in Keiskammahoek in October 2016 and in Shiloh in November 2016, with a one-year recall period. 
152 See Chapter 4 for more on the methodology and conceptual critique of the household as a unit of analysis. 
153 This includes 55 households in Keiskammahoek. 
154 In Chapter 12 I will introduce my class typology into the analysis. However, for the purpose of understanding the different ways in which 
the JV has contributed to livelihoods (or put them at risk), the analysis for now is constructed foremost around the taxonomic groups, because 
they speak directly to household interactions with the JV farms. 
155 See chapter 4 for more on the methodology employed for delineating these groups and sampling households. 
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Table 21. Table of Key Features of Household Composition for Keiskammahoek Sample 
(N=55 households) 
  
Adults in 
househol
d 
 Children 
(0-18) in 
househol
d 
Househol
d Size  Age of 
househol
d head 
Males 
present 
most/ all 
nights 
Female
s 
present 
most/ 
all 
nights 
 Total 
yearly  
income  
Total  
Househol
d 
Assets156 
Mean 4.84 1.85 6.69 61.22 1.53 1.36 R166 815 44 
Median 5.00 1.00 6 60.00 1.00 1.00 R128 495 40 
Range 7 7 13 49 5 5 R716 565 72 
 
In South Africa the upper-bound poverty line (UBPL) and lower-bound poverty line (LBPL) 
consider the cost of basic food and other basic living needs like shelter, clothing and 
transportation157. The UBPL is R992 per person per month and the LBPL is R647158. The 
government makes use of the lower-bound poverty line for poverty reduction targets in policy 
documents like the Medium Term Strategic Framework and National Development Plan 
(Wilkinson, 2018). Significantly, when these poverty lines are applied to my sample, none of 
the households with access to irrigation plots, (JV dividend and JV dividend and wage 
receiving households), are living below either poverty line. Access to the relatively large 
dividends, along with some households that have access to JV jobs, may contribute to this.  
 
11% of my total sample is living below the LBPL, all of which are no JV benefits households. 
31% of my sample is living below the upper-bound poverty line (UBPL). 59% of households 
living below the UBPL are no JV benefits households, while 41% are JV wage receiving 
households. If we compare these poverty rates to the national and provincial averages, in 2015 
55.5% of South Africans were living in poverty (UBPL) and poverty was most acutely 
concentrated in the Eastern Cape where 72.9% of residents live in poverty. Clearly, the way 
that I have sampled households would have an influence on how representative they are in 
relation to national and provincial averages. 27.3% of my sample is no JV benefits households, 
receiving no dividends or jobs from the development intervention. Whereas the remainder is 
receiving some benefits, 14.5 % are receiving dividends, 38.2 % are receiving JV jobs and 20% 
are receiving both dividends and jobs. Most of my sample is therefore receiving some stable 
income. Unlike poor households without access to a ‘development intervention’ like a JV, 
which survive mainly on social grants, remittances and possibly some precarious wage labour. 
 
A cross-tabulation of household heads and marital status, reveals that 45.4% of all household 
heads in Keiskammahoek are married in a civil union and/or traditional marriage, 3.6% are co-
habiting, 7.3% are divorced, 5.5% are separated or abandoned, 29.1% is widowed and 9.1% 
have never been married. When the data is disaggregated by gender of household head, the 
majority of female household heads (68.7%) are widows, whereas only 12.8% of male 
household heads are widowed. 31.3% of female-headed households are single (including 
divorced, separated or co-habiting women) and have gained access to residential land in their 
                                                 
156 See attachments for list of assets included in the livelihood survey. See chapter on methodology for how assets were scored. A total asset 
score of 66 was possible, if households had one of each type of asset (they may have more). 
157 These poverty lines were adjusted in 2017 but I will make use of the 2015 lines, since the survey was conducted in 2016 
158 See: http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334 ; https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-official-poverty-numbers/ 
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own right. This finding is in line with other research, which has illustrated that since 1994 
single women have had improved access to residential land in the former homelands (Claasens, 
2013). However, the larger proportion of female-headed households with widows, illustrates 
how women’s access to land is, still to a great degree, reliant on their relations with men 
(Cousins 2013 b; Fay, 2005; Oomen, 2005).  
 
For my sample of all women (not only household heads), 55% have never been married, 26% 
are married in a civil union, 3% are traditionally married, 11% are widowed, 1.5% are co-
habiting with a partner and 3.5% are divorced, separated or abandoned. These statistics are in 
line with general trends in the decreased incidence of marriage in the former homelands 
(Claassens, 2013; Hunter, 2005). The poorest households tend to divest in social institutions 
such as marriage, especially where culturally, marriage necessitates gifting of ‘bride wealth’. 
High levels of unemployment, decreased incidence of remittances and women’s access to 
social grants, have also been identified as contributing factors (Sharp and Spiegel, 1985; Berry, 
1989; Claassens, 2013). 
 
Table 22. Livelihood Sources and Household Composition in Keiskammahoek  
(N=55 households) 
 
Livelihood Sources in Keiskammahoek: By number of household members with access to various income sources 
  
H
ousehold size 
Proportion under 18 
years 
Proportion of adults 
present m
ost/all nights 
 Types of incom
e 
sources in household 
A
dults w
ith no incom
e 
sources 
O
ther agricultural 
form
al job (not JV
) 
  O
ther agricultural 
inform
al jobs (not JV
) 
O
ff-farm
 form
al jobs 
O
ff-farm
 inform
al 
jobs 
C
ivil servant jobs 
 O
w
n-account farm
ing 
w
ithout labourers 
 O
w
n-account farm
ing 
w
ith labourers 
 Self-em
ployed 
w
ithout labour 
 Self-em
ployed w
ith                                               
labour 
 Public w
orks jobs 
 C
ivil servant pension 
 O
ld age grants 
 C
hild support grants 
 R
em
ittances in cash 
Mean 7 0.24 0.6 6 0.85 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Median 6 0.25 0.6 6 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Sum 368 
  
304 47 2 4 33 34 11 61 13 15 5 16 5 32 64 20 
 
Table 22 above illustrates that in Keiskammahoek a median of 40% of adult household 
members are still migrating for work. Households meet their livelihoods from numerous 
sources with a mean of 6 different types159. Agricultural employment outside of the JV is 
insignificant. Own-account farming without labour is still practiced by most households and is 
significant to social reproduction (including the ceremonial function of livestock), but 
inconsequential to household incomes. Minimal sales are made to neighbours, with only a few 
targeting formal markets. Remittances, formerly the mainstay of rural livelihoods, have 
declined in part having been replaced by social grants. The most prominent sources of income 
are wage employment outside of agriculture. There was a mean of one off-farm formal job per 
household but these jobs all involved migration, while some informal jobs (also a mean of 1) 
could be found in the case study site or nearby villages and towns.  
 
                                                 
159 This refers to number of ‘types of livelihood sources’ (e.g. old age grant, public works jobs etc.) not the total number of livelihood sources. 
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When households are further divided into asset quartiles, I found that all the civil servant 
positions and own-account farming with labourers are located in the middle and rich 
households, while self-employment with labour is only found in the rich households. This 
finding points towards a correlation between asset quartiles and capital/labour relations. Public 
works jobs are concentrated in the poor households where there is a mean of one, while none of 
these jobs were found in the middle and rich households. Child support grants and old age 
grants are critical to all households but intersect with generational characteristics of 
households.  
 
Table 23. Household Composition, Incomes and Assets by Gender of Household Heads in 
Keiskammahoek, 
 (N= 55 households) 
 
  
% Of 
Adults 
Present 
Most 
Nights 
% Under 
18 years 
 Total 
yearly 
cash 
income 
Total 
income 
from own 
account 
farming 
% Of 
income 
from own 
account 
farming  
% Of 
income 
from 
Social 
grants  
 Number 
of off-
farm 
formal 
jobs 
Number 
of off-
farm 
informal 
jobs 
Cattle 
owned  
Total 
household 
assets 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Female-
headed 
households 
N= 16 0.58 0.32 R120 910 R2085 0.02 0.25 0 0 2 43 
Male-
headed 
households 
N= 39 0.61 0.21 R196 566 R16 442 0.08 0.17 1 1 7 44 
 
Table 23 above explores some key features of female and male-headed households. In the 
sample of households in Keiskammahoek there are 39 male-headed households (70.9% of 
sample) and 16 female-headed households (29.1%). Male-headed households have a higher 
mean income, as well as more household assets and cattle. However, within the sample of 
male-headed households and female-headed households, there is also differentiation160. There 
is however, clearly a larger range among male-headed households, particularly when it comes 
to the distribution of yearly income. There is a minimum of R20 000 and a maximum of R736 
600. The range is smaller among female-headed households where the minimum is R42 580 
but the maximum is R232 680 per year.  
 
The richest households, in terms of both income and assets, are male-headed households (but 
so are the poorest). The poorest female-headed households are often sheltered from severe 
income or asset deprivation by social grants, particularly child support grants. The data 
reported above indicates that a greater proportion of household incomes are derived from social 
grants in female-headed households. Male-headed households, however, derive larger portions 
of their income from own-account farming, which is clearly linked to livestock ownership. 
Female- headed households also have larger proportions of household members under 18, 
which would further influence their comparatively lower incomes, since fewer members are of 
                                                 
160 This is suggested by how the mean is skewed higher than the median, and there is a relatively high standard deviation for both groups. I 
have only reported the means in this table for ease of reading and space. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 220 
working age. Significantly, male-headed households have a mean of one permanent and casual 
off-farm job, whereas female-headed households do not.  
 
These findings thus reflect the broader literature, which highlights how female-headed 
households tend to be overall more vulnerable. This is because of gendered struggles in the 
work place, home, kin networks and other social spaces. Women (particularly when unmarried) 
also generally have inferior customary inheritance rights to land and livestock, which are 
contingent on their relationships with male household members (Claasens, 2013; Cousins 2013 
b; Fay, 2005; Oomen, 2005; Berry, 1989; Whitehead and Tsikata, 2003; Knowles, 1991).  
10.3 Livelihoods and Household Composition by Taxonomic Groups in 
Keiskammahoek 
 
Table 24 below captures some important aspects of socio-economic differentiation by the JV 
related taxonomic groups. The first important thing to notice is how the households fit into the 
various asset groups. Notably there is no ‘poor’ grouping among the JV dividend receiving 
households and there is only one female-headed household classified as asset ‘poor’ among the 
dividend & JV wage receiving households. The majority (53%) of no JV benefits households 
are, however, classified as asset poor, along with and a fair proportion of the JV wage 
receiving households (28.6%). If, as the literature suggests, asset ownership can be considered 
a reliable proxy for household wealth, (June et al., 2012; Ewerling et al., 2017) then clearly 
access to an irrigation plot is a determining factor in the wealth status of households. Among 
those households without irrigation plots, it is those with access to JV jobs who have more 
assets.  
 
Notably the JV dividend receiving households have much larger median household sizes than 
the rest of the sample. This has to be read in conjunction with the age of household heads, 
which is by far the oldest at 75 years old. It was common for these elder pensioners to be 
looking after the grandchildren of migrant parents. The table below also illustrates that this 
group has the largest proportion of household members under 18 years old (33%). JV dividend 
receiving households would commonly explain that they were using their dividends to take 
care of their grandchildren who had been left in their care. Some of these households were also 
sending ‘reverse remittances’ (from rural to urban areas) to migrant children looking for jobs in 
the cities. This quote from a female-headed JV dividend receiving household reflects this 
livelihood strategy: 
 
“We are sending her [daughter] money every month to survive in Cape Town because 
she is still looking for work. The money from the dividend helps. We send her about 
R700 per month. I also look after the grandchild here, she is seven now”. 
 
JV dividend receiving households also have the smallest proportion of adults present most 
nights, with only 42%. This reflects the reality that younger migrant members of these 
households are working (or looking for work) in urban areas. Apart from the dividends, the 
livelihoods of these households are thus met, to a great deal, through migrant jobs. Dividend 
and JV wage receiving households, however, have 67% of adults present most nights. The 
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household members working on the JV farms would influence this result. Even though the JV 
dividend receiving households have the largest annual incomes, because their household sizes 
are so much larger, they are not necessarily ‘financially better off’ in all cases. The dividend 
receiving households have a median household size of only 9; as opposed to 6 in the dividend 
and JV wage receiving households. The dividend receiving households have however 
accumulated more wealth in cattle, which may also relate to the relatively older household 
heads.  
 
Table 24. Keiskammahoek: Socio-Economic Differentiation by JV Related Taxonomic Groups 161 
(N= 55 households) 
 
  
JV Dividend 
Receiving Households 
N=8 
JV Wage Receiving 
Households 
N=21 
Dividend & JV Wage 
Receiving Households 
N=11 
No JV Benefits 
Households 
N=15 
Proportion of HHs 
in various Asset 
Groups162 
Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich 
0 0.5 0.5 0.286 0.428 0.286 0.091 0.545 0.364 0.533 0.2 
0.26
7 
  Median (Mean) Median (Mean) Median (Mean) Median (Mean) 
Household size 9 6 6 6 
 Age of HH head 75 56 66 60 
Highest level of 
education of HH 
head Some secondary Some secondary Some secondary Some primary 
Proportion of 
female headed 
HHs 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.33 
Proportion of 
Adults Present 
most/all nights 0.42 0.6 0.67 0.67 
Proportion of HH 
members under 18 
years 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Number of types 
of income sources 
in HH 6 5 6 5 
Number of adults 
with no income 
sources 1 1 1 0 
 Total yearly cash 
income for HH  R255 110 (R296 415) R95 000 (R132 310) R232 680 (R261 092) R54 000 (R76 869) 
Cattle owned by 
HH  5 (9) 0 (5) 4 (7) 0 (3) 
Knapsack 
sprayers owned 1 0 1 0 
Motor vehicles 
owned 1 0 1 0 
 
                                                 
161 I have included the mean for ‘cattle owned by the household’ and ‘income’, since these were the only variables for which there were 
distinct divergences between the mean and median. For these variables, the mean is larger than the median, indicating a positively skewed 
distribution and inequality of cattle ownership and income among households. In such cases, the median is considered a more accurate 
representation of the average. 
162 See methodology chapter (4) for more on how asset groups are defined. The weightings to delineate the asset groups are established 
separately in each case study site. The households are divided into three (more or less) equal groups, based on their asset scores. Those defined 
as ‘asset poor’ have asset-weighting scores of 15-33; ’asset middle’ have 36-49; and ‘asset rich’ have 50-87 in Keiskammahoek. 
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The annual incomes and cattle wealth of the two groups of irrigation plot holders, contrasts 
strikingly to the two groups without irrigation plots. When a one-way ANOVA (Analysis of 
variance) test163 is run for the taxonomic groups and yearly cash income, the test of statistical 
significance164 is markedly high at .000 and the F statistic165 is 10.255. This indicates that there 
is a statistical correlation between the taxonomic groups and household incomes, and that there 
is greater difference between taxonomic groups than within them. When the same test is run for 
asset groups and incomes, there is statistical significance of .013 and an F statistic of 3.992. 
This is still statistically significant, however, the correlation is much less pronounced as 
compared to the taxonomic groups. The F statistic is not as high as it could be, which indicates 
that there is also a fair amount of differentiation within asset groups. This indicates that the 
taxonomic groups are more determining of household incomes than the asset groups. How 
households relate to the JV (receiving dividends and/or wages or no benefits), is therefore a 
critical factor in their yearly incomes. 
 
What also stands out in Table 24 above is that it is only the households with access to irrigation 
plots, which have a mean of one motor vehicle and knapsack sprayer. Within the JV wage 
receiving and no JV benefits households there is a greater range of household incomes, 
pointing to more extreme income differentiation within these group. JV wage receiving 
households have much larger incomes than the no JV benefits households. The small sample of 
the latter group means that these results should be treated with caution, however, it would seem 
to indicate that access to a JV job might contribute to the formers’ relatively larger incomes. In 
the former group the JV salary of permanently employed household members accounted for a 
median of 42% (mean of 41%) of total household income. We can therefore conclude that JV 
jobs make a significant contribution to incomes and the reproduction of these households.  
 
However, another factor to consider is that many of these JV workers are related to households, 
which own land on the JV scheme e.g., they are nephews, nieces or siblings of landowning 
households, who live in separate households. These landowning households don’t tend to share 
their dividends with family members in separate households (JV wage receiving households). 
It’s possible that the historical benefits of the wider kin network owning this land, could impact 
their social standing and material position in other ways. 
 
Table 24 appears to demonstrate that the no JV benefits group is worse-off in some key 
aspects. They have the lowest incomes, least cattle and the majority are asset poor.  They are 
also the only group that have a lower level of education, ‘some primary’, as opposed to ‘some 
secondary’, among the other groups. They also have the highest proportion of female-headed 
households.  
 
Table 25 below captures the different types of on and off-farm income sources that the 
taxonomic groups derive their livelihoods from. Some notable patterns are observable in this 
                                                 
163 One-way ANOVA, measures whether the variance or difference of values from the mean are greater between groups (e.g. taxonomic or 
asset groups) or within specific groups. It gives us an indication of whether what appear to be differences between the taxonomic groups, are 
also statistically significant. 
164 The lower the number, the more statistically significant the result. A rule of thumb to measure significance is that levels should be below 
.05 
165 The higher the F statistic is above 1, the greater the variance between groups. 
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table in terms of which kinds of incomes each group relies on. Further analysis (not captured in 
the table), using frequency distributions, illustrates differential access among households of the 
same taxonomic group i.e. some households have more than one member with access to a type 
of income source. For example, the frequency of JV permanent jobs is distributed unequally 
across the households. One JV wage receiving household has access to two permanent jobs (a 
husband and wife). This household was related to a dividend receiving household, who was the 
husband’s uncle. Another JV wage and dividend receiving household has access to three JV 
permanent jobs.  
 
Table 25. Keiskammahoek: Proportion of Households with Access to Different Types of Farm 
and Off-Farm Income by Taxonomic Groups 
(N=55 households) 
 
Types of Income Sources 
Dividend 
Receiving 
Household 
N=8 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
N=21 
Dividend & JV 
Wage Receiving 
Household 
N=11 
No JV Benefits 
Household 
N=15 
Proportion of HH 
with income 
Proportion of HH 
with income 
Proportion of HH 
with income 
Proportion of HH 
with income 
 JV dividend 100% 0% 100% 0% 
 JV permanent jobs 0% 86% 73% 0% 
 JV casual jobs 0% 19% 46% 0% 
 Other agricultural permanent 
job 13% 0% 9% 0% 
 Other agricultural casual jobs 25% 0% 0% 6% 
 Off-farm permanent jobs 38% 43% 45% 53% 
 Off-farm casual jobs 38% 62% 46% 47% 
Civil servant jobs 38% 14% 19% 0% 
Self-employed (off-farm), no 
hired labour 13% 33% 18% 20% 
 Self-employed (off-farm) with 
hired labour 13% 9% 9% 7% 
Public works jobs 0% 24% 9% 47% 
Old age grants 87% 24% 64% 40% 
Civil servant pension 13% 0% 9% 13% 
Disability grants 13% 24% 0% 27% 
Child support grants 50% 62% 56% 67% 
Remittances in cash 25% 33% 9% 33% 
Remittances in kind 13% 0% 18% 0% 
Own-account farming  
(household labour only) 50% 67% 64% 67% 
Own-account farming 
(household and hired labour) 25% 14% 27% 7% 
Own-account farming (paid 
household labour) 25% 0% 0% 0% 
 
All groups have access to off-farm permanent and casual jobs, which indicates the importance 
of access to wage labour among all of the taxonomic groups. No JV benefits households have 
the highest proportion of households (53%) with access to off-farm permanent jobs. Their 
livelihoods are strongly reliant on migrant labour and remittances, in the absence of access to 
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on-farm jobs and land for farming. 43% of JV wage receiving households have permanent off-
farm jobs. This group also has the highest proportion of households with access to off-farm 
casual jobs (62%).  Many off-farm casual jobs, (but not all) can be found in Keiskammahoek, 
or nearby villages and towns, without need for migration. These jobs are also present amongst 
all the taxonomic groups, but the lowest proportion is among the dividend receiving 
households.  
 
Among irrigation plot holders, 45% of dividend and JV wage receiving households have off-
farm permanent jobs, as compared to 38% of dividend receiving households. The lower 
proportion among the latter (in spite of higher migration rates) can be explained by the much 
larger proportion with access to civil servant jobs. Therefore, this data illustrates that access to 
land on the irrigation scheme, doesn’t negate the necessity to meet household reproduction in 
part through wage labour. However, the type of wage labour accessed may be influenced by 
land ownership, which undoubtedly has influenced the class position of these households i.e. 
allowing them to access skilled civil servant and permanent wage employment. 
 
The above table demonstrates how civil servant jobs are concentrated in those households 
receiving either dividends and/or jobs from the JV. Notably there were none of these jobs 
among the no JV benefits households, although one household was receiving a civil servant 
pension. The unequal distribution of civil servant jobs may speak to the relative political 
influence of landowning households. 38% of dividends receiving households have access to 
these jobs (25% of these households have two household members employed as civil servants, 
while 13% have one person employed). Access to remunerative civil servant jobs among 
dividend receiving households may be a possible explanation for why there was no perceived 
need to labour on the JV farm. 19% of JV dividend and wage receiving households have access 
to these jobs, (half of these households have two household members employed as civil 
servants). 14% of JV wage receiving households have access to these jobs, and it should be 
noted that these were households that are related to irrigation plot holders. A few civil servant 
pensions can be found across these households, except for JV wage receiving households who 
have relatively young household heads.  
 
Remittances in cash are highest among those households without access to irrigation plots, at 
33% for both groups. Following this, 25% of dividend receiving households receive 
remittances in cash; as compared to only 9% of dividend and JV wage receiving households. 
However, the latter receive slightly more remittances in kind. These differences among 
irrigation plot holders could perhaps reflect generational dynamics. Migrant labourers in 
dividend receiving households may be remitting more frequently to aged household heads, who 
are looking after their children. It could also possibly reflect migrant labourers with access to 
better civil servant jobs, allowing them to remit more frequently.  
 
There are household members who are self-employed (no hired labour), across all the 
taxonomic groups. However, the highest concentration is among JV wage receiving 
households, with 33% of households. Self-employed off-farm businesses (with hired labour) 
were generally not as common as other income sources across the taxonomic groups. It is 
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however notable, that the highest incidence of this income source is among the dividend 
receiving households with 13%. The use of hired labour is a clear indication of relative class 
position.   
 
Public works jobs are notably concentrated in households without access to dividends and 
hence irrigation plots. The highest incidence is amongst no JV benefits households with 47%. 
7% of these households have three household members with access to jobs with the community 
works program (CWP). 24% of JV wage receiving households have access to these jobs. 
Notably, no dividend receiving households access these jobs, and only one dividend JV wage 
household does. Households accessing public works jobs can be considered to be relatively 
vulnerable. Clearly land ownership is a determining factor in accessing more secure wage 
labour. Access to the dividend, may also negate the necessity of younger household members 
resorting to public works jobs. 
 
The data on access to old age grants, speaks to the generational composition of these 
households. Notably, in dividend receiving households in Keiskammahoek, 87% of households 
have access to an old age grant and 25% of these households have access to two old age grants. 
In contrast, only 64% of dividend and wage receiving households have access to old age 
grants. This may explain, in part, why these households are working on the JV farm. Younger 
household members in dividend receiving households may not feel compelled to labour on the 
farm, because there is the security of an old age pension and dividend. The much older median 
age of household heads (75 years) in dividend receiving households as opposed to 66 years old 
in dividend and wage receiving households, also speaks to the physical ability of household 
heads to labour. In the latter group, there are a few household heads (rather than younger 
household members) labouring on the farm. The youngest household heads are concentrated in 
the JV wage receiving households.  
 
Large proportions of all groups have access to child support grants. However, the highest 
proportions are among those with no JV benefits at 67%, (40% of these households have access 
to two child support grants). 62% of JV wage receiving households have access to child 
support grants, (19% have access to two and 10% have access to 4 grants). 56% of dividend 
and wage receiving households have access to these grants. The incidence is lowest, but still 
relatively high among the dividend receiving households (50%). This mostly accounts for those 
grandparents looking after their grandchildren.  
 
Although dividend receiving households have the largest proportion of household members 
under 18, they also have the lowest proportion with access to child support grants. This is 
because there are so many civil servants in this group, who are not eligible to receive social 
grants. There were also some households who had told their children to keep these grants, as 
they were using their dividends and pensions to look after the grandchildren. At the very least, 
JVs can be seen (in some cases) to subsidise migrant labourers looking for work in cities. This 
is achieved by pensioners using dividends to look after grandchildren, and in some cases also 
sending ‘reverse remittances’ to urban migrants searching for work.  
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There are larger proportions of households with access to irrigation plots engaging in own-
account farming: 100% of the dividend receiving households and 91% of dividend and wage 
receiving households, as opposed to 81% of JV wage receiving households and 74% of no JV 
benefits households. The most common reasons for not engaging in own-account farming 
included: the drought and challenges with accessing water, lack of fencing, theft of livestock 
and crops, and lack of labour and other inputs. JV wage receiving households, particularly 
noted, that they struggled to cultivate gardens due to the demands of their JV job, and other 
household members were unwilling or were unable to continue cultivating. Households 
engaged in wage labour, or with members who had fallen ill, often preferred to keep livestock, 
which entails somewhat less labour demands as this statement from a no JV benefits household 
indicates, “We stopped with the garden and kept pigs because diabetes makes it hard to plant.” 
 
 Since households with irrigation plots had accummulated such large plots (12-20 hectares), 
and most of their homes remain in amongst the pastures on the irrigation scheme166, many have 
maintained 1-2 hectares for cropping and livestock. This has allowed for quite extensive own-
account farming. However conditions varied across the households in Keiskammahoek, which 
was an area of contention. Some irrigation plot holders claimed that those with positions on the 
Seven Stars Trust or Cooperative, had disproportionate access to free electricity, water and 
fencing for own-account farming. Those without access to fencing can’t keep livestock on their 
properties, (due to the biosecurity threats this poses to the JV dairy herd) and without water 
obviously keeping a household gardens is a challenge. Thus dynamics of local politics and 
power still influence livelihoods in Keiskammahoek, even though their presence is more subtle 
than the more explosive context of intragroup conflict in Shiloh, as we will see below.   
 
Overall we can see that the two irrigation plot-owning groups make more use of hired labour in 
own-account farming than the other taxonomic groups. 50% of dividend receiving households 
hire labour and 14% of JV dividend and wage receiving households hire labour. The high 
incidence of hired labour among these groups is reflective of a number of variables, including 
class place, expanded scale of production, as well as generational dynamics and illness. There 
are a number of cases of quite dynamic producers, who are investing JV dividends and/ or 
wages (along with off-farm incomes) into own-account farming. Notably, 25% of dividend 
receiving households are making use of ‘paid family labour’. This involves household 
members paying a set rate to family/ kin, who live in the same household or in a relative’s 
household e.g. nieces, nephews, cousins or grandchildren. In some instances paying family is a 
way to ease the burden of poverty and unemployment, especially among younger kin members. 
It also maintains social networks and distributes JV benefits across kin households, or among 
generations within a household.  
 
 
 
                                                 
166 The households of some farmers had to be removed to make way for the construction of new center pivots for the irrigation scheme. In 
these cases they’ve been allocated new households by the JV with large household gardens.  
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10.4 Impact of JV Jobs on Social Reproduction in Keiskammahoek  
 
At the time that the survey was conducted in October 2016, the farm was hiring 50 permanent 
labourers167 and one casual labourer (who was soon to be made permanent). The households of 
31 of these permanent workers were included in the household survey. This included 14 female 
workers and 17 male workers. In addition, the JV farm also had two student interns, three farm 
managers (two dairy managers and an irrigation manager) and a financial manager (based at 
the farm)168. There were also 9 casual workers in 7 households, who had benefitted from casual 
employment in the last 12 months169. The survey covers the households of all 9 of these casual 
workers, which included 2 female workers and 7 male workers. Overall the gender divide of 
the 40 jobs, among the sampled population is 40% female and 60% male. However the 
household survey only covered 68% of the total labour force on the JV farm. All labourers, 
apart from one general worker, the managers and student interns, were sourced from the local 
community. Of the 51 households benefitting from JV jobs at the time of the survey, 14 of 
these households or (27.5% of total labourers), were also receiving dividends and are thus 
categorized as dividend and wage receiving households.  
 
Table 26. Keiskammahoek: Contribution of Permanent and Casual JV Jobs to Household Income 
(N=33 households) 
 
Keiskammahoek: JV Permanent and Casual Jobs as Proportion of Total Annual Household Income in 
2015/6 
Taxonomic 
Group 
Mean/ 
Median 
JV permanent 
jobs as % of 
total 
household 
income 
Frequency/ 
households Taxonomic Group 
Mean/ 
Median 
JV casual 
jobs as % of 
total 
household 
income 
Frequency/ 
households 
Dividend & JV 
Wage Receiving 
Household 
Mean 
(%) 
0,16 
8 
 
Dividend & JV 
Wage Receiving 
Household 
Mean 
(%) 
0,09 
 
3 Median 
(%) 0,17 
Median 
(%) 0,05 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
Mean 
(%) 
0,41 
 
18 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
Mean 
(%) 
0,17 
4 
 Median 
(%)  0,42 
Median 
(%) 0,11 
 
Table 26 above outlines the contribution of JV jobs to household income. Seven Stars Trust 
pays minimum wage to all of their general workers170. At the time of the survey they were 
being paid R14.25 per hour (agricultural minimum wage), which amounted to a mean of R4125 
per month, and permanent workers also received a 13th cheque at the end of the year. Those in 
management positions received competitive salaries based on their experience, as well as a 
                                                 
167 This excludes the three managers and two student interns also employed at the farm. These numbers were confirmed through a list of 
employees obtained from the JV farm, which was used to randomly survey households. 
168 All three farm managers and the student interns were interviewed but the results of their households are not included here. See Chapter 6. 
169 Only the one worker was employed casually at the time of the survey. 
170 This includes ‘irrigators’, ‘milkers’, ‘herders’, ‘security guards’ and general workers performing tasks as required who are all remunerated 
the same, in line with the agriculture minimum wage of R14.25 at the time of the survey. 
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performance bonus171. General workers reported working for 8-10 hours a day.  However, the 
nature of dairy farming means that working hours can be unpredictable, and overtime was 
frequently reported. Workers are on-shift for either 8 or 10 days and then off for 2 days. Dairy 
farming is thus more demanding of labour than other sectors of agriculture might be. This may 
limit who can access or who is willing to take on these jobs. Some respondents, who were 
unwilling or unable to labour on the JV farm, referred to domestic labour demands such as 
caring for children or the elderly, as well as health status, as prohibiting factors. On the other 
hand, the fact that dairy farming necessitates more permanent labour (as opposed to seasonal) 
is of benefit to households in a context where permanent contracts are a scarce commodity. 
 
Table 26 above, illustrates that these jobs make quite significant contributions, although with 
some variation across households. The median contribution for permanent jobs at 
Keiskammahoek for JV dividend and wage receiving households is 17%, and for JV wage 
receiving households it’s much higher at 42%. There is quite a wide range among these 
different households in terms of the contribution of JV wages to household incomes. For the 
JV wage receiving households, the contribution is in the range of 17% to as high as 94%. For 
JV dividend and wage receiving households, the range is between 8% and 50%. For more than 
30% of all households with permanent JV jobs (across both categories), the income from a JV 
job comprises over 50% of their household income. For 73% of households, the JV job 
comprises at least 25% of their total household income.  
 
The contribution of casual jobs is far less significant, which reflects the relatively short-term 
nature of these jobs. However, for a relatively income poor household, access to a short-term 
casual job can still contribute a significant proportion of household income. For example, I 
surveyed one household where a casual job, lasting only three months, contributed 42% of 
annual household income. The relatively higher contribution of casual jobs to the household 
incomes of JV Wage Receiving Households, in Keiskammahoek as opposed to Shiloh (see next 
section), can be explained by the presence of skilled labourers who are remunerated at a higher 
wage.  
Contributions of JV jobs: household perspectives 
 
I must again caution that it is difficult to separate the contributions of JV jobs in relation to 
other household incomes, since money is fungible. That said, this section tries to understand 
what impact JV jobs have had on the ability of households to reproduce themselves, and 
whether in some cases, these incomes may have been reinvested in other productive activities 
such as own-account farming. 7 of the 33 respondents interviewed, said they were able to save 
or invest part of their salary in other productive activities like farming. However, several 
respondents also indicated that they were using these incomes to pay for the education of other 
household members, which can also be considered potentially productive, or at the very least 
an investment in diversifying household incomes. The following quotes indicate the 
contributions that JV Jobs make to household reproduction: 
 
                                                 
171 For example, one manager was receiving R20 000 per month and another was receiving R27 000 per month. The managers also have a 
bonus system, based on the farm performance.  
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Female respondent, JV Wage Receiving Household, (poor asset group): “This job is the 
most important salary in the house. We used to stay in a shack, but since working her I have 
built a house and I can support my children and buy them clothes”  
 
Male respondent, JV Wage Receiving Household, (middle asset group): “I want to buy 
livestock because I have a son that needs cattle, but I don't earn enough money here at the farm 
to buy anything other than groceries”.  
 
Male respondent, JV Wage Receiving Household,  (poor asset group): “The income I get 
from this job on the farm is much better than the casual brick laying I did before in the 
community. It’s the largest income we have. Now I can support my children and buy clothes 
for me and them.”  
 
Female respondent, JV Wage Receiving Household, (middle asset group): “I worked here 
on this farm before Amadlelo came here- for 10 years now. Things are better now with 
Amadlelo, the money is better now. I use my salary to buy furniture and I also extended the 
house. I spend it on sending the child for education. All of this comes from my salary. I haven't 
put any money in livestock because my husband buys livestock and things for our garden, he is 
a truck driver.” 
 
The above quotes indicate that the JV jobs make important contributions to household 
reproduction. Many key informants highlighted the stable nature of income from a JV job. In 
many cases, their salary is the largest household income source. Several workers also 
highlighted that this was their first job in agriculture, and thus they were learning a new skill. 
Their JV salaries are in many cases comparably better to their previous jobs, like the response 
above indicates, from a worker who previously did casual brick laying. Some respondents, 
however, note that salaries on the JV farm are lower than their previous permanent or casual 
jobs in cities but that living costs are lower in Keiskammahoek, as indicated in the following 
quote from a JV worker.  
 
Male respondent, dividend and JV wage receiving household (rich asset group): “I lost my 
job as a security guard in Cape Town and then I returned to Keiskammahoek to work at the 
dairy. The salary was better in Cape Town but after paying for rent and transport it was 
actually less than what I get here.”  
 
The relative contribution that these incomes make clearly varies and whether they are deemed 
sufficient, is influenced by the number of dependents that the salaried individual has to support. 
High levels of unemployment in households, means that it is difficult in many cases to save 
income for other productive activities. However the following quotes below indicate that there 
are some cases in which this is happening: 
 
Female respondent, JV Wage Receiving Household, (poor asset group): “I used some of my 
money from this job to buy the pigs. Before working here I didn't keep pigs, just chickens. I 
already got R800 from slaughtering one pig and selling it in pieces. I was meant to get R1500 
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but people buying on credit haven’t paid yet. I am planning to buy more pigs to slaughter and 
sell. I also buy my mother groceries, I don’t give money because otherwise my brothers drink 
the money, they are all unemployed".  
 
Female respondent, JV Wage Receiving Household, (middle asset group): “My life has 
changed a lot since getting this job. I have a bed now, before I didn't, and a fridge! I can pay 
for my children to use transport to go to school and buy things they need…I bought two calves 
from the farm, but they died because I had no time to look after them. I will buy more calves 
soon, in time for my son’s circumcision. I’ll also keep some, so when I have a problem with 
debt I can sell them. I pay my sister R500 a month to look after my children and she will also 
look after the new calves so they won’t die. “  
Conflicts and contestation over JV jobs in Keiskammahoek 
 
Although it is clear that JV jobs are contributing significantly to household reproduction, there 
are also many conflicts emerging over who has the right to these jobs. The farm’s trust has 
committed to only hiring people in the local vicinity, apart from the managers, since hiring 
people from outside of Keiskammahoek has been met with resistance in the past, as a farm 
manager explains: “There are no tensions in being a manager from outside the community 
because they know there is no one here that has the qualifications. The problem comes when 
we try and employ people as general workers from say Alice. So we try employ only locally.” 
 
The following quotes from different no JV benefits households, reflect these tensions over JV 
jobs. The JV farm, as a capitalist enterprise, sits uneasily within a communal setting where the 
continued viability of the farm itself relies on maintaining broader social networks within the 
neighboring villages: 
 
Female respondent, no JV benefits households (rich asset group): “The older workers who 
are landowners shouldn't be able to work there because they get pensions and profits from that 
farm too. They must keep those jobs for the youth in this village!”  
 
Male respondent, no JV benefits households (middle asset group): “You have to bribe 
people to get in there. There is a lot of politics in who gets the jobs there and who doesn't. The 
people who get hired are those who are kids of the farmers or friends of them. I know many 
people who tried and couldn't get a job there... It's not easy unless you beg and beg.” 
 
Even though only 27.5% of the work force on the JV farm is actually household members of 
irrigation plot owners, the perception about unfair hiring practices was widely held among the 
no JV benefits group. In cases where JV wage receiving households were kin of irrigation plot 
holders, they maintained in all cases, that they had to go through regular application procedures 
to get their jobs, as this quote reflects, “I submitted my CV, the same like all the others, it 
wasn’t my uncle that helped me get this job”. There are also contentions among the 
landowners, as to who gets access to JV jobs, as the following quote from a dividend receiving 
household suggests: “I did ask for a job for my child but it's not easy because all the committee 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 231 
members get their children the jobs. When you are not on the committee, you don't get a 
chance to put your child in to work”.  
 
Other dividend receiving households, however, expressed their concerns that their children 
weren’t interested in working on the farm. There are many reasons for this, including the 
perception that dairy farming is ‘hard labour’. Many younger household members also see their 
future in urban areas, where salaries are higher, as the following quote from a dividend 
receiving household reflects: “All of my children are working in the big cities, none of them 
wanted to come back here and work on the farm. They are all in Knysna or Cape Town. They 
think they can make more money there.” Some of the elder land rights holders, were therefore 
concerned about the future of the JV farm once the current landowners passed over.  
 
An analysis of the kinds of jobs that the children of the Keiskammahoek irrigation plot owners 
engage in indicates that many have access to civil servant and permanent employment in the 
cities. The historical patterns of accumulation of land and class formation among the 
Keiskammahoek farmers, afforded these households the opportunity to provide a good 
education for their children. Many have attended technical colleges or universities, or at the 
least finished high school. A relatively poorly paid job in agriculture, (if it is not a management 
position), is therefore not appealing to many of these youth.  
 
These complex discourses and emerging conflicts, over who has the right to work on the farm, 
are permeated with language of belonging, but are ultimately driven by a crisis of reproduction 
in the wider community (as evidenced by the socio-economic analysis of no JV benefits 
households above). These tensions have materialised, in some cases, into outright violence and 
intimidation over jobs. During fieldwork, I came across three households that had left 
employment on the farm as a result of threats or attacks. The following quotes indicate the 
heightened tensions emerging around jobs:  
 
Male respondent, JV dividend receiving household (rich asset group): “I worked on the JV 
there for a while, I was working night shifts as security. One day some guys were trying to 
attack me on the way to work. When I was a security guard, I caught one guy stealing cattle 
and I think that person employed the guys to attack me.”  
 
Female respondent, JV wage receiving household (poor asset group): “My son was working 
at the farm in a casual job earlier this year. But he had to leave because he was receiving 
threats and some guys were preventing him from going to work. I think this man wanted the 
job for himself. I feared for his life and advised my son to leave the job”.  
 
Security guards have especially been the targets of intimidation by thieves wanting to steal 
dairy cows, feed, equipment or other inputs from the farm. The farm, at one point, resorted to 
hiring security guards from outside the community to guard the farm at night, as the risk was 
too grave to workers considered to be ‘community members’. Another risk to workers is 
particularly of a gendered nature. Many female workers, in both Keiskmammahoek and Shiloh, 
expressed fear about walking to work in the early hours of the morning. Most females are 
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employed on the farm are milkers, and milking starts at 4am when it is still dark. There have 
been cases of attacks as well as attempted attacks. Some workers, who live far away, have been 
provided with residence on the Keiskammahoek farm to address this. 
10.5 Impact of JV Dividends on Social Reproduction in Keiskammahoek 
 
In Keiskammahoek the JV dividend contributes quite significantly to overall household 
income. In the 2015/6 financial years, irrigation plot holders at Keiskammahoek received a 
once-off dividend of R50 000 (based on farm profits), as well as R5000 a month, which they 
referred to as a ‘land-rental’. 172 From the 19 households sampled the median JV dividend 
(including profits and rentals) they had received in the last twelve months was therefore R110, 
000. Three dividend receiving households said they received R90 000. Two JV dividend and 
wage receiving households said they received R90 000 and one said they only received R52 
000. The remaining households: 5 JV dividend receiving households and 8 JV dividend and 
wage receiving households, all recalled receiving R110 000. Since this data relied on the recall 
of key respondents, I can’t be sure whether these discrepancies point to unequal distribution of 
benefits, or whether respondents were deliberately underplaying their benefits, or in some cases 
couldn’t recall accurately (in some households old-age may account for discrepancies).  
 
Table 27 below illustrates that the dividend contributes significantly to total household incomes 
for both taxonomic groups. For dividend receiving households, the mean contribution (48%) is 
larger than the median (44%), illustrating a positively skewed distribution.  Among a few of 
these households, the dividend is contributing very large proportions to total household 
income. This reflects the generational characteristics of this taxonomic group (relatively old 
household heads). Some households are relying exclusively on dividends and pensions, for 
example. The range of contribution of dividends to total household income is between 15% and 
86% among dividend receiving households. Among the JV dividend and wage receiving 
households, there is a negatively skewed distribution and the mean value (43%) is lower than 
the median (47%). There is a smaller range in the contribution of dividends to total household 
income among this group, from 21% to 65% of total household income.  
 
Table 27. Keiskammahoek: Contribution of JV Dividends to Household Incomes 
(N= 19 households) 
 
JV Dividend as proportion of total household income in 2015/16 
Case study site Category of respondent Mean Median 
Keiskammahoek 
Dividend receiving households 0.48 0.44 
JV dividend and wage receiving 
households 0.43 0.47 
 
Across the 19 households, according to household recall, R1 932 000 was distributed in 
dividend payments between November 2015 and October 2016. However if we assume that the 
                                                 
172 Although landowners refer to these as ‘rents’ Amadlelo Agri explains that because the sharemilking model implies that the landowner’s 
contribution to the farming business is their land and fixed assets, the dividend is in fact their profit share. There are however cases where 
additional land has been contributed to the JV schemes and a set land rental is paid e.g. at Shiloh for additional ¼ hectare food plots that were 
acquired and at Amadlelo’s Middledrift JV farm. 
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median is accurate and recall was a problem; given that I heard from the cooperative and 
Amadlelo Agri that landowners are not paid according to the size of their plots and everyone 
receives the same amount. Then we can assume that 35 landowners, receiving R110 000 each, 
amounted to a payout of R3 850 000. According to interviews with Amadlelo Agri, 
Keiskammahoek made R12 000 000 in profits in 2015/2016. After a 10% management fee is 
reserved for Amadlelo (R1 200 000) that should leave the landowners with 50% of the 
remaining R10 800 000 in profits. This amounts to a total of R5 400 000 in profits owed to the 
irrigation plot holders, which leaves R1 550 000 unaccounted for. However, without access to 
financial data on the farm, it is hard to know whether any capital investments were made to the 
farm’s fixed assets in the last financial year that might have reduced the distributed profits173. 
Cooperative and Trust members also noted that some profits had been invested in other 
community projects.  
Contribution of dividends: Household perspectives in Keiskammahoek 
 
At Keiskammahoek, most of the households receiving dividends emphasised the important 
contribution they made to reproduction of the household. There were more favourable than 
critical responses regarding dividends in Keiskammahoek. Many landowning households in 
Keiskammahoek are merely passive recipients of JV dividends, in the sense that they are used 
for consumption or household subsistence and are not reinvested in other productive activities. 
However, even in these cases, dividends are important to the overall reproductive strategy of 
households. I particularly noticed a pattern of elder pensioners using their dividends to take 
care of grandchildren and some were also sending ‘reverse remittances’ to migrant children.  
 
There is also a minority of households showing evidence of accumulation in farming, who are 
using their dividends to accumulate livestock and other productive assets. Some of these 
activities involved the sale of sizeable surpluses 174  particularly rearing pigs, broilers and 
goats175 and vegetable farming in large household gardens.  Some were also purchasing bulls 
and heifers from the JV farm and selling them to the local community for a profit. Even if 
households were not selling a surplus, household gardens and livestock rearing contributed 
significantly to social reproduction and livestock possess a ceremonial value. Moreover 
accumulation of cattle is an investment in household capital, often with the intention of 
generational distribution. The following statements below, illustrate the different household 
perspectives on dividends and how they contribute to household reproduction. 
  
Male respondent, dividend receiving household (asset rich group): “Now we just sit down 
and can get benefits -we are too old to struggle! When Amadlelo came, the life changed very 
well. We work well with Amadlelo. Amadlelo is also helping us get a title for our land. I can 
save money now and before I couldn't save, I had to use it all. Now I can send my 
grandchildren to school and look after them well. This money is better now than when I 
                                                 
173 These amounts are derived purely from interviews and therefore cannot be regarded as 100% accurate. 
174 The amount reserved for household consumption versus sales differed across households. However in the Middle and Richest households I 
found pig and chicken businesses where the majority or all of the animals were sold. Many farmers sold directly to the local community and a 
few also sold to the local supermarket or butchery.   
175 Goats are also important to the ceremonial economy in the Ciskei. Households may also choose to accumulate their own herds rather than 
selling so they can be used for their own ceremonies. 
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planted on my own. When I was planting here before, sometimes the business wouldn't go well 
and then you suffer. The business of growing vegetables is very unstable, it’s up and down. 
Sometimes you give people veg on credit because there is no buyer. Now it's more certain, you 
know what you are going to get every month. I bought three calves with the dividend, Brahman 
cows; they stay on the communal grazing land. I have a big garden here and I want to open the 
garden and make a place for goats and chickens – I plan to do it soon. Before Amadlelo came I 
didn't have any cows, I was just growing veg. I also used that R50 000 to build a new house at 
Lower Zencuka. When we do our ceremonies, we must do it that side.” 
 
Female respondent, dividend and JV wage receiving household (asset middle group): “The 
money has helped a lot because I’m a widow and before we were struggling a lot. Before my 
son hadn’t even been to the bush [for circumcision]! Now we can also buy things in cash like 
furniture, instead of getting into debt. We were farming the plot before this project, up until 
2000 but it was difficult and we had to share inputs with the other farmers.  Now we don’t need 
to do that because Amadlelo farms the field for us. Before we just sold it to the community but 
people would take our crops and milk through debit and in the end we wouldn’t get paid. We 
would pay our labourers in harvest, not in cash. With the joint venture we have a solid market, 
every day the milk is going, you don’t have to worry. I have a son working on that farm, so he 
gets a salary from there. I can also support some children who are unemployed. I also have my 
own broiler project, and my children help me with it, which brings in about R40 000 a year.  I 
could make more from it if there were better markets but the problem is the community buys 
on credit and often they don’t pay me back.” 
 
Gender and inter and intra-household distribution of JV dividends  
 
An important finding emerging from this study is the need to focus on the distribution of 
benefits and risks associated with these investments at inter and intra-household levels. It is at 
this level that struggles over jobs and dividends are most acute. JVs are precipitating a 
reorganisation of labour processes and their gendered relations within and between households. 
Many female respondents expressed frustrations over male members controlling income from 
JV dividends. The first quote from a wife of a landowner in Keiskammahoek is revealing of the 
gendered ways in which JV dividends can so easily be usurped by male household heads when 
they come in the form of a bank transfer. The second quote from a female-headed widower 
illustrates that her husband took a unilateral decision to give the land over to the JV. The last 
quote demonstrates a conflict between a separated couple where the husband is withholding 
part of the dividend from the wife:  
 
Dividend receiving household (rich asset group): “Men always want all the money to come 
to them... Sometimes you can't know how much you got because they don't tell you, they 
control it. The dividend goes straight to his bank so I don't even know if it's paid or not.” 
 
Dividend receiving household (middle asset group): “I never attend meetings of the 
cooperative. I never agreed that this land would be under Amadlelo. My husband would be 
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angry with me in his grave if he heard me saying that because he wanted the partnership. When 
he was alive I had no control over how the dividend was spent.” 
 
JV Dividend and wage receiving household (middle asset group): “My husband and I are 
separated and now we are fighting over that dividend. I don’t know if he is coming back to the 
house or not. I should get half of the dividend but from the R30 000 we got in December 2015, 
my husband only gave me R10 000. I want to resolve this issue by getting the farm to pay us 
separately but they said I must go to the Magistrates court first.” 
 
Gendered conflicts were especially marked in Keiskammahoek, where households were still 
farming their land prior to the JV. The comparatively large size of the dividend, also explains 
why it is igniting intra-household struggles over the distribution of this income. Women 
explained how it was easier to have a degree of control over farming income, prior to the JV. 
Since the JV, women were developing new strategies to renegotiate their livelihoods. Some 
women refocused their efforts on household gardens, and many had started small pig or broiler 
businesses. However, the effect of the JV on gender relations was differentiated and 
contingent, and the outcome was not always negative for women’s relative power within 
households. Some women emphasized having equal, or at least considerable negotiating power, 
over how JV dividends and wages were spent in the home, as the following quote indicates. 
 
JV Dividend and wage receiving household (rich asset group): “Me and my husband receive 
the money together. I think the relations at this project between men and women are fine, 
because husbands and wives come together to the meetings. But we can't say what goes on in 
those families in private. But me and my husband decide everything together.” 
 
I didn’t find any evidence of dividends being distributed (in money or kind) within extended 
kin groups. This refers to where, for example, relatives live in separate houses from the 
household receiving the dividend payment. It also didn’t seem to make a difference if a relative 
was close or more distant e.g. a child as compared to a niece or nephew. Where a relative had a 
separate household, and especially where females had married into a new household, these kin 
members were unable to successfully lay claim to the dividend. If however, a kin member had 
laboured on the farm prior to the JV being established, this might strengthen claims to JV 
benefits176. During the Ciskei era, however, the farm was organised around nuclear family 
units that made use predominantly of unpaid (immediate) family labour. Therefore in most 
cases extended kin were not labouring on the land. The main way, in which extended kin make 
claims to the benefits of the JV, are through preferential access to jobs.   
 
Female respondent from JV Wage Receiving Household (poor asset group) : “I never 
receive any money from my uncle from the dividend, not even gifts. I don't live with my uncle; 
I live with my mother, brothers and sisters. My mother never worked on my uncle’s farm, so 
my mother’s house doesn't share in the profits. My uncle never even helped to build this house. 
I bought the zinc and windows from my wages and I asked some guys in the village to make a 
Xhosa house.” 
                                                 
176 This dynamic has been explored by Berry (1993), and seemed pertinent in this context. 
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Female respondent, JV Wage Receiving Household, (middle asset group): “My mother has 
a title for land on this farm but my household doesn't get any payments from the dividend, 
because I live here with my husband.”  
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Chapter 11. Household Composition and Livelihoods in Shiloh 
11.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the current status of local livelihood systems and household composition 
in Shiloh, along the same lines as the previous chapter did for Keiskammahoek. I will also 
draw the reader's attention to some striking differences between the two case studies 
throughout the analysis in this Chapter. I conclude with a comparative analysis of the two case 
study sites, in terms of the character of livelihoods and household composition. I also look at 
how contextual differences may have produced different outcomes in relation to the JVs.  
11.2 Overview of Livelihoods and Household Composition in Shiloh 
 
Table 28 below reports some key features of household composition, for my sample of 62 
households, including 331 individuals in Shiloh. The median household size is 5 and the age of 
the household head is 67 years. 53% of the sample is female-headed households. The table 
illustrates that there is a wide range in the assets and incomes of households, pointing towards 
socio-economic differentiation among the Shiloh sample.  Noticeably, the Shiloh sample has 
much lower mean and median household incomes and assets than the Keiskammahoek sample. 
The median yearly household income is R86 300 as opposed to R128 495 in Keiskammahoek. 
Even when you disaggregate median household incomes by median household size, 
Keiskammahoek still has a higher median household income per person per year of R21 415, 
as opposed to R17 260 in Shiloh.  
 
Table 28. Table of Key Features of Household Composition for Shiloh Sample 
(N=62 households) 
 
  
Number of 
adults in 
household 
 Number 
of 
children   
(0-18)  
Household 
size 
 Age of 
Household 
Head 
Males 
present 
most/all 
nights 
Females 
present 
most/all 
nights 
 Total 
yearly 
household 
income  
Total 
household 
assets177 
Mean 4 1 5 64 1 2 R122 447 39 
Median 4 1 5 67 1 1 R86 300 38 
Range 9 6 14 55 5 4 R659 900 78 
 
Higher incomes in Keiskammahoek would be influenced, in part, by the larger dividends 
received by a part of the sample of households. 37% of the Shiloh sample is living in poverty, 
according to South Africa’s upper-bound poverty line (UBPL) of R992 per person per month.  
Again, this is higher than the 31% of households living below the UBPL in Keiskammahoek. 
Noticeably none of these households were irrigation plot holders in Keiskammahoek. However 
in Shiloh, a significant proportion of households living below the UBPL are dividend receiving 
households (31%). The remaining households living below the UBPL include 56% from no JV 
benefits households and 13% from JV wage receiving households.  
 
                                                 
177 See attachments for list of assets included in the livelihood survey. See chapter on methodology for how assets were scored. A total asset 
score of 66 was possible, if households had one of each type of asset (they may have more).  
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There are 17% of households in the Shiloh sample living below the lower-bound poverty line 
(LBPL) of R647, as compared to 11% in Keiskammahoek. While the largest proportion of 
these households is made up of no JV benefits households in Shiloh (80%), the remaining 
households living below the LBPL are dividend receiving households (20%). Access to JV 
dividends, have thus not managed to keep the latter out of extreme poverty. It is also noticeable 
that access to wage employment on the JV is more determining of the position of households 
than dividends (and thus land ownership). There are no dividend and JV wage receiving 
households categorized as poor, according to either poverty line. There are more dividend 
receiving households categorized as poor than JV wage receiving households. The JV however 
would not be the only determining factor in the position of these households. The tables below 
explore various features of these households and their access to other kinds of incomes and 
assets. 
 
When a cross-tabulation is run for household heads and marital status, 24.2% of household 
heads have never been married, 14.5% are married in a civil union, 9.7% are married in a 
traditional/ customary union, 6.5% are in a civil and customary marriage, 38.7% are widowed, 
4.8% are separated or abandoned and 1.6% are co-habiting with a partner. Noticeably, the rates 
of customary marriage (and civil and customary marriage) are much higher in Shiloh, as 
compared to Keiskammahoek. This correlates with the customary setting in Shiloh, where 
traditional institutions play a more important role. Overall, however, there is a much higher 
incidence of household heads in Shiloh that have never been married with 24.2%, as compared 
to 9.1% in Keiskammahoek. When these marriage statistics are analyzed in relation to the 
lower household incomes and assets of the Shiloh sample, these results correspond with 
research, which has indicated, that poorer households tend to divest from the social institution 
of marriage (Claassens, 2013; Berry, 1989). 
 
Table 29. Livelihood Sources and Household Composition in Shiloh 
(N= 62 Households) 
 
Livelihood Sources in Shiloh: By number of household members with access to various income sources 
 
H
ousehold size 
Proportion 
under 18 years 
%
 O
f adults 
present m
ost 
nights 
T
ypes of incom
e 
sources 
A
dults w
ith no 
incom
e sources 
A
gricultural 
perm
anent job 
(not JV
) 
A
gricultural 
casual jobs 
(not JV
) 
N
on-agricultural 
form
al jobs 
N
on-agricultural 
inform
al jobs 
C
ivil servant 
jobs 
O
w
n-account 
farm
ing no hired 
labourers 
O
w
n-account 
farm
ing hired 
labourers 
Self-em
ployed 
w
ithout hired 
labour 
Self-em
ployed  
w
ith hired 
labour 
Public w
orks 
jobs 
C
ivil servant 
pension 
O
ld age grants 
C
hild support 
grants 
R
em
ittances in 
C
ash 
Mean 5 0.2 0.74 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Median 5 0.14 0.83 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Sum 331   
  
303 43 1 1 26 29 12 56 20 19 8 11 2 51 73 20 
 
In Table 29, we can observe similar general trends for Shiloh, as captured for the 
Keiskammahoek sample above. However, what stands out is the decreased access to waged 
employment. Access to both formal and informal off-farm jobs is lower in Shiloh, with a mean 
and median of 0. When the sample is divided into asset groups, it is only among the rich 
households that there is a mean of 1 for off-farm formal and informal jobs, own-account 
farming (with hired labour) and self-employment (with hired labour). Self-employment 
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(without hired labour) is concentrated in asset poor and middle households, and involved high 
levels of precarity and low-income contributions. There is thus more inequality in terms of 
access to different income sources and jobs in Shiloh. 
 
Households also have access to fewer types of income sources and there are lower rates of 
migration, with a median of 17%, as opposed to 40% in Keiskammahoek.  I found many young 
people returning to Shiloh after failed attempts to find employment in urban areas. The more 
extreme context of unemployment in Shiloh heightens demands for JV jobs and control over 
land and dividends, in ways that exemplify a broader crisis of unemployment, beyond the ways 
local struggles are often articulated on the ground. In Shiloh this is taking the shape of a 
noticeable generational struggle over the JV farm, which is explored further below.  
 
Table 30 below provides a comparative analysis of household composition, incomes and assets 
by gender of household heads. Firstly, it is noticeable that there are far more female-headed 
households in Shiloh (53.2% of all households) than in Keiskammahoek (29%). However, 
unlike in Keiskammahoek, female-headed households in Shiloh, have slightly higher annual 
household incomes than male-headed households. In a context of more extreme 
unemployment, the fact that female-headed households have relatively better access to social 
grants may account in part for this. They derive 43% of their incomes from social grants, as 
opposed to male-headed households where social grants account for 26% of incomes. Female-
headed households have a greater proportion of household members who are under 18 years, 
and thus they would have access to more child support grants in particular.  Male-headed 
households, however, have more cattle and household assets. They also derive larger portions 
of their income from own-account farming, which in large part is derived from livestock 
ownership. 
 
Table 30. Household Composition, Incomes and Assets by Gender of Household-Heads in Shiloh 
(N= 62 Households) 
 
    
% Of 
adults 
present 
most 
nights 
% 
Under 
18 
years 
 Total 
yearly 
househol
d income  
Total 
income 
from own 
account 
farming 
% Of 
income 
from own 
account 
farming  
% Of 
income 
from 
social 
grants  
 Number 
of off-
farm 
formal 
jobs 
Number 
of off-
farm 
informal 
jobs 
Cattle 
owned  
Total 
househol
d assets 
Female-
headed 
households 
N= 33 Mean 0.73 0.25 R123 733 R2328 0.02 0.43 0 0 2 38 
Male-
headed 
households  
N=29 Mean 0.75 0.14 R120 983 R5812 0.04 0.26 0 0 9 41 
 
11.3 Livelihoods and Household Composition by Taxonomic Groups in Shiloh  
 
Table 31 below explores some key features of socio-economic differentiation by the JV related 
taxonomic groups. Looking firstly at how these groups are located in the asset groups, it is 
noteworthy that there are no households in the dividend and JV receiving households located in 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 240 
the poor asset group. On the contrary no JV benefits households have a very large proportion 
located in the poor asset group (74%), and none are categorised as asset rich. Dividend 
receiving households and JV wage receiving households have a similar distribution of 
households across the different asset groups. However, the former has slightly less households 
located in the poor category, but the latter has slightly more households located in the rich 
category. The fact that households without access to irrigation plots are comparable in asset 
wealth to some of the customary landowners, may indicate that jobs are equally if not more 
important than land rights. The small dividends deriving to customary landowners, means that 
households with JV wages are reaping comparatively more monetary benefits; which is a 
source of contention.   
 
Table 31. Shiloh: Socio-Economic Differentiation by JV Related Taxonomic Groups 
(N= 62 households) 
 
  
Dividend Receiving 
Household 
N=23 
JV Wage Receiving 
Household 
N=9 
Dividend and JV Wage 
Receiving Household 
N=10 
No JV Benefits 
Household 
N= 20 
% Of 
households 
(HHs) in 
various Asset 
Groups178 
Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich 
0.22 0.3 0.48 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.6 0.4 0.74 0.26 0 
  Median (Mean) Median (Mean) Median (Mean) Median (Mean) 
Household size 5 7 6 5 
 Age of HH 
head 74 52 66 65 
Highest level 
of education: 
HH head Some secondary Finished secondary Some secondary Some secondary 
% Of female-
headed HHs 0.522 0.22 0.5 0.7 
% Of Adults 
present most 
nights 0.75 0.83 0.61 1 
% Of HH 
members under 
18 years 0.2 0.13 0 (0.08) 0.33 
Number of 
types of 
income sources  5 5 7 4 
Number of 
adults with no 
income sources 0 (1) 1 0 0 (1) 
 Total HH 
yearly cash 
income  R70 600 (R146 955) R86 600 (R86 337) R143 785 (R186 827) R41 760 (R44 151) 
Cattle owned 
by HH  0 (8) 0 (4) 6 (9) 0 (1) 
Knapsack 
sprayers  0 1 0 0 
Motor vehicles  1 0 0 0 
                                                 
178 The weightings to delineate the asset groups are established separately in each case study site. The households are divided into three (more 
or less) equal groups, based on their asset scores. Those defined as asset poor have asset-weighting scores of 8-33; asset middle households 
have 34-43; and asset rich households have 45-86 in Shiloh. 
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If we look at the household incomes for these groups, it is striking how dividend and JV wage 
receiving households have by far the largest household incomes, with a median that is more 
than double that of dividend receiving households. What is also worth noting is that there is 
quite a pronounced difference between the mean and median yearly income of dividend 
receiving household, illustrating a wide range of incomes among households. This is an 
indication of income inequality among this taxonomic group. The median income of dividend 
receiving households is also lower than that of JV wage receiving households.  
 
The no JV benefits households clearly have significantly lower incomes than any other 
taxonomic group. There is not a significant difference between the mean and median, 
indicating more homogeneity among this group; which is also a feature of the JV wage 
receiving households. Interestingly, the same trend was not visible in Keiskammahoek. 
Incomes among irrigation plot holders in Shiloh show a much greater range. This could 
arguably be a basis for heightened intragroup conflict, or at least contention, among customary 
landowners in Shiloh. The qualitative research also indicated that households, with such 
different material positions and livelihood strategies, are finding it difficult to agree upon a 
collective vision for the JV farm.  
 
These taxonomic groups also illustrate distinct patterns in terms of generational dynamics. The 
dividend receiving households have by far the oldest household heads at 74, which contrast 
with the dividend and JV wage receiving households with a median age of only 66. This is the 
same trend found in Keiskammahoek, indicating that it is households with younger household 
heads that are accessing JV jobs. JV wage receiving households have even younger household 
heads, with a median age of 52.  
 
Dividend and JV wage receiving households have strikingly low proportions of members less 
than 18 years. They also have the most ‘types of income sources’ and all household members 
have at least one income source. All of these characteristics of their household composition 
explain why they are ‘best off’ in terms of asset and income wealth. As a contrast, the no JV 
benefits households have the largest proportion of members under 18 with 33%. They also 
have the least types of income sources with only 4, and notably they have the highest 
proportion of female-headed households at 70%. The group with the lowest proportion of 
female-headed households is the JV wage receiving households with only 22%. 
 
Dividend and JV wage receiving households are the only group with a median number of cattle 
owned above 0. They have a median of 6 or a mean of 9 heads of cattle. In comparison the 
dividend receiving households have a median of 0 and a mean of 8. The large difference 
between the mean and median for this group, demonstrates unequal distribution of cattle 
ownership among households in this taxonomic group. Among the irrigation plot holders 
access to a JV job appears to influence ability to invest household income in cattle. Whereas 
those without the stable income of a JV job or other wage labour, may be depleting their herds 
in times of shocks, which was a commonly reported response. However, the JV wage receiving 
households also have a median of 0 and a mean of 4 cattle. Therefore, it is not the JV job alone 
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that influences cattle ownership, but clearly other factors contribute, including historical 
trajectories of class formation and access to a range of other types of off-farm incomes.  
 
If we look at the proportion of household members present most nights, it is noticeable that the 
dividend and JV wage receiving households have the lowest proportion with 61% present most 
nights. This correlates with the data in Table 32 below, which tells us that these households 
also have the largest proportion with access to off-farm permanent jobs (50%) and civil servant 
jobs (30%), which both generally involve migrant labour. Access to these types of secure and 
better-paid income sources, contributes to their overall higher household incomes and 
investments in cattle. It may also explain why they invest in livestock, as its common for these 
types of ‘worker farmers’ to invest off-farm incomes in livestock, rather than household 
gardens or plots for example, due to the decreased labour requirements.  JV wage receiving 
households on the other hand have less household members migrating, with 83% of household 
members present most nights. They are the only group with access to at least 1 knapsack 
sprayer, clearly concentrating own-account farming in household gardens and smaller 
livestock. JV wage receiving households also only have 11% of households with access to off-
farm permanent jobs, as opposed to 50% of dividend and JV wage receiving households.  
 
Table 32 below captures the proportion of households with access to different types of 
incomes. 36% of dividend receiving households have access to permanent off-farm jobs. 
Households without access to irrigation plots, have lower proportions with access to these jobs: 
15% of no JV benefits households and only 11% of JV wage receiving households are 
employed in permanent off-farm jobs. This indicates that those with access to irrigation plots 
also have increased access to migrant wage income, in the form of permanent off-farm 
employment.  
 
Notably civil servant jobs are also strongly correlated with irrigation plot holding households, 
speaking to their relative political power. Civil servant pensions are also found exclusively 
among irrigation plot holders. Remittances are found across all taxonomic groups however, the 
largest proportions of households are among dividend receiving households. Households 
without JV jobs have the highest proportions with access to casual off-farm jobs. These types 
of jobs are mostly sourced locally or in nearby villages and towns. 41% of dividend receiving 
households and 35% of no JV benefits households have household members with casual off-
farm jobs. 22% of JV wage receiving households and 30% of dividend and JV wage receiving 
households have household members with casual off-farm jobs. 
 
Households with access to JV jobs also have the highest proportion with access to public works 
jobs. This supports the contention of dividend receiving households and no JV benefits 
households, who complain that public works jobs are accessed according to the same networks 
of privilege in which JV jobs are accessed, i.e. through the traditional leader (who is a member 
of the Mayime Cooperative). Households in dividend receiving and no JV benefits households 
accessing these jobs, may not have fallen out of the graces of the traditional leader. 
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Table 32. Shiloh: Proportion of Households with Access to Different Types of Farm and Off-Farm 
Income 
(N= 62 households) 
 
Types of Income Sources 
Dividend 
Receiving 
Household 
N=23 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
N=9 
Dividend and JV 
Wage Receiving 
Household 
N=10 
No JV 
Benefits 
Household 
N= 20 
JV dividend 100% 0 100% 0 
JV permanent jobs 0 89% 90% 0 
JV casual jobs 0 22% 20% 0 
Other agricultural permanent job 5% 0 0 0 
Other agricultural casual job 5% 0 0 0 
Off-farm permanent jobs 36% 11% 50% 15% 
Off-farm casual jobs 41% 22% 30% 35% 
Civil servant jobs 23% 11% 30% 5% 
Self-employed (off-farm), no hired 
labour 23% 22% 10% 25% 
Self-employed (off-farm) with hired 
labour 14% 0 0 0 
Public works jobs 9% 33% 20% 15% 
Old age grants 73% 67% 70% 65% 
Civil servant pension 5% 0 10% 0 
Disability grant 23% 0 10% 20% 
Child support grants 36% 57% 30% 60% 
Remittances in cash 30% 22% 10% 20% 
Own-account farming  (household 
labour only) 55% 78% 90% 40% 
Own-account farming (household 
and hired labour) 45% 11% 10% 5% 
Own-account farming (paid 
household labour) 0 0 0 10% 
 
Some of the no JV benefits households, who complained about not being able to access public 
works jobs, were households in SADA Township. The unsettled land claim is clearly playing 
out over access to public works and JV jobs. Likewise some of the dividend receiving 
households who complained about not being selected for either JV jobs or public works, are 
supporters of the so-called ‘opposition group’ which is in conflict with the leadership of the 
Mayime Cooperative. 
 
There are much larger proportions of dividend receiving households (23%) accessing disability 
grants, as compared to dividend and JV wage receiving households (10%). This could possibly 
be one explanatory factor, among others, as to why the former are not employed in JV jobs, i.e. 
illness among household members of labouring age and/or caretaking demands placed on 
healthy household members. Dividend receiving households also have the largest proportion 
with access to (the relatively larger) old age grants, which corresponds with their relatively 
elder household heads. Access to child support grants is much higher in households without 
access to irrigation plots.  
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Self-employment (with hired labour) is not common in Shiloh and is concentrated in the 
dividend receiving households. However only 14% of these households are self- employed 
with hired labour. Self-employed without hired labour, generally involved petty trade and what 
was referred to as ‘piece jobs’ like casual brick-laying or plumbing in the local community. 
These incomes were generally low and could be quite erratic. It is notable that our taxonomic 
group with the highest household incomes- divided and JV wage receiving households- also 
have the lowest proportion of households engaged in this type of activity (10%). The remaining 
taxonomic groups had a more or less similar proportion engaging in self-employment (without 
hired labour), with between 22 and 25% of households. 
 
It is only the two taxonomic groups with access to irrigation plots, where all households are 
engaged in some form of own-account farming. Some of these households were exclusively 
involved in livestock farming and have abandoned cultivation of household gardens. This was 
due in large part to the drought, but also other factors such as lack of access to inputs and 
labour. Hiring of labour in own-account farming is notably highest in dividend receiving 
households. However, in some cases this was due to illness and therefore lack of household 
labour, rather than being indicative of capital/ labour relations or a sign of accumulation. Some 
livestock owning households are hiring a herder to take care of cattle on communal grazing 
ranges because Shiloh suffers particularly badly from stock theft. 
 
Overall the data on labour relations in own-account farming illustrates that in Shiloh there are 
very few households making use of labour more frequently and selling a surplus. There are 
larger proportions of the Keiskammahoek irrigation plot holders hiring labour and targeting 
markets. This, in part, illustrates how the larger dividends are being reinvested in own-account 
farming. However, the fact that many of their households in Keiskammahoek are located on the 
irrigation scheme also means that many have access to water, unlike the Shiloh landowners. 
Keiskammahoek landowners also have larger household gardens to cultivate, which would 
allow for a surplus to be sold.  Due to the drought many of the Shiloh landowners have 
abandoned their gardens and their own-account farming is restricted to livestock (which has 
also been adversely affected by the drought).  
11.4 Impact of JV Jobs on Social Reproduction in Shiloh 
 
At Shiloh at the time of research, the farm was employing 26 people in permanent JV jobs 
(including three male managers). The information provided below on the contribution of JV 
jobs includes the households of 19 permanent workers179. Within these households there are 
more males than females employed. Only 6 households had a female member working in a 
permanent JV job, whereas 12 households had a male member working in a permanent JV job, 
(one of which had two males employed). According to the list of permanent labourers, 
provided by the farm, there are only 6 female workers out of a total of 26 labourers. 4 
households had also benefited from casual JV jobs in the last year, which included 1 female 
worker and 3 male workers. Men are therefore benefiting more from JV jobs than women are 
because the latter only account for 23% of the labour force. On the other hand, in 
                                                 
179 This includes one of the junior managers whose household was based in Shiloh. This household also has a general worker employed at the 
farm. See chapter 6 for livelihood benefits to the other two managers. 
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Keiskammahoek 40% of the labour force sampled was female. At the Shiloh JV farm, gender 
equity within the labour force needs to be given more consideration.  
 
In dairy farming, however, there is a definite gendered division of labour. Women tend to work 
as 'milkers' at the rotary dairy parlour, sell milk180and rear calves (although women tend not to 
do the more physical tasks such as administering injections to calves). Men work in roles 
considered to require more physical strength, such as working as irrigators, tractor drivers, 
herders and security guards and completing tasks such as artificial insemination. On a 
relatively small farm (with fewer labourers) like Shiloh, the gendered division of labour may 
result in more men being hired, who are perceived to be able to do all the required jobs on the 
farm (including physical jobs). The specific commodity (milk) being produced therefore has 
implications for gendered benefits. 
 
Table 33 below outlines the contribution of JV jobs to household income. These jobs make 
significant contributions to both taxonomic groups. In Shiloh JV jobs contribute more to 
overall household income (than they do in Keiskammahoek), with a median of 50% for JV 
wage receiving households and 32% for dividend and JV wage receiving households. There is 
differentiation between JV wage receiving households and dividend and JV wage receiving 
households in Shiloh. However this differentiation is not as stark as it is in Keiskammahoek, in 
part because dividend and JV wage receiving households in Shiloh don’t have access to large 
dividends. However, this also supports the finding that households in Shiloh are subject to a 
more intense ‘reproductive squeeze’, with less available wage-labour outside of the JV and 
fewer cases of landowning households or other groups accumulating in farming.  
 
Table 33. Shiloh: Contribution of Permanent and Casual JV Jobs to Household Incomes 
(N= 19 households) 
 
Shiloh: JV Permanent and Casual Jobs as Proportion of Total Household Income 
Category of 
Respondent 
Mean/ 
Median 
JV 
Permanent 
jobs as % 
total 
household 
income 
Frequency/ 
households 
Category of 
Respondent 
Mean/ 
Median 
JV Casual 
jobs as % 
total 
household 
income 
Frequency/ 
households 
Dividend and JV 
Wage Receiving 
Household 
Mean (%) 0,34 
10 
Dividend and JV 
Wage Receiving 
Household 
Mean (%) 0,01 
 
2 Median 
(%) 0,32 Median (%) 0,01 
JV Wage Receiving 
Household 
Mean (%) 0,56 
9 
JV Wage 
Receiving 
Household 
Mean (%) 0,53 
2 Median 
(%) 
0,5 Median (%) 0,53 
 
                                                 
180 However at Shiloh milk sales are controlled by the Mayime cooperative at their office and not on the farm, as is the case at 
Keiskammahoek. One dividend and JV wage receiving household is included with a worker who sells milk. This household has the second 
lowest salary for JV permanent jobs. The woman works at the farm 6 days a week selling milk at the Mayime Cooperative headquarters. 
However she works for fewer hours than a general worker would. This labourer started working on the grapevines as part of the EPWP paid 
labour force and then transferred to the dairy subsequently. 
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In terms of JV permanent jobs, none of the households with access to permanent jobs are 
categorised as asset poor. Whether the contribution of a permanent job has moved households 
out of this asset poor category, (in combination with the relative contribution of other 
incomes), or whether the most vulnerable are not included as permanent workers is unclear. 
Casual JV jobs are, however, found among households categorised as asset poor. In one 
household this income comprised the entire yearly income, as they didn’t even have access to 
social grants. 
 
Benefits in the form of JV jobs contributed to 27.4% of households included in the sample. The 
total monetary value of JV permanent and causal jobs amounts to R866 896 from November 
2015 to October 2016. However this is only for 82.6% of the total labour force that was 
included in the sample at Shiloh. The mean yearly income from a JV permanent job in a JV 
wage receiving household is R44 422, which is slightly less than the mean for dividend and JV 
wage receiving household at R45 260. However this difference is mostly insignificant, as it 
may be slightly skewed by the fact that one household in the latter group had two JV jobs181.  
The standard deviation, or average distance from the mean, is higher in the case of dividend 
and JV wage receiving households (also skewed by this one household) at R32 778, compared 
to R18 802 for JV wage receiving households. This may also be because there are more female 
workers among dividend and JV wage receiving households. Females tend to work as milkers, 
who generally work less overtime and shorter hours than their male counterparts, who work as 
irrigators and general workers. The contributions that JV jobs make to household reproduction, 
are demonstrated in the following quotes: 
 
Male respondent, in JV wage receiving household (middle asset group): “I started here in 
2011 as a permanent and I have a contract. I am a herder here. I work for about 9 and half 
hours a day but sometimes it can be up to 14 hours. I get R14.25 an hour or about R4600 per 
month. We also get an incentive bonus of R500 but it works on a point system. Before this job 
I worked for the Department of Water Affairs as a plumber. I get more money now because I 
got around R3500 there. My income from the dairy covers food, clothes and feed for the 
animals. I have bought some furniture and calves from the farm with the money too. But it isn’t 
enough money to be able to save because I support all 4 members of my household- they are all 
unemployed. The only other income we have is my wife’s small business. She sells soup packs 
of chicken to the neighbours. She buys them from a farmhouse near Queenstown and sells to 
people on credit and makes about R500 a month. I inherited 5 cattle from my uncle and I 
bought 8 calves from the dairy farm, three are still calves and the rest are big. I sold two cattle 
last year and I got R10 300 for them. We also slaughtered two of my mother’s cows in a 
ceremony last year. There are lots of problems with stock theft here in Shiloh, in 2015 I lost 3 
cattle. The problem is the unemployment here in Shiloh. I want to take my son to circumcision 
school, so I will use the money from the cattle. When it's raining again, the cows will get fat 
and then I can sell them.” 
                                                 
181 One of these labourers is a junior manager who is still studying and therefore only works part-time. This household was the only household 
included in the sample that had a household member in a ‘management’ position on the farm. The reason for this was that this household had 
both a general worker and a junior manager (who is still studying at university and is still a manager in training, who only works at the JV farm 
during university holidays). This household is also located in Shiloh village, unlike all the other Managers whose main households are in other 
provinces or parts of the Eastern Cape. 
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Female respondent in JV wage receiving household, (middle asset group):  “I used to work 
in a factory that closed down and then I was unemployed for two months. It was a dairy factory 
that made yoghurt, mass and juice. This [JV] job offers a little bit more than what I was 
previously earning. I started here in 2011 on a 3-month contract and then they made me 
permanent. I work about 45 hours a week. The only income in the house is my wages, my 
mother’s old age grant and four child support grants. We struggle to make months end, so we 
are unable to save money. We have to pay school fees for the four children. I want to start 
rearing pigs for extra money; I started with one pig this year. I will sell to the abattoir because 
the community never pays back the things on credit. The challenges of this work at the farm is 
that as a women it is dangerous to walk here in the morning, you can get hurt because there are 
lots of muggers. I had an incident because I interrupted some guys busy stealing the silage. 
Relations between the workers and the community are not 100%, but it's okay. There is some 
jealousy between those who want jobs and us. The theft is much better on the farm now... 
workers are not stealing anymore, but they used to. After we caught some guys working on the 
farm, they realized they are losing their jobs and they are breaking this project down. From the 
community side, there is still stealing but not as much as in the beginning. The security guys 
are doing a good job now.” 
 
The above quotes from workers on the JV farm illustrate that the jobs are central to meeting the 
social reproduction of the households. In many contexts, it is also the first time that workers 
have accessed wage labour in the agricultural sector, thus the JV is contributing to skills 
development as well. The high levels of dependency in many of these households, however, 
affect the impact that JV incomes are able to make. Several workers reported having to support 
numerous unemployed household members. The other drain on JV job incomes are the 
ceremonial functions that households need to perform in order to reproduce the household and 
its members in its full social and cultural significance. These rituals, such as circumcision 
school and ancestral ceremonies, are however considered central to maintaining social 
networks and cultural life. The need to maintain a ceremonial fund, however, does put strain on 
household incomes. It also limits household’s ability to accumulate cattle and other livestock, 
particularly in a context where livestock theft along with the drought is putting considerable 
strain on livestock farmers.  
Conflicts over JV jobs in Shiloh 
 
Many of the tensions over jobs that were witnessed in Keiskammahoek are also present in 
Shiloh. These tensions take place at various inter and intra household levels: between 
‘customary landowners’ themselves, and between them as a social group and the wider 
community without rights to irrigation plots. Underpinning these divides are further complex 
social identities that mediate access to jobs. At Shiloh, the Mayime Cooperative is directly 
responsible for sourcing labour for the JV farm. Households falling out of favour with 
members of the Cooperative’s committee or the traditional leader (headman)182 are allegedly 
unable to access JV jobs.  
 
                                                 
182 The headman is a prominent member of Mayime Cooperative’s committee. 
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Households living in nearby SADA Township are also excluded from job opportunities. This is 
related to the historical land conflict between SADA residents and Shiloh residents. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, Sada Township was a historical site of relocation during Apartheid’s 
forced removals and Shiloh residents claim the land as their ancestral grazing land. Access to 
jobs is thus somewhat more politicised in Shiloh than in Keiskammahoek. This is in part 
because in the latter case, the farm operating company is responsible for hiring labour rather 
than the cooperative. In Shiloh conflicts around the JV also impact access to public works and 
other contract jobs, since the traditional leader is involved in selections for these jobs too. The 
following quotes reflect some of these complex dynamics:  
 
Male respondent, no JV benefits household (poor asset group): “The dairy only takes 
people from Upper and Lower Shiloh. We are not happy but we don't complain because they 
[Mayime Cooperative] complain this land at SADA is their land, so they must work on their 
land otherwise it becomes a fight! But we need jobs too!” 
 
Female respondent, dividend receiving household (middle asset group): “If you want to get 
a job there it's really difficult. People are called from their houses to work there. You can't just 
go to the manager to ask for a job. They want people they know to work there, their friends, on 
their side. The people who work there are only from a certain side of the community… those 
on the side of Mayime and the Nkosana”. 
 
Male respondent, in dividend receiving household (poor asset group): “I wanted to work 
on the farm but Mayime said that I am overage to work there... Those jobs are for the youth. If 
you are more than 35 years they say you are too old, you only get the piece jobs”. 
 
11.5 Impact of JV Dividends on Social Reproduction in Shiloh 
 
In Shiloh the small amount distributed to households in the form of dividends and land rents, 
means that they make marginal contributions to overall household incomes. Table 34 below 
indicates that dividends and land rents contributed a median of 2% to total household income 
in 2015/16 for both taxonomic groups. At Shiloh, dividends (based on farm profits) are paid 
twice a year and the amount depends on the size of plots contributed by households. The 
Shiloh JV farm acquired some additional ¼ hectare food plots and households are paid a set 
rental of R600 a year for these. These ¼ hectare food plots make up 80 hectares of the farms 
total 450 hectares. Overall, there are allegedly 395 households receiving dividends and/or land 
rentals from food plots. The mean amount distributed in dividends and land rentals for the 33 
households included in the sample, was R2096 per year.  
 
The chairperson of the Mayime Cooperative stated in an interview, that the first year dividends 
were distributed was in 2011 and each household received R1000 for the year. This amount has 
slowly grown over the years to R2000 per ¾ hectare plot in 2015/16. In the absence of 
financial statements, which the Mayime Cooperative was unwilling to share, if we take the 
cooperative’s statement on dividends and land rents as true then: the farm may have paid out 
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R192 000183 in land rents for ¼ hectare food plots and distributed R986 000184 in dividends. 
Therefore total benefits deriving to 395 households are possibly in the realm of R1, 178, 000 in 
the 2015/16 financial year.  Among the households sampled, there is a more or less equal 
gender split in terms of the sex of individuals within households who are directly receiving 
dividends: 48% are females and 52% are males. Many women claiming dividends are widows 
but some are also younger female-headed households who have inherited irrigation plots.  
 
Table 34. Shiloh: Contribution of JV Dividends to Household Incomes 
(N= 33 households) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Among the household sampled, there is quite a lot of variation in the dividend amounts recalled 
by respondents. In some cases this is due to the number of plots owned. However, in other 
cases I noted discrepancies in the amount recalled by key informants who owned the same 
number of plots. The intragroup conflicts in Shiloh around the JV may explain the 
discrepancies in key informant recall of dividend amounts. Some key informants were 
suspicious or even fearful of the fieldwork, given the on-going conflicts among customary 
landowners. They were thus hesitant to talk openly and honestly about dividends. For various 
reasons respondents many have misstated dividend amounts i.e. fear of retaliation from the 
cooperative, or in an attempt to obtain my support to rally for their cause.  
 
Given the politics and power dynamics witnessed around dividend payouts, I would not rule 
out the possibility that in some cases (as respondents claimed), they were receiving smaller 
dividend payouts, since their households were in conflict with the Mayime Cooperative. 
Without the actual financial statements, which I was unable to get from the Mayime 
Cooperative (in spite of several attempts to do so), it is not possible to state unequivocally what 
benefits have been distributed. Since there is such variation in dividends reported among 
households, it is worthwhile looking at a frequency distribution of dividends and land rents 
recalled by respondents in the two taxonomic groups, which is reported in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
183 Each ¼ hectare is leased for R600 per year. For a total area of 80 hectares that would be 320-¼ hectare plots. Therefore R600 x 320 = R192, 
000 
184 This calculation is reached based on 370 hectares (total area of 450 - 80 hectares of food plots). Each ¾ hectare plot allegedly received 
R2000 in dividends therefore: R2000 x 493 (3/4 hectare plots) = R986, 000. However I must caution that it was even difficult to get clarity on 
the total area under cultivation. The Mayime Cooperative stated that the farm was operating over 450 hectare. Amadlelo Agri’s website refers 
to 330 hectare. However their shareholding document (see chapter 6) refers to 400 hectares and key informant interviews confirmed that an 
additional 50 hectares were acquired bringing it to 450 hectares. 
JV Dividend as proportion of total household income 
Case study site Category of respondent Mean Median 
Shiloh 
Dividend Receiving Household 0.03 0.02 
Dividend and JV Wage Receiving 
Household 0.02 0.02 
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Table 35. Frequency Distribution of JV Dividends and Land Rents in Shiloh in 2015/16 
(N= 33 households) 
Category of 
respondent 
Amount received 
in dividends & 
land rents in 
2015/16 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Dividend Receiving 
Household 
R0 1 4.3 4.3 
R500 1 4.3 8.7 
R600 2 8.7 17.4 
R1000 2 8.7 26.1 
R1200 4 17.4 43.5 
R1500 2 8.7 52.2 
R1600 1 4.3 56.5 
R2100 1 4.3 60.9 
R2500 1 4.3 65.2 
R2600 6 26.1 91.3 
R3100 1 4.3 95.7 
R3700 1 4.3 100 
  Total: 23 100   
Dividend and JV 
Wage Receiving 
Household 
R600 1 10 10 
R1200 3 30 40 
R1700 1 10 50 
R2500 1 10 60 
R3300 1 10 70 
R3600 1 10 80 
R4100 1 10 90 
R5200 1 10 100 
  Total: 10 100   
 
Contribution of dividends: household perspectives 
 
The following statements below, illustrate the different household perspectives on dividends. 
The contribution of these relatively small incomes to houshold reproduction, contrasts starkly 
to Keiskammahoek, as does the general contention over these benefits. 
 
 Female respondent, in dividend receiving household (asset rich group): “The money they 
gave us was peanuts because that Clover Company is coming to fetch the milk every day and 
there are almost 1000 cows. After some arguments they increased it to R2500 this year. What's 
happening with the profits at that dairy? People are not being honest. From the first time they 
started that dairy, we said thank you because this land was sleeping and now we are at least 
eating. But we are still eating peanuts! The land stood still from when Ulimocor was liquidated 
until the dairy. The land was brown not green. But when we started seeing this joint venture is 
profitable, we started wondering about those profits. It was our fathers who first made this 
agreement for the JV, but our elders had no idea how to run it…We are not happy about what 
is going on there. We had proposed that one of the key projects that can come from the dairy is 
to develop the small town through setting up a mall, but instead they decided to come and put 
up the vineyard for wine making to further damage people through alcoholism! We don’t even 
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know how we are supposed to benefit from those vineyards. They just say they take grapes to 
Cape Town. We are not getting anything from them.” 
 
Male respondent, in dividend receiving household (asset poor group): “We are just happy for 
that one day when the money comes from the farm, but it runs out quickly. We are living in 
poverty here. The dividend is important because it buys something that we don't have, like 
furniture or clothes, but it lasts only for a short while… just for that day. My father’s pension is 
more money, its R1500, and it comes every month… that dividend only comes once a year. My 
father made a very good living under Ulimocor. But after Ulimocor left they vandalized 
everything, so the irrigation scheme was broken and it was just for grazing. There was only one 
year since Ulimocor left, that we tried to plough for the potatoes and mielies when Siyazondla 
came. But nothing happened from it, we had no water and government didn’t make a follow 
up…I go to the cooperative meetings for my father, I am a member of that committee. Mayime 
has projects, which includes the housing project for youth. RDP is too slow, so the youth are 
erecting houses for themselves. They are also paying me R200 a fortnight to help sometimes… 
Things are running smoothly with the dairy project but the main challenge is there is too much 
poverty… the project is not enough. Government doesn't come and see how Shiloh is. 
Government must put money here to make things better... The dairy on its own can’t support 
us- we need jobs as well! Especially the youth, they are busy smoking drugs, and the only jobs 
they have is to make children. There are not enough EPWP jobs! If that dairy makes some 
other projects, like one for cheese or yoghurt, then maybe things will be better, but we need 
government funding!” 
 
 Female respondent, dividend receiving household, (asset middle group): “I inherited those 
fields they are using at the farm when my grandmother passed away in 1999. I am the eldest 
sister and there are no brothers. I never ploughed that land since I got it. I didn't have the 
strength to plough it. During the Sebe regime my family used to crop the lands, but since then 
we haven't. I decided to do the home garden instead because those fields are too big for me. I 
also keep pigs around the house, I have four now. They make good money, last year I 
slaughtered two and I got R5000 for each pig, selling it in pieces to the community. The money 
from that farm is less then my garden and pigs, which are most important. In 2015 we got 
R1000 in November and it was followed by R600 so far in 2016. We should get another R1000 
this November. I have three plots rented at the dairy but I don't know how big they are. The 
income assists because we can buy groceries with it for that month but the amount will never 
be sufficient. I want at least R15 000 a year for my land there. I have no idea how the amount 
is decided. I don't even know if I'm a member of Mayime. I only go to the meetings when the 
amounts are paid… Why are you asking me these questions? Are you going to give this 
information to the Cooperative? Have you seen the lists, are our names on the list? We haven't 
even seen the list of landowners, and we asked for it! “ 
  
Firstly, it is important to notice that the first respondent refers to Clover as the company that 
procures the milk from the farm. However, since 2015 COEGA Dairy has been procuring milk 
from Shiloh. This was a common mistake that was made by respondents, and indicates that 
they are not well informed regarding the JV project. The last quote also illustrates how 
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customary landowners are unaware of the governance and financial arrangements, and that 
they have little power in holding the cooperative to account. Many respondents were fearful of 
retaliation from the Mayime Cooperative, who might stop distributing their dividends. This 
illustrates dynamics of unequal power relations between the committee of the Mayime 
Cooperative and customary landowners meant to receive benefits. It also doesn’t help that 
many landowners (as the last quote demonstrates) are unaware of the area of land that they 
have customary rights to. This means that they can’t enforce their rights legally and hold the 
committee to account, (in terms of being paid the correct amount for the land contributed).  
 
Another area of contention, that the quotes reflect, is disputes over how profits should be used. 
Views differed over whether profits should be paid out in full as dividends to the landowners, 
or reinvested in other ‘community projects’. Among such a large group, which is socially 
differentiated, views obviously differed as to which kinds of ‘community projects’ were 
suitable. The choice of the Mayime cooperative to reinvest profits into a vineyard project185 
has been met with disapproval among many households. Poorer households, however, tended 
to prefer that all profits be distributed as dividends because of the strains they face to their 
simple reproduction.  The last respondent became very nervous talking about the dividends and 
was worried about the cooperative penalizing her. This kind of response was quite common 
and indicative of a general atmosphere of distrust and fear, which frames the intragroup 
conflict among customary landowners in Shiloh. I did my best to reaffirm my impartiality as a 
researcher and my commitment to protect anonymity. However, the tense context undoubtedly 
affected the responses I received from key informants.  
Conflict over JV dividends in Shiloh: intragroup conflicts inflected by social 
differentiation  
 
As already discussed in Chapters 7 and 9, within the customary landowning group, who are 
receiving dividends and jobs from the JV, there are various factional groups that have emerged, 
which are built around complex and overlapping identities. Various layers of social networks 
mediate access to not only jobs but allegedly also dividends and decision-making power in 
Shiloh. Most notably are whether households are considered members of the ‘traditional 
community’, association to the local Moravian Church and generational dynamics. These 
conflicts also have their roots in the intense reproductive squeeze many households in Shiloh 
are subject to. Capitalist farming introduces tensions and contradictions to social reproduction 
(Murray Li, 2011; Manenzhe, 2016/8; Mackintosh, 1989). This is reflected in the below quote, 
that indicates some of the demands being made on the JV farm, which are in direct conflict 
with the viability of the farm as a capitalist enterprise: 
 
Male respondent, JV wage receiving household (middle asset group): “Some of the issues 
are that the dividends comes after 6 months, but they want the money every month…. But the 
cooperative say if they pay every month there will be a loss. Another thing they wanted is milk 
                                                 
185 This project has allegedly received other government funding. However, customary landowners claimed that profits from land contributed 
towards the dairy were being reinvested in the vineyards. I couldn’t get clarity on this from Mayime committee member or financial statements 
to prove the contrary. 
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for every landowner but that will also create a loss. A lot of people are not happy with it; there 
are opposers of this project. Half of the beneficiaries I think are unhappy.“ 
 
Manenzhe (2016/18) and Hornby (2014) have also noted similar contradictions and tensions 
between social reproduction of poorer households and capitalist farming in the South African 
context. Manenzhe (2018) for example, notes that tensions documented in JV schemes in 
Levubu in South Africa’s Limpopo Province, can be linked to “the contradictory unity of 
capital and labour within community-owned enterprises, with difficult choices to be made 
between enhancing social reproduction or ensuring accumulation and profitability” (p.15). 
These types of dynamics and contradictions are markedly present in the Shiloh case study.  
 
When asked about the distribution of dividends to households, however, the Chairperson of the 
Mayime Cooperative did not note any grave contentions over the land rent and dividend 
payments: “There are no challenges in distributing dividends. We go to a general meeting and 
report how much money we have. All the landowners together decide how much must be kept 
in the bank, to do things for the business, and how much must go to the people for the 
dividends. We pay a dividend to 395 beneficiaries”. She did however note that there were 
conflicts among the beneficiaries, linked to ‘seeing things differently’ and households ‘not 
wanting development’: “The challenge is that there are so many beneficiaries. People don’t see 
things the way we do… I don’t know why they are against us, they don’t want the 
development!”  
 
Given the rather extreme levels of social differentiation among the customary landowners (that 
are documented above), it is not surprising that households have differing ideas about how JV 
benefits should be used and distributed. Rather than ‘not wanting development’, however, it 
appears that the root of the contention lies in poorer households struggling to meet their 
reproduction. However, there are also more complex dynamics of power at work, which 
intersect particularly around generational, religious, class and customary identities, which will 
be unpacked further in the coming chapters. 
 
One so-called ‘opposition group’, raises numerous concerns around the governance of the 
Mayime Cooperative and its committee. Some of these issues that are raised are relevant to the 
distribution of dividends. Households associated to the ‘opposition’ claim that many 
households are receiving dividends even though they are not ‘landowners’. They also 
expressed discontent that the Mayime Cooperative is responsible for distributing dividends to 
households, rather than the Shiloh Dairies Trust. The following statements illustrate these 
disputes: 
 
Female respondent, dividend receiving household (rich asset group): “278 people own the 
dairy who are supposed to get money ... But because of corruption there are 395 who are 
getting the money. There is a fight in this village about this, some of those top members of 
Mayime Cooperative are not even landowners.” 
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Male respondent, dividend and JV wage receiving household (middle asset group): “There 
are two things here... The trust, which runs the dairy and Amadlelo, sits on that, and the Co-op 
that divides the dividend into people’s bank accounts. Joining the co-op is voluntary, but 
people don't see eye to eye and the co-op is a middleman between the trust and the landowners. 
Why is this co-op running our money because they don't represent us all? I think the money 
should be run by the trust!” 
 
A manager at Amadlelo Agri also notes the conundrum regarding the number of beneficiaries, 
as well as issues around the governance of the Mayime cooperative, which affects the 
transparent distribution of dividends:“ There are difficulties in these communal projects around 
who the beneficiaries of these projects are. People start coming out of the woodwork. At Shiloh 
when they first started there were 278 beneficiaries and then somehow it grew to 395, and we 
are not sure how”. In my sample of 33 households, who supposedly have customary rights to 
irrigation plots, there is one household that claimed that they were not receiving a dividend 
because they are a part of the ‘opposition group’ in conflict with the current leadership of the 
Mayime Cooperative. The following statement explains this conflict:  
 
Male respondent, customary landowner: “Since we were pushed out of the committee in 
2013, we don't get anything. I went to Mayime’s office and they just said go to the bank. We 
wrote to Bhisho [Government] but they never responded and we formed a new group that is 
opposed to the committee and then the legal process started. This opposition group is not 
getting money. I have 4 fields being used by the dairy and I receive nothing. Now I am being 
told I will only receive R600 a year. We are still hopeful if the committee can change that 
things can be run better and we will get our money.” 
 
The intragroup conflicts emerging in Shiloh are complex and multi-layered, with several 
opposing discourses. Some of these contentions have already been discussed in previous 
chapters but will be elaborated on in more detail in the proceeding chapters. However, I have 
introduced some of these dynamics here to highlight that evaluating the outcomes of dividends 
and jobs in this context requires grappling with complexity.  
11.6. Conclusion: Comparative Analysis of Livelihoods Impacts in Shiloh and 
Keiskammahoek 
 
This chapter has illustrated how investigating characteristics of household composition, the 
wider political economy and dynamics of social reproduction, are of central importance in 
understanding the impacts of the JV farms on livelihoods. Making use of different taxonomic 
groups assisted in drawing out relevant causal factors. For example, although the asset groups 
do not denote ‘class categories’, the results presented above indicate that there are correlations 
between asset groups and dynamics of capital-labour relations. This was particularly the case 
with hiring of labour, which was exclusively found in the 'middle asset' and 'rich asset' 
households in Keiskammahoek and only in the 'rich asset' households in Shiloh.  
 
Overall the comparative analysis, paints a picture of a rural community in Shiloh whose 
livelihoods and ability to meet social reproduction are somewhat more precarious than in 
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Keiskammahoek. More households in the Shiloh sample live below the poverty line (both 
UBPL and LBPL), they have less assets and lower incomes186, scarcer access to wage labour, 
more female-headed households and generally rely more heavily on safety nets like public 
works jobs and social grants. Understanding pressures to household reproduction can also help 
explain emerging tensions over JV benefits.  
 
Investigating inter- and intra-household distribution of JV benefits (and risks) is also central to 
understanding these contentions and conflicts. At Shiloh conflicts over dividends take place at 
an inter-household level, and appear to be mediated by alliance to the Mayime Cooperative, the 
traditional leader and the Moravian Church. At Keiskammahoek there is decidedly less tension 
over dividends. However, the relatively larger dividends have, in some cases, ignited intra-
household conflicts over their distribution, which have taken on a particularly gendered 
character. At both case study sites, there are contentions over who has the right to labour on the 
farm, which are permeated with language of belonging and mediated by networks of kin and 
customary groups. There are also notable generational struggles over jobs. The following 
chapter will analyse these intragroup conflicts in more detail, exploring the impacts of 
dynamics of class formation.  
 
The case studies reveal that there is evidence of livelihood benefits at the two Amadlelo Agri 
JV farms in Shiloh and Keiskammahoek, in the form of jobs, land rents and dividend 
payments. The formalization of labour processes on the JV farms has allowed households to 
access formal employment, a scarce commodity in these areas. The conditions for labour on the 
JV farms are decidedly less precarious than that of informal wage labour or most self-
employment opportunities that can be found in the surrounding areas. The nature of dairy also 
means that there are more formal jobs created as opposed to seasonal or informal jobs. 
Arguably, the formality that comes with a JV, involving agribusiness, does have some benefits 
for labour. Petty commodity producing entities are often squeezed for working capital. As a 
result, super-exploitation of labour (including self-exploitation) is a common strategy to 
survive. However, in the context of a JV it is politically untenable for agribusiness to 
remunerate labour below the minimum wage. Authors such as Sender and Johnston (2004) 
have also highlighted the benefits of commercial farming for the poorest sectors of classes of 
rural labour. 
 
Data presented above for each case study indicates that JV jobs make significant contributions 
to household incomes. This is especially the case among JV wage receiving households, where 
JV wages in many cases comprise the largest and most stable household income source. In 
Keiskammahoek the median contribution to total household income for this group is 42%, and 
in Shiloh it is 50%. A more stark difference is evident between the dividend and JV wage 
receiving households. In Keiskammahoek JV wages contribute a median of 17% and in Shiloh 
they contribute 32%. These differences, in the latter group, can be explained in part by the 
comparatively larger dividends received in Keiskammahoek. However, the wider analysis of 
household livelihoods presented in this chapter provides a fuller account for these differences. 
                                                 
186 Median yearly household income for the sample was R86, 300 in Shiloh and R128, 495 in Keiskammahoek. This would, however, be 
affected in part by the larger dividends received by a portion of the sample in the latter case.  
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Particularly important, are variances in household composition, access to off-farm jobs, asset 
ownership, and labour hiring patterns. Households in Shiloh are generally subject to a more 
intense reproductive squeeze, as a result of a broader unemployment crisis. The wider 
livelihood portfolio of households and character of household composition thus interacts with 
the JV intervention in complex ways.  
 
In Keiskammahoek, JV dividends are clearly making significant contributions to overall 
household incomes: a median of 44% in dividend receiving households and 47% in dividend 
and JV job receiving households. Many elder pensioners are using these incomes to take care 
of grandchildren and some also send ‘reverse remittances’ to migrant children looking for work 
in urban areas. Some respondents noted that they were using this money to reinvest in own-
account farming and were hiring labour. However, these households also had access to many 
other types of off-farm income, and because money is fungible it’s hard to delineate the 
dividend’s contribution from these other sources of income. It is fair to conclude, that the 
dividend makes a contribution to the overall reinvestment fund for own-account farming in 
many of these households.  
 
In Shiloh, the dividend only contributes a median of 2% to both taxonomic groups. It thus 
makes a relatively small contribution and is used predominantly on household consumption. In 
general, however, you don’t see the same level of accumulation occurring in farming in Shiloh, 
even with contributions of off-farm incomes (as opposed to dividends). There are some 
dynamic livestock (worker) farmers, however they are fewer in numbers. The difference in 
livelihood strategies in these two sites, is in part a reflection of how the Keiskammahoek 
landowners accumulated larger areas of land and how most have maintained 1 or 2 hectares for 
own production. However, livelihood strategies are also more closely connected to agrarian 
activities. Most households had been farming their land and continuing to target formal and 
informal markets (to different degrees), up until the JV was implemented. Whereas the 
majority of landowners in Shiloh reported having abandoned the use of their land on the 
irrigation scheme between 1994 and 1997. Access to off-farm incomes and social grants have 
thus become comparatively more critical for the reproduction of these households. .  
 
The main benefit deriving to the no JV benefits group is the availability of cheap unpasteurized 
milk from the JV farms. In October/November 2016, the farms were selling 5 litres of milk for 
R32.50 (R6.50 per litre)187. The official price for supermarkets in rural areas in October 2016 
was R14.24 for a litre of UHT milk and R13.14 for a litre of fresh pasteurized milk188 (NAMC, 
2016). However, one could pay considerably more in a local grocery shop, and so many local 
households buy milk from the farms. Workers at the farms also receive free milk each day. At 
Keiskammahoek, a worker responsible for selling milk reported that in peak times189 around 60 
people purchase milk each day. In Keiskammahoek, some local entrepreneurs were buying 
milk from the farm and selling it at a premium of R45 (for 5 litres) to surrounding villages, 
where people are unable to reach the farm by foot. Several key informants in both Shiloh and 
                                                 
187 R5 per litre for 500 litres or more when buying in bulk 
188 It is not legal for supermarkets to sell unpasteurized milk in South Africa, although it is in high demand since many local people prefer to 
drink ‘Maas’ (sour milk).’ 
189 In the summer when it is easy to make ‘Amasi’ or ‘Maas’ (sour milk). 
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Keiskammahoek also emphasised the benefit of being able to purchase calves cheaply from the 
farm, especially for ceremonial purposes. Many households are also purchasing these calves 
and rearing them, to sell for a profit in the local ceremonial economy. The new market for 
cheap calves is thus a positive spin-off of these JV interventions.  
 
The chapter also highlighted some conflicts between households receiving jobs and dividends 
from the farm and no JV benefits households. In both sites this taxonomic group is decidedly 
worse-off in terms of incomes, assets, access to land and other key features of household 
composition (e.g. they have the largest proportion of female-headed households). As a control 
group, this may indicate that access to JV benefits is a determining variable in the relative 
ability of households to meet their social reproduction effectively. However, as discussed 
above, the sampling procedure for this group may have interfered with the results. Historical 
trajectories of land use, livelihoods and social differentiation, and how they interact with 
contemporary dynamics, are also central to understanding difference between these taxonomic 
groups. Bringing these complex levels of analysis together will now be the focus of the 
proceeding chapters. 
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Chapter 12. A Class-Analytic Approach to Agricultural Joint Ventures 
 
12. 1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter engages with key debates regarding the dynamics of class formation in the former 
Bantustans (or 'homelands') of South Africa. It is widely acknowledged that the oppressive and 
racially defined character of the labour regimes that emerged in the colonial and Apartheid 
eras, constrained rural class formation in these areas to some extent. However, a dominant 
'linear proletarianisation thesis' has overstated class homogeneity, and its continuing influence 
on scholars, means that processes of incipient class formation in these contexts continue to be 
underestimated (Levin and Neocosmos 1989; Cousins 2010).  
 
In previous chapters we have seen that the Shiloh and Keiskammahoek case studies illustrate 
quite divergent outcomes, even though the same JV model is implemented. This chapter will 
illustrate how the divergent outcomes in these two rural settlements are most powerfully 
explained by differences in the class structure of each settlement. A class-based typology 
assists in understanding the tensions that the JV model of capitalist farming generates in 
relation to household reproduction, in a class-differentiated manner.  
 
The chapter focuses primarily on a class-analytic approach, which combines Patnaik’s (1987) 
'labour exploitation criterion' with class typologies developed for the South African context by 
Cousins (2010) and Levin et al. (1997). Analysis of class dynamics (which intersect with other 
aspects of social difference in complex ways) accounts for many of the divergent outcomes 
evident in Keiskammahoek and Shiloh. In particular, it helps to explain the more intense 
intragroup conflicts that have emerged in the Shiloh case. A class-analytic approach is also 
significant, because it illuminates the emerging agrarian class structure that a JV intervention 
conditions, and thus explores the implications of the model for agrarian change in South Africa 
12.2 Class Typologies 
 
Interrogating tendencies towards rural class differentiation requires an engagement with the 
concept of petty commodity production190. Class differentiation among the peasantry occurs as 
a result of being 'locked into' commodity production in order to meet subsistence needs, so that 
peasants can no longer reproduce themselves outside of commodity relations (Brenner 2001). 
Within a capitalist mode of production, small enterprises that predominantly make use of 
family labour are best thought of as differentiated classes of 'petty commodity producers' 
(Bernstein 2010). These enterprises combine within them the contradictory class places of 
labour and capital. Since they own the means of production they are 'capitalists', but because 
they exploit their own labour power they also occupy the class place of 'labour' (Bernstein 
2010).  
                                                 
190 Petty commodity production has already been discussed in Chapter 2 but will be elaborated on here, as it is central to the discussion of my 
proposed class typology. See Chapter 2 also for debates on class formation in the former homelands, as I will not reiterate these again to save 
space. 
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In reality, many petty commodity producers will make use of hired labour for certain tasks, but 
the majority of labour inputs are sourced from the family. The class positions of capital and 
labour can also be differentially distributed within the household. For example, it is common 
for the class place of labour to be occupied by women and children, while men control the 
production process and thus occupy the class place of capital (Cousins 2010; Bernstein 2010). 
The position of petty commodity producers is characteristically unstable, in part because of 
how they combine these contradictory class positions (Bernstein 1986). Their ability to deal 
with competition and shocks, and to negotiate these internal contradictions of class, is uneven 
and this results in a tendency towards class differentiation (Cousins 2010; Gibbon and 
Neocosmos 1985).  
 
Lenin (1967 [1899]) explored the tendencies and dynamics of class differentiation among the 
peasantry in the context of the Russian countryside in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and identified poor, middle and rich peasants. Poor peasants struggle to reproduce 
themselves without squeezing their own labour-power, their capital, or both. Many lose control 
of their capital and come to rely exclusively on the sale of their labour-power, thus 
transforming into proletarians (or semi-proletarians, if they maintain some foothold in 
agricultural production). Middle peasants can engage in simple reproduction and meet these 
pressures through their own efforts. Rich peasants are those able to engage in expanded 
reproduction, accumulating capital and perhaps producing on an increasingly larger scale of 
production, and some may become capitalist farmers over time.  
 
Lenin’s (1967) framework has been widely utilised to describe general tendencies towards 
class differentiation in a plethora of different contexts. Cousins (2010), however, has argued 
that it cannot be applied to the South African context, because the emergence of an African 
peasantry was deliberately constrained by the creation of the 'homelands' as labour reserves, 
and by the appropriation of land by an emerging 'white capitalist farming class'. Cousins 
(2010:12) proposes a different way of understanding class that takes account of the intricate 
ways in which wage employment is combined with self-employment:  
 
"An alternative approach to analysing rural social formations in the region is to view 
both proletarianisation and the emergence of petty commodity production as class 
trajectories within a capitalist economy, and, furthermore, to see these as being able to 
be combined with each other (in complex and contradictory ways). This possibility 
yields the composite category of ‘worker-peasants’, in which simple reproduction is 
achieved through combining small-scale agriculture and wage labour".  
 
Typologies have been developed in the sub-Saharan African context, which attempt to capture 
this reality of households meeting their reproduction through both farming and wage 
employment (Scoones et al. 2012; Neocosmos 1987, Cousins et al. 1992). I have summarised 
two typologies in Table 36 below, which were developed for the South African context. 
Cousins (2010) framework focuses on small-scale agricultural producers, and thus does not 
include class categories for rural residents who do not engage in farming and combine off-farm 
incomes such as wages and social grants, while Levin et al. (1997) include a category for a 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 260 
'rural proletariat, dependent on selling their labour power. I will draw on these two typologies 
in proposing a relevant typology for my case study sites, while making adjustments for 
contextually specific dynamics. 
 
Table 36. Existing Class Typologies for Agrarian Social Formations in South Africa 
Levin et al. (1997) Cousins (2010) 
Petty bourgeoisie: salaried individuals who 
engage in farming. 
Capitalists whose main income is not from farming: 
farm on a small scale but their main income is 
another business. 
Petty capitalists: engage in petty commodity 
production, hire some wage labour and some 
have access to small businesses. 
 
Small-scale capitalist farmers: rely substantially on 
hired labour and can begin to engage in expanded 
reproduction and capital accumulation. 
Petty commodity producers: are able to reproduce 
themselves from farming alone (or only minor 
additional forms of income). 
Worker farmers: wage workers with access to 
land. 
 
Worker farmers: farm on a substantial scale but are 
also engaged in wage labour, and combine these in 
their simple reproduction. 
Allotment holding wage workers: primarily 
dependent on wages and pensions, also have 
access to small garden plots. 
Allotment holding wage workers: work small plots or 
gardens but are primarily dependent on wages for 
their simple reproduction. 
Rural proletariat: landless or near landless, 
depend almost wholly on wages. 
 
Supplementary food producers: work small plots or 
gardens and do not have access to wage income. Rely 
on social grants, craftwork or petty trading for their 
simple reproduction. 
 
12.3 Methodology for Class Analysis: Patnaik’s Labour Exploitation Criterion 
 
The framework for my approach to rural class analysis is based in part on Patnaik’s (1987) 
Labour Exploitation Criterion, which is embedded firmly in the Marxist tradition. Patnaik’s 
empirical index distinguishes peasant classes based on 'the degree and type of labour 
exploitation relative to self-employment, as the single most important indicator of class status 
(ibid.: 51). The primary forms of exploitation that she considers are firstly, direct exploitation 
through hiring labour (i.e. surplus value appropriation191) and secondly, indirect exploitation 
through leasing of land (rent appropriation). The latter is based on the Marxist theory of 
'absolute ground rent', which has already been discussed in Chapter 8. Very schematically, 
under a capitalist mode of production rent is inextricably linked to the existence of a class of 
landed property, which claims a monopoly of property over land.  
 
The existence of rent is explained thus by Patnaik (1983: 75), 'Absolute ground rent is a tribute 
exacted by the class of landlords by virtue of their monopoly of landed property, from the 
capitalist class out of the total surplus value appropriated by the capitalist class from the 
                                                 
191 Surplus value is the product of the unpaid surplus labour time of producers (labour), which is appropriated by capitalists as profit (Bernstein 
2010). 
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working class'. In adopting this framework for analysis of my cases, I view the JV dividends 
that households with rights to irrigation plots receive as a form of rent involving indirect 
exploitation of labour.  
 
Patnaik (1987) notes that, when defining a labour exploitation ratio for households, the unit of 
measurement could be labour-days, product or income. She chooses labour-days as her key 
criterion because it is easier to measure and 'because it lays bare the underlying production 
relation in the clearest possible manner' (Patnaik 1987). However, she notes that any unit of 
measurement would suffice, as the latter two are simply 'the product and value forms or 
expressions of the first, labour days' (ibid.:52).  
 
I have chosen to use income data as my key measure for the practical reason that in my 
household survey I gathered detailed data on incomes but not on labour-days. Given that 
residents of Shiloh and Keiskammahoek engage in a variety of off-farm livelihood activities, 
with quite variable degrees of income generation, it could also be argued that ‘income’ may be 
more illuminating than ‘labour-days’ worked, since days worked in an informal or seasonal 
unskilled job would render quite different incomes from, for example, a permanent job 
requiring skills. There are however definite limitations in the use of income data for calculating 
a labour exploitation ration, which have already been discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
In the use of the labour exploitation index Patnaik (1987) acknowledges that one has to accept 
a degree of reductionism. I am aware of the limitations of the approach, but as with all 
'typologies', one may need to accede to a degree of abstraction and then explore the degree to 
which it produces meaningful results. However, basing an empirical index first and foremost 
on labour relations is preferable to alternative approaches that infer the class position of rural 
producers from, for example, scale of production or size of land holding. It is also preferable to 
approaches which identify class by 'individual attributes', such as a person’s education, which 
are then used to explain differential material life conditions, while often excluding the 
dynamics of systemic inequality (Wright 2015).   
 
Patnaik’ labour exploitation ratio is calculated by the following formula: 
 
E= (Hi – Ho) / F= X/F 
Labour-exploitation ratio= Net labour-days hired in/Family labour in self-employment 
where  E  = Labour-exploitation ratio 
 Hi = Labour-days hired in or net income from labour hired in (including rents) 
 Ho= Family labour-days hired out or net income from family labour hired out 
  i.e. total wages 
 F= Family labour-days in self-employment or net income from family labour in 
 self-employment  
X = Net labour-days hired in  
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In order to distinguish between different class categories, Patnaik establishes limits for each 
class for the value of E (labour-exploitation ratio) and assigns relative values for X (net labour 
hired in) as opposed to F (family labour in self-employment). The logic of how these 'limits' 
are established is documented in Table 37 below, in the 'reason' column, and I elaborate on 
these in the section that follows. It is also important to establish a methodology for identifying 
'outliers', or exceptions to the general rule. For example, Patnaik (1987) identified a class of 
'petty employers' in her Indian case, who are very poor households that rely primarily on hired-
in labour as a matter of necessity, owing to the absence of able-bodied workers in the family 
and not as a reflection of an exploitative class position. It is thus necessary to use other 
indicators to identify these exceptions.  
 
In addition to 'labour exploitation', Patnaik (1987: 201) identified a further two 'secondary 
characteristics' to distinguish classes in agrarian societies, but which are not directly computed 
in her labour-exploitation criterion, namely 'the degree of possession of means of production, 
and the achievement or otherwise of a customary subsistence”'. We can expect that both of 
these additional variables will correlate closely with the type of labour exploitation that 
predominates.  
 
Patnaik’s (1987) method is commensurate with Cousins’ (2010) class-analytic typology, since 
his principle variables are, 'the degree to which agriculture contributes to social reproduction or 
expanded reproduction, and the degree to which hired labour is used in the agricultural 
production process' (Cousins: 14). I make use of some of the additional variables mentioned by 
Patnaik (1987) and Cousins (2010) along with relevant additions (e.g. the contributions of 
social grants) to distinguish between different classes which have a similar labour-exploitation 
ratio, but which are qualitatively different (see Table 37 below). These additions are considered 
as separate variables and are not calculated into the labour exploitation criterion.  
 
I use ownership of farming assets (means of production), ownership of livestock, and whether 
or not there is sale of an agricultural surplus, to distinguish between 'allotment holding workers' 
and 'worker farmers'. The latter reinvest off-farm incomes in own-account farming on a more 
substantial scale than the former. I use social grant incomes as a separate variable to identify a 
class category of 'supplementary food producers' that rely substantially on grants, and to 
distinguish them from 'petty commodity producers'. These two class categories have similar 
labour exploitation ratios and are similar to Patnaik’s 'small peasants', because neither has 
access to significant wage incomes (petty commodity producers might enjoy a little wage 
income). Social grant incomes are included as a separate variable because it can be argued that 
they are an income not derived from a household-based labour process.192 
 
Patnaik (1987) makes use of the class categories employed by Lenin (1967) to differentiate 
classes of peasants, which may be relevant in the Indian agrarian context. I have chosen to steer 
clear of the term 'peasant' due to its 'conceptual baggage'. This term invokes intense debates 
                                                 
192 Some approaches have described incomes like pensions as a form of rent appropriation. This may be an accurate portrayal of labour 
relations in a developed country context, but I have chosen not to adopt this stance because it would misrepresent their class position in the 
South African context. 
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within agrarian political economy about the nature of the 'peasantry', and whether or not it has 
disappeared as a result of on-going and accelerating processes of deagrarianisation (Bryceson 
et al. 2000; Hobsbawm 1994), and is thus merely a historical category (Bernstein 2010), or is 
currently being eliminated (Kitching 2001), or continues to exist and is a major social force in 
the countryside, underpinning contemporary agrarian political movements (McMichael 2006; 
van der Ploeg 2008). Instead, I have chosen to use terms which shed light on the social 
relations of production on JV farms in Shiloh and Keiskammahoek, and the diverse ways in 
which households meet their reproduction needs both on and off-farms, across rural and urban 
spaces.  
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Table 37. Methodology for Establishing Class Categories and Proportions for Case Studies 
Type of 
Labour 
Exploitation 
Patnaik’s 
(1987) Class 
Categories 
Characteristics Value of E= 
X/F 
 
Reason Bunce (2018) 
Revised Class 
Categories 
Characteristics of revised 
class categories  
Variables 
considered (in 
addition to 
Patnaik’s value of 
E=X/F) 
Class % in 
Shiloh 
sample 
(N=62) 
Class % in 
Keiskam
mahoek      
(N= 55) 
 
 
Primarily 
exploiting 
labour of 
others 
Landlords No manual labour in 
self-employment, 
large-scale 
employment of others’ 
labour 
 
𝑬𝑬 → ∞ 
 
𝑭𝑭 =  𝟎𝟎 
𝚾𝚾 > 𝟎𝟎  
         
Rent earning 
pensioners 
Survive entirely off rents 
(JV dividends) and 
pensions. No wage labour 
or manual labour in self-
employment (besides in 
garden plot and rearing 
livestock, which most 
often involves hired 
labour).  
JV rent 
appropriation and 
access to social 
grants. 
𝐹𝐹 ≥ 0 
0% 5.5% 
Rich 
peasants 
At least as large an 
employment of others’ 
labour as self-
employment  
 
𝑬𝑬 ≥ 𝟏𝟏 
 
 
𝑭𝑭 > 𝟎𝟎 
𝚾𝚾 > 𝟎𝟎 
𝚾𝚾 ≥ 𝑭𝑭 
Rent earning 
rich farmers 
and business 
owners 
Employment of others’ 
labour (including rents) is 
equal to or larger than self-
employment. Some derive 
substantial income from 
off-farm business with 
hired labour. Also sell 
labour in off-farm 
activities and some labour 
on the JV. Reinvest 
income in own farming, 
especially accumulating 
livestock. 
Livelihoods 
centered around JV 
incomes, own-
account farming 
and own businesses 
with hired labour.  
3.2% 14.5% 
 
 
 
Primarily 
self-
employed  
Middle 
peasants 
Rely primarily on self-
employment but 
employ the labour of 
others to a minor 
extent 
 
𝟏𝟏 > 𝑬𝑬 > 𝟎𝟎 𝑭𝑭 > 𝟎𝟎 𝑿𝑿 ≥ 𝟎𝟎 
𝑿𝑿 < 𝑭𝑭 Doesn’t exist in either case study  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Small 
peasants 
Zero employment of 
others or working for 
others; or working for 
others to lesser extent 
than self-employment 
 
𝟎𝟎 ≥ 𝑬𝑬 > −𝟏𝟏 
 
 
𝑭𝑭 > 𝟎𝟎 
𝑿𝑿 ≤ 𝟎𝟎 |𝑿𝑿| < 𝑭𝑭 
 
Petty 
commodity 
producer / 
petty trader 
Reproduce themselves 
predominantly from self-
employment (on-farm 
and/or petty trade) without 
any or minimal hired in 
labour, which may be 
supplemented to a minor 
Self-employment is 
main income 
source 
8.1% 5.5% 
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extent by wage labour. 
Supplementar
y food 
producers 
No access to wage income. 
Survive primarily on social 
grants, supplemented by 
garden plots and petty 
trading  
Social grants are 
main income 
source (77-100%).  
14.5% 0% 
 
 
 
 
Primarily 
exploited by 
others 
Poor 
Peasants 
Some self-employment 
but rely primarily on 
working for others.  
 
 𝑬𝑬 ≤ −𝟏𝟏 
 
 
𝑭𝑭 > 𝟎𝟎 
𝚾𝚾 < 𝟎𝟎 |𝑿𝑿| ≥ 𝑭𝑭 Worker farmer Engaged in wage labour (often migrant, also JV) for simple reproduction, 
but reinvest off-farm 
incomes in own account 
farming on a substantial 
scale. 
Fulfil 2/3 
criterion193: Cattle 
assets (middle or 
rich); farming 
assets (middle or 
rich); sell a surplus 
32.3% 20% 
Allotment 
holding 
worker 
Engage in wage labour for 
simple reproduction but 
also work small home 
gardens or plots. 
Do not fulfil 2/3 
criterion. Tend to 
have fewer 
livestock, farm 
assets and 
marginal/ no sales 
30.6% 41.8% 
Landless 
labourers 
Do not engage in self-
employment since they 
have no means of 
production, and 
depend entirely on 
working for others. 
 
𝑬𝑬 → −∞ 
 
𝑭𝑭 = 𝟎𝟎 
𝑿𝑿 < 𝟎𝟎 
 
Near-landless 
labour 
Depend almost wholly on 
wages and social grants. 
Landless or near-landless. 
No plots, no 
livestock, most do 
not cultivate 
garden or to minor 
extent 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 0 
11.3% 
 
12.7% 
 
(Source: Patnaik 1987; Cousins 2010; Levin et al. 1997, with the author's own additions Bunce, 2018)
                                                 
193 2/3 criterion avoids excluding households (e.g. livestock farmers), who may have fewer farming assets or different types of livestock (not cattle); and/or no sales in the last year, due to 
rearing/harvesting times or drought.  
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12.4 Results of Employing a Class-Analytic Typology for Investigating Social Differentiation 
in JVs 
 
 In Keiskammahoek, those households who did not engage in wage labour and relied primarily on JV 
rents, social grants (primarily pensions) and own-account farming with hired labour were identified as 
rent earning pensioners. This class category is found only in Keiskammahoek, and accounts for 5.5% of 
the sample. Their labour exploitation ratio tends towards positive infinity:  𝐸𝐸 → ∞; they have little or no 
self-employment: 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 0; and net income from labour hired in tends to have a large positive value, 
derived primarily from JV rents: Χ > 0.  
 
A substantial part of the sample in Keiskammahoek was classified as rent earning rich farmers and 
business owners (14.5%), while in Shiloh only 3.2% of the sample fell within this category. In Shiloh, 
these households were not identified in this category due to JV rents (which are insignificant compared 
to other incomes). Rather, they earned income from off-farm businesses in which they hired labour, 
combined with own-account farming. This class category’s labour exploitation ratio equals or succeeds 
one: E ≥ 1; self-employment is greater than zero: F > 0; net income from labour hired in is greater than 
zero: Χ > 0; and net income from labour hired in succeeds or at least equals that from self-employment: 
Χ ≥ F. 
 
A middle peasantry could not be identified in either case. In the case study sites, even if self-
employment (with some hired labour) was undertaken, as in Keiskammahoek, it earned much less 
income than was contributed by JV rents. The value of E was thus necessarily larger than 1, placing 
these households in the class category of rent earning rich farmers and business owners. I also did not 
classify any of these households as 'small-scale capitalist farmers', as identified in Cousins’ (2010) 
typology. This is because there were no cases where households relied substantially on hired labour in 
agricultural enterprises and were engaged in expanded reproduction (accumulation).  
 
Most of the households engaging more extensively in own-account farming were classified as rent 
earning rich farmers and business owners or worker farmers, in the latter case because of heavy reliance 
on the sale of their labour in return for wages. Among these households, a minority were hiring in labour 
more frequently, but generally no more than a single labourer for between 1–5 days a week in household 
gardens or for herding, where households generally paid a herder collectively. The significance of this 
absence of middle farmers/peasantry and small-scale capitalist farmers for agrarian change in South 
Africa, particularly in light of the prominence of the JV model is discussed further below.  
 
Supplementary food producers were identified only in Shiloh, where they made up 14.5% of the total. 
Social grant contributions ranged from 77% to 98% of overall household income. In both sites only a 
minority of households identified as petty commodity producers or traders. Both of these class 
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categories have a labour exploitation ratio 0 ≥ 𝐸𝐸 > −1  that corresponds to Patnaik’s (1987) small 
peasants.  An ideal petty producer would have a ratio of zero, but because some are obliged to 
supplement self-employment with wages, the ratio may be less than zero but will be greater than -1. 
Self-employment is greater than zero: 𝐹𝐹 > 0; net income from labour hired in is less than or equal to 
zero: 𝑋𝑋 ≤ 0; and the modulus194 value of net income from labour hired in is less than income from self-
employment. If less than half the total income is from working for others, the household is still a small 
peasant: |X| < F. As detailed in the previous section I distinguish between these class categories on the 
basis of their degree of dependence on social grant incomes.  
 
A near-landless labour class category was also identified, which depends almost wholly on wages, 
supplemented by social grants. They have no field plots, no livestock, few or no agricultural assets and 
most do not cultivate a garden. Their labour exploitation ratio tends towards negative infinity E → −∞; 
They have zero or near zero self-employment: F ≥ 0; and their net labour days hired in will have a large 
negative value, since their entire income is from working for others: 𝑋𝑋 < 0. Some of the labourers on 
the JV farms in both sites fall within this class category. In Keiskammahoek, they account for 12.7% of 
the sample, and in Shiloh, 11.3%.  
 
Cousins (2010) notes that the boundaries between his worker peasants and allotment holding wage 
workers are blurred, however, the main distinction he draws 'rests primarily on scale of land-holding'. In 
the specific contexts investigated here, however, scale of land-holding is not a relevant variable. Even if 
households own irrigation plots, none of the households in these class categories farm these plots 
themselves, because they are hired to the JV scheme. Historical processes of land closure related to the 
establishment of the irrigation schemes, means that there are very few dry land plots. Limited access to 
land and the importance of wage labour means many households are not cultivating plots but rather 
investing in livestock farming, using communal grazing land for goats, sheep and cattle, or their 
household yards for small livestock like pigs and chickens.  I did not want to exclude dynamic livestock 
producers engaged in farming on a substantial scale from the category of worker farmer, simply because 
they did not have plots. As described in the previous section, the additional parameters I established for 
worker farmers included: cattle ownership, ownership of agricultural assets195 and whether a surplus 
was being sold or not.  
 
Worker farmers and allotment holding workers correspond to Patnaik’s (1987) poor peasants. Their 
labour exploitation ratio is less than or equal to -1:  𝐸𝐸 ≤ −1; self-employment is greater than zero: 
𝐹𝐹 > 0; net income from labour hired in is less than zero, because they sell their labour to a greater 
extent than hiring the labour of others: Χ < 0; and the modulus of net income from labour hired in may 
equal self-employment, but is generally greater than: |X| ≥ F.  
 
                                                 
194 Modulus |x| of a real number x is the non-negative value of x without regard to its sign.   
195 I established asset groups for the variable of cattle (no cattle, poor, middle and rich) and agricultural asset ownership (poor, middle and rich) according to 
data for each case study site. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 268 
Worker farmers engage in wage labour for their simple reproduction, but also reinvest off-farm incomes 
in own account farming on a substantial scale. In Shiloh, a larger proportion identified as worker 
farmers (32.3%), as compared to Keiskammahoek where they account for only 20% of the sample 
because there are more households located in the category rent earning rich farmers and business 
owners. Worker farmers with access to JV dividends and JV wage incomes were reinvesting these in 
own-account farming, particularly significant being the relatively large dividends so reinvested in 
Keiskammahoek. As I will discuss in more detail below, there are important qualitative differences 
between the reproductive strategies of worker farmers in Shiloh and Keiskammahoek.  
 
Allotment holding workers rely mostly on wage labour (including JV jobs) for their simple reproduction, 
but also work small home gardens or plots. They own fewer livestock and farm assets than worker 
farmers, and earn little or no sales income from their own-account farming. In Shiloh, they accounted 
for 30.6% of the sample, and in Keiskammahoek, 41.8% of the sample.  In the following section I 
explore further the characteristics of these various class categories, in each case study site, and 
disaggregate them according to taxonomic groups. 
 
12.5 Characteristics of Class Differentiation in Shiloh 
 
 
Tables 38, 39 and 40 present a picture of a highly differentiated sample of households. These different 
class categories comprise households that compose their livelihoods in very diverse ways. The extent, to 
which they exploit their own household labour, engage in wage labour, or hire in labour, differs 
significantly among households. Unsurprisingly, it is the rent earning rich farmers and business owners 
who have the highest mean incomes. This is closely related to their exploitation of hired labour in off-
farm businesses and in own-account farming, which accounts for 81% of their incomes, as indicated 
below in Table 38. These incomes are complemented by off-farm permanent jobs and old age pensions. 
Households in this class category do not have members who labour on the JV farm.  
 
Worker farmers have the second highest household incomes, however, this is a feature of this class 
category having the largest proportion of income from wage labour. The highest proportion of JV jobs, 
are found in this class category, with a mean of one per household. They also have access to a range of 
other incomes, notably a mean of one job per household for off-farm permanent and casual jobs, and 
access to remittances. There are more households in this category self-exploiting family labour in own-
account farming, but many are also hiring labour. Households also have access to a mean of one old age 
grant and child support grants.  
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Table 38. Shiloh: Features of the Labour Exploitation Ratio (E=X/F)  
 (N= 62 households) 
 
 Class 
Categories: 
Near-
landless 
labour 
Supplementary 
food producers 
Allotment 
holding 
worker 
Worker 
farmer 
Petty 
commodity 
producer 
Rent earning 
rich farmers 
and business 
owners 
  Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
E= Labour 
Exploitation 
Ratio 
-41557.5 
(-22200) 
-0.03 
(0) 
-7384.24 
(-39.17) 
-25673.65 
(-44.73) 
-0.46 
(-0.4) 
227600 
(227600) 
Total yearly cash 
income for 
household (HH) 
R55 511 R36 193 R82 374 R201 533 R147 724 R271 500 
Proportion of 
Income from 
Labour Hired In 
0 0 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.81 
Proportion of 
Income from 
Labour Hired Out 
0.72 0 0.6 0.73 0.13 0.12 
Proportion of 
Income from 
Self-Employed 
Family Labour 
0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.59 0 
Proportion of 
Income from 
Social Grants 
0.24 0.93 0.33 0.18 0.27 0.07 
 
Supplementary food producers have the lowest incomes and derive a mean proportion of 93% of 
household incomes from social grants. Their only other income is from own-account farming, in which 
no labour is hired, and some engage in petty trade. The near-landless labour class category has the 
second lowest incomes, and 72% of their income is derived from wage labour. However, the types of 
jobs are limited to casual and precarious jobs. The generational characteristics of these households (with 
young household heads), means that most do not have access to pensions but they have a mean of one 
child support grant.  
Allotment holding workers derive their largest income from labour hired out, which accounts for 60%. 
After worker farmers this class category has the next greatest number with access to a JV job. There is at 
least one household member engaged in own-account farming with family labour, and a minority is 
hiring in labour. Notably there is no mean of one for any specific type of waged income source, in part 
because there is a great diversity among these households in terms of 'types of jobs' they engage in. 
Social grants account for 33% of their incomes, which is the second greatest contribution to a class 
category, after the supplementary food producers.  
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Table 39. Shiloh: Access to Different Types of On and Off-Farm Income Sources by Class Categories 
 (N= 62 Households (including 331 individuals)) 
 
Number of HH 
Members with 
Access to 
Different 
Income Sources: 
Near-
landless 
labour 
Supplement
ary food 
producers 
Allotment 
holding 
worker 
Worker 
farmer 
Petty 
commodity 
producer 
Rent 
earning rich 
farmers and 
business 
owners 
Mean Sum Mean Sum Mean Sum Mean Sum Mean Sum Mean Sum 
JV permanent 
jobs 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 11 0 1 0 0 
JV casual jobs 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 
JV dividend 0 0 0 2 1 11 1 16 1 4 1 2 
Off-farm 
permanent jobs 0 1 0 0 0 4 1 20 0 1 0 0 
Off-farm casual 
jobs 1 6 0 0 0 7 1 10 1 3 1 2 
Civil servants 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 5 0 0 0 0 
 Own-account 
farming (no 
hired labour) 0 1 1 9 1 20 1 21 1 7 0 0 
 Own-account 
farming (hired 
labour) 0 1 0 0 0 4 1 10 0 1 2 4 
Off-farm self-
employment (no 
hired labour) 0 0 0 3 0 4 0 3 2 9 0 0 
 Off-farm self-
employment 
(hired labour) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 3 
Public works 
jobs 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 
Old age grants 0 3 1 11 1 13 1 20 1 3 1 1 
 Disability grant 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 2 1 3 0 0 
Child support 
grants (total #)  1 8 1 12 1 26 1 14 3 13 0 0 
Remittances  0 3 0 2 0 12 1 18 0 1 0 0 
The class category, for which self-employed family labour contributes the most to livelihoods, is 
unsurprisingly the petty commodity producers. They derive 59% of their income from self-employed 
family labour, and they have a mean of two household members engaged in these activities (with no 
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hired labour). Social grants accounting for 27% of their incomes, and notably there is a mean of three 
child support grants per household. Markedly, the petty commodity producers have higher mean 
household incomes than the allotment holding workers, in part because they are complementing self-
employment with off-farm casual jobs, where there is a mean of one job per household.  
 
Table 40 presents different aspects of household composition, and some other important aspects of 
socioeconomic differentiation among different class categories. Of particular interest, is how the 
taxonomic groups intersect with the various class categories. The near-landless labour category is 
predominantly made up (85.7%) of those households, which derive no benefits from the JV. The 
remaining households are those with access to a JV job. The supplementary food producers are likewise 
chiefly made up (77.8%) of 'no JV benefits households', with the remainder being 'JV dividend 
households'. It is significant, that our two most vulnerable classes are largely made up of those without 
access to irrigation plots. However, it is also noteworthy, that there are JV dividend households among 
the supplementary food producers. This highlights the levels of differentiation among households with 
irrigation plots.  
 
On the other extreme of the class typology are the rent earning rich farmers and business owners, who 
are entirely derived from JV dividend households. Allotment holding workers are represented among all 
of the taxonomic groups, but the largest proportion is from JV dividend households (42.1%). Worker 
farmers are also found across all taxonomic groups, but with most representation among JV dividend 
households (40%) and JV dividend and wage households (35%). The largest proportion of petty 
commodity producers, are among JV dividend households (60%). 
 
The class categories with the highest proportion of female-headed households are the two most 
vulnerable class categories- the near-landless labourers (85.7% are female-headed) and the 
supplementary food producers (66.7%). The class category with the most male-headed households, are 
the worker farmers (65%). Household assets correlate with household incomes in some cases. The two 
class categories with the highest incomes also have a large proportion of households located in the 'asset 
rich' category. Worker farmers are located in the 'rich' farming asset category, followed by rent earning 
rich farmers and business owners, who have the highest score in the 'middle rich' category.  
 
Cattle ownership is disproportionally distributed across these class categories, it is concentrated among 
the rent earning rich farmers and business owners, followed by the worker farmers. These two class 
categories also have the highest means for all other types of livestock, except for pigs, which are more 
equally distributed across the class categories. There is a mean of one pig among all groups, except for 
near-landless labourers and allotment holding workers, who do not own pigs. 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 272 
Table 40. Shiloh: Aspects of Socio Economic Differentiation and Household Composition by Class 
Categories 
(N= 62 households) 
Class Categories: 
  
Near-
landless 
labour 
Supple- 
mentary 
food 
producers 
Allotment 
holding 
worker 
Worker 
farmer 
Petty 
commodity 
producer 
Rent earning 
rich farmers 
and business 
owners 
JV Taxonomic 
Groups: %  in Class 
Categories 
JV Dividend 
HH  22.20% 42.10% 40.00% 60.00% 100.00% 
JV Wage HH 14.30%  21.10% 20.00%   JV Dividend 
& Wage HH   10.50% 35.00% 20.00%  
No JV 
Benefits HH 85.70% 77.80% 26.30% 5.00% 20.00%  
Gender of HH head: 
%  in Class 
Categories 
Female 85.70% 66.70% 52.60% 35.00% 60.00% 50.00% 
Male 14.30% 33.30% 47.40% 65.00% 40.00% 50.00% 
Other       
HH Asset Groups: %  
in Class Categories 
Poor 85.70% 44.40% 47.40%  40.00%  Middle 14.30% 55.60% 31.60% 40.00% 40.00%  Rich   21.10% 60.00% 20.00% 100.00% 
Cattle Groups: %  in 
Class Categories 
No Cattle 100.00% 77.80% 94.70% 5.00% 80.00% 50.00% 
Cattle Poor   5.30% 10.00% 20.00%  Cattle Middle 
Rich  22.20%  45.00%   
Cattle Rich    40.00%  50.00% Garden plot 
cultivated during the 
last 12 months 
Yes 28.60% 55.60% 73.70% 65.00% 60.00% 100.00% 
No 71.40% 44.40% 26.30% 35.00% 40.00%   
Household size Mean: 4 4 5 6 5 4 
% Adults present 
most/ all nights Mean: 0.85 0.88 0.78 0.57 0.89 0.63 
% HH members 
under 18 years Mean: 0.35 0.2 0.23 0.17 0.08 0 
Age of HH Head Mean: 53 72 61 67 65 67 
# Types of income 
sources  Mean: 3 3 5 6 6 5 
HH members with no 
incomes Mean: 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Cattle owned  Mean: 0 1 0 10 0 60 
Goats owned  Mean: 0 2 0 11 2 15 
Pigs owned  Mean: 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Sheep owned  Mean: 0 0 0 4 1 3 
Chickens owned  Mean: 0 2 1 7 4 9 
Weighting of farming 
assets  Mean:  Poor (3)  Middle (5) Middle (5) Rich (11)  Middle (6) Middle (7) 
Motor vehicles owned Mean: 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Number of irrigation 
plots Mean: 0 1 1 1 1 2 
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Notably, households categorised as near-landless labourers own no livestock at all, and allotment 
holding workers, only have a mean of one chicken. The supplementary food producers own more small 
livestock than the allotment holding workers. This indicates differentiated livelihood strategies and the 
increased dependence on wage work among allotment holding workers, and possibly a reduced 
availability of household labour to engage in own-account farming. However, generational 
characteristics may also account for differences in livestock ownership. Supplementary food producers 
have the oldest mean for household heads at 72 years, possibly allowing for generational accumulation 
and investment of pensions in livestock.  
 
Notably, the worker farmers have the smallest proportion of adults present most or all nights (57%), 
signifying the highest incidence of migration among the class categories. Petty commodity producers, on 
the other hand, have the most adults present. The percentage of household members under eighteen 
speaks to dynamics of generational reproduction and a consumer/producer ratio. Notably this variable 
correlates with income levels. There are no child dependents in the rent earning rich farmers and 
business owner households, while the near-landless labour households have 35% of household members 
under eighteen years. These different aspects of household composition, illustrate how class on its own 
cannot explain everything, and how aspects of generation, gender and other identities, intersect with 
class in complex ways.  
 
Below I contrast the livelihood strategies of two customary landowning households who are both 
receiving dividends from the JV. The first is a supplementary food producer household, where 
reproduction is met without recourse to wage employment, and the second is an allotment holding wage 
worker household, where a JV job is crucial to reproduction. Generational dynamics and local political 
dynamics, particularly allegiance to the traditional leader and Mayime Cooperative, clearly interweave 
with class place.  
 
Supplementary Food Producer  
 
JV dividend receiving household: "I am 77 years old and live here with my wife, brother and grandchild. 
We survive off our old age pensions, my brother’s disability grant and a child support grant. We have a 
1/4 hectare garden plot where we grow maize and other vegetables. It is only myself and my wife 
working in the garden and we don’t sell anything, we eat it all.  In the last year we harvested about a 
plastic shopping bag of peas, 50 cabbages, 20 bunches of beetroot, 25 (10 KG) bags of potatoes, and we 
still need to harvest the maize. I inherited that irrigation plot, which is rented to the dairy, from my 
father because I am the first born. The Moravian church handed that land to my grandfather. The last 
time we ploughed that land ourselves was in 2010. I was growing maize, beans and vegetables and I 
would hire people from Sada Township sometimes. We would work with other landowners to pull 
resources to plough. In 2010 I only made about R200 from sales but overall I was making more from the 
land before because I always had enough food on the table! I was influenced by the other landowners 
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who handed their land over to the dairy. I am not pleased with the current status and now we are too old 
to work that land, so we will see whether we ask another white man to take over. I received R1200 last 
November from the dairy. The amount has been the same since 2011. At this dairy they milk twice a day 
and then the truck goes to PE so it is too little to receive only R1200 a year. I think that there is 
something funny going on there. The main cause of the conflict in this community is this small amount 
we get. The money contributes little to our lives. I bought a fridge with the money and it was finished. I 
attend Mayime Cooperative meetings once a month. We do ask questions in the coop meetings but we 
get silenced and answers don't surface".   
 
Allotment Holding Wage Worker 
 
JV dividend and wage receiving household: "I am 52 years old and I live with my mother, sister and my 
two daughters of 18 and 21 years. I never took a wife. I started working at the dairy in 2011. I am a 
general worker and irrigator. The Mayime committee called me for the job, I didn’t apply. I make 
around R3500 but it changes depending on how much you work, we get R14.25 per hour. I like working 
in agriculture, I’ve never worked in agriculture before this. I worked in construction as a builder before. 
The money is better now in this job because I would only make R1500 to R2000 a month building. My 
salary pays for the groceries, furniture and clothes in my house. I save R350 a month, which the 
company saves for me in an account and some months I try and save in my bank too. We keep a 
vegetable garden and sometimes when we get a lot of crops I sell some things to the neighbours, 
especially the potatoes and some beetroot, cabbage and onion. This year we sold 4 bags of potatoes, 
(those 10 KG ones), 15 bunches of beetroot and about 20 cabbages. We don’t have any cattle but this 
year we started keeping chickens for around the household. Our other income is from my mother’s old 
age grant and we get a child support grant for my youngest daughter- but next year she’ll be too old for 
it. My sister works at the local clinic as a cleaner. She makes around R1800 a month and she works 5 
days a week. My daughter is 21 years old, but she is unemployed and I support her through my job. We 
have lived in Shiloh since 1982. Before that I was living on a white farm near here. The Nkosana 
allocated us this land and we built the house ourselves".   
 
12.6 Characteristics of Class Differentiation in Keiskammahoek 
 
It is clear that these class categories have different characteristics of household composition and other 
important aspects of socioeconomic differentiation. Table 41 illustrates that the class category with 
access to the highest incomes in Keiskammahoek, are the worker farmers. They derive 70% of their 
household incomes from hiring their own labour out. Households classified as near-landless labourers 
derive 72% of their income from hiring their own labour out. However, they have much lower incomes 
as these jobs are generally informal and poorly paid. Table 42 indicates that worker farmer households 
have a mean of one JV job. They also have access to a range of other incomes, including a mean of one 
permanent and casual off-farm job, and one civil servant job. 18% of their income is from labour hired 
in, which is in part from labour exploitation through JV rents. However, it is also due to there being a 
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mean of one member engaged in own-account farming, with hired labour. Worker farmers have the 
lowest social grant contribution to income, of only 6%.  
 
The next greatest mean, for total household incomes, is among the rent earning rich farmers and 
business owners. Their greatest proportion of income is derived from labour hired in, which accounts for 
64%. Table 42 indicates, that this is mostly from JV dividends, as there is a lower incidence of hiring 
labour in own-account farming. Exploitation of family labour in own-account farming is more common 
among these households, where there is a mean of one. These households complement their incomes 
from labour hired in, with wage labour, particularly JV jobs and civil servant jobs. They also have 
access to off-farm permanent and casual jobs (and remittances), but these are distributed unequally 
among households. In general, their livelihoods are more closely centered around the JV farm and their 
own-account farming, than worker farmers, who rely more significantly on off-farm jobs. The 
livelihoods of rent earning rich farmers and business owners, like worker farmers, do not rely 
insignificantly on social grants, which constitute just 9% of incomes. 
 
Table 41. Keiskammahoek: Features of the Labour Exploitation Ratio (E=X/F) 
 (N= 55 households)  
 
Class Categories: 
Near-
landless 
labour 
Allotment 
holding 
worker 
Worker 
farmer 
Petty 
Commodity 
Producer/ 
Trader 
Rent earning 
rich farmers 
and business 
owners 
Rent 
earning 
pensioners 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
E= Labour 
Exploitation Ratio 
-53280 
(-2000) 
-6395.54 
(-20) 
-29149.46 
(-14.75) 
-0.53 
(-0.55) 
54712.63 
(20.67) 
36866.22 
(63.48) 
Total yearly cash 
income for 
household 
R85 916 R116 117 R341 014 R116 813 R228 769 R132 262 
Proportion of 
Income from Labour 
Hired In 
0 0.06 0.18 0 0.64 0.76 
Proportion of 
Income from Labour 
Hired Out 
0.72 0.61 0.7 0.21 0.21 0 
Proportion of 
Income From Self-
Employed Family 
Labour 
0.01 0.09 0.06 0.44 0.06 0.01 
Proportion of 
Income from Social 
Grants 
0.27 0.24 0.06 0.35 0.09 0.23 
 
The class place of rent earning pensioners intersects with generational dynamics, as household heads 
have the oldest mean age of 78 years. 23% of their income is derived from social grants, and notably 
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they are the only class with a mean of one for disability grants. Together with generational dynamics, ill 
health may explain why they are not accessing wage labour. The highest contribution to their income is 
from labour hired in (76%), predominantly from the JV dividend. The use of hired labour in own-
account farming reflects in part, illness and old age.  
 
Allotment holding workers, derive 61 % of their income from hiring their own labour out, particularly in 
JV jobs. Most JV workers are located in these households. They also have a mean of at least one 
permanent and casual off-farm job. These incomes are supplemented by own-account farming with 
family labour and petty trade. Social grants contribute significantly to their household incomes, 
accounting for 24%. Petty commodity producers derive 44% of their income from self-employed family 
labour. At least two household members are engaged in own-account farming and one in off-farm petty 
trade, both with no hired labour. Social grants contribute most significantly to this group, accounting for 
35% of household income. They also access wage labour, particularly off-farm casual jobs.  
 
Households classified as near-landless labour, have by far the lowest incomes. They have access to 
precarious and poorly paid types of wage labour, and notably they are the only class category with a 
mean of one public works job. A few households have access to JV jobs, and there is a mean of one 
casual job, one permanent job and one remittance. This is the class category with the second highest 
reliance on social grants, which contribute 27% of total household income. There is a mean of one child 
support grant. When compared to other social grants, child support grants have a relatively low-income 
contribution (R350 per month in 2016), as compared to an old age grant (R1500 per month). 
 
Table 43 illustrates how the class categories intersect with the taxonomic groups. The majority of near-
landless labourers are 'no JV benefits households' (57.1%), with the remainder from JV wage 
households. Allotment holding workers are primarily 'JV wage households' (52.2%), followed by 'no JV 
benefits households' (34.8 %), with the remaining minority distributed among the two taxonomic groups 
with access to irrigation plots. Worker farmers are most prominent among 'JV wage households' 
(45.4%), followed by 'JV dividend households' (27.3%) and 'JV dividend and wage households' (18.2%). 
Petty commodity producers are concentrated in 'no JV benefits households' (66.7%) and the remainder 
in 'JV wage households'.  Rent earning rich farmers and business owners, are concentrated in 'JV 
dividend and wage households' (87.5%) and the rest are found in 'JV dividend households'. Rent earning 
pensioners are only found in 'JV dividend households.  
 
Rent earning rich farmers and business owners have the highest incidence of female-headed households 
with 50%, and worker farmers have the lowest with only 9.1%. Worker farmers have the largest 
household sizes and the highest incidence of migrant labour, with only 46% of adult household members 
present most or all nights. Table 43 also captures some striking aspects of generational reproduction. 
Near-landless labour households have the youngest household heads, and 29% of their household 
members are under eighteen years, while rent earning pensioners have the oldest household heads, and 
the lowest percentage of household members under 18 years, with only 13%.  
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Table 43 also illustrates how asset ownership correlates with class categories, and their defining 
livelihood strategies. For example, near-landless labourers have a high proportion (57.1%) categorised 
as asset 'poor'. While, both rent earning rich farmers and business owners, and worker farmers have the 
most households categorised as 'middle rich' in household assets, but 'rich' in farming assets. In contrast, 
rent earning pensioners are 'rich' in household assets but 'middle-rich' in farming assets, illustrating 
differentiated reproductive strategies.  
 
The most prolific livestock owners are worker farmers, rent earning rich farmers and business owners, 
and petty commodity producers. Accumulation of cattle is most pronounced among worker farmers, 
followed by petty commodity producers, and then rent earning rich farmers and business owners. 
Ownership of large herds of goats is notable among petty commodity producers but also among worker 
farmers. The high number of chickens among rent earning rich farmers and business owners, is because 
a few households are engaging in small-scale broiler farming, targeting local markets. Pig ownership 
among worker farmers, and rent earning rich farmers and business owners, also indicates some small pig 
businesses targeting markets and run mostly by females. Notably, allotment holding workers only have a 
mean of four chickens and one pig and they are characterised as 'middle rich' in farming assets. Near-
landless labourers in contrast, have 71.4% of households who have not cultivated a household garden in 
the last year, they own no livestock, and have few or no farming assets. 
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Table 42. Keiskammahoek: Access to Different Types of On and Off-Farm Income Sources by Class Categories 
 (N= 55 households (including 368 individuals)) 
 
Number of HH Members with 
Access to Different Income 
Sources: 
Near-landless 
labour 
Allotment 
holding worker Worker farmer 
Petty 
Commodity 
Producer 
Rent earning 
rich farmers and 
business owners 
Rent earning 
pensioners 
Mean Sum Mean Sum Mean Sum Mean Sum Mean Sum Mean Sum 
JV permanent jobs 0 3 1 12 1 10 0 1 1 4 0 0 
JV casual jobs 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 4 0 0 
JV Dividend 0 0 0 3 0 5 0 0 1 9 1 3 
Permanent jobs 1 5 1 13 1 13 0 1 0 3 0 0 
Casual jobs 1 4 1 18 1 8 1 3 0 3 0 0 
Civil servant jobs 0 0 0 2 1 6 0 0 1 4 0 0 
Own-account farming 
 (no hired labour) 0 3 1 34 1 11 2 5 1 9 0 0 
Own-account farming 
 (hired labour) 0 0 0 2 1 7 0 0 0 2 1 4 
Off farm self-employment 
 (no hired labour) 0 2 0 6 0 4 1 3 0 1 0 0 
Off farm self-employment  
(hired labour) 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Public works jobs 1 5 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Old age grants 0 1 1 12 0 5 1 4 1 7 1 3 
Disability grant 0 3 0 7 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Child support grants (total 
number) 1 7 1 31 1 14 1 4 1 7 1 2 
Remittances  1 4 0 11 0 4 0 1 1 6 0 1 
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Table 43. Keiskammahoek: Aspects of Socioeconomic Differentiation and Household Composition by Class Categories  
(N= 55 households) 
 
Class Categories: Near-landless labour 
Allotment 
holding 
worker 
Worker 
farmer 
Petty 
Commodity 
Producer/ 
Trader 
Rent earning rich 
farmers and 
business owners 
Rent earning 
pensioners 
 JV Taxonomic Groups: 
%  in Class Categories 
JV Dividend HH   4.30% 27.30%   12.50% 100.00% 
JV Wage HH 42.90% 52.20% 45.40% 33.30%     
JV Dividend & Wage HH   8.70% 18.20%   87.50%   
No JV Benefits HH 57.10% 34.80% 9.10% 66.70%     
Gender of HH head: 
%  in Class Categories 
Female 28.60% 30.40% 9.10% 33.30% 50.00% 33.30% 
Male 71.40% 69.60% 90.90% 66.70% 50.00% 66.70% 
Other             
HH Asset Groups: 
%  in Class Categories 
Poor 57.10% 34.80% 9.10% 33.30% 12.50%   
Middle 14.30% 43.50% 54.50%   50.00% 33.30% 
Rich 28.60% 21.70% 36.40% 66.70% 37.50% 66.70% 
Cattle Groups: 
%  in Class Categories 
No Cattle 100.00% 78.30% 9.10% 33.30% 25.00%   
Cattle Poor   17.40%     37.50% 100.00% 
Cattle Middle Rich   4.30% 36.40% 33.30% 25.00%   
Cattle Rich     54.50% 33.30% 12.50%   
Garden plot cultivated 
during the last 12 
months 
Yes 26.60% 65.20% 63.60% 100.00% 62.50% 100.00% 
No 71.40% 34.80% 36.40%   37.50%   
Household size Mean: 6 6 8 7 7 6 
% Adults present 
most/all nights Mean: 0.57 0.59 0.46 0.67 0.65 0.58 
% HH members under 
18 years Mean: 0.29 0.22 0.3 0.17 0.27 0.13 
Age of HH head Mean: 54 57 65 72 63 78 
# Types of income 
sources  Mean: 4 5 6 6 6 5 
HH members with no 
incomes Mean: 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Cattle owned by 
household Mean: 0 1 15 13 7 3 
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Goats owned by 
household Mean: 0 1.43 9.36 28.67 3.88 1.33 
Pigs owned by 
household Mean: 0 1 3 1 4 2 
Sheep owned by 
household Mean: 0 0 4 12 0 0 
Chickens owned by 
household Mean: 0 4 9 5 29 5 
Weighting of farming 
assets  Mean: Poor (5) Middle (7) Rich (13) Rich (14) Rich (14) Middle (10) 
Motor vehicles owned Mean: 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Number of irrigation 
plots Mean: 0 0 2 0 3 3 
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Worker Peasant household in Keiskammahoek: A story of accumulation  
 
I came across a household which represents a livelihood trajectory of accumulation. This household has 
used their dividend to accumulate dairy cattle, which are rented to the JV farm to generate significant 
incomes. This is a dividend receiving household which is categorised as asset rich. The household has 
also managed to accumulate 4 heads of cattle (not dairy cows), 40 goats, 50 chickens and 30 ducks. 
These livestock, particularly the goats and ducks, are sold to the local community. They hire a full-time 
worker to look after the animals and work in the household garden. The household earned R316 600 in 
2015/16, of which the largest contribution is the rental of dairy cows (R144 000). The household head is 
also a member of the Trust and an ‘additional member’ on the board of the Seven Stars Cooperative. 
The following life history illuminates the history behind how the household came to rent dairy cows to 
the farm: 
 
"I came from Colesburg in 1977 to this irrigation scheme. I am 76 years old. In this house there is my 
wife and 5 grandchildren, my one son who is a lawyer, another son who is a private security guard and 
two daughters who both work in Johannesburg in permanent clerical jobs. Before I came here I was 
working as a police officer and before that I worked in a hotel. I decided to get out of the police force 
because of the frustration of the riots. I grew up on a livestock farm so farming wasn’t completely new... 
During the Ciskei we each milked 6 cows and there was no payment for your produce, they would give 
you R120 for your whole produce no matter the amount. We were like workers not farmers! It was not a 
good income but we managed to give our children an education on that money. I have a title for the land 
since 1985 but not everyone does... Before Amadlelo came here I had around 30 cows and we were just 
milking them and selling to the community and we planted maize and veg on his land, hiring people 
casually. We started in 2010 getting a small stipend from Seven Stars farm, around R600 then it slowly 
increased. Now we get R5000 a month and a large amount at end of the year. In 2015 we got R50 000.  I 
used the dividend to fix up this house and to look after my grandchildren. I also fixed my car and bought 
livestock.  
 
I hire 20 cattle to the dairy farm business. I started with 10 cows in 2013 and through the calves I now 
hire 20 dairy cows to the (JV) business. When we started Seven Stars, some people sold their cows but 
they used that money for other things. I decided to save that money and buy more cows for the business. 
I get R600 per month for each cow and I get paid at the end of the year. When I can get more money I 
will want to extend my cows. My most important income source will be from the cows because the one 
from the dividend is up and down and depends on how well the business does, now there is a drought so 
it may be difficult. My wife and I both have old age pensions. She also receives three child support 
grants for the grandchildren. I also have other livestock and cattle, I keep them in an outside camp 
during the day and at night I close them in one of the three houses I have on the scheme. We sell 
livestock to the local community. We have a home garden that my wife looks after but just for eating not 
for sale. She has one person to help in the garden and also with the livestock, he is a casual person but he 
comes daily".  
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The class position of this worker peasant household is illuminated by its ability to hire in labour and to 
accumulate productive assets. Younger household members are actively engaged in wage labour. Some 
of the migrant children remit, while others contribute to household expenses and the ceremonial fund 
when they return to the rural household, including investments in livestock. This case illustrates how the 
JV is providing some opportunities for landowners to accumulate productive capital in Keiskammahoek. 
For an elder pensioner, the opportunity provided to generate passive income through renting dairy cows 
to the JV scheme is a pragmatic and seemingly beneficial livelihood strategy. Clearly incomes and 
benefits deriving from the JV are central to the overall accumulation strategy of this household.  
 
However, the life history also reveals that this particular household has a much longer trajectory of 
accumulation and class formation extending beyond the JV. Before accessing land on the irrigation 
scheme the household head was a police officer. He managed to save money during his employ with the 
state. He received a pay-out upon his resignation and still receives a state pension to augment the 
dividends he receives from the scheme. This example demonstrates that it is not always possible to 
determine the degree to which cases of accumulation are a direct result of JV benefits, as compared to 
other income and asset sources and historical processes of class formation. Money is fungible and class 
place is dynamic and inherently unstable. 
12.7 Discussion and Comparative Analysis of Shiloh and Keiskammahoek  
 
The results of employing the class typology, illustrate definite patterns between the class categories. 
These differences are not only expressed in terms of trends in different forms of labour exploitation, but 
also in terms of reproductive strategies, access to different types of incomes, assets and also household 
composition. This indicates that despite limitations in using income data, the modifications to Patnaik’s 
(1989) labour exploitation ratio were successful in distinguishing class categories with common 
characteristics. The results of the livelihood survey and life histories (which could not be presented in 
full here) have confirmed that in both Shiloh and Keiskammahoek, the local communities in which these 
JVs are being implemented, are socially differentiated along lines of class. However, aspects of 
generational difference, gender, religion, race, and ethnicity, intersect with class in complex ways. There 
are also important differences between these two sites, in terms of historical trajectories of class 
formation, social differentiation and particularly land use and consolidation, which assist in explaining 
the very diverse outcomes.  
 
At an obvious level, the divergent outcomes between Shiloh and Keiskammahoek are also a function of 
the size of the beneficiary group and scale of production. In Keiskammahoek, 2000 cows are kept on 
745 hectares with dividends deriving to only 35 households. This sharply contrasts to Shiloh, where you 
have 900 cows on 450 hectares, with a huge beneficiary group of 395 households, and hence both 
smaller dividends and fewer JV jobs. The difference in reproductive strategies across these case studies, 
is in part, a reflection of the way in which larger holdings of land had been historically accumulated in 
Keiskammahoek prior to the JV. Farming their irrigation plots had remained a central livelihood activity 
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up until  the JV was implemented in 2010. This fact, along with historical processes of class formation, 
can in part account for the much larger numbers of rent earning rich farmers and business owners, and 
worker farmers engaging extensively in own-account farming. However, access to a larger JV dividend 
also enables a surplus to be reinvested in farming, and at the same time influences their labour 
exploitation ratio.  
 
This contrasts sharply with Shiloh, where the majority of landowners reported having abandoned 
cropping on the irrigation scheme between 1994 and 1997, when the Ciskei’s agricultural parastatal 
Ulimocor was dissolved, and the homeland was reincorporated into a democratic South Africa. 
Following this, for the most part, the land was only used to graze cattle in Shiloh. Consequently, access 
to wage-labour and social grants became comparatively more critical for the reproduction of these 
households. This explains the relatively small number of rent earning rich farmers and business owners, 
and a larger grouping of worker farmers in Shiloh, relying substantially on wages. The wider context of 
unemployment in Shiloh also accounts for the identification of the class category of supplementary food 
producers (not identified in Keiskammahoek), who rely almost entirely on social grants, supplemented 
marginally by own-account farming.  
 
In order to understand the heightened levels of intragroup conflict in Shiloh, relative to Keiskammahoek, 
it is revealing to compare the class structure of those households with access to irrigation plots, as 
documented in Table 44 below. Clearly, there is differentiation among these households in both sites. 
However, in Shiloh, this differentiation is more extreme. In particular there are classes like petty 
commodity producers, which make little or no use of wage labour and mostly exploit their own family 
labour. Households identified as supplementary food producers rely considerably on social grants, and 
can thus be considered quite a vulnerable class. In Keiskammahoek, neither of these class categories can 
be identified among households with rights to irrigation plots.  
 
The majority of households in Shiloh are located in the allotment holding worker class and worker 
farmer class, comprising 74% together. In Shiloh, the rent earning rich farmers and business owners are 
a very small minority, and the rent earning pensioner class category, does not exist. In Keiskammahoek 
by contrast, when these two classes are combined, they account for 57.5% of households with irrigation 
plots. These classes both exploit the labour of others, to an equal or usually greater extent, than they 
exploit their own labour in self-employment. Rent earning pensioners do not sell their labour, and rent 
earning rich farmers and business owners, sell their own labour to a smaller degree than they hire in the 
labour of others. This demonstrates how the predominant dynamics of labour exploitation among 
irrigation plot holders, is vastly different between the two case study sites.  
 
In Keiskammahoek, there are a relatively large proportion of worker farmers among households owning 
irrigation plots, although less than in Shiloh. In both case study sites, worker farmers have quite high 
household incomes, relative to other class categories. However, in Keiskammahoek, with a mean of 
R341 041, this is much higher than Shiloh with only R201 533. However, the former also tends to have 
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larger household sizes. In Keiskammahoek, social grants only contribute 6% to total worker farmer 
incomes, whereas in Shiloh they contribute 18%. In Keiskammahoek, worker farmers have a mean of 
one civil servant job, whereas in Shiloh, only a few households have access to these jobs. This speaks to 
a difference in the type of wage labour and possibly the 'political connectedness' of Keiskammahoek's 
worker farmers.  
 
Table 44. Class Typology for Combined Taxonomic Groups of 'JV Dividend' and 'JV Dividend and Wage 
Households'  
Class categories for irrigation plot 
holdholders196 Shiloh Keiskammahoek 
Supplementary Food Producers 7% 0% 
Allotment holding worker 30% 15.5% 
Worker farmer 44% 27% 
Petty commodity producer / trader 12% 0% 
Rent earning rich farmers and business 
 
7% 42% 
Rent earning pensioners 0% 15.5% 
 
The life histories also reveal that there are qualitative differences between worker farmers' reproductive 
strategies. In Keiskammahoek there is evidence of accumulation in farming, which is simply not present 
in Shiloh to the same extent. For example, I found a worker farmer who had accumulated 20 dairy cattle 
and is renting them to the JV farm. This also illustrates the point that the qualitative differences in the 
class place of worker farmers, in relation to rent earning rich farmers and business owners in 
Keiskammahoek, may not be so pronounced as to create the type of class conflict that is evident in 
Shiloh.  
 
There are also half as many allotment holding workers among irrigation plot holders in Keiskammahoek 
as there are in Shiloh. In Keiskammahoek this class has higher overall household incomes, (a greater 
proportion of which is from self-employment, particularly agricultural sales), they rely less on social 
grants and they have more assets and livestock. A closer look also reveals that in Keiskammahoek some 
households were located in this category because of gender and generational dynamics. These were 
female-headed households who didn’t own cattle and due to old age or illness, some were no longer 
generating a surplus from own-account farming. These households predominantly rely on the JV 
dividends, supplemented by the support of younger, healthy household members engaged in wage 
employment.  
 
                                                 
196 The near-landless labour class category is not included here because this is a class typology for households that own irrigation plots, and thus they are not 
landless.  
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In Shiloh, the incidence of female-headed households is however far more pronounced, and shows an 
almost opposite trend to Keiskammahoek. In Shiloh, every class category except worker farmers, has 
more female-headed households than male-headed households. In contrast, in Keiskammahoek, it is 
only among rent earning rich farmers and business owners where there is a 50/50 split, and all of these 
were households headed by elder widows. This is an important characteristic difference between the two 
sites. Literature highlights how female-headed households tend to be more vulnerable. This is not only 
because of gendered struggles in the work place, home and other social spaces. Women (particularly 
when unmarried), also generally have inferior customary inheritance rights, which are contingent on 
their relationships with male household members (Claasens 2013; Cousins 2013b; Fay 2005; Oomen 
2005; Berry 1989; Whitehead and Tsikata 2003; Knowles 1991).  
 
Various layers of social networks mediate access to jobs, dividends and decision-making power in 
Shiloh. Many intragroup conflicts have emerged, focused around the JV farm. However, life histories 
and ethnographic immersion revealed that many of these conflicts preceded the establishment of the JV, 
but had since been reinvigorated by it. Several aspects of social difference intersect in complex ways 
with the class categories, including generational and gender dynamics, as well as association to the local 
Moravian Church and being considered a member of the 'traditional community', in good relations with 
the local headman who is a member of the cooperative.  
 
Although the JV has not led to the same levels of intragroup conflict in Keiskammahoek, there are still 
visible areas of contention. The history of land consolidation under 35 landowners has contributed to 
shortages of grazing land in this area. In the first years of the farms establishment, the surrounding 
community would frequently cut fences to let their livestock on to the pastures, which caused serious 
challenges for the biosecurity of the farm’s dairy herd. The local community often refers to the 
landowners as 'settlers', since many originate from other parts of South Africa. The legitimacy of their 
rights to the land is frequently questioned, framed by discourses of belonging and membership to 
customary groups, which endure in spite of the title deeds most households hold.  
 
Another important finding emerging from this study is the need to focus not only on intragroup conflicts 
through a class lens, but also on the distribution of benefits and risks at an intra-household level. In some 
cases, JVs are precipitating a reorganisation of labour processes and their gendered-relations within 
households. Some female respondents expressed frustrations over male members controlling JV 
dividends and wages. This quote, from a woman in a rent earning rich farmer and business owner 
household in Keiskammahoek, is revealing of gendered struggles:  
 
"Men always want all the money to come to them. Sometimes you can't know how much you got 
because they don't tell you, they control it. The dividend goes straight to my husband’s bank so I 
don't even know if it's paid or not". 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 286 
Gendered struggles were especially marked in Keiskammahoek, where households were still farming 
their land prior to the JV. The comparatively large size of the dividend also explains why it is igniting 
intra-household struggles over the distribution of this income. Women explained how it had been easier 
to have a degree of control over farming income prior to the JV. However, since the implementation of 
the JV, women needed to develop new strategies to renegotiate their livelihoods. Some women had 
refocused their efforts on household gardens, and many had started small pig or broiler businesses. 
However, the effects of the JV on gender relations were differentiated and contingent and the outcome 
was not always negative for women's relative power within households. Some women emphasised 
having equal, or at least considerable negotiating power, over how JV dividends and wages were spent 
in the home.  
 
In spite of these conflicts over the distribution of JV jobs and dividends, it must be recognised that the 
evidence indicates that in both sites, jobs in particular, made significant contributions to household 
incomes. This was especially the case among JV wage receiving households located in allotment 
holding worker and near-landless labour class categories, where they were often the largest and most 
stable income source. There is also evidence in Keiskammahoek of JV dividends being reinvested in 
own account farming, particularly in the households of rent earning rich farmer and business owners and 
worker farmers. 
 
12.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter made use of a methodology for exploring class dynamics, that brings together Patnaik’s 
(1989) labour exploitation criterion with other approaches to develop class typologies in the South 
African context (Cousins 2010; Levin et al. 1997). The results of employing the class typology, 
demonstrate how differing dynamics of class formation and other aspects of social differentiation help 
explain divergent outcomes in the comparative case study of the Amadlelo Agri JV farms in Shiloh and 
Keiskammahoek.  
 
A longer view of historical processes of class formation and accumulation of land, livestock and farming 
assets in Keiskammahoek under a few households, can in part account for the JV’s relative success. This 
is demonstrated by the examples of rent earning rich farmers and business owners and worker farmers, 
who are investing JV dividends and wages extensively in own-account farming. In Shiloh, the many 
intragroup conflicts that have emerged around the JV farm reflect the realities of a highly differentiated 
community, and a context where household reproduction is under more extreme pressure.  
 
 The class typology, detailed in this Chapter, is also significant because it speaks to the type of emerging 
agrarian structure that a JV intervention conditions. This has important implications for debates around 
agrarian change in South Africa. Significantly, the study could not identify any households as 'middle 
farmers'. This contrasts to research that has identified dynamic middle farmer class categories, 'reliant on 
'accumulation' from below' through petty commodity production' (Scoones et al. 2012; Cousins, 2013). 
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Many authors consider accumulation from below to be a more progressive, dynamic and desirable 
pathway of agrarian reform (Cousins 2015; Aliber and Hall 2012; Scoones et al. 2012). The JV model 
does not, however, seem to provide the conditions for establishing such a class category of accumulating 
middle farmers.  
 
Also I could not find evidence of the emergence of small-scale capitalist farmers, as identified in 
Cousins’ (2010) typology. However, it could be argued that some of the black JV farm managers 
(discussed in Chapter 6) could be viewed as small-scale capitalist farmers. The entrance of black small-
scale capitalist farmers could be viewed as contributing to transformation of the dairy sector. However, 
benefits to this class need to be evaluated in relation to benefits to households that hold land rights to 
irrigation plots, and particularly the high levels of intragroup conflicts emerging in Shiloh in the face of 
the JV intervention. 
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Chapter 13. Sharemilking Joint Ventures: Impacts on Social Reproduction, Land 
Rights and Class Relations in the Amadlelo Agri Schemes 
 
13.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter is the final concluding chapter of this PhD thesis. I will attempt to summarise and discuss 
the key analytical issues and findings that the thesis has explored. I will also particularly focus on two of 
my key research questions, which involve a synthesis of the findings discussed so far, and which have 
particular relevance for research, policy and practice: 
 
• How can the impacts of JVs on the livelihoods and land rights of local residents be explained, 
with particular emphasis on the social relations of production, the structure of property rights, 
discourses of ‘custom’ and the character of decision-making and power?  
 
• What are the wider political and policy lessons that can be drawn from these cases of large-scale 
agricultural investments in communal areas? And how can the study contribute to understanding 
processes of agrarian change in contemporary South Africa? 
 
13.2 Summary of the Key Analytical Issues Explored in this Thesis 
 
The Amadlelo Agri model of sharemilking JVs and its benefits for agrarian capital 
 
The way in which agrarian capital chooses to organise production is no accident. It tells one something 
about how capital is responding to the particular pressures inherent to a commodity market and the 
wider political economy. Capital must be organised in ways that are profitable if it is to survive. Political 
uncertainty around land reform, coupled with a volatile market for milk in South Africa, explains in part 
why white agrarian capital choses to enter into dairy joint ventures with black landowners. JVs are a 
strategy to ‘hang in’ and access government funding to make investments less risky, in highly 
competitive value chains like dairy.  
 
Agribusiness partners often cite their primary motivation as a desire to contribute to land reform and 
black economic empowerment. However, a number of other incentives were also noted. The 
comparative case study reveals that sharemilking in the South African context is a means by which to 
avoid tying capital up in costly fixed assets and land, as these are instead provided through government 
grants and access to communal land. This allows agribusiness to free up capital to rather accumulate 
large herds of valuable dairy cows and make investments in the wider value-chain, up and downstream 
from the farm, which arise through sharemilking ‘empowerment deals’.  Other incentives of the model 
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for agribusiness include: access to scarce and valuable irrigated pastures in South Africa's coastal 
regions (which provide a differential rent), increasing political creditability within the context of land 
reform, and the labour-disciplining effect of having a large part of the labour force derived from 
customary landowners/ community shareholders. 
 
Amadlelo Agri reports that government investment in fixed assets across all of their projects to date has 
amounted to R197 million, while they have invested R92 million in dairy animals and movable 
equipment. Amadlelo Agri benefits from a 10% management fee and 50% of the remaining profits, 
while investing far less capital in movable assets as compared to the value of the land, irrigation 
infrastructure and milking parlours. The model is thus a good return on investment for the sharemilker. 
The kind of financial data required to carry out a thorough analysis of the relative return on investment 
to the community cooperatives vis-à-vis Amadlelo Agri was not made available to me, and therefore I 
cannot attempt to unequivocally answer the question of whether the community beneficiaries are being 
exploited, as government has claimed.  
 
In many cases ‘main-stream economic logic’ states that strategic partners prefer to invest where there is 
private title. The main explanation for this is that tenure insecurity doesn’t provide adequate insurance 
on investments, especially for crops that require long-term investments e.g. tree crops (Bitzer, V & 
Bijman, J., 2014; Derman et al., 2006). For dairy, however, this restriction can be more easily overcome 
because of the nature of the commodity being produced, which involves twice-daily milking. If 
government invests in the fixed assets, as they have in a number of Amadlelo Agri's farms, risk is 
reduced for agribusiness, which can easily withdraw their cows197 or movable assets should the venture 
fail.  
Landed Property and Rent in South Africa's Land Reform 
 
In Chapter 8, I made use of Patnaik's (1983) application of the Marxist theory of rent to sharecropping, 
in order to theorize class relations in sharemilking. Within this framing, the JV dividend is seen as a 
form of rent. This clarifies the fundamental social relations of production involved in sharemilking, as 
one between landed property (the community/ customary landowners) and a capitalist producer tenant 
(Amadlelo Agri/ Agribusiness). Patnaik’s (1993) conceptualisation of sharecropping, as a form of 
capitalist rent, is important and helps us clarify social relations of production. Viewing sharecropping, in 
its widely held empirically associated character with petty production and pre-capitalist relations, does 
not adequately explain the concrete capital-labour relations we have investigated in sharemilking. 
Importantly, Patnaik (1993) notes that the key difference between a petty producer and a capitalist tenant 
or sharecropper, is that the latter produces for profit and therefore does not pay the whole of their 
surplus product as rent, whereas the former does. 
 
In order to ensure, therefore, that a sharecropping or sharemilking arrangement is still profitable, the 
capitalist tenant must raise the output and surplus per unit of land by employing advanced techniques or 
                                                 
197 Given the lucrative rental market for dairy cows in South Africa. 
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technologies and/or by accessing land where a differential rent (as discussed above) can be reaped. 
Importantly this conceptualisation also explains why capitalist producers only employ share contracts 
with certain types of farming. Dairy, for example, allows for the penetration of capital, in the form of 
mechanisation. This allows capitalist tenants (sharemilkers in this case) to lower the proportion of the 
surplus product paid as a rent, making the arrangement profitable in ways that other types of farming 
would not allow for because they can't be mechanised.  
I have conceptualised class relations in sharemilking as those between landed property (the customary 
landowners) and a capitalist tenant (agribusiness). The class identities of the various landowning 
households will, however, be more complex, given the ways in which class position is fragmented 
(Bernstein, 2011a). However, for the purpose of theorising sharemilking and understanding its dominant 
social relations of production, it is useful to abstract from the complexities of class place among 
different landowning households. In most cases, households owning irrigation plots and receiving rents 
from the JV will not identify simply as ‘landed property’. The pressures of social reproduction in rural 
South Africa would allow very few people to live off rents alone. As Chapter 12 demonstrated, however, 
in Keiskammahoek I did identify such a class category among the irrigation plot owners, who survive 
entirely off rents and pensions, with no access to wage labour. I have referred to them as "rent earning 
pensioners" because of how generational characteristics intersect with class place.  
 
My theorisation of class relations of sharemilking arrangements in the former homelands, making use of 
Marxist theories of rent and landed property, also has some parallels with Capps (2010) theorisation of 
the Bafokeng Tribal Authority in the context of platinum mining in South Africa. To explain land 
relations in the former homelands, Capps (ibid) makes use of the concept of 'tribal landed property’, 
which is understood as:  
 
"... A dialectical unity of local state and corporate land relations that are both form and effect of 
the contradictory development of the capital relation in sub-Saharan Africa under conditions of 
colonial imperialism. As a state institution the chieftaincy is everywhere constituted as a 
territorialised tribal authority, while as a landed institution it has the potential (though by no 
means the necessity) to assume the ‘class function’ of modern landed property in relation to 
agrarian and industrial capital" (p. 3). 
 
Capps' (2010) conceptualisation, allows for communal tenure to be understood from within a political 
economy perspective, and its inherent class relations to be drawn from those that characterise the 
capitalist mode of production. This avoids the perplexing tendency to draw on 'pre-capitalist' social 
forms and relations to understand its dynamics. My theorisation of landed property in sharemilking 
arrangements, does not, however, focus strongly on the institution of chieftaincy. This is in part because 
of the somewhat unique context of the Ciskei where, for example, the institution of chieftaincy is absent 
in Keiskammahoek but present in the Shiloh case study. However, the key class dynamics remain 
relevant. In particular, Capps (2010) explains how 'tribal landed property' is viewed as a distinct 
phenomenal form that embodies both a political and economic character, unlike the purely economic 
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form of ‘landed property’. This creates various antagonisms and contradictions between political 
authority and the economic aspects of landed property. 
 
This specific characterisation is useful for my purposes, as it explains the enduring role of the state, in 
which all communal land remains vested. The state continues to play a major role in land administration 
and in directing development on land located in the former homelands (whether privately or 
communally owned). The Keiskammahoek case study, illustrates that in the context of the communal 
areas, even where land is privately owned, the legitimacy of land rights continue to be subject to 
negotiation based on membership to various, nested social groups (Berry, 1993; Moore, 1998). Thus the 
nature of land rights remain 'politically up for dispute' and are not merely enforced through the 
'economic power' bestowed on landed property to organise production (Wood, 1981; Capps, 2010).  
 
Capps (2010), for example, explains how tribal landed property's power to subordinate labour to capital 
is made more precarious by its political aspects, which become the condition by which it can exert its 
economic power. The many contestations over JV arrangements, that I discussed in this thesis, not only 
in the Amadlelo Agri case studies but also in a number of other JVs being implemented in the communal 
areas, have their roots in the inherent tensions that characterise the type of 'landed property' found in 
South Africa's former 'homelands'. 
The wider significance of the Amadlelo Agri case for debates on 'Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment' (BBBEE) and class  
 
An implication, of the class dynamics inherent in the sharemilking JV model, is that it may not be 
creating the right conditions to stimulate a class of productive black farmers, since beneficiaries are 
involved primarily as workers and as passive recipients of dividends and land rents. Key informants 
from Amadlelo Agri, also acknowledge this limitation of the JV model, as the following statement 
expresses: “I don't think that the JV model is mobilizing people to be excited about agriculture, it just 
makes them wait for their dividend".  
 
A definite limitation of the model is that it is centred on agribusiness directing the production and 
management of the JV farms. The cooperatives are not being sufficiently trained to take over the 
financial management of their farms, which remains quite centralised under Amadlelo Agri though the 
farm trusts. In essence the JV model and its vision of agrarian reform is at risk of equating ‘black 
emerging farmers’ with a group of customary landowners, who are in reality passive recipients of JV 
dividends and jobs. This in general reflects the wider conundrum of the BBBEE programme in South 
Africa. There is a need to re-envision alternative models, which ensure the continued productivity of our 
economy in the long term. This means creating new opportunities for 'accumulation from below', rather 
than only focusing on distributing the value of existing capitals.  
 
There are a number of cases, where customary landowning households are using their dividends to 
reinvest in own-account farming. These households could be potential candidates for accumulation and 
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for establishing productive farming enterprises, alongside the JVs. This could create an impetus towards 
a more fundamental shift in agrarian relations. However, government and agribusiness are not currently 
supporting this potential. A number of limiting factors were identified, in particular, the fact that 
complementarity of land use for the JVs and own-account farming by households has not been 
integrated into the design of the farms, insufficient access to reliable markets and the poor functioning of 
the community cooperatives.  
 
These types of JV 'partnership models' between capital and poorer communities (or in many cases 
workers) aren’t unique to the agricultural sector. They should therefore also be explained within the 
general tendencies of capitalism. Under modern capitalism providing employees, or other ‘vulnerable 
classes’, with equity ownership in a firm has become a global trend. Social or worker ownership is a 
way to deal with the inability of firms to raise wages in a context of economic stagnation (Minns, 1996; 
Sesil et al., 2001).  
 
These types of arrangements can therefore be seen as a compact between the state and capital, to jointly 
manage the threat of labour and political unrest that might arise from falling living standards. In contexts 
like South Africa, which suffers from pervasive unemployment, this is particularly relevant. In many 
ways both the state and agribusiness are aware that arrangements like JVs cannot provide opportunities 
for wealth and capital accumulation among beneficiaries, especially where many households are 
included, as is the case in Shiloh. However, JVs are seen by the state as contributing to social welfare for 
the growing masses of the poor in the former homelands. Thus they fit neatly into the neoliberal, 'social 
safety net' approach of the South African state.  
Impacts on social reproduction, land rights and class relations  
 
The comparative case study reveals that there is evidence of livelihood benefits for local residents, in the 
form of jobs, land rents, dividend payments and some opportunities have emerged for accumulation. 
However, there are also some impacts that could be evaluated as negative for social reproduction, in its 
broadest social, economic and cultural significance. At an obvious level, the divergent outcomes 
between Shiloh and Keiskammahoek are a function of the size of the beneficiary group, and scale of 
production. However, I will also detail a number of other less obvious explanations for the contrasting 
outcomes at these two JV farms. 
 
The formalization of labour processes on the JV farms has allowed households to access formal 
employment, which is a scarce commodity in these areas. Income data presented in Chapters 10 and 11 
for each case study indicated that JV jobs make significant contributions to household incomes. This is 
especially the case among JV wage receiving households, where JV wages in many cases comprise the 
largest and most stable household income source. In Shiloh, the dividend makes a relatively small 
contribution and is used predominantly on household consumption. While at Keiskammahoek the 
dividend makes a significant contribution to household income, and also contributes to the reinvestment 
fund for own-account farming in many of these households.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 293 
 
A Marxist lens is interested with accumulation dynamics in farming, or answering Bernstein's (2010) 
questions of  "who gets what and what do they do with it?" In a minority of cases in Keiskammahoek, 
dividends are contributing to accumulation in own-account farming. However, money is fungible and it 
is not always easy to differentiate benefits from the JV from other income sources. Several authors have 
emphasized the importance of wages and remittances in sustaining agricultural production in the former 
homelands (Murray, 1981; Spiegel, 1986; James, 1985; Beinart, 1982). This continues to be true in the 
case studies investigated. However, barring a few households, incomes generated from these agricultural 
activities remain relatively insignificant, in comparison to other off-farm income sources. Hebinck and 
van Averbeke (2013) have, however, emphasised for other regions of the Ciskei, that agrarian activities 
continue to contribute significantly to household reproduction, in spite of their contribution to monetary 
income being relatively low.  
  
The main benefit deriving to the no JV benefits group is the availability of cheap unpasteurized milk 
from the JV farms and the sale of calves. In both sites this taxonomic group is decidedly worse-off in 
terms of incomes, assets, access to land and other key features of household composition (e.g. they have 
the largest proportion of female-headed households). This seems to indicate that access to benefits from 
the JV may contribute to the more secure livelihoods of the other three taxonomic groups in the sample. 
However, my 'opportunistic sampling' method for the no JV benefits group means I cannot decisively 
assert this. There are also a number of other factors that are difficult to control for, including historic 
processes of class formation, which are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Numerous challenges, weigh heavily on JV benefits. In both sites conceptions of belonging to customary 
and kin groups mediate access to benefits.  Preferential access to jobs for irrigation plot owners and their 
wider kin networks are creating conflict with the wider community. At Keiskammahoek, in reality this 
appears to be more of a ‘perception’ of preferential access, since only 27.5% of the total labour force 
comes from households who also receive dividends. On the contrary, at Shiloh 53% of the labour force 
are dividend and JV wage receiving households. At both case study sites, there are contentions over who 
has the right to labour on the farm, which are permeated with language of belonging and mediated by 
networks of kin and customary groups. There are also notable generational struggles over jobs. 
 
The examples of lost livelihoods and conflicts over JV jobs, presented in Chapters 10 and 11, illustrate 
the difficulties of operating ‘capitalist farming ventures’ in a communal setting where complex social 
networks remain important in mediating access to land, jobs and other resources. Irrigation plot holders 
are under pressure to offer jobs to their kin, while the viability of the farm itself relies on maintaining 
social relations with local residents in surrounding villages. The farm has to navigate these dynamics 
carefully to avoid the risk of alienating different groups, which may pose a risk to its legitimate right to 
use the land. 
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Inter- and intra-household distribution of JV benefits and risks  
 
Investigating inter- and intra-household distribution of JV benefits (and risks) is central to understanding 
impacts of the JV and also the emerging contentions and conflicts. The different social and historical 
characteristics of each case study site, has produced noticeably different intragroup relations and class 
dynamics. In Shiloh, along with membership to customary and kin groups, benefits are mediated by 
alliance to the Mayime Cooperative, the traditional leader and the Moravian Church.  
 
At Keiskammahoek there is decidedly less tension over dividends. However, the relatively larger 
dividends have, in some cases, ignited intra-household conflicts over their distribution, which have 
taken on a particularly gendered character. In some cases the JV has thus had a negative effect on the 
position of women in households, which is discussed in Chapter 10. The rights of Keiskammahoek's 
landowners to their irrigation plots also remains contested by the wider community, who refer to them as 
'settlers', in spite of the private title deeds most households have.  
Poor governance of community cooperatives 
Issues of democratic governance and the character of power and decision-making are particularly 
important in understanding the distribution of risks and benefits, as discussed in Chapter 7. The very 
poor governance of the community cooperatives has produced numerous tensions. This is particularly 
the case in Shiloh, where claims of corruption and mismanagement, regarding the Mayime Cooperative, 
have resulted in intense intragroup conflict and even violence. Access to dividends and jobs are 
somewhat more politicised in Shiloh, as compared to Keiskammahoek. At Keiskammahoek the farm 
operating trust is responsible for hiring labour and distributing dividends, whereas in Shiloh the Mayime 
Cooperative handles these tasks. Poor governance also affects the potential sustainability of the JV 
model, since currently it seems unlikely that either the Mayime Cooperative or Seven Stars Cooperatives 
would be able to run the farming enterprises without Amadlelo Agri in the near future. 
Amadlelo Agri asserts that much of their energies are focused on dealing with the complexities of 
community politics to ensure buy-in, but they appear hesitant to tackle face-on the claims of corruption 
within the Mayime Cooperative. However, without resolving these tensions, and the issue of democratic 
and transparent governance of the cooperatives, the long-term viability of the JVs is uncertain.  
Tensions between social reproduction and capitalist farming 
 
There is the sense that even if governance challenges are addressed, the JV model at Shiloh in particular, 
will still be a mismatch for the reproductive needs of poorer households. This tension is reflected in the 
emerging conflict at Shiloh, over whether all profits should be paid out as dividends to customary 
landowners or saved and reinvested in the cooperative business. Many poorer households are simply 
unwilling to reinvest their meagre dividend payments into building a business, which will reap little 
benefits given the large number of beneficiaries. Capitalist farming thus introduces numerous tensions 
into processes of social reproduction engaged in by socially differentiated households. This is a 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 295 
conclusion that has been made before by other authors, including Manenzhe (2016) regarding JV 
arrangements in Limpopo and Hornby (2016) regarding the operations of CPAs in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
The JV model is designed to operate according to the imperatives of profit inherent to capitalist farming, 
free from concerns of meeting the reproductive demands of poorer households, or of maintaining the 
many social networks that are key to social and cultural life in the communal areas (PLAAS, 2016; 
Berry, 1989). However, this sits uneasily with the realities in which these JVs are being implemented. 
The demands placed on the farm to hire landowner’s kin, and how cooperatives are embroiled in local 
identity politics is also rooted in the complexities of social reproduction. Therefore, there appears to be 
an inherent mismatch between the logic of the JV model and that of social reproduction.  
 
The pressures experienced by differentiated households in their ability to meet social reproduction, is 
central to understanding conflicts over land, jobs and dividends. These tensions do not create as much 
tension in Keiskammahoek, due to on the one hand the larger dividends to satisfy the needs of 
reproduction, and on the other hand the different character of class dynamics among the landowning 
group. At Shiloh, where social differentiation is more intense among the landowners, their reproductive 
needs are more distinct, and conflict is emerging over how dividends should be used by the Mayime 
Cooperative. 
Joint ventures and trajectories of class formation  
 
Another key impact of the JVs is the particular way in which they promote class formation. In Chapter 
12, I present a methodology for exploring class dynamics that brings together Patnaik’s (1989) labour 
exploitation criterion, with other approaches to develop class typologies in the South African context 
(Cousins 2010; Levin et al. 1997), along with my own additions. The results of employing the class 
typology illustrate how in both Shiloh and Keiskammahoek, the local communities in which these JVs 
are being implemented, are socially differentiated along lines of class.  
 
The differences between the class categories are expressed, not only in terms of trends in different forms 
of labour exploitation, but also in terms of reproductive strategies, access to different types of incomes, 
assets and also household composition. The comparative analysis of the class character of each 
settlement in Chapter 12 illustrated how divergent outcomes from the JVs in these two rural settlements 
are most powerfully explained by differences in the class structure of each settlement. A class-based 
typology assists in understanding the tensions that the JV model of capitalist farming generates in 
relation to household reproduction, in a class-differentiated manner.  
 
Class dynamics are, however, not the only ones at work, and are intermeshed with many other 
‘determinations’. Class place is thus complex, contingent and subject to processes of constant change 
(Scoones et al., 2012; Cousins, 2010; Bernstein, 2010). The challenge is in theorizing the ways in which 
class difference relates to other aspects of social difference. Peters (2004) also notes that “differentiation 
takes many forms- including youth against elders, men against women, ethnic and religious 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 296 
confrontations- these also reveal new social divisions that, in sum, can be seen as class formation” 
(p.291). This PhD has thus tried to illustrate how the JV interacts with and impacts on currents of class 
formation, and how class interacts with other aspects of social difference, particularly gender, kinship, 
ethnicity, race, generation and religious affiliation.  
 
In order to understand the heightened levels of intragroup conflict in Shiloh, as compared to 
Keiskammahoek, it is revealing to compare the class structure of those households with access to 
irrigation plots, which is documented in Chapter 12. Clearly in both sites there is differentiation among 
households. However, in Shiloh, this differentiation is more extreme. In particular there are classes like 
petty commodity producers, which make little or no use of wage labour and mostly exploit their own 
family labour. Households identified as supplementary food producers rely considerably on social 
grants, and can thus be considered quite a vulnerable class. In Keiskammahoek, neither of these class 
categories can be identified among households with rights to irrigation plots.  
 
The majority of households in Shiloh are located in the allotment holding worker and worker farmer 
class categories, comprising 74% together. In Shiloh, the rent earning rich farmers and business owners 
are a very small minority, and the rent earning pensioner class category, does not exist. In contrast in 
Keiskammahoek, when these two classes are combined, they account for 57.5% of households with 
irrigation plots. These classes both exploit the labour of others, to an equal or usually greater extent, than 
they exploit their own labour in self-employment. Rent earning pensioners do not sell their labour, and 
rent earning rich farmers and business owners, sell their own labour to a smaller degree than they hire 
in the labour of others. This demonstrates how the predominant dynamics of labour exploitation among 
irrigation plot holders, is vastly different between the two case study sites.  
 
This thesis has also attempted to illustrate how an analysis of historical trajectories of class formation, 
land rights and use, and livelihoods is also central to understanding the impacts of JVs in different 
contexts. This was the explicit focus of Chapter 5 and I have attempted to thread a historical lens 
throughout this thesis. In Keiskammahoek, the historical process of class formation that took place 
during the Ciskei era, among a small group of 35 petty commodity producing households on the 
irrigation scheme is central to understanding contemporary dynamics. They managed to accumulate 
larger parcels of land from their neighbours (many with private title), along with productive assets. For 
landowners in Keiskammahoek, farming their irrigation plots, had remained a central livelihood activity 
up until the JV was implemented in 2010. This fact, along with historical processes of accumulation, can 
in part account for the much larger numbers of rent earning rich farmers and business owners and 
worker farmers, who are engaging extensively in own-account farming. However, access to a larger JV 
dividend also enables a surplus to be reinvested in farming.  
 
This contrasts sharply with Shiloh, where the majority of landowners reported having abandoned 
cropping on the irrigation scheme between 1994 and 1997. The vandalism that took place to the 
irrigation scheme following the liquidation of the Ciskei parastatal, prohibited production on the 
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irrigation scheme in the democratic period, and also created a lingering intragroup conflict. However, 
even during the Ciskei era, much of the land (apart from 17 plots used for commercial dairy farming and 
the food plots) was operated by a 'group farm', and customary landowners received dividends and jobs. 
Therefore the conditions for accumulation found in Keiskammahoek198, were never afforded to the 
customary landowners at Shiloh.  
 
Overall, the comparative analysis of livelihoods presented in Chapters 10 and 11, illustrates that the 
ability of households to meet social reproduction are somewhat more precarious in Shiloh. More 
households in the Shiloh sample live below the poverty line, they have less assets and lower incomes199, 
scarcer access to wage labour, more female-headed households, and generally rely more heavily on 
safety nets like public works jobs and social grants. The wider livelihood portfolio of households and 
character of household composition thus interacts with the JV intervention in complex ways. 
Understanding pressures to household reproduction can also help explain emerging tensions over JV 
benefits.  
 
Historical land use patterns and conflicts and the impacts of the joint ventures 
 
Apart from the different nature of land rights in Shiloh (communal allocations) and Keiskammahoek 
(predominantly private titles and deeds of sale), there are also some important differences in terms of 
how land use has been affected by the JV farms. In Shiloh most landowners have given over the use of 
all of their land to the JV, with a minority maintaining a few quarter hectare food plots. This means that 
most people have the use of communal grazing camps and their small household gardens for own-
account farming, and they do not have access to water from the irrigation scheme. This has limited the 
ability of households in Shiloh to engage in own-account farming to the same extent as households in 
Keiskammahoek.  
 
In contrast, in Keiskammahoek, households had accumulated relatively large plots in the past (of 
between 12 and 20 hectares), and most homes remain located on these plots and are surrounded by 
pastures on the irrigation scheme.200 Many households have maintained plots of around one to two 
hectares for cropping and livestock production. Own-account farming is thus a relatively more important 
livelihood strategy to these households. It is argued that, apart from the very different dynamics of class 
formation in Shiloh and Keiskammahoek, the fact that most households in the latter maintained some 
land on the irrigation scheme to keep livestock and cultivate plots, can in part account for the JVs 
relative success. 
 
                                                 
198 Chapter 5 demonstrated that during the Ciskei era landowning households were also exploited by Ulimocor, and meeting livelihoods was a struggle for 
many of them. Many households had to combine farming with off-farm incomes as well. However, in comparison to Shiloh, the opportunities for 
accumulation in farming and over land and other assets were far more conducive in Keiskammahoek. 
199 Median yearly household income for the sample was R86, 300 in Shiloh and R128, 495 in Keiskammahoek. This would, however, be affected in part by 
the larger dividends received by a portion of the sample in the latter case.  
200 The houses of some farmers had to be removed to make way for the construction of new centre pivots for the irrigation scheme. In these cases they have 
been allocated new houses by the JV, including large household gardens.  
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At both Shiloh and Keiskammahoek there are some noticeable conflicts and contestations around land. 
This creates a challenging context in which the JVs must operate. At Shiloh an on-going land conflict 
from the post-Ciskei era has found a new expression in the context of the JV, because the state has failed 
to address the longstanding claims of 17 dairy farming households, that lost land and dairy animals.  
 
At Shiloh, within the group of irrigation plot owners, the emergence of an 'opposition group', reflects 
another layer of contention over rights to and use of communal plots. This intragroup conflict ultimately 
reflects complex dynamics of class, generation, religion and allegiance to customary groups. The 
heightened tensions around land in Shiloh have historical roots, but the smaller dividends fuel this 
conflict, as do the more intense pressures to social reproduction. These conflicts all have historical roots 
that cannot be understood or explained solely in the contemporary context, as a result of how the JV is 
structured. Intragroup dynamics, which have historical roots extending beyond the implementation of 
the JV intervention, are therefore central to understanding impacts on livelihoods and land rights and 
use. 
The agrarian question of labour: Conflicts over joint ventures reflect a wider crisis of social 
reproduction 
 
Conflicts emerging around the JVs must also be understood within the wider political economy. 
Therefore, an investigation of the local historical context only takes one so far. In this sense, Bernstein’s 
(2011) rendering of the agrarian question of labour compels our attention towards the wider crisis of 
employment under modern capitalism, and how classes of labour battle to meet their simple 
reproduction needs. It is this tension which is often at the core of struggles over land, its use and its 
meaning (Arrighi and Moore, 2001).  
 
Struggles emerging in the countryside, in the face of the types of agricultural investments detailed in this 
PhD thesis, are implicitly therefore also part of broader social and political struggles. These struggles 
take many forms, and it is not always easy to distinguish their class character, because of the ways in 
which classes of labour are fragmented (Bernstein, 2010). How local residents respond to JVs, and the 
seeming failure of some investments to improve livelihoods is thus also a reflection of the wider failings 
of our capitalist economy in general, and in particular the failings of land and agrarian reform to address 
this crisis of reproduction. 
13.3 Conclusions on Political and Policy Lessons: Agrarian Change and Joint Ventures in 
the Communal Areas 
 
So, what are the wider political and policy lessons that can be drawn from these cases of large-scale 
agricultural investments in communal areas? How can this study contribute to understanding processes 
of agrarian change in contemporary South Africa? There are a number of lessons emerging from this 
study. Some of these are relevant at a policy level, or are of interest to academia and advancing a 
research agenda on agrarian studies. Whilst other lessons may concern agribusiness and those 
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implementing development interventions on the ground. Critically, there are also a number of 'political 
lessons' for advancing a progressive politics of land in South Africa.   
Integrating a class-analytics approach into agrarian reform policy 
 
A central lesson emerging from this study is that the outcomes and impacts associated with JVs, or other 
agricultural investment models, cannot be fully understood without a comprehensive understanding of 
class and other dynamics of social differentiation. Social differentiation and the varying reproductive 
needs of 'beneficiary communities' must be thoroughly understood before agricultural models or 
investments are designed. The unfortunate reality for policy makers and implementers is that it is naive 
to assume that a single model of agricultural investment can be uniformly implemented across the 
communal areas to produce the same results.  
 
Interventions should also have a wider political agenda in mind, in regards to the character of agrarian 
reform desired and the underlying class relations that tend to generate these changes. For example, the 
question of whether we should be promoting ‘accumulation from below’ among differentiated 
smallholders on irrigation schemes (Cousins 2015; Aliber and Hall 2012; Scoones et al. 2012; Pellizzoli, 
2009), in place of the JV model that involves customary landowners primarily as workers and 
shareholders. 
 
This PhD thesis has explored the question, of how a 'class lens' can assist in understanding the impacts 
of JVs on on-going dynamics of agrarian change, and the challenge of transforming relations of land, 
labour and capital in South Africa’s former homelands. The failure of both policy and research to 
adequately investigate and understand incipient class formation has meant that residents in the former 
'homelands' are assumed to be a fairly homogenous class of proletarians or semi-proletarians (Levin and 
Neocosmos 1989). Although these debates have progressed, and some detailed studies have 
endeavoured to highlight dynamics of class and other aspects of social differentiation (Levin et al. 1997; 
Cousins 2010/3), dynamics of class formation in the former 'homelands' continue to be somewhat 
misunderstood today.   
 
As discussed above, in Shiloh the many intragroup conflicts that have emerged around the JV farm, 
reflect the realities of a highly differentiated community and a context where household reproduction is 
under more extreme pressure. The case of Shiloh provides a precursory warning, regarding the 
implementation of capital-intensive agricultural investments like JVs within large beneficiary groups in 
communal areas. This is particularly the case where there is intense contestation over land rights, pre-
existing intragroup conflict, and high levels of poverty and unemployment. The tensions that capitalist 
farming introduces and the contradictions it poses to the social reproduction of poorer households, can in 
part explain the emerging conflicts and the limited benefits that the JV has had for local livelihoods. In 
cases like Shiloh, I'm inclined to conclude that the production of agricultural commodities that require 
less capital investment, and which are better suited to smallholder production (labour absorbing 
commodities), would provide better benefits for these communities. 
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Debates around the extent of social differentiation in the former homelands are important precisely 
because they have implications for the types of pathways we imagine for agrarian reform. The solitary 
focus on JVs, has excluded other possible ways of organising production, to meet a variety of contexts 
and the diverse reproductive needs of households. At the same time, however, this does not mean that 
JVs are inappropriate in all contexts. Rather, closer attention is required on more appropriately crafting 
solutions to meet the realities of diverse 'communities'.  
 
For example, in Keiskammahoek where you have a group of elder landowners, whose younger kin are 
on the most part engaged in off-farm businesses and employed in nearby cities, the JV model may be a 
more appropriate fit for the generational and household characteristics of the landowners. Dairy farming 
also represents continuity with the previous use of land on this scheme. Although some contend, as 
Laker (2016) does, that "Keiskammahoek should never have been put under pastures for dairy cows. 
With its high potential soils it should have been under high value cash crops”.  
 
With due regard to the context of South Africa, JVs must also be evaluated on their ability to contribute 
to transformation of the country's agrarian structure (Bitzer and Bijman, 2014). The class typology, 
detailed in Chapter 12, is significant because it speak to the type of emerging agrarian structure that a JV 
intervention conditions. This has important implications for debates around agrarian change in South 
Africa.  
 
Significantly, this study could not identify any households as 'middle farmers'. This contrasts to research 
conducted by Scoones et al. (2012: 503) in Zimbabwe, for example, which identified a dynamic middle 
farmer class category, 'reliant on 'accumulation' from below' through petty commodity production'. 
Cousins' (2013a) research on Msinga, has likewise illustrated that smallholder irrigation schemes in 
South Africa, where plots are being used for own-account farming, can provide conducive conditions for 
establishing a class of middle farmers. Many authors consider accumulation from below to be a more 
progressive, dynamic and desirable pathway of agrarian reform (Cousins 2015; Aliber and Hall 2012; 
Scoones et al. 2012). The JV model does not, however, seem to provide the conditions for establishing 
such a class category of accumulating middle farmers.  
 
I also could not find evidence of the emergence of small-scale capitalist farmers, as identified in 
Cousins’ (2010) typology. However, it could be argued that some of the black JV farm managers could 
be viewed as small-scale capitalist farmers. A few have begun accumulating cattle, which they rent out 
to the JV and other commercial dairy farms, providing significant passive incomes. One male manager 
had also become a '10 % sharemilker' and is remunerated according to a 10 % share of the farm’s profit, 
rather than a set salary. Amadlelo’s model does therefore seem to be facilitating the entrance of new 
black farm managers, into a dairy sector dominated by white commercial farmers and managers. 
However, benefits to this class, need to be evaluated in relation to benefits to households that hold land 
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rights to irrigation plots. Notably, apart from one junior manager at Shiloh, none of the managers are 
from among the customary landowners, who are involved predominantly as shareholders and workers.  
 
The relative success of Amadlelo Agri's training and mentoring programme for black farm managers and 
sharemilkers, raises questions around whether this particular aspect could be more effectively 
implemented in different ways, and in other parts of the land reform programme. Clearly, there are 
mismatches between their sharemilking model and the contextual realities of some rural settlements in 
the communal areas of the former homeland. However, perhaps an adaption of the model could serve 
BBBEE and land and agrarian reform in other ways. I would suggest that there are two contexts in 
which their sharemilking model could be more suitably employed outside the communal areas of the 
former homelands. 
 
Firstly, it could be implemented in the context of the land reform programme. However, it should target 
only very small beneficiary groups, so that adequate dividends can be generated to allow for 
accumulation. Black farm managers, graduating through Amadlelo Agri's programme, could impart 
skills to land reform beneficiaries, providing the possibility for them to run the business on their own in 
the future, should they chose to, or continue a sharemilking arrangement if preferred. If their programme 
intentionally targeted existing market-oriented smallholders, it would be easier to provide the right 
conditions for small-scale black capitalist farmers to flourish through 'accumulation from below'. Farm 
workers, with existing skills in the dairy sector, would also be obvious candidates for this model. In 
some cases, it could also work in relation to claimant groups of pensioners, who are unable to undertake 
or supervise farming, as is largely the case in Keiskammahoek.  
 
Secondly, Chapter 8 revealed that there are some agribusiness firms that are currently sharemilking with 
white landowners. These share contracts are commonly made with white dairy farmers who are ‘in 
distress’, due to competitive pressures, poor management and lack of capital. Perhaps this could be an 
opportunity for Amadlelo Agri's black farm managers, who could sharemilk on existing white dairy 
farms. However, in order to legitimise these investments on white-owned land, there should be existing 
fixed asset, as these couldn't be justifiably provided by state grants201. This could provide a way for the 
sharemilking model to make use of existing assets, rather than diverting large sums of ReCap grants to 
establish costly dairy farms from scratch, which offer little benefits in the context of large beneficiary 
groups in the former homelands.  
 
This model should also entail agreements for black sharemilkers to graduate to owner-operators. Since it 
takes around 4-5 years to settle down a dairy farm, sharemilking might provide a way to avoid 
burdening emerging capitalist farmers with the risks entailed in maintaining both the fixed and movable 
assets from the onset. Since it is clear that there are already many white dairy farmers in distress, who 
are exiting the industry, this may provide as of yet unexplored potential for the entrance of successful 
black capitalist dairy farmers. I do acknowledge that this approach has limited scope in terms of 
                                                 
201 Although in some cases, where future hand over of the farm has been agreed, state grants for upgrading of assets could be justified. 
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numbers of beneficiaries reached. However, given the realities of South Africa's extremely competitive 
and concentrated dairy industry, which is dominated by large-scale capitalist farmers, dairy is simply not 
the sector that can realistically provide opportunities for a large number of market-oriented small-scale 
farmers to accumulate from below.  
Joint ventures and agrarian reform: Broadening out the range of models to suit diverse contexts 
 
There is also the necessity of being pragmatic in certain contexts, and seeking to do the best to support 
livelihoods given the constraints of the capitalist economy, rather than disregarding JVs purely on 
ideological grounds. In some cases of restitution and redistribution, where farms produce high value 
export crops (e.g. horticultural farms in Limpopo), it may be justifiable that government opts not to 
destroy what are profitable existing enterprises that have the potential to support much needed jobs 
(Davies, 2014, Manenzhe, 2016). However, research has also illustrated that these JVs have struggled to 
produce benefits for local residents and more should be done to secure complementary livelihoods 
alongside JV production (Manenzhe, 2018; Lahiff et al., 2012). However, on the most part, this is not 
the case in the former homelands, where many of these irrigation schemes have fallen into total or 
partial disrepair, as was the case in Shiloh and Keiskammahoek. Therefore the context of the former 
homelands, rather, requires interventions that more closely fit the reproductive demands of differentiated 
communities.  
 
Opening up and broadening out the range of possible pathways is suggested here, in which JVs may be 
one possibility, among a range of other production models, particularly differentiated small-scale 
farming systems (see Cousins 2010/3; Aliber and Hall 2012). Land use may be reorganised in some 
cases, to allow for the complementarity of a large-scale JV or other model, alongside land reserved for 
household production in which producers are adequately supported (Manenzhe, 2016).  
 
It is argued that, apart from the very different dynamics of class formation in Shiloh and 
Keiskammahoek, the fact that most households in the latter maintained some land on the irrigation 
scheme to keep livestock and cultivate household gardens, can in part account for its relative success. 
Given the evidence in this thesis that there is interest among landowning households in investing 
dividends in own-account farming, more could be done by Government and Amadlelo Agri to support 
these activities alongside the JV. Particularly, improving the governance of the primary and secondary 
cooperatives and securing access to markets, which appear to be the main constraints in expanding their 
household farming operations. 
Equitable distribution of benefits in sharemilking JVs 
 
Even where it is deemed that a sharemilking JV or a mixed-model is suitable, there are still some issues 
of concern that should be addressed regarding the equitable distribution of investments and benefits 
from sharemilking JV arrangements.  As discussed in Chapter 8, the New Zealand 50/50 sharemilking 
model delineates much more carefully between the landowner costs and the sharemilkers costs in the 
dairy farming operation. In New Zealand it is the milk income that is shared, whereas in Amadlelo 
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Agri's model the profits are shared. In essence, this difference comes down to a clear separation of the 
maintenance costs of each party's assets (NZDairy, 2016; Gardner, 2011; du Faur, 1997). This 
separation has been blurred in Amadlelo Agri's 50/50 sharemilking model, with important implications 
for the ‘fairness’ of the model and return on investment for the beneficiary communities.  
 
The analysis in Chapter 8, of the relative return on investment accruing to the 'sharemilker' and the 
'landowners' in Amadlelo's 50/50 sharemilking contract as compared to New Zealand's model, revealed 
that the latter model would be of more benefit to customary landowners. Strictly separating the 
maintenance of the fixed assets of the landowners (Mayime and Seven Stars Cooperatives) and the 
movable assets of the sharemilker (Amadlelo Agri), appears to be a more beneficial way to structure a 
sharemilk contract, from the viewpoint of the customary landowners. There are already examples of the 
New Zealand 50/50 sharemilking model being implemented in its original formulation, in the context of 
land reform in South Africa. A proposed focus of future research would be a comparative analysis of the 
model used by Grasslands Agriculture at their Schoonfontein sharemilking farm and the Amadlelo Agri 
model.  
 
Dairy farming and land and agrarian reform  
 
The volatile and highly competitive nature of the dairy industry has shaped the type of large-scale JV 
sharemilking arrangements that are emerging in the communal areas of South Africa. Restructuring and 
liberalisation of the dairy sector and the specific nature of dairy as an agricultural commodity, which is 
particularly amenable to technological innovations and capital-intensive methods, has resulted in 
extreme competition between producers. Scale of production is necessary to survive the competitive 
pressures of the dairy sector in South Africa and since 1994 we have witnessed a drastic reduction in the 
number of dairy producers. This specific nature of the industry must be considered when coming up 
with new avenues for black emerging farmers to enter the dairy sector, and also when asking the 
question of whether dairy is the right commodity for land and agrarian reform given the volatility of the 
sector. 
 
The National Development Plan (2011) identified dairy as an agricultural commodity with relatively 
high growth potential, but with a limited capacity to absorb labour, given high levels of mechanization. 
Alternative commodities have been identified which have high-growth potential and importantly absorb 
more labour, since they are less ameliorable to mechanisation (see figure 16). In contexts like the former 
homelands, where there is a high demand for jobs, we should be considering some of these labour-
intensive alternatives where smallholders could be more competitive, such as subtropical fruits and nuts, 
vegetables, sugar and livestock production on communal rangelands. 
 
What about smallholder dairy farming as an alternative to JVs between communal landowners and 
strategic partners? Do the case studies, detailed in Chapter 6, of successful smallholder dairy farming 
elsewhere on the continent like Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, or further afield in India, provide 
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applicable lessons for South Africa? Unfortunately, reality seems to demand that even proponents of 
smallholder models need to pragmatically consider whether there is a future for dairy smallholders in 
South Africa (Midgley, 2016; Mkhabela and Mndeme, 2010; Muriuki and Thorpe, 2001). Without a 
significant shift in the way government supports and protects the dairy sector, the review of the South 
African dairy sector, undertaken in Chapter 6, indicates that a smallholder dairy programme would set 
up customary landowners to fail.  
 
Alternatives to JV arrangements in the former 'homelands' 
 
An alternative way of organising production on irrigation schemes in the former homelands, would be 
promoting a successful smallholder sector. However, pathways of accumulation for smallholders are 
also clearly limited by the particularities of agrarian change in South Africa. Especially important 
factors to consider are the competitive agricultural sector, which is dominated by large-scale producers, 
processes of deagrarianisation, and a history of expropriation. This means there is more widespread 
dependence on wage labour in South Africa's rural areas (and particularly in the former homelands), 
than in other parts of the continent (Cousins, 2015; Bernstein, 1996/ 2011b). 
 
 Extreme poverty in the communal areas and dependence on wage labour, means local residents may not 
have been engaged in farming for some time. Since Africans have been historically marginalised in the 
agriculture sector, concerns have abounded regarding the 'viability' of supporting a differentiated small 
to medium-scale sector of black farmers. This has led to the belief that promoting equity ownership of 
existing farms and other agricultural enterprises, alongside secure employment, is more pragmatic 
(Cousins and Scoones 2010; Davis 2014). There is, however, evidence to suggest that smallholders are 
succeeding in spite of these challenges (Aliber and Hall, 2012; Cousins, 2013). A model based on 
providing a supportive system for smallholder production may work as an alternative to JVs, however, it 
is unlikely that dairy is the right commodity to promote in many cases. 
 
In the context of market-oriented smallholder farmers, Cousins (2015) particularly suggests that we 
should consider 'labour-intensive fresh produce on irrigation schemes’ and ‘indigenous goats and cattle 
on communal rangelands’. Providing secure markets for horticultural crops would be key. For example, 
government could secure access to markets like schools, hospitals and prisons, and smallholders could 
leverage a mix of formal and informal markets. Such a programme could target smallholders already 
engaged in production, particularly those 200, 000 identified by Aliber and Hall, (2012). In cases where 
market-oriented smallholders have rights to communal plots on irrigation schemes in the former 
homelands, and where JVs are deemed to be an inappropriate solution for agrarian reform, this could be 
a viable alternative. 
It is ironic that in the context of the communal areas, and particularly on irrigation schemes where 
existing land rights are overwhelmingly characterized by access to small plots of land, well suited to 
smallholder production, the government should still opt to consolidate people’s land into large group 
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farms. This results in establishing huge groups of beneficiaries represented by single entities. Experience 
with CPAs, trusts and cooperatives in South Africa’s land reform programme, have to date proven that 
these entities face extreme challenges and are seldom successful (Cousins and Walker, 2015; DAFF, 
2012; CLS, 2015202; Clark and Luwaya, 2017; PLAAS, 2016).   
In Averbeke et al.’s (1998) study of several smallholder irrigation schemes, they concluded:  “food plots 
have been one of the relatively successful aspects of irrigation scheme development in central Eastern 
Cape”. Some food plots in Shiloh have now been incorporated under the JV farm. However, Averbeke 
et al.’s (1998) findings beg the question of whether there could be better livelihood outcomes deriving 
from these food plots if household production was promoted alongside the JV intervention, rather than 
incorporating them as part of the land farmed by the JV.  
 
However, as discussed above, even within a rural settlement, households are socially differentiated. 
Therefore devising suitable alternative models for organizing land rights and use would need to be 
crafted to the specific reproductive needs of households in different contexts. For example, whether land 
is required to substitute reproduction (through food plots), or whether access to larger plots is required to 
allow for a surplus to be sold and for farming to play a major part in a household’s livelihood and 
potentially allow for accumulation. Averbeke et al. (1998) advise the following regarding the size of 
plots on irrigation schemes, (although this would need to be qualified by the type of crops being 
produced): 
“Whereas food plot schemes appear to be a suitable model of introducing irrigation on land held 
under communal tenure, it is not recommended for settlement schemes. The size of standard food 
plots (0, 25ha or less) is just too small to make irrigated agriculture a viable livelihood option. 
From the study it appeared that a minimum plot size of 2ha is required in order for agriculture to 
become the main source of income for farming households”. 
Then there is also the question of land for what purpose i.e. grazing or crop production? As Chapter 12 
indicated, a number of worker farmer households, in both sites, are engaging extensively in livestock 
production. For many, this is easier to combine with wage employment because households members 
may be absent for long periods. In cases where customary landowners fall into the category of 
supplementary food producers, discussed in Chapter 12, what strategies are viable? South Africa has 
limited agriculturally productive land and water rights, and thus we must ask the difficult question of 
who the beneficiaries of land and agrarian reform should be, and how we can best support differentiated 
producers. Aliber and Hall (2012) identify three viable strategies. Firstly, focusing on promoting food 
security for a large number of poor households. Secondly, providing opportunities for a select few 
better-off farmers to graduate to commercial farmers, which they refer to as ‘accumulation for the few’. 
Finally, a much more radical programme of ‘accumulation from below’, whereby a large number of the 
existing population of subsistence and smallholders are supported to maximise and diversify their 
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production to develop into ‘sustainable commercial smallholders’. It is the latter proposal, which they 
promote.  
 
Obviously the context of the communal areas differs from the land redistribution and restitution 
programmes, which aim to redistribute water and land rights, and thus the types of viable production 
models will also differ. Market-oriented smallholders in the former homelands should, however, also be 
the targets of these programmes. This would go some way towards depopulating available agricultural 
land in these areas (Cousins and Walker, 2015; Aliber and Hall, 2012). Within the current constraints, in 
contexts like Shiloh, where there are a large number of households owning small plots (between a 1/4 to 
1 hectare), predominantly promoting food security, alongside some opportunities for selling a small 
surplus, may be what is viable. Opportunities for accumulation in farming for some households might be 
greater in livestock farming, due to limited land available on irrigation schemes.  
 
We also need to be realistic about the role that land and agrarian reform can feasibly play in addressing 
the crisis of social reproduction which poorer households in South Africa's communal areas face 
(Bernstein, 2011b/2013; Cousins, 2015). As Bernstein (2013) asserts, what is needed to improve the 
wellbeing of South Africa’s rural and urban classes of labour is a much broader and “radical political 
and macroeconomic project centred on public investment and redistribution”. Improving access to off-
farm jobs will be central to this strategy. The vast majority of people in the former homelands rely on 
wages, remittances and social grants to meet their reproduction (Neves and du Toit, 2013; Walker and 
Cousins, 2015). 
 
Lessons emerging from this thesis for future research 
 
This PhD provides some general insights for future research. The sole focus of much of the literature on 
agricultural investments has been on relationships between agribusiness, and what are too often 
portrayed as homogenous communities. However, this PhD thesis has illustrated that this approach is 
misleading of the real politics on the ground.  Struggles over jobs, dividends and land take place within 
highly differentiated communities. Understanding how dynamics of class and other aspects of social 
differentiation play out in the context of agricultural investments is key to understanding their 
significance for agrarian change.  
 
To understand the impacts of JV-type interventions on livelihoods, land rights and agrarian change, the 
level of analysis required is multiple. It requires grappling with complex realities and overlapping causal 
factors to bring together form and content (Harvey, 2010). Relevant emphases of analysis should be 
moulded to suit different contexts. Some of the many key dynamics that have together helped to build 
the rich picture of social reality presented in this thesis include: a focus on class dynamics inherent to a 
specific social relation of production (sharemilking joint ventures), intragroup conflicts and historical 
trajectories of social differentiation, and relationships between different social groups and the state. All 
of these factors are moreover embedded in specific historical contexts, but are equally conditioned by a 
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wider political economy and the capitalist mode of production. It is only in understanding the broader 
'political economy', in which specific JV interventions are inserted, that we can understand how they 
interact with a complex set of social realties to produce certain outcomes in different contexts.  
 
The focus of research should be on understanding this complexity, and how agricultural investments are 
reorganising social, economic and cultural life and work, and the means by which communities 
reproduce themselves in a full set of social relations. It is the task of research to bring these numerous 
and complex levels of analysis together to form "a rich totality of many determinations and relations” 
(Marx, 1973: 100). Embracing complexity is the only means by which we can offer adequate 
explanations for the impacts of agricultural investments on livelihoods and land rights and use, and 
begin to comprehend their significance for agrarian change. 
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Appendix 
 
1. Livelihood Survey: Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire Number:     
 
Category of respondent’s household: 
(landowner/labourer/ other community) 
 
Name of respondent  
Name of Joint Venture Project:  
Village name:  
Ward number:   
Municipality and district:  
Name by which household is known:  
Cellphone number of respondent:  
 
Particulars of visit to the household: 
Number of visits Date Time started Time finished 
First visit    
Second visit    
Third visit    
 
Hello, our names are Brittany Bunce and Welcome Nelo. Brittany is a PhD student at the University of the 
Western Cape and Welcome is the research assistant and translator. We have no links to the government or any 
company. The purpose of this survey is to understand people’s livelihoods and land use in this area. The interview 
will focus on your family history, income sources, agricultural activities and land use. If you agree to participate 
please be advised that I will not mention your name in the results of this study as to maintain confidentiality at all 
times.  Your information will be compiled with hundreds of other households in this area. Your participation in 
this research is entirely voluntary, which means that you are free to decide not to participate. You may also 
choose not to answer particular questions that are asked. If there is anything that you would prefer not to discuss, 
please feel free to say so. The interview will take about an hour. Since I am a student I must warn you that there is 
no payment for taking part in the study.  
 
• Do you have any queries about the study? Are you available and interested in taking part in this study? 
• We would like to interview one member of this household but that member should know and be able to 
share relevant information about the household and of the people living here. Who can we interview? 
• Would you prefer to be interviewed in English or Xhosa? 
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A. Codes Table 1: for Household Structure Model (DO NOT READ OUT!) 
 
 (A4) How is this person 
related to you  
 (A5) What is this 
person’s marital status? 
 (A6) Highest level of 
education attained?  
 (A7) How many nights a week is 
this person present in the 
household? 
1 Self 1 Never been married 1 No schooling 1 Present most or all nights 
2 Husband/wife/ partner 2 Married  2 Some primary 2 Present during working days but 
away most weekends 
3 My child 3 Co-habiting 3 Completed primary 3 Present during weekends but away 
most working days 
4 Adopted/ foster child 4 Other form of marriage/ 
partnership (describe)- 
Husband, wife or partner 
still alive 
4 Some secondary 4 Present about once a month 
5 Partner’s child 5 Divorced 5 Grade 12/ Standard 10 5 Present for one or two periods in the 
year 
6 Grandchild 6 Separated/ Abandoned 6 Post-school training/ 
technical certificate 
6 Present during school or work 
holidays 
7 Parent 7 Widowed 7 University degree 7 Other (describe) 
8 Step parent 
9 Grandparent 
10 Sibling 
11 Partner’s sibling 
12 Own niece/nephew 
13 Partner’s niece/nephew 
14 Cousin 
15 Partner’s cousin 
16 Uncle or aunt 
17 Partner’s uncle or aunt 
18 Tenant 
19 Domestic worker 
20 Other (describe) 
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A. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE MODEL  
 
Name of household head: _________________________________________________ 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 
Name What sex were 
you/ household 
member 
assigned at 
birth? 
Age 
 
How is this 
Person Related 
To You? 
(USE CODE) 
What is this 
person’s 
marital 
status? 
(USE CODE) 
Highest level 
of education 
attained?  
(USE CODE) 
How many 
nights a 
week is this 
person in the 
household? 
(USE 
CODE) 
Comments? 
F M other 
1. 
 
1 2 3       
2. 
 
1 2 3       
3. 
 
1 2 3       
4. 
 
1 2 3       
5. 
 
1 2 3       
6. 
 
1 2 3       
7. 
 
1 2 3       
8. 
 
1 2 3       
9. 
 
1 2 3       
10. 
 
1 2 3       
11. 
 
1 2 3       
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Comments: 
 
 
 
12. 
 
1 2 3       
13. 
 
1 2 3       
14. 
 
1 2 3       
15. 
 
1 2 3       
16. 
 
1 2 3       
17. 
 
1 2 3       
18. 
 
1 2 3       
19. 
 
1 2 3       
20. 
 
1 2 3       
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B. Code table 2: For Income Sources of Household Members 
Code Types of Income Source 
1 Employee on the joint venture (permanent job) 
2 Employee on the joint venture (non-permanent job/ contract/seasonal job) 
3 Employee in other agricultural job (permanent job)  
4 Employee in other agricultural job (non-permanent job)  
5 Employee in non-agricultural private sector job (permanent job) 
6 Employee in non-agricultural private sector job (non-permanent job) 
7 Civil servant 
8 Ward councillor or other political position 
9 Traditional leadership (chief, nkosana etc.) 
10 Farming activities on household’s land  
11 Non-agricultural own/family income-earning activity 
12 Gathering fire wood and other natural resources  
13 Work on income generating project with NGO 
14 Work on EPWP or CWP (not including JV jobs paid by EPWP) 
15 Old age grant  
16 Civil servant pension 
17 Pension from private employer 
18 Disability grant 
19 Child support grant 
20 Foster Care Grant 
21 Remittances  (from household members working elsewhere) in cash 
22 Remittances in kind (food, clothes etc.) 
23 Transfers in cash (from people who have established separate households) 
24 Transfers in kind 
25 Gifts 
26 Other (Specify) 
 
 
Note: Probe using list of possible income sources, once respondent has finished. It’s especially important to find out if there is a household 
member working on the JV or in case respondent doesn’t consider an activity to be important enough to mention 
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B. INCOME SOURCES OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS IN THE LAST YEAR 
 (In description*: include detail on nature of income sources e.g. type of job, position employed in, economic sector, where it is located etc.) 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 
 Name of 
household 
member  
Income source 1 Income source 2 Income source 3 
Cod
e 
Description Cod
e 
Description Cod
e 
Description 
1  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Income 
Amount:……………./month 
    
 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
3  
 
 
 
 
      
4  
 
 
 
 
      
5  
 
 
 
 
      
6  
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7  
 
 
    
 
 
 
  
8  
 
 
      
 B1 B2 B3 B4 
 Name of 
household 
member 
Income source 4 Income source 5 Income source 6 
Cod
e 
Description Cod
e 
Description Cod
e 
Description 
1  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
3  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
4  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
5  
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6  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
7  
 
 
      
 
 
 
8  
 
 
      
 
 
Comments on income sources:  
(Gendered & generational nature of household income; PCP production?; Capital/ labour relations etc.) 
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C. LAND USED BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD IN THE PAST YEAR 
• What types of land does this household have? (Include land not adjacent to the household) 
 C.1 
 
C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 C.7 C.8 
Type of 
land 
Does 
the 
househo
ld have 
this 
type of 
land? 
 
In what 
year was 
this land 
first 
acquired 
by the 
household
?  
How was the land first 
acquired? 
(e.g. inheritance, 
allocated by traditional 
leader etc & to determine 
whether PTO, quitrent, 
freehold etc). 
Has the land 
been used 
by the 
household in 
the last 
year?  
If yes, what is the land 
used for?  
If no, in 
what year 
was this 
land last 
used?  
If no why hasn’t 
the land been 
used in the last 
year? 
Ye
s 
No Yes No 
1 Residentia
l 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1    1 2    
2 Garden 
plots 
within or 
adjacent 
to 
household 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
3 Communit
y Garden  
 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
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4 Fields 
(including 
land given 
to JV 
farm?) 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
5 Irrigation 
scheme 
plot 
(including 
land given 
to JV 
farm?) 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
6 Other 
project 
garden 
plot (NGO 
or Govt) 
 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
7 Additional 
land 
reform 
land 
 
(including 
land given 
to JV?) 
1 2   1 2    
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8 Grazing 
land 
(including 
land given 
to JV?) 
Communit
y Garden 
 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
9 Other 
(specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
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D. ADDITIONAL LAND BASED QUESTIONS: DISPOSAL, RENTING AND LENDING OF LAND 
 
 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 
Type of land use Yes  No Size of 
land? 
What was the land 
used for 
previously? 
Is compensation received for the 
land and how much? 
Comments? 
 
Yes No Amount Frequency203 
1. Have you/ or a member of this 
household ever rented or lent land to 
someone else? 
 
 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
2. Have you/ or a member of this 
household ever borrowed land from 
someone else? 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
3. Have you/ or a member of this 
household ever sold land to someone 
else? 
 
 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
4. Have you/ or a member of this 
household ever bought land from 
someone else? 
 
 
 
1 2   1 2    
                                                 
203 Monthly, yearly, quarterly, once-off? 
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E. CROPS GROWN BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD IN THE LAST YEAR 
(Note! only refer to land you know the household has: refer to table C) 
 
 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
 Type of land Crop type 
1 
Amount 
Harvested 
(Specify 
measure 
e.g. bag, 
bucket) 
Crop type 
2 
Amount 
Harvested 
Crop type 
3 
Amount 
Harvested 
Crop type 
4 
Amount 
Harvested 
1 Garden plots within 
household 
 
 
        
2 Irrigation scheme plot 
 
 
 
        
3 Fields 
 
 
 
        
4 Community Garden 
 
 
        
5 Other project garden 
plot (NGO or Govt) 
 
 
        
6 Additional land 
reform land 
 
 
        
7 Other (specify)         
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8  
 
 
        
9  
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 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
 Type of land Crop type 
5 
Amount 
Harvested 
Crop type 
6 
Amount 
Harvested 
Crop type 
7 
Amount 
Harvested 
Crop type 
8 
Amount 
Harvested 
1 Garden plots within 
household 
 
 
        
2 Irrigation scheme plot 
 
 
 
        
3 Fields 
 
 
 
        
4 Community Garden 
 
 
 
        
5 Other project garden 
plot (NGO or Govt) 
 
 
        
6 Additional land 
reform land 
 
 
        
7 Other (specify) 
 
 
        
8  
 
 
        
9  
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F. CROPS SOLD BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD IN THE LAST YEAR 
F.1 F.2 F.3 F.4 F.5 
Crop type Amount sold (include 
measure e.g. bag, 
bucket etc.) 
Cash Received Purchaser Comments 
1. 
 
 
 
    
2. 
 
 
 
    
3. 
 
 
 
    
4. 
 
 
 
    
5. 
 
 
 
    
6. 
 
 
 
    
7. 
 
 
 
    
8. 
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G. LIVESTOCK OWNED BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD IN THE LAST YEAR 
• What livestock are owned by members of this household? (Include animals owned but kept elsewhere) 
 G1. G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 
 Type of 
livestock 
Number 
owned 
now 
Number 
owned a 
year ago 
Sales in 
the last 
year 
Cash 
received 
Purchaser? Which household 
member owns these 
animals? (gender) 
Comments  
1 Cattle 
 
 
     1 
2 
3 
 
2 Goats 
 
 
     1 
2 
3 
 
3 Pigs 
 
 
     1 
2 
3 
 
4 Sheep 
 
 
     1 
2 
3 
 
5 Chickens 
 
 
     1 
2 
3 
 
6 Ducks 
 
 
     1 
2 
3 
 
7 Horses 
 
 
     1 
2 
3 
 
8 Donkeys 
 
     1 
2 
3 
 
9 Other 
(specify) 
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H. DURABLE GOODS AND PRODUCTIVE ASSETS OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 
H1 DOMESTIC  
(& weighting 1,2,3) 
H2 H3 H4 H5. TOTAL 
[multiplied by the 
weighting (3,2,1)] 
Does the 
household have? 
Number owned? In working order  
Yes (1) No (2) Yes No DOMESTIC 
DURABLE 
1.  Solar Panel (1)       
2.  Paraffin stove (1)      
3. Microwave  (2)      
4. Gas stove  (2)       
5. Electric stove (2)      
6. Fridge/ freezer (2)      
7. Sewing Machine (2)      
8. Washing Machine (3)      
9. Electric generator (3)      
10. Lounge suite/ couch (3)      
ELECTRONIC/ 
COMMUNICATION 
    ELECTRONIC/ 
COMMUNICATI
ON 
11. Radio (1)       
12. CD Player (1)       
13. Television (1)      
14. DVD Player (2)      
15. Home phone line (2)      
16. Mobile phone without 
contract (2) 
     
17. Mobile phone with 
contract (3) 
     
18. Computer (3)      
TRANSPORT TRANSPORT 
19. Bicycle (1)       
20. Motorcycle (2)       
21. Car  (3)      
23.Truck (3)      
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AGRICULTURAL AGRICULTURAL 
Large Agricultural Assets 
24. Tractor (3)       
25. Water tank (3)      
26. Water pump (3)      
27. Plough (3)      
Medium Agricultural Assets 
28. Wheelbarrow (2)      
29. Knapsack sprayer (2)      
30. Donkey/ ox cart (2)      
Small Agricultural Assets 
31. Garden spade (1)      
32. Garden fork (1)      
33. Hoe (1)      
34. Other (specify) 
 
     
35. Other (specify 
 
     
 
Comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That is the end of the interview. Thank you for taking the time to sharing your story with us.  
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